



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NUMBER ONE

WINTER 1967

The American Negro College

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS AND DAVID RIESMAN

Education and Community

FRED M. NEWMAN AND DONALD W. OLIVER

The Education Industries: A Discussion

PAUL GOODMAN, GERALD HOLTON,
DONALD W. OLIVER, G. HOWARD GOOLD,
EDWARD KATZENBACH

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Considering contemporary Negro colleges in the light of their historical background, the authors discuss the roles of these colleges and possibilities for change. Concluding that few major changes are likely, within traditional frameworks, they suggest alternate new roles for some of these colleges.

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS

Institute for Policy Studies

DAVID RIESMAN

Harvard University

The American Negro College*

Although there are important ideological and political differences between colleges founded to serve Negroes and those founded to serve white ethnic and religious minorities, Negro colleges today face many of the same dilemmas as these white institutions. To the extent that Negroes seek entry into a racially integrated, national society, they will tend to seek out colleges which provide anticipatory socialization for such life. Some traditionally Negro colleges will try to provide this socialization by attracting white students and becoming indistinguishable from other institutions of higher learning. Most, unable to attract whites, will remain overwhelmingly Negro for the foreseeable future. Such colleges will educate mostly Negroes who will work behind the wall of segregation. Although these institutions are likely to survive, and indeed to educate a substantial proportion of all Negro undergradu-

* We are indebted to the Carnegie Corporation for support of part of our work on Negro colleges. We are also indebted to Richard Balzer of VISTA; Elias Blake of Educational Projects, Inc.; Ernst Borinski of Tougaloo College; John Ehle of Winston-Salem, N.C.; Leonard Fein of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; John Hope Franklin of the University of

ates, they are also likely to remain academically inferior institutions. Even so, there may be more desirable, if less probable, alternative futures for these marginal Negro colleges.

I. NEGROES IN AMERICA

Few who write about the conditions of American Negro life can entirely escape the racist assumptions which are so much a part of American culture. This applies to Negroes as well as whites. Nor can such writers escape the fact that oppression corrupts the oppressed as well as the oppressors. Many features of Negro life are extremely ugly, and are made no more beautiful by the knowledge that they are by-products of white prejudice. Since racists use such ugliness to justify continued segregation and paternalism, writers who provide them with ammunition are bound to look like racists to many readers. Some of those who read an earlier draft of this article reacted in this way, and some will do the same with this one. Nonetheless, it seems important to try to describe what we have seen as honestly as we can rather than trying to pretend that we have not seen it at all.

Until relatively recently virtually all Americans, both black and white, assumed that the plight of the American Negro was in almost every respect unique. Carried to America as a slave, subjected to a centuries-long process of cultural "thought reform" which makes a good many more recent totalitarian efforts look both humane and ineffective,¹ liberated from slavery only to be held in a state of near peonage on Southern plantations, persistently segregated and isolated by laws and customs without parallel in American life, the American Negro and his problems seemed "special" in almost every respect. Sociologists spoke of Negroes as a "caste" rather than a "class," and political leaders and publicists thought of them as a "race" rather than an "ethnic group."²

Chicago; Richard Frost of the U. S. Office of Economic Opportunity; David Fowler of the Carnegie Institute of Technology; Eli Ginzberg of Columbia University; Bernard Harleston of Tufts University; Wesley Hotchkiss of the United Church Board for Homeland Missions; Richard Hunt of Harvard University; Clifton Johnson of LeMoyne College; Lewis Jones of Fisk University; Michael Maccoby of Cuernavaca, Mexico; Thomas F. Pettigrew of Harvard University; Harold Pfautz of Brown University; Richard Robbins of Wheaton College; Sydney S. Spivack of Princeton University; Marvin Wachman of Lincoln University; Arthur Waskow of the Institute for Policy Studies; and Samuel Wiggins of George Peabody College for their invaluable criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. Needless to say, they are not responsible for, and often do not agree with, the authors' views.

¹ Cf. the discussion in Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in Institutional and Intellectual Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), Chap. iii.

² Negroes are not, of course, America's only non-white minority. Indians in the West are often more numerous and more oppressed than Negroes, and for a time Pacific Coast Orientals suffered similarly. But it still seems fair to say that the Negroes' situation has been essentially unique.

Like many persecuted minorities, most Southern Negroes came to accept the legitimacy of the order which crushed them, and the superiority of the white men who stood at the top of that order. There might be occasional revolts, or muted criticism channeled into music or religion, but in spite of the impact of Marcus Garvey's movement, there seemed to be for most Negroes no genuine alternatives to seeing themselves as "Americans," whose most realistic hope for themselves and for their children appeared to be eventual integration into white society. They were not "Africans" who could return home, and they were not "natives" who could hope to reclaim "their" country from white "colonialists." In this respect, Southern Negroes were no different from the Irish, Italian, Jewish, and other minorities who wanted to become "American." There was, of course, plenty of ambivalence about integration, and it was often feared in practice at the same time it was coveted in principle. There were also recurrent religious groups which rejected assimilation into anything as profane as established white institutions. But among Southern Negroes, as among other ethnic minorities, this stance was a deviation from the norm. Whether one looked at hair styles, preferred skin color, the drive to desegregate schools, brand-name choices, or overall ideology, it seemed clear that for most Negroes "white was right."

The rural South was, however, so ordered that very few Negroes could even hope to join the white social system in their own lifetime. (A few had the right genes and temperament to "pass," but this was hardly an alternative for the majority.) Whatever shady or respectable routes to better status the black metropolis offered, the rural South offered at best a few positions within the segregated community. These positions generated a bourgeois outlook variously characterized by Franklin Frazier, John Dollard, Allison Davis, Hortense Powdermaker, and others. To become a doctor, mortician, or preacher was not, however, a first step towards assimilation into the national upper-middle class for a Negro—as it was for a second or third generation Irish-American or Jewish-American. For a Negro, membership in the black bourgeoisie was a dead-end. Those who joined this *ersatz* elite might earn a comfortable living, but they could not hope to rise further, nor even expect their children to do so. Even the Negro teachers, who were fiscally and bureaucratically part of the white social system, were never socially or politically part of it. No Negro could pass up through this system into white society, as occasional members of white ethnic minorities did from the very beginning.³

Furthermore, unlike other countries with analogous racial situations, the

³ Exceptions to this condition could be found in small Northern or Western communities with only a handful of Negroes, whether Great Barrington, Massachusetts, or Seattle before World War I, as pictured in Horace R. Cayton's autobiography, *Long Old Road* (New York, 1966).

rural South did not permit the Negro middle class to acquire much political power or social status by acting as brokers between the dominant white majority and the suppressed Negro minority. Southern whites occupied not only the top but most of the intermediate jobs, even when these involved direct contact with poor Negroes. The white sheriff hired white deputies, the white plantation owner hired a white supervisor, and the white welfare system usually hired white case workers. The most important exceptions to this pattern were the churches whose Negro ministers sometimes acted as intermediaries between their flocks and local white leaders. In addition, white school boards evolved a system of "indirect rule" through Negro principals which was in some respects analogous to the British colonial system in Africa and Asia.

So long as the overwhelming majority of Negroes remained rural, their plight as an ethnic minority was indeed unique, and it would plainly be misleading to assume that the traditional Southern Negro college was merely a species of the larger ethnic genus.

But once Negroes began to move off the farm, and more especially once they began to move out of the predominantly Anglo-Saxon South, the circumstances we have described began to change. Unlike their counterparts in the South, Northern urban leaders were used to playing ethnic politics. They allowed Negroes to vote, and often courted (or bought) those votes. Legal restrictions based on race had never been as widespread or as rigid as in the South, and after the great migration north brought on by the Depression and World War II, they disappeared entirely. The official rhetoric of the white North proclaimed the possibility of creating a "color-blind" society, and at times even suggested that this task had already been accomplished. It seemed to follow that blackness might be only one aspect of the Negro's ethnic heritage, and not necessarily the most important one. More generally, it seemed to follow that Negroes were in fact no different from other ethnic minorities which had entered the urban melting-pot at the bottom, gone through a long, painful, but ultimately effective transformation, and emerged as "red-blooded" Americans. Thus there seemed to be no reason why, with appropriate efforts at self-help and support from sympathetic whites, Negroes could not become fully "assimilated," just as the Irish, Italians, Poles, and Jews were being assimilated.⁴

Having been taught in the South that "white was right," but that, never-

⁴ For an explicit effort to compare the situation of the urban Negro to that of urban white minorities, see Oscar Handlin, *Firebell in the Night* (Boston, 1964). For a perceptive study of the New York situation, see Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, 1963). See also Irving Kristol, "The Negro Today is Like the Immigrant Yesterday," *New York Times Magazine*, September 11, 1966.

theless, no Negro should ever *act* as if he were white, the Negro who moved North confronted a new ideology. White was still right, but now Negroes were not only permitted, but in many respects required, to act as if they were white. Just as with other ethnic minorities, assimilation—or integration as it was almost invariably called when Negroes were involved—meant that the minority would adopt most of the customs and concerns of the “Anglo-Saxon” majority. Having done this, Negroes would, it was presumed, disperse through the hitherto white occupational structure in an increasingly random pattern, competing on equal terms and presumably achieving increasingly equal rewards.

Some prophets of integration also expected that in the long run Negroes would disperse through the hitherto white social system, ultimately intermarrying in substantial numbers and hopefully in this way eliminating skin color as a major social issue.⁵ This goal had, however, remained elusive even for white ethnic minorities, and most integrationists, especially Negroes, regarded it as much less important than occupational dispersion and economic gains. Indeed, it is safe to say that the great majority of Negroes today have only limited interest in social integration, since they feel slightly (or at times acutely) uncomfortable or defensive around whites. (The dean of one of the nation’s leading Negro colleges underlined this point when he commented that even today his own head often itched when he talked to white men, because as a child he had habitually assumed the “darky” pose of scratching his head and saying “Yassir” to white men.) Since most whites, even when well intentioned, feel comparably ill at ease with Negroes, off-the-job contact is likely to be even more limited than between Jews and Gentiles or between Catholics and non-Catholics. The ambivalence surrounding such contacts will, in turn, continue to be a staple of conversation, fantasy, and action.

The ideology of integration was often at odds with the reality of the Northern ghetto, but it persisted nonetheless, just as it had among other ethnic minorities. Indeed, it not only persisted but spread. Supported by the mass media and the federal judiciary, it began to have an effect on Southern Negroes, and by the early 1960’s sparked a mass movement of considerable proportions. For a variety of complex political reasons, this movement was able to win at least sporadic support from the federal government and to set in motion changes in the Old South which, while not yet nearly complete, probably mean the end of old-style Southern segregation. The caste system is not dead today; but within a generation the New South will probably be

⁵ See for example, Norman Podhoretz, “My Negro Problem—and Ours,” *Commentary*, February, 1963.

dominated by a pattern of racial relationships rather like that now found in the North.

Even if old-style segregation does not die, its importance will fade for purely demographic reasons. Southern agriculture is at long last being mechanized, and Negro hands have little value, even at 30 cents an hour. Since Negroes have little land and less capital, they are moving to the cities at a very rapid rate. (In 1950 more than 20 per cent of all Negroes still lived on farms; by 1960 the proportion had fallen to 8 per cent; by 1970 it is likely to be 3 or 4 per cent.) This movement off the plantation has brought a rise in the number of Negroes in Southern hamlets and small towns as well as in large cities. But in the long run, the great majority of Negroes will almost certainly find their way to industrial centers, North and South. These will not, of course, all be great cities. There will be plenty of Negroes in places like Savannah as well as places like Atlanta, and in places like Springfield as well as places like Boston. The trend is nonetheless clear.

There was a time—and not so long ago either—when urbanization and the destruction of the legal and quasi-legal pillars of segregation were regarded as sufficient conditions for the eventual assimilation of Negroes into middle-class America. These developments were expected to put Negroes on the same escalator to equality that white ethnic minorities were supposed to have ridden—and often had. The events of the last few years have, however, made clear that the problem is not so simple. Nearly ten million Negroes have now moved to the urban North and become, at least in the eyes of the law, fully equal citizens.⁶ Yet in social and economic terms, they are *not* becoming equal. The Northern Negro's position today is clearly better than that of his parents and grandparents or of his Southern cousins; but the Northern Negro's position is no closer to that of white Northerners than it was a generation ago.

This is not the place to describe in detail the evidence for this assertion, but a few statistics underscore the general point. Perhaps the best quantitative measure of the gap is income. In the rural South, Negro family incomes still average less than 45 per cent of white family incomes. In the urban South, the gap is only slightly smaller, with Negro incomes averaging about half of white ones. In the urban North, Negro incomes average about 70 per cent of white incomes. There does not appear to have been any significant change in these ratios since the end of World War II. During periods of declining unemployment, such as World War II, Korea, and the 1960's, Negroes tend to catch up slightly. When unemployment rises, they lag behind.

⁶ In 1960 about 40 per cent of all Negroes lived outside the South. The percentage is rising about 1 per cent annually. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1965* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), Table 23.

When it remains stable, the Negroes' position vis-à-vis that of whites does the same. The fluctuations are, in other words, cyclical; there is no sign of long term improvement. Indeed, since Negro birth rates have not fallen as much as white ones, disposable income *per family member* is probably increasing more slowly among Northern Negroes than among Northern whites. Equally important, while the competitive position of the Negro family as a whole has remained pretty stable, the competitive position of the Negro male has deteriorated.⁷ Only the relative improvement in the position of Negro women has kept the total income of Negro families relatively stable compared to whites.⁸

Nor is the physical isolation of the urban Negro diminishing. In almost every big Northern city, the proportion of Negroes attending all-Negro schools is rising, despite some ingenious and sincere efforts to arrest the process. In housing, more Negroes are moving to the suburbs, but many of them have moved to what are, or will soon become, all-Negro sections, much like the overwhelmingly Jewish or Italian sections nearby. In both schooling and housing, moreover, *de facto* segregation of Negroes has been far more complete than it ever was with other ghettoized ethnic minorities.⁹

Surveying these facts, we are forced to conclude that, while what we will call "old-style" Southern segregation is probably dying, "new-style" Northern segregation is enduring. This new-style segregation differs from its ancestor, however, in several important respects. To begin with, it is primarily class segregation rather than race segregation—though the two are obviously related in a society where the urban lower class appears to be increasingly black and most black city dwellers appear to be lower-class.¹⁰ New-style seg-

⁷ See Alan B. Batchelder, "Decline in the Relative Income of Negro Men," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXVIII, November 1964, 525-548.

⁸ For a comprehensive overview of the gap between Negro and white living standards, see the Fall, 1965, issue of *Daedalus*, especially the contributions of Daniel P. Moynihan, St. Clair Drake, Rashi Fein, and Philip M. Hauser.

⁹ On housing, see Philip M. Hauser, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro," *Daedalus*, Fall 1965, pp. 852-3.

¹⁰ Statistically, it seems clear that the majority of the urban poor are, and will probably remain, white. In 1964, only 18 per cent of all families in the central cities of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of more than 50,000 were non-white. (It should be borne in mind, that the Census does not use the term "central city" in the vernacular sense, but rather includes *all* residents of the largest city or cities in a metropolitan area.) Only 34 per cent of the families with less than \$3,000 in those cities were non-white. (Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 48, Washington, 1966, Table 1.) The fact remains that in most large cities, Negroes now *think* they constitute the majority of the poor, and middle-class whites generally share this assumption. The reason for this misperception is partly the civil rights movement, which has given poor Negroes a visibility that poor whites only rarely achieve. In addition, racial perceptions inevitably focus on central tendencies, and the *typical* urban Negro is poor, whereas the *typical* white is not. In 1964, for example, the median income of white families in the central cities of SMSA's over 50,000 was \$6,034, while the median income of non-white families was \$3,656.

regation allows those Negroes who acquire white middle-class habits and attitudes to move up into the white world; indeed, its vagaries are such that there are some fields and times when it is considerably easier for a Negro with a given set of qualifications to move ahead than for a comparable white.¹¹ But while class segregation allows upward mobility for a minority, it does little to facilitate such mobility for the majority. A Negro who acquires what the white professional and managerial class regards as appropriate skills and virtues will do very well indeed, but very few Negroes *will* acquire them. Everything about life in the urban Negro ghetto conspires to prevent their developing the traits needed for upward mobility. The schools, which have increasingly become the first rung on the occupational ladder, almost never afford Negroes an opportunity to meet and mix with children more fortunate than themselves. Their teachers are also likely to be less ar-

¹¹ Compare, for example, the incomes of Negroes and whites at the same educational level. James C. Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, 1966), p. 273, shows that the academic value of a year of school for Negroes averages about three-quarters its value for whites, judged by various achievement tests. This same survey suggests (p. 345 ff.) that a similar pattern probably continues through college, though here the data are less reliable. In comparing Negro and white incomes then, Negro educational attainment should be discounted about 25 per cent to make it really comparable to white attainment. When this is done, one finds that Negro men earn 10 to 20 per cent less than comparable whites, while Negro women earn from 25 to 65 per cent more than comparable whites. There is, however, a serious flaw in this procedure. Coleman *et al.* did not analyze their data by sex. If they had done so, we suspect that they would have found that the "discount rate" on a year of education was appreciably more than 25 per cent for Negro males, appreciable less for Negro females. This in turn would have suggested that Negro males were less discriminated against in the labor market than our figures suggest, and that Negro females had a smaller competitive advantage. Further analyses of Coleman's data, aimed at clarifying this point, are currently being conducted.

Since the above data are likely to be misinterpreted, we must emphasize that when we speak of Negro women's having a "competitive advantage" over comparable whites, we do not mean that an employer is likely to favor a Negro over a white when two otherwise identical women apply for a given job. However, if a Negro woman does get a job such as that of schoolteacher, she is more likely than a white woman to hold the position throughout her life, rather than drop out for marriage or child-rearing, and thus to accumulate seniority or even administrative position. Furthermore, the structure of the educational-occupational system is such that Negro women may need fewer skills to earn a given income than whites do. This is because many jobs require academic credentials, not academic skills, and Negro women have more of the former than they "deserve" by white standards of academic performance. (Or, if one prefers, white women have fewer credentials than they "deserve" by Negro standards of performance.) On the basis of the data treated by Coleman *et al.*, for example, one would expect the typical girl graduating from a Southern Negro college to have lower test scores than the typical sophomore dropping out of a Southern white college. If both applied for teaching jobs, however, the Negro B.A. would have a better chance of getting a job, even in the South.

It is of course a violation of pure meritocratic principle to prefer presumed or certified rather than actual competence. Such violations are not confined to Negro-white competition, nor do they ordinarily favor Negroes. All systems of certification and credentials do, however, have such vagaries. In addition, and less commonly, there is a small number of cases in which, say, the Negro Ph.D. may be favored over a white one because he is a Negro and his prospective employer is anxious to integrate his staff as compensatory justice, to respond to pressure, to cope with Negro clients, or for many other reasons.

ticulate and well-educated than those whom suburban whites encounter—though occasional exceptions can be found.¹² Other public services and private opportunities are, for the most part, equally deficient, despite exceptions such as the public wards of some teaching hospitals.

Class segregation is not, of course, new to American life. Every urban ethnic minority has suffered from it. The case of the American Negro may, however, be different in several crucial respects. For one thing, each previous ethnic minority escaped its ghettos at least in part because there was another, more recent urbanized ethnic group to fill the bottom rung of society. The arrival of a new, unskilled minority supported rapid economic growth, creating not only skilled, blue-collar jobs but white-collar and small business opportunities for better established groups. It also helped redirect the anti-lower-class bias of those who had already made it, or were doing so. The Anglo-Protestant "nativists" came to accept the Irish more readily once they were exposed to the Italians and Jews, and the Irish in turn lost interest in looking down on the Italians when Negroes arrived in the North in large numbers. Today there is no new minority to take the Negroes' place at the bottom, except to some extent the not very numerous Puerto Ricans.

The fact that Negroes have no "successors" on the urban escalator should be considered from both an economic and cultural angle. Economically, the harsh fact is that except at the very top, the income distribution in America has remained remarkably stable over the past generation, and probably for several generations.¹³ If we assume that the income distribution is fixed, somebody must occupy the bottom of the pyramid. The only way for Negroes to move up would be for others to take their place. This would be relatively easy to arrange if the "others" could be, say, indigent Latin American immigrants. If they have to be the children of white families who now have higher living standards and more political leverage than Negroes, the resistance to change will be greater.

The cultural impact of the Negroes' being the last to join the American

¹² On the importance of various facets of the school in determining student achievement, see Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.* Chap. iii. The report shows that the effects of schools on their students have usually been overestimated, but that insofar as they *do* have an effect, the class background of an individual pupil's classmates is the most important identifiable variable affecting his performance.

¹³ The bottom 20 per cent of all families have had between 4 and 5 per cent of all income for as long as we have had income statistics. (See Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* [Washington, D.C., 1957], Series G100.) In strictly theoretical terms, the time has probably long since passed—if indeed it ever existed—when such an underclass was needed to support the comforts of the middle class. If, for example, annual increases in productivity were all channelled to the poorest fifth of society for a mere two years, their incomes could be doubled. But as a practical matter, the income distribution seems almost immune to Washington's modest efforts at adjustment, and neither the Negroes nor any of its other victims seem able to challenge it successfully.

industrial club may, however, be even more serious than its economic impact. As Stanley Elkins and others have pointed out, the very fluidity of the class structure in America may have helped direct status anxiety to the one thing which seemed stable: color. Negroes are visible in a way that no other ethnic minority, including Orientals and Indians, has evidently been. They are, moreover, victims of a racial mythology in which they believe almost as strongly as the whites who propagate it. According to this mythology, racial categories differ from ethnic ones in that the former are unalterably fixed, like separate species, while the latter are a matter of degree. This myth is taken for granted by almost everyone. The Census, for example, asks respondents whether they or their parents were born in a foreign country, and enumerates "ethnic" minorities accordingly. But after the second generation the Census presumes that there will be too much assimilation and intermarriage to make such ethnic classifications valid or useful. With "racial" groups, on the other hand, classifications are permanent. A man is "white," "Negro," or "other," no matter how many generations removed he may be from Europe, Africa, or Asia. Not only that, a man is "Negro" no matter how many European ancestors he may have and no matter what the color of his skin, if he admits to *any* African ancestors, however remote. In theory, if seldom in practice, it is a matter of black or white.

This mythology, which tells everyone involved that Negroes are "different," seems to have a self-fulfilling quality. If whites assume that Negroes are forever different, whether for genetic or other reasons, most Negroes will come to half believe it. If they believe it, it will tend to remain so. And if Negroes remain "different," both Negroes and whites will probably tend to assume that, at least in the American context, they are "inferior." Egalitarian pluralism seems possible in America only *after* a large measure of assimilation.

Nevertheless, while the analogy between urban Negroes and other ethnic minorities is far from perfect, important similarities have developed. Perhaps most important, the old job ceiling for Negroes is becoming penetrable. There is still plenty of discrimination in hiring and promotion, but there is also beginning to be reverse discrimination by organizations eager to atone for past injustices or to establish themselves in the vanguard of what is now defined as progress. The search for "qualified Negroes" is particularly conspicuous in the federal government, but can also be seen in many large corporations. While some of these Negroes are hired mainly for public relations purposes, and find that power is in the hands of a white deputy, many are entering middle-level jobs on terms of real equality. Unlike the old Negro middle class, this new class is in continuous contact with whites, usually has

to meet white standards of competence, and often competes with white colleagues for advancement. It is thus much more nearly akin to, say, the Irish-Catholic business and professional class than to the old Negro bourgeoisie. The kinship is beginning to extend in another direction as well, for the new Negro middle class is to some extent assuming the role of intermediary between the white elite and the Negro poor. Negro professionals certainly do not dominate the schools, welfare agencies, police stations, or hospitals which serve Northern ghettos, but their role is slowly growing. A generation hence it may be comparable to the role they already play in ghetto churches, political machines, and anti-poverty organizations, and thus to the role that upwardly mobile members of other ethnic groups have so frequently played vis-à-vis their less adept fellows.

How different this new Negro middle class will be from the old is difficult to predict. To the extent that it is really part of a national or metropolitan social structure, so that its members mix intellectually and professionally with whites, it will be quite different. But this may not always happen. The development of parallel Catholic institutions enabled many Irish and Italians to move into professional roles without coming into much contact with non-Catholics, and much the same thing may happen among Negroes.

We can imagine Harlem Negroes demanding and getting a school system which would be virtually autonomous within New York City, would hire largely or exclusively Negro principals and teachers, and would probably have minimal contact or direct competition with white educators elsewhere. While the very ablest teachers and administrators would take their chances on the larger and more mixed world, the virtually separate Negro educational system would nevertheless be required to employ people with the same formal credentials as the largely white system. This would generate a continuing demand for teachers who had gone through the motions of getting a higher education, even if they had done so in inferior, perhaps segregated colleges. Similar developments in health, welfare, religion, politics, and law enforcement could conceivably support the growth of a Negro professional class not very different from its old Southern counterpart. This class would have more power than the old leadership of the separate Negro pyramid, a standard of living more nearly equal to that of whites, and the possibility of moving into the white world if it chose, but it would be relatively isolated and insulated.

Comparable developments in profit-making enterprises are, however, harder to imagine. Negro small business-men have not had much luck competing with the big, white-controlled national corporations, and Negroes

with such a bent are likely to end up joining white corporations rather than trying to fight them.¹⁴

Whether or not an individual middle-class Negro chooses to remain largely within a Negro milieu, or to move out into a partially integrated one, the possibility of such mobility will certainly exercise a profound effect on him. Middle-class Negroes will have contact with one another, and those who remain within the ghetto will be influenced by those who do not. Thus, even those middle-class Negroes who are products of new-style segregation will be significantly different from the old Negro middle class.¹⁵ To prepare for entry into the partially integrated, new middle class, Negro students may increasingly choose the predominantly white colleges as antechambers rather than the established Negro colleges. It is true that some may continue to prefer the decompression chambers of the Negro colleges, even if their eventual aim is to work in the white economy and professional structure. Moreover, the Negro colleges will be more accessible in academic, cultural, and to some extent financial terms, especially for Negroes in the South. A small number of Negro colleges may even provide their students with access to an interracial and intercultural world that transcends the United States and may thus offer a potentially superior entrée to the contemporary world. But most of these colleges enter that world bearing an unhappy burden of specifically Southern history, and will have a difficult time overcoming it.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEGRO COLLEGES

The first Negro colleges opened in the North before the Civil War, though none granted a B.A. until after 1865. During Reconstruction, when it became possible for Northern abolitionists and missionaries to operate south of the Mason-Dixon line, the founding of Negro colleges was greatly accelerated. With the help of the Freedman's Bureau and the American Missionary Association, they established some two hundred private Negro colleges. Like the pre-Civil War clergymen who had fanned out across the South and

¹⁴ Possibly, however, Negro small businessmen may be able to drive most white (often Jewish) small businessmen out of the Negro urban ghettos, aided on the one side by governmental, philanthropic, and educational help of an urban county agent sort, and on the other side by Negro nationalism, sometimes coupled with anti-Semitism. To the extent that the Black Muslims and similar organizations can create a patriarchal, prideful, "Protestant," methodical middle class, they may in time assist this development, now mainly confined to propaganda. So far, the "Americanism" of the Negro sub-cultures is indicated by the paucity of specifically Negro goods (compared, for example, to those sold by Puerto Rican storekeepers in New York City).

¹⁵ Since the above was written, we have profited from a study by A. J. Jaffe, Walter Adams, and Sandra G. Meyers, *Ethnic Higher Education—Negro Colleges in the 1960's* (MS, Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1966), which suggests that two-thirds of Southern Negro college students aspire to work in the North.

Midwest to found Protestant colleges, and like the Catholic Fathers and Sisters who were doing the same throughout the nineteenth century, the well-intentioned clerics who founded most of the private Negro colleges often had more courage and ambition than judgment or resources. Few of their colleges had adequate financial support, and virtually none had a steady supply of qualified applicants. Indeed, only about half the new institutions were still afloat in 1900, and only half of these had any college-level students.¹⁶ (Which is not to say that they did no useful work with their pre-college students.)

Dozens of these colleges were established to train Negro clergymen—sometimes as missionaries to Africa. Almost all found it necessary to accept non-clerical students in order to survive, and this meant many became *de facto* teachers colleges. Yet church subventions remained financially important to many of these colleges long after they had become relatively inconsequential to white sectarian and ethnic institutions. Even today, 37 of the 49 surviving private Negro colleges, and 19 of the 21 private Negro junior colleges, are church-related.¹⁷

The new Negro colleges differed from white ethnic colleges in several important respects. First, and perhaps most important, Negroes played a much smaller role in founding what were nominally “their” colleges than the Irish, Swedes, or Jews played in founding theirs. The private Negro colleges were for the most part financed by white philanthropists, controlled by white boards of trustees, initially administered by white presidents, and largely staffed by white faculty. In due course, the administration and faculty usually became predominantly Negro, but by then a psychological and cultural pattern had been established which was hard to break.¹⁸ Furthermore, even when the staff became predominantly Negro, the board and the donors often remained predominantly white.

It is easy to misunderstand or exaggerate the extent to which white control shaped these private colleges. Some radicals have argued, for example, that wealthy whites supported Negro colleges in order to head off potentially revolutionary stirrings among the Negro masses. This seems to us almost wholly fanciful. Men like John D. Rockefeller, to take the most famous example, had less reason to feel threatened by impoverished Southern Negroes

¹⁶ The mortality rate for white colleges founded in the nineteenth century was also about 50 per cent, and the proportion doing mainly secondary work remained nearly as high until the founding of public high schools became common in the last quarter of the century.

¹⁷ See Earl J. McGrath, *The Predominantly Negro College in Transition* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965), pp. 19-20.

¹⁸ So far as we know, there is now no college founded for Negroes which has had only white presidents. At least one (Lincoln) had a Negro president some years ago although it now has a white one. Several others have only recently acquired Negro presidents.

than by almost any dispossessed group in America—and there were many such groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If wealthy Northerners had been mainly concerned with protecting their class interests—and they certainly *were* concerned with this at times—they would hardly have spent their money in remote places like Tuskegee. The white farmers of the Midwest and the seething urban proletariat threatened established privilege far more than did rural Negro share-croppers. Rather than assuming a Machiavellian plot to support “Uncle Toms” like Booker T. Washington against “militants” like W.E.B. DuBois, we would argue that the Northern whites who backed private colleges for Negroes were moved by genuinely philanthropic motives. Unlike Southern segregationists (who feared “uppity” Negroes), these Northern whites saw no necessary conflict between improving the condition of the Southern Negro and preserving their own privileges. Believing in progress on all fronts, they assumed Negroes could be better off without rich whites being worse off.

None of this means that the financial backers, trustees, presidents, or white teachers in the private Negro colleges were uniformly committed to an ideology of racial equality. Many thought there were limits on what Negroes could accomplish, either in school or as adults. These Northerners differed from Southern whites in being less fearful of the political consequences of educating their presumed inferiors. The missionary spirit of many of these institutions was extremely patronizing, however, and the day-to-day reality was often predicated on the assumption of white supremacy. White faculty, for example, might eat separately from Negro faculty, or send their children to a separate faculty school. On the other hand, some white faculty at Fisk and elsewhere sent their children to the Negro colleges where they taught, thus creating an interracial model that could be profoundly impressive to the Negroes, but that correspondingly could bring reprisals from racist Southern whites who did not want to see Negroes taught at all, let alone in mixed company.

In any event, the basic character of the private Negro colleges was not shaped primarily by the prejudices or self-interest of their white trustees, any more than the basic character of other colleges has been. Rather, the Negro college was molded by the circumstances in which it found itself locally. That is why the few colleges founded by all-Negro denominations were so similar to those founded by whites—though they were, on the average, even poorer and less distinguished. The basic fact was that *any* Negro college had to recruit most of its students from the segregated South, and that most of these recruits expected to return to the segregated South. Not only that, but all these colleges depended for survival on the tolerance, or at least the indifference, of local white supremacists. They had few wealthy or loyal

alumni to buoy them up or to rally round in times of troubles, and only a few had any endowment on which to rely. Under these circumstances, it made relatively little difference whether the white trustees were liberal or conservative—and indeed many of these colleges' white backers were more liberal and enlightened than the Negroes who came to administer and teach in the colleges. Northern whites could, after all, afford to be liberal; the writ of the Ku Klux Klan never reached into New York City. Even those whites who came South were often more willing to oppose local mores than their Negro colleagues. Sometimes they had the advantage of their innocence and ignorance of local customs and violated these without fully appreciating the risks they ran. Moreover, tested for authentic dedication by their Negro colleagues and students, they were put on their mettle to be courageous in a way that has happened only very recently and in a few places to Negro faculties under pressure from militant undergraduates. And if things got too hot, there was always the possibility of returning North.

Given most Northern white colleges' reluctance to hire black administrators or faculty, Negroes had no such safety net; if they lost their jobs as professors, the best local alternative might be a low-paid Federal Civil Service job in the Post Office or elsewhere. Thus, Negroes had to be cautious, for the consequences of a false move looked (and often were) disastrous. Understandably, Negroes living under such pressures were extremely resentful of the relative freedom of their more mobile white colleagues, and were bitter when such men criticized the ways in which the Negro educators kept the peace with local whites. The whites in turn could often feel that the career sacrifices they were making and the difficulties for their own families were not appreciated or understood by the Negroes, for whom a professorship, even at a Negro college, was one of the best positions a Negro could hope for.

The subservience of Negro colleges to local mores was not, however, complete. Some of the better private Negro colleges maintained a tradition of dissent, and some of the most vocal Negro critics of America in general and of segregation in particular were on the faculties of colleges like Fisk, Howard, and the Atlanta group. Even the Negro state colleges sometimes harbored dissenters whose "impolitic" views could be more or less purposely overlooked, under the tacit treaty by which local whites and even state legislators left the Negro state colleges, like the Negro churches, under a quasi-protective screen of silence. (Where the state college is in the state capitol, like Southern University in Baton Rouge, it does of course risk direct legislative scrutiny—just as white Louisiana State in the same city does.)

Despite these small apertures, however, dissenters were exceptional. Like other ethnic and sectarian colleges in their early years, most Negro colleges had little use for academic freedom or controversy. Like most white colleges,

they wanted to hire safe, congenial instructors rather than the controversial ones. If they made a mistake and got someone who "didn't fit in," or who "didn't understand the local situation," his elimination was seldom difficult. Nevertheless, even at their worst, the Negro college campus provided a freer and more comfortable environment for Negro intellectuals than any other place in the South. Tougaloo College outside Jackson, for example, has been an oasis in a racist desert. A number of other colleges in less beleaguered settings have played a similar if less difficult and dramatic role. Along with the Negro churches, Negro colleges were among the few places where Negroes could meet freely with one another, and often with whites. Integrated professional meetings were possible at Atlanta University when they were still taboo at Georgia Tech or Georgia State in the same city, and the same was true elsewhere. In part this was because the Negro campuses were so completely sealed off from the white world that whites simply did not notice what went on there. But in part it was because the presidents of some of these colleges were willing to protect their faculty and students.

As in any very hierarchical organization, all these possibilities depended very much on the character of the top men—far more so than in a big modern university where the professional guilds and externally financed research barons usually play decisive roles. While there were plenty of President Bledsoes in the Negro colleges, there were also courageous and progressive men who did as much as their situations would allow—and more. Some of them might appear to the contemporary outsider like Uncle Toms, for more than most college presidents, they had to depend on the weapons of the weak: guile and rhetoric and seeming compliance. Many of these men had great personal fortitude and dignity although most have unfortunately been left behind by the civil rights movement whose cause they advanced at an earlier point. Without such men, however, the years of complete segregation would have been even more stifling than they were, for by drawing on their connections with cosmopolitan whites they were able to create at least some breathing space in the Negro community.

Thus far we have been talking about private Negro colleges. But every Southern and Border state also had one or more publicly controlled Negro college. Some, such as Alcorn A & M in Mississippi, were set up during Reconstruction, when Negroes and their allies controlled the state legislature. Most, however, came later. Some were established to train Negro teachers for Negro schools. Others were established after 1890 to meet the federal government's new requirement that states either admit Negroes to their land-grant colleges or provide "separate but equal" colleges for them. Every state with a significant Negro population chose the latter alternative, often converting a normal school into an "A and I" or "A and T" college to be-

come eligible for federal support. By the turn of the century seventeen states had separate land-grant colleges for Negroes.

None of these land-grant colleges, however, moved very far toward implementing what might loosely be called the "land-grant idea" of public service and practical involvement in the affairs of the surrounding community. They spent less of their tiny budgets on extension and technical services for Negro farmers than white land-grant colleges did for the more prosperous (and therefore more innovative) white farmers. There were few night courses for aspiring lawyers, no refresher courses for middle-aged physicians, no consultants or technical services for Negro businessmen, no extension centers for culture-hungry housewives or job-hungry white-collar workers. In part this absence of services was because the white legislature, not Washington, exercised effective control over these colleges and saw them mainly as institutions for making Negro girls into teachers. But even in the Border states, where Negroes voted, and where their enthusiastic support would have helped a public Negro college get more money from the legislature, little was done. The Negro public did not demand such services, and Negro educators did not usually try to create such a demand. Everyone talked about Tuskegee, but nobody imitated it. Instead, they accepted W. E. B. DuBois's "radical" thesis that able Negroes were entitled to education as non-utilitarian as that given able whites, and then went him one better by making it pedantic as well. This underlines the fact that the problem was "Southern" as well as "Negro." Even the white land-grant colleges in the South have usually had what a Midwesterner would regard as a comparatively narrow, classical, campus-oriented view of their responsibilities.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the chasm separating Negro educators and their impoverished constituency was probably even wider than that separating Southern white educators from theirs.

The Negro professors' reluctance to mix with less educated people, the white legislatures' reluctance to finance such mixing lest it stir up trouble or enable Negroes to compete with whites, and poor Negroes' assumption that colleges should provide credentials rather than services, all ensured that most Negro land-grant colleges would become (or in some cases simply remain) *de facto* teachers colleges. A number of states established additional Negro colleges solely to train teachers. By World War I, there were some thirty public Negro colleges in the Southern and Border states, plus one in Pennsylvania and one in Ohio.

The only additions to the Negro public sector since World War I have

¹⁹ Not many white Southern state universities have applied to operate Upward Bound projects, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has not had many competitors in focusing on state and regional problems.

been a handful of marginal, two-year colleges, almost all in Florida.²⁰ Perhaps surprisingly, such colleges have not had the same appeal to Southern Negroes that they have had to whites in comparable economic and intellectual circumstances. Junior college is evidently seen as a gateway to business and commerce, where Negroes have traditionally had little hope of advancement. Four-year colleges, on the other hand, provided entrée into a profession, which could be practiced behind the wall of segregation. For most Negroes, anything less than a B.A. seemed virtually useless.²¹ This attitude has perhaps been reinforced by the unrealistically high hopes which characterize so much of Negro life.²² Negroes evidently have preferred to enter a four-year college, try for a B.A. and drop out, rather than enter a two-year college and settle for an A.A. degree.²³

Regardless of their clientele or nominal purpose, public Negro colleges have been white financed and white controlled. This condition gave them a certain basic similarity to private Negro colleges, and made the relationship of all these Negro colleges to their clientele quite different from that of white ethnic colleges to their clientele. The white ethnic colleges had, after all, been established at least in part because their founders, trustees, presidents, instructors, and prospective clientele rejected some part of the Anglo-Saxon tradition to which established colleges were committed. In most cases this quarrel was couched in religious terms, but it was usually as much a matter of culture as of theology.²⁴

²⁰ These have now been merged with Florida's network of white junior colleges.

²¹ This attitude seems to have a firm economic foundation only for Negro women, among whom teaching is the principal form of middle-income work. The Negro woman who finishes college typically earns 75 per cent more than the Negro woman who enters but does not finish, whereas a white woman with a B.A. earns only 55 per cent more than a white woman dropout. Among men, on the other hand, the picture is reversed. The Negro man who earns a degree averages only 20 per cent more than a Negro dropout, while a white man with a degree averages 28 per cent more than a white dropout. See *1960 Census, op. cit.*, Table 223. On this basis one might expect Negro men to be more interested in junior colleges than white men, but that is not the case.

²² See, for example, Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 275 ff.

²³ Although statistics on attrition are full of pitfalls, Negro men seem to be somewhat more likely to drop out of college than white men, while among women the rates are about the same for Negroes and whites. See *1960 Census, op. cit.*, Tables 168 and 173. On Negro enrollment in junior colleges, see Coleman *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-445. In the Midwest and California, where Negroes have a somewhat better chance of advancing within white-owned enterprises, they enroll at junior colleges in large numbers. A Negro in Los Angeles, for example, would have to be pretty deaf to all around him if he failed to get the message that Los Angeles City College was available to him, virtually as much a part of the local educational culture as the high school.

²⁴ The religious rationale for ethnic separatism often had unintended consequences, as we try to show in more detail in the forthcoming book from which this article is extracted. Irish Catholic colleges emphasized their Catholicity rather than their Irishness, and tried to attract non-Irish Catholics. This left the non-Irish without a religious rationale for setting up their own colleges, and they seldom did so. Some went to somewhat alien Irish-Catholic colleges; most turned to "neutral" public institutions.

The Negro colleges had no such quarrel with Anglo-American culture. Mostly they were founded by whites, financed by whites, and at least in their early years administered and staffed mainly by whites. There were, it is true, a few colleges such as Morris Brown in Atlanta, Wilberforce in Ohio, and Morris College and Allen University in South Carolina, which were controlled by all-Negro denominations. There were some other private Negro colleges which came over a period of years to have predominantly Negro boards of trustees, not to mention Negro presidents and predominantly Negro staffs. Some public Negro colleges were led from the outset by Negro presidents; indeed, some have only recently been allowed by state law or custom to have an integrated faculty.²⁵ But for reasons already indicated, the "grey" Negroes who played key roles in these colleges were even more deferential to local white expectations and pressures than the white trustees and staffs. Thus, instead of trying to promote a distinctive set of habits and values in their students, they were, by almost any standard, purveyors of super-American, ultra-bourgeois prejudices and aspirations. Far from fighting to preserve a separate sub-culture, as other ethnic colleges did, the Negro colleges were militantly opposed to almost everything which made Negroes different from whites, on the grounds that it was "lower-class." Other ethnic colleges confronting this same dilemma chose to attack the lower-class immigrant sub-culture in some ways, while legitimizing and embellishing it in others, usually under a religious umbrella which could include Europe-oriented theological elements. The Negro colleges, pious though they were, lacked a religious rationale for their separatism. They were separate only because the white colleges which they emulated would not admit their students. Under such circumstances, the Negro colleges could have maintained their self-respect only if they had viewed themselves as a pre-revolutionary holding operation, designed to salvage the victims of injustice. This stance would, however, have demanded an open and continual attack on segregation and white supremacy, which the Negro colleges could not afford to make. The result was usually self-contempt, born either from acceptance of the white view that Negroes were inferior or from disgust at having succumbed silently to an outrageous injustice, or from both.

The cumulative result of all this was that the Negro college of the 1950's was usually an ill-financed, ill-staffed caricature of white higher education—which was, after all, easy enough to caricature. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the Negro college served as a living reminder of how bad most white colleges in an earlier era had been—and a few still are. So,

²⁵ It should be noted that East Indians, Africans, Haitians, Chinese, and now Cuban refugees have taught at these colleges without questions of "race mixing" being raised.

too, the authoritarian atmosphere of the Negro college, with the intervening trustees, the domineering but frightened president, the faculty tyrannized by the president and in turn tyrannizing the students, and the tendency of the persecuted at all levels to identify with their persecutors (and in due course to take their place), all harked back to an earlier period of white academic history. The emphasis on athletics, fraternities, and sororities at many of the Negro colleges also classed them with the more historically "retarded" white institutions which Veblen satirized.

Like the bulk of the white population two generations earlier, American Negroes in the 1950's still lived in a world where most people were poor and could not change that fact, where success seemed to depend on winning the favor of some higher power (be it "the man" or his divine counterpart), and where any form of self-expression, self-assertion, or self-indulgence threatened to topple them off the straight and narrow path, back into hell. Sometimes these attitudes were promoted under the auspices of a vengeful religion, sometimes as part of the quest for material comfort, sometimes through a peculiarly noxious combination of mindless materialism and fundamentalist rigidity.

The puritanism of these colleges seems, however, often to have been more external than internal. Students were required to go through the motions of being prim, disciplined models of Victorian virtue, but little success was attained in developing the self-control which had given New England asceticism its strength. The faculty at these colleges was usually contemptuous of the students, even when a rhetoric of sympathy for the problems caused by their "lack of background" prevailed. Like nineteenth-century America at its pious worst, the Negro colleges seemed intent on ignoring the actual qualities of people. The result was a propensity for make-believe. Almost all Negro colleges have been extremely protective of girls, for example, even though it would appear from contemporary studies (such as those of Lee Rainwater) that most of them, including those from the black bourgeoisie, early became sexually knowledgeable. Another form of protectiveness, which is still operative, springs from the understandable desire of many Negro parents, especially in the middle class, to protect their children not only from disagreeable or traumatic contacts with the white world, but also from inviting and seductive ones. While they wanted for their children what can be obtained in a white college, they wanted it in a safe Negro environment where the young people would not be tempted to marry outside the boundaries of race or class, or to land in other sorts of "trouble" out of idealism or adventurousness. (A similar protectiveness operates in the comparable white worlds, especially for girls.)

Yet to put matters this way judges the Negro colleges in particular and

the Negro bourgeoisie in general with what has been called 20-20 hindsight. In the early years after the Civil War and down to very recent times, it could be a prideful accomplishment to show that a Negro was capable of postponing gratification, of scholarly attainment, even of pedantry and intellectual makework. Such an enterprise was at war with what was self-defeating and indolent in the South as a whole, an importation of the Protestant ethic that can only be disparaged once its achievements can be taken for granted. In a less self-conscious age, the Negro educator could feel unambivalent about his mission of uplift, certain that the white culture, whose representative he was, was superior to the non-culture he was uprooting.

Even so, the effort to impose discipline and direction on the students was compromised by dishonesty as well as pretense. Dishonesty is not, of course, unique to Negro colleges, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it is more common, especially at the poorer ones. Both Negroes and whites from these colleges report in conversation instances of petty blackmail and fraud, ranging from such relatively subtle things as college officials' profiteering on textbooks to more egregious incidents like a president's "borrowing" money from a new, untenured faculty member and not repaying it. Similarly, the grading system, which professors of all colors normally use to blackmail students into reading books and writing papers, is sometimes reported to be used at some of these colleges to blackmail students into mowing lawns, sweeping offices, or even providing sexual favors. Such incidents are not, of course, unknown at white colleges, and invidious comparisons are obviously both risky and inflammatory. This is especially true when no objective indices are available against which to check our impressions. Nonetheless, matters of this kind are crucial to any serious evaluation of colleges and their atmospheres, and they cannot simply be ignored. We are often asked, for example, whether Southern Negro colleges are any more benighted or corrupt than the typical mediocre Southern white colleges. There are no objective answers to such questions and so we must report our impression that Southern Negro colleges are, with a handful of hopeful exceptions, in something of a class by themselves. We know no Southern white college, for example, which could match the atmosphere of Ralph Ellison's Negro college in *Invisible Man*. We have known Negro colleges of which this fictional image was a not entirely inaccurate reflection.

To say this is not to deny the oppressiveness, fakery, and formalism coupled with punitiveness, of which some white colleges are capable. Several of these colleges, for example, have turned patriotic anti-Communism into a paying proposition. The Negro colleges, conservative though they have been, have never gone into the market in this particular way. Indeed, we want to emphasize that we are *not* saying that all Negro colleges are worse than all

white colleges in all respects—this has never been so. What has been the case is that the great majority of Negro institutions stand near the tail end of the academic procession in terms of student aptitudes, faculty creativity, and intellectual and moral ferment. In some part, this provincialism has been the result of poverty. The typical Negro college, for example, pays its faculty only 75-80 per cent of what the typical white college pays.²⁶ Negro college expenditures per student were only two-thirds the national average in 1960 (having deteriorated from almost four-fifths in 1950).²⁷ But all this tells only part of the story.

The more serious problems at the Negro colleges seem to us cultural rather than logistical, and this makes them hard to quantify. One can, of course, compare the number of Ph.D.'s from national universities at Negro and white colleges, or the number of professors who attend professional meetings and contribute to learned journals. We have not made this comparison for the country as a whole, but we have made comparisons of specific colleges. The results suggest that with perhaps a dozen exceptions the Negro colleges rank in the second half of the academic roster of distinction.²⁸ When one compares student bodies, the results are even more discouraging. Test scores for students at Negro and white colleges are not available on a national basis, but they are available for many individual colleges, and they show that Negro colleges are almost never academically selective by white standards.²⁹ College Board scores in most Negro colleges seem to average in the 300's, and some Negro colleges report medians in the 200's.³⁰

²⁶ Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 434.

²⁷ McGrath, *op. cit.*, p. 26. Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 435, provides a more recent and more optimistic financial picture. The data presented by Coleman *et al.* on this point, however, seem to understate the level of expenditure in predominantly white colleges. This may be a matter of definitions, in which case Negro college expenditures are probably also understated and the comparisons valid.

²⁸ Readers familiar with our other writings on education will realize that we are not enamored of prevailing definitions of academic distinction and that we do not regard the elite institutions that set the model as generally deserving either the prestige or the imitation that they engender. We think that there are too few academic models as it is, in terms both of what there is to be known and felt and in terms of the many diverse constituencies of students and communities which colleges might serve. What we are saying in the text is descriptive: by the going definitions which they themselves tend to accept, the Negro colleges on the whole have not attained national as distinct from local eminence. And we are also saying something more open to question, namely, that most of these colleges have not as yet found an alternative path—hardly any “inferior” white colleges have found such a path either. Readers of this *Review* need hardly be reminded that there are other virtues than the academic ones—among them: solidarity, candor, intensity of feeling and perception—and neither Negro nor white colleges have, whatever their rhetoric, done much to identify and cultivate these.

²⁹ See James Cass and Max Birnbaum, *Comparative Guide to American Colleges* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). Of the 320 colleges identified as “selective” by the authors, none is predominantly Negro.

³⁰ Roughly 2 per cent of all students taking the SAT score below 300; roughly 16 per cent score below 400.

This means that the *typical* student at one of these colleges ranks in the bottom 5 or 10 per cent of those taking the CEEB tests. Or to put it another way, perhaps no more than 10 or 15 per cent of the students at most Negro colleges rank above the national undergraduate average on verbal or mathematical tests.⁸¹ As of 1965, we know of only one winner of a National Merit Scholarship who had ever attended a Negro college.

The fact that Negro colleges recruit students most of whom are of very limited academic promise is not, of course, necessarily an indictment of either the students or the colleges. We have the impression, however, supported by fragmentary statistics, that these colleges do even less than comparable white colleges to remedy their students' academic inadequacies.⁸² As a result, each new generation of Negro professionals, and especially teachers, perpetuates the cycle of deprivation.

Nevertheless, as we have already emphasized, Negro colleges are not all alike. At the head of the Negro academic procession stands a handful of well-known private institutions, such as Fisk, Morehouse, Spelman, Hampton, Howard, Tuskegee, and Dillard, and an even smaller number of public ones such as Texas Southern and Morgan State.⁸³ By most criteria, these institutions would probably fall near the middle of the national academic procession. They attract a few brilliant students, employ a few brilliant professors, and run a few very lively programs. On the whole, however, their faculties are comparable to those of small and not very distinguished sectarian colleges or fairly typical state colleges. Both intellectually and economically, the students approximate the latter somewhat more closely than the former.

⁸¹ This assertion is based on our own spot checks of particular colleges, on a survey of teachers colleges for whites and Negroes (Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 345), and on the comparative performance of Negroes and whites in high school (*loc. cit.*, p. 219 ff.). For a more optimistic appraisal, see Jaffe, Adams, and Meyers, *op. cit.*, who find that 25 per cent of the Southern Negroes planning to enter college rank above the national median for all college entrants. It should be added that some writers have questioned whether verbal aptitude tests predict academic potential as well for lower-class Negroes as for middle-class whites. Kenneth Clark and Lawrence Plotkin report, for example, that Negroes who received scholarships from the National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students (NSSFNS) to attend integrated colleges were as likely to do well when they had poor verbal scores as when they had good ones. They argue that for these students, motivation was the critical variable. See *The Negro Student at Integrated Colleges* (N.Y.: NSSFNS, 1963.) On the other hand, Julian C. Stanley and Andrew C. Porter have summarized a number of studies of this same problem which show that SAT scores predict Negro college grades as accurately as they do white ones. (See "Predicting College Grades of Negroes versus Whites," University of Wisconsin, mimeographed, 1966. See also T. Anne Cleary, "Test Bias: Validity of the Scholastic Aptitude Test for Negro and White Students in Integrated Colleges," Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1966.)

⁸² See Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 345. These data are far from conclusive.

⁸³ Howard is privately controlled but largely federally financed, so that it is not always put in the private category. Some would argue that Dillard should not be included above, or that Bennett, Talladega, Knoxville, or Lincoln University in Pennsylvania ought to be. Fisk, Morehouse, Spelman, and Hampton are sometimes referred to as the Negro Ivy League.

In addition to these leaders, there are some fifty relatively large public colleges and about sixty small private ones. By almost any standard, these colleges are academic disaster areas. Underpaid as their faculty members usually are, many of them could not make as much elsewhere. Some, indeed, could not get any other academic job. Insecure and marginal, they become insistently pedantic. The better faculty members are dimly aware that their students cannot master the kinds of material they themselves studied during their graduate years at Michigan, Ohio State, Howard, NYU, or Teachers College. But like Nigerians wedded to a University of London syllabus, they cling to a pallid version of the academic tradition, itself in need of revival. Anxious about their authority, remembering how hard they worked for their degrees, and worried by how much they have forgotten or not kept up with, they require their students to memorize scraps of wisdom in much the same fashion as a bad high school, an old-fashioned Catholic college, or a provincial teachers' college does.

Colleges such as these admit almost any high school graduate who will pay tuition, and graduate most of those who keep paying. Despite modest academic demands and a wide range of remedial courses intended to compensate students for their generally miserable elementary and secondary educations, attrition runs from 40 to 70 per cent. If this were a matter of academic failure, it could be understood and perhaps defended, especially in colleges which know that most of their graduates will become the elementary and secondary teachers of the next generation of Negroes. But in point of fact, relatively few students leave these colleges for strictly academic reasons.⁸⁴ Most simply get bored or discouraged and decide the sacrifices they and their parents have been making are no longer worthwhile. Some run out of money, drop out to work, and never decide to come back. There is little reason to assume that most of these dropouts are less intellectually competent than those who graduate. Indeed, these colleges are so repressive and monotonous that, at least among the men, it may well be the better students who leave, in frustration or boredom—though some, of course, return after a season and bring savor and maturity to their fellow undergraduates.

Nonetheless, the Negro colleges have for several generations been the major agency for selecting and socializing the prospective members of the black bourgeoisie. Their role here is even more important than the role of white colleges for white society, for upward mobility among Negroes has depend-

⁸⁴ Shaw University in Raleigh is one of a number which have attempted to insist that entering students, if not academically qualified to be freshmen, must take non-credit remedial courses. But it is a terrific battle to convince students and their parents that they might have to pay more than four years' tuition for a four-year degree. A college which insists too rigidly on such prerequisites may find others drawing its students away by offering a less demanding B.A.

ed more on professional credentials and less on entrepreneurial or managerial talent. The fact that these colleges often sift out the rebellious, the creative, and the alienated may do even more to explain the character of the black bourgeoisie and may do more damage to the Negro potential than the equivalent sifting does to the white. Those who have joined the Negro middle class, and even those who aspire to do so, have been extremely conservative on all issues other than racial equality, and sometimes even on that.

Civil rights activism has depended very heavily on Negroes of college age. Like university students elsewhere, these adolescents have not yet been locked into the economy, and are relatively free from economic reprisals (though their parents have not been). Correspondingly, they have been less susceptible to temptation and therefore less suspect in Negro communities which are corrosively skeptical of adult leadership. But the students' activism has seldom been encouraged, even tacitly, by Negro college administrators or faculty, and has often been bitterly opposed. This opposition reflects the obvious pressure that whites could bring to bear on the Negro colleges to add to their already numerous troubles. It also reflects the irritation of the more academically oriented faculty at seeing their best students distracted from school work by what many professors regard as mindless activism, while their worst students may seem to use civil rights work as an excuse for goofing off. These faculty members want their students to win Woodrow Wilson Fellowships or to get into medical school, not go to jail. The less academic faculty are also unsympathetic to civil rights activists. Thus the gap between the white-fearing and God-fearing adults and the dissident and rebellious young people has perhaps been even greater in the Negro world than in the corresponding white world. For this and other reasons, the Negro college campuses have not, with a few famous exceptions, been centers of protest in the South, nor have they provided the shock troops for organizations like the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee in the way that Northern campuses have for the Northern Student Movement and Students for a Democratic Society. Nonetheless, the civil rights movement has had an enormous impact on the attitudes of students at Negro colleges during the past few years. There is more open rebelliousness, more racial pride,²⁵ and more hope than even a few years back.

One reason for the relative conservatism of the Negro campuses may be the fact that on many of them, women still out-number men as much as two

²⁵ Clifton Johnson has directed our attention to one small but significant indication of this, namely the gradually darkening skin color of the girls chosen as beauty queens on Negro campuses. In hair styles and facial features, however, white Hollywood's definitions of beauty still seem to prevail on most campuses.

to one. For Negro colleges as a group, women constitute 54 per cent of enrollment, compared to 38 per cent at white colleges.⁸⁶ This imbalance is, of course, an endemic problem in all phases of Negro life, perhaps partly because education has been so crucial to social mobility or immobility among Negroes. White girls outperform white boys throughout elementary and secondary school. Among whites, however, success begins to be more evenly distributed in college, where the "hard" sciences count for more, where even "soft" subjects can be studied in "hard" ways, and where boys have other ways of asserting themselves than by not learning what they are told to learn. In the Negro colleges these opportunities seem less available, and girls continue to dominate things. This may be one important reason why the matriarchial pattern of lower-class Negro life seems to survive even in the Negro middle-class.

Overall, if one looks at the available data on student academic quality in the great majority of the Negro colleges, one sees how little they accomplish in the way of remedial work with students who often arrive without the basic tools of English, much less mathematics or foreign languages. The essays such students write as freshmen are even less literate than in unselective white colleges. The wide gap between learning and life has not been bridged, and many graduate without its even being narrowed.

Yet when we have visited these institutions we have found pockets of vitality despite the depressing conditions. Hardly any college has not been touched by the efforts at upgrading of recent years. Hardly any is without a small nucleus of faculty, white as well as Negro, who struggle with exemplary passion to overcome the students' previous conditioning, lack of academic motivation, and susceptibility to collegiate distraction. Even the most academically inferior of these colleges have, by good or bad luck, a few students who respond to the zealous efforts of the more imaginative and suggest what might happen if more of their kind could somehow be attracted and kept. (Much the same thing is true at the equivalent white institutions.) There seems to be something about a college, as about a nation, which engenders a paradoxical combination of euphoria and paranoia and leads otherwise judicious people to dedicate themselves to its service in spite of somehow knowing better. The sparkplug may in one place be the librarian, in another the chaplain, in still another a white academic missionary, and

⁸⁶ Kenneth A. Simon and W. Vance Grant, *Digest of Educational Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1965), Tables 50 and 62. Census data suggest that the ratio of Negro men to women is probably about the same in integrated colleges. Actually, the Census publishes no breakdown of college students by both sex and race, but cautious inferences can be made about Negro sex ratios from those for all non-Whites. Allowing for the fact that the Oriental non-Whites are overwhelmingly male, the national male-female ratio for Negroes appears to be about 45:55.

in still others Negro faculty—often women—who might go elsewhere but who stay to suffer and struggle. And as we shall see, outside leverage from leading white universities, from foundations, and from Washington can sometimes buoy these small minorities, giving them the feeling that they are not entirely crazy to stick it out.

III. THE FUTURE OF THE NEGRO COLLEGES: RECRUITMENT

Thus far we have spoken of Negro colleges as by-products of the Southern caste system. This statement is something of an oversimplification, as the existence of two such colleges in Pennsylvania and two in Ohio attests. Nevertheless, few would deny that Negro colleges were in all essential features a response to racism. During the past decade, however, racism in its traditional form has been under mounting attack, both from the Negroes who suffer under it and from much of the white elite which had hitherto accepted or even actively profited from it. No matter how "backlash" politics develop, and no matter what becomes of the Negro poor, the Negro middle classes seem destined to be incorporated into the established institutions which dominate American life. This development is particularly clear in the urban North, but it is also an emerging pattern in the South. This, as we have already suggested, makes the Negroes' situation more nearly akin to that of other ethnic minorities than was true in the past. It also poses an enormous challenge to the Negro colleges, whose symbiotic relationship with the old Negro middle class has been called into question.

What kinds of students will the Negro colleges get, now that opportunities and incentives for Negroes to attend predominantly white colleges are expanding? The answer to this question depends in part on established white institutions. To the extent that Negro B.A.'s want to move into these institutions, they will have to impress recruiters from major corporations and admissions committees at various kinds of graduate and professional schools. These men will be white in most cases; and even when they are not, they will be interested in the usual middle-class virtues, including certain kinds of intellectual skills. There is virtually no chance in the foreseeable future for the development of major national corporations controlled by Negroes, but if there were, it is hard to imagine their having junior management training programs very different from white corporations. In the professions, too, advancement will usually depend on attending a white professional or graduate school. Howard is the only Negro university which approaches comparison with a good non-Negro university, and it is trying to attract white students and become a fully integrated institution. The two Negro medical schools (Meharry and Howard) are said to rank among the

worst in the nation, and would probably have been closed long ago had they not been a main source of doctors willing to tend Negro patients. There are five Negro law schools, most of which are only one jump ahead of the accrediting agencies. Virtually none of the graduate programs in arts and sciences at Negro colleges is adequate by white academic standards. While the graduate programs in education which most public Negro colleges offer are probably not greatly different from those in the majority of white colleges, we know of none which can claim distinction. That the historical reasons for all this are clear does not make the current situation easier to remedy. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any all-Negro school will ever have a first-rate graduate professional program—though some currently all-Negro schools may establish such programs at the same time they become integrated. Therefore, the Negro B.A. who hopes not just to enter a profession but to advance within it will usually want both the credentials and the training of a predominantly white, national university.

The question, then, is whether white graduate schools and white corporations will be eager to accept the graduates of Negro colleges. At the moment, the "Negro problem" is still relatively fashionable. Both corporations and graduate schools are making special efforts to provide compensatory training for Negroes who have had inadequate undergraduate (not to mention elementary and secondary) education. Recruiters have swarmed onto Negro campuses in recent years, searching for the "instant Negro." Lincoln University in Pennsylvania reported last year, for example, that it had more visits from company recruiters than it had B.A.'s. Some major universities have also established special summer programs to identify and prepare Negro college students for graduate work. A number of universities have even "adopted" one or more Negro colleges, establishing formal links which make it easier for the graduates of the Negro colleges to get into the "parent" university's graduate schools.

Universities and corporations are, though, in competition with one another, and the leeway they have to extend compensatory opportunity to Negroes over the long term will depend on the Negroes' ability to compete on relatively equal terms. There will of course continue to be white academicians and corporate managers whose interest in extending opportunities to Negroes will not succumb to a change in fashion or to easy rejection when the first recruits are neither Ralph Bunche nor George Washington Carver, John Hope Franklin nor Robert Weaver. Yet it would seem that, in general, the Negroes who enter graduate school will have to respond fairly quickly to the cram courses and keep fairly close to the pace set by the predominantly white graduate students. Because white professors have sometimes been over-optimistic about Negro graduate students and have made allowances

for their earlier handicaps, a reaction may come against providing special help, especially if it turns out that poorly prepared Negroes cannot seize the second chance they have been given. Such a reaction is particularly likely since graduate schools have thus far been so unrelievedly meritocratic and so little concerned with inventing new ways to help students learn, whether by reorganizing the disciplines or by instituting the kind of curriculum revision now under way in the elementary and secondary schools.

The danger of disappointing these unrealistic white expectations will probably be a problem for most Negro B.A.'s who enter white corporations or graduate or professional schools, regardless of where they attended college. But the problem may be more acute for those who have been to all-Negro colleges than for those who have been to predominantly white ones. The latter will already have shown they can compete with whites academically and that they can make out in a predominantly white milieu. From the viewpoint of a company recruiter or a law school dean, a Negro from San Francisco State, Temple, or Roosevelt will almost certainly seem less of a risk than a Negro from Alcorn A & M or even Fisk.

When the current wave of interest in "qualified" Negroes began, people naturally turned to the Negro colleges because these were the most obvious and most concentrated source of Negro B.A.'s. A company which wanted a Negro for its front office, for example, could send a recruiter to Hampton and be sure that he would come back with a Negro, even if he was not always the perfect candidate. If they sent a recruiter to, say, Wayne State in Detroit, it was awkward (as well as illegal) to ask to see only Negroes. Yet it was time-consuming to interview 100 whites in order to locate the few Negroes the company wanted, especially since Negroes often assumed that recruiters would be interested only in whites, and therefore did not sign up to be interviewed. At Hampton, every student knew at least that if a recruiter came to the campus he was interested in Negro applicants. Nonetheless, we surmise that more Negro men earn B.A.'s from Wayne every year than from Hampton. Not only that, but most Wayne Negroes are probably readier than Hampton ones to enter white professional schools or office jobs. This situation is not, of course, primarily caused by anything Wayne does or Hampton fails to do. While there are some Northern Negroes from metropolitan school systems at Hampton, as at other Negro colleges, the majority of Wayne Negroes has been better schooled before coming to college, more rigorously selected, and made more familiar with a white milieu. Wayne Negroes have been less visible than their Hampton counterparts, because they are immersed in a sea of white faces—though there are, no doubt, tables in the student union where they congregate. Nevertheless, if they work out better than graduates of predominantly Negro schools in law schools, graduate

chemistry departments, executive training programs, and other enterprises with national recruiting nets, these enterprises will make the effort needed to find and favor them.

Nor is the Wayne-Hampton comparison an isolated case. A myth has developed to the effect that virtually all Negro undergraduates are in Negro colleges—a myth whose corollary is that the growth of the educated Negro middle class depends on white financial support for Negro colleges. The fact is, however, that almost half of all Negro undergraduates are already in predominantly white colleges.⁸⁷

If white employers and graduate and professional schools favor Negroes with "white" B.A.'s, this proportion will grow. If Negro high school graduates were to become aware of such bias in selection (or to imagine its existence), the proportion of Negroes going to white colleges would rise even faster. If the financial, academic, and especially, the social obstacles to Negroes' attending integrated colleges were then eliminated, the Negro colleges would soon lose a large proportion of their applicants.

⁸⁷ Estimates of the total number of Negroes attending college vary widely. Four have come to our attention.

1) *The U.S. Office of Education*. USOE did not collect statistics on Negro enrollment in predominantly white colleges prior to 1965. In that year USOE asked registrars to give their "best estimate" of the number of Negroes in their colleges. About 90 per cent did so. These estimates suggested that 4.6 per cent of all college students were Negroes. It must be emphasized, however, that these were *guesses*, not an enumeration. Since most college officials are eager to prove their institution's commitment to civil rights, and since the Office of Education was thought to favor racial integration, some college registrars probably overestimated the proportion of Negroes at their institutions. We are reluctant to rely on the USOE figure. (For an analysis of the USOE data, see Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 368 ff.)

2) *The Census*. Most Census reports classify respondents as "white" or "non-white." The latter classification includes not only Negroes but Orientals, American Indians, and other non-Caucasians. Since 92 per cent of all American nonwhites are Negroes, Census data on nonwhites are normally presumed to describe Negroes fairly accurately. In the case of college students, however, this assumption turns out to be hazardous. The *School Enrollment* supplement to the 1960 Census (Final Report PC (2)-5A, Table 1) provides a detailed racial breakdown and shows that only 77 per cent of all "nonwhite" college students are Negroes. The bulk of the remainder are Orientals, whose college enrollment rate exceeds that of whites. The *School Enrollment* supplement is the only Census report which enumerates Negro students separately from other nonwhites. It shows that in the spring of 1960 Negroes constituted 5.2 per cent of all undergraduates and 3.0 per cent of all graduate students—or 4.9 per cent of total enrollment. "Other nonwhites" constituted 1.5 per cent of total enrollment. This evidence is, however, somewhat suspect, for the Census reports substantially fewer white college students than U.S. Office of Education data for the same year would lead one to expect.

3) *The NORC survey*. (James A. Davis, *Great Aspirations* [Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 1964], p. 101 ff.) NORC found that 3.0 per cent of the June, 1961, B.A.'s reported their race as Negro and 2.5 per cent reported their race as Oriental or other nonwhite. The discrepancy between these figures and those reported to the Census and to USOE might be partly explained by higher undergraduate attrition among Negroes than whites, but neither Census nor USOE data show attrition differentials of this magnitude. Differences in sampling procedures and definitions probably account for part of the variation.

4) *The McGrath mail survey*. (McGrath, *op. cit.*, p. 21.) McGrath does not describe exactly whom he counted as a college student and whom he did not, but judging by his statis-

The fact is, however, that while white employers and graduate schools may somewhat prefer Negroes who have proven they can make it at a white college, and while Negro high school students may in some cases realize this, such matters are seldom clearcut. There will, moreover, continue to be some employers and callings (e.g., teaching in predominantly Negro schools) in which it makes relatively little difference where a man or woman went to college, so long as he has the right paper credentials for professional certification. In addition, there are many cases where the contacts made at a Negro college will be much more valuable than the contacts with a smaller number of Negroes and a potentially larger number of whites at an integrated college. This would be true not only of occupations such as the ministry, law, or undertaking, usually practiced within the community, but also if one wants to work for a white employer such as an insurance company which seeks out those Negro B.A.'s who have the social connections with other Negroes that come from attending a leading Negro college.

Furthermore, even if the advantages of attending an integrated college become clear, and every Negro high school student is made aware of them, the obstacles to actually enrolling in such a college will remain formidable for many Negroes for a long time to come.

The legal difficulties confronting a Negro who wants to attend a non-Negro college have never been overwhelming so long as no other problems existed. There have been Northern white colleges open to Negroes since well before the Civil War—if the applicant had the proper preparation, enough money to pay tuition and subsistence, and a thick enough skin to endure social isolation and occasional slights. Today almost all white institutions, even in the South, will accept a Negro applicant, and most have done so. Those which have not are mostly small, academically undistinguished, sectarian colleges to which relatively few Negroes would want to go even if they expected to be welcome.

The economic obstacles to attending a predominantly white college are

tical calculations, he seems to have included all regular, degree-credit students, full-time and part-time, graduate and undergraduate, while excluding extension students. In that case, his figures indicate that Negroes constituted 4.1 per cent of college enrollment in 1964. This figure can perhaps be reconciled with NORC's finding that 3.0 per cent of all 1961 graduates were Negroes, but not with the 1960 Census finding that 4.9 per cent of all students were Negroes, nor with the USOE figure of 4.6 per cent.

Given this contradictory evidence, we can make only approximate guesses about Negro educational patterns. We know that in 1966 about 11 per cent of all 18-21 year olds were Negroes; between 4 and 5 per cent of all undergraduates were Negroes; about 2.5 per cent of all undergraduates were enrolled in Negro colleges (projected from McGrath, *op. cit.*, p. 21, and 1965 *Digest of Educational Statistics*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 62). This means that between 50 and 60 per cent of all Negro students are probably in Negro colleges. This percentage is probably falling, but we do not know how fast.

also diminishing. It is almost invariably cheaper for a Negro living north of the Mason-Dixon line to attend a public institution in his own state than to go South to a Negro one—and the proportion of Negroes in the North is growing. The cost differential will grow even wider in the next decade, for public universities will by then be available in almost every major Northern city, and public junior colleges with only nominal admissions requirements will be within commuting distance of Negroes in most northern cities of even moderate size.

In the South, public commuter colleges of any sort may be slower coming. Atlanta, Savannah, New Orleans, Houston, and Memphis have such colleges, and Memphis State has already attracted a substantial Negro enrollment. But there are still many sizeable Southern cities without a public college, perhaps partly because politicians have anticipated that new institutions of this sort would mix Negroes with whites. In addition, there are still substantial numbers of Negroes in the small towns of the South, and many of these will not have even a junior college in the foreseeable future.

Under these circumstances the economic calculus which determines where it is cheapest for a Southern Negro to go will be more complex than in the North. Today the Southern urban Negro often finds that his cheapest alternative is a private Negro college in his home city. Almost all these colleges now charge substantially less tuition than white colleges in the same area. Tuition is, however, everywhere rising faster than room and board charges, and in most states it will eventually be cheaper for a student to go away to a public college than to commute to even the cheapest private ones. Since public residential colleges for whites and Negroes almost always have the same charges in any given state, economic considerations are likely to have relatively little effect on students' decisions whether or not to integrate, once the private commuter college is priced out of the low-cost field. This day will of course be hastened by the establishment of public commuter colleges in more and more Southern cities.

The question remains, what should be regarded as a "large" and therefore potentially decisive difference in cost, and what can be discounted as a "small" and therefore inconsequential one. In 1963, Earl McGrath asked students in Negro colleges how much their parents earned, and got the following replies:³⁸

<i>Family Income</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Below \$4,000	42
\$4,000 to \$5,999	26
\$6,000 to \$9,999	23
Above \$10,000	10
Total	101

³⁸ McGrath, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

McGrath's study indicates that, according to the College Scholarship Service's formulae, most of these Negro families were in no position to make any contribution whatever to their children's college expenses.³⁹ Most nevertheless *did* contribute, often substantially. Their financial sacrifice speaks for their faith in the value of higher education, but it also suggests that price differences of a few hundred dollars could easily have led such families to prefer a Negro college to a white one. This condition will probably remain true for the foreseeable future.

The Negro who really wants to attend an integrated college, however, whether in the North or the South, need not rely entirely on family support. He can also get a job, borrow, or if he is lucky, get a scholarship. In the past, Negroes have found it somewhat more difficult than whites to find jobs while attending college, partly because they were Negroes, partly because they were more often women, and partly because they more often attended college in isolated, rural areas where jobs were scarce.⁴⁰ This handicap should, however, be increasingly offset by the federal government's work-study program, which provides colleges with subsidies to create jobs for undergraduates.

The federal government is also now committed to making almost unlimited loan funds available to undergraduates. Many Negroes have, however, been reluctant to take advantage of these. For one thing they realized that even if they completed college they would not necessarily be able to earn enough to repay a loan easily—though the partial forgiveness of loans made to future teachers made matters easier for some, especially girls. In addition, many Negro undergraduates had good reason to fear they would never graduate, and this made the prospect of being saddled with a federal debt doubly alarming. Finally, many Negroes had to borrow up to the statutory limit merely to attend a local Negro college, so that federal loans gave them no additional leeway to attend more expensive integrated institutions. As borrowing becomes a more common way of financing higher education for whites, however, Negro resistance may also diminish.

Finally, there are scholarships. Most applicants to Negro colleges have not had the academic qualifications to apply for scholarships at Northern institutions, nor even to apply for admission to the highly competitive pri-

³⁹ College Scholarship Service, *Manual for Financial Aid Officers* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1965). The formulae developed by CSS are used with minor variations by most private colleges and some public ones in measuring how much a student's family can be expected to contribute to his educational costs.

⁴⁰ The 1960 Census (*School Enrollment Supplement*, Final Report, PC (2)-5A, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963, Table 8) showed that 39 per cent of all Negro undergraduates were in the labor force, compared to 46 per cent of white undergraduates. Given the differences in family income, one might expect as many as 75 per cent of the Negro undergraduates to work if jobs were available.

vate colleges which offer most of the full scholarships. Special programs designed to recruit, tutor, and graduate more Negro students at these colleges have succeeded in turning up a number of youngsters who could make it, but the number who plainly cannot remains much larger. The efforts of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation and the National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students have been similarly limited in their numerical effect. This does not, however, mean that such programs will prove politically or culturally irrelevant. Increasing the number of "Ivy League Negroes" could have an enormously positive effect on the national scene a generation hence. It could also have a conspicuous negative effect on Negro colleges in the more immediate future. If the various scholarship programs enable even 10,000 of the most talented Southern Negroes to attend white institutions, the Negro institutions will become markedly more depressing than they now are, and would lose much of their remaining appeal to able faculty.

Another potential threat to the Negro colleges' hold on Negro students is the federal government's still tiny program of scholarships, which are awarded entirely on the basis of need rather than academic promise. These scholarships go to Negroes in appreciable numbers, and they should help those who want to attend unselective white colleges, North or South, to do so. Finally, the "Cold War GI Bill," while paying rather modest benefits, should enable a number of Negro men to attend integrated colleges if they also take advantage of federal loans and work.

Taking all these factors into account, we conclude that poverty alone is unlikely to keep a significant number of Negroes in the Negro colleges in the years ahead. Many Negro students may, of course, *think* they cannot afford to attend a white college, and many may not know about the various programs which would help them pay their way. Indeed, lower-class culture is in general a culture of ignorance of opportunities that are in principle available. Correspondingly, it is the poorer Negro colleges which lack the knowledge, resources, ingenuity, and surplus of energy to go after Federal or other outside grants; the news that "everybody" knows does not travel their way unaided. Yet aid is on its way, both to students and colleges, as college officials are rounded up for conferences, as college textbook salesmen bring news to pollinate a campus, and as promotional efforts penetrate at least to the bigger colleges and high schools.

If we turn from economic to academic obstacles, the path to white colleges looks considerably rougher. We have already cited test scores which suggest that the majority of the students now enrolled in Negro colleges would have great difficulty either getting in or staying in a typical white college. This is true not only of Southern Negroes from segregated schools but of some Northern Negroes who now go South to Negro colleges, sometimes after at-

tending an integrated high school. The only kind of integrated college most of these Negroes could enter would be a junior college which took any high school graduate, or a state college which took anyone in the top three-quarters or the top half of his class. Many Negroes now in Negro colleges would have difficulty surviving even in these colleges without special help—and special help is something that the unselective public commuter college has in the past seldom supplied.⁴¹ Still, if universal higher education becomes a nationally accepted goal—and we think it will—cities and states will be under enormous political pressure (from Negroes, among others) to provide not only colleges which will admit anyone, but also colleges which will graduate anyone who stays the course. In this as in so many other respects, the colleges seem merely to be two generations behind the secondary schools. Looking ahead, it seems likely that unselective junior colleges will be available to the majority of Negroes, North and South, within a generation. It also seems likely that in the more progressive states, such as North Carolina, Texas, and Florida, public four-year colleges will be available in most sizeable cities.

The most important obstacles to Negroes' moving into integrated colleges may not, however, be either economic or academic but more broadly social. There is, to begin with, the fact that Negroes live in a relatively closed subculture, within which the distinction of "their" colleges is usually overestimated. There are many reasons for this overestimation. To begin with, almost every Negro over forty-five who went to college did so at an all-Negro institution. This means that virtually all the successful Negroes of whom a high school senior might have heard are Negro college alumni.⁴² Furthermore, at least in the South, the Negro high school student is likely to have teachers and guidance counsellors all of whom have been to Negro colleges. The counsellor, too overworked to keep up with new trends in admissions offices at white colleges, may fear rebuff if he sends a Negro to a white college—even though today the rejection is more likely to be on academic than racial grounds. Then, too, Negro counsellors are as prone as white ones to feel that what was good enough for them ought to be good enough for the young. Many have a "Who the hell do you think you are?" attitude toward students who want to go to a white college. In addition, some Negro college applicants have a parent, and many have a relative or parental friend, who attended a Negro college. These Negro alumni are often fiercely loyal to their alma mater, partly because they so often feel that college made every-

⁴¹ Cf. Burton R. Clark, *The Open Door College: A Case Study* (New York, 1960), for discussion of counseling of students into more or less demanding junior college programs.

⁴² One suggestive partial exception is Martin Luther King, Jr. King was an undergraduate at Morehouse, but the fact that both he and a number of other Negro Methodist clergymen also studied at Boston University has added to that institution's considerable appeal to younger Negroes. BU's reputation in African Studies has also helped.

thing else (i.e., the escape from lower-class life) possible for them, partly because they often still participate in Negro fraternity or sorority affairs to which college gave them entrée, and partly because at college they made social contacts of value in their careers.

Taken together, all these adult influences have a conservative effect on the college choices of the young, pushing them towards the institutions of their forefathers. The reader who recalls what we said earlier about Negroes' belief in white cultural supremacy may find this choice a bit surprising, and might expect Negro parents, teachers, and other adults to seek vicarious "whiteness" by pushing the young into integrated institutions. Sometimes such pushing does occur, but it is not a simple or uniform pattern. Negro feelings about white institutions are even more dramatically ambivalent than the feelings of other ethnic minorities about Anglo-Saxon attitudes and mores, and all these conflicting emotions are brought to bear on college choices. The Negro who accepts the standards of academic competence established at the national universities may nonetheless claim—and in some respects really believe—that Howard is as academically distinguished as Yale, or that a boy can learn as much at Tuskegee as at MIT. This attitude has been in some ways legitimized and reenforced by the civil rights movement, which has given many Negroes a tentative new pride in their race, and has made them feel that white may not be entirely right after all. The hostility to whites which is much more openly expressed today than it was even a few years back may make attending a white college look like a sell-out.⁴⁸

In addition to all these adult influences, young Negroes have an important influence on one another. If as we have already suggested, the generational gap is even wider among Negroes than among whites, we would expect Negro students' college choices to be even more influenced by their peers than whites' choices are. Nor need this influence lead to integration. If Negroes come up through segregated schools and have exclusively Negro friends, peer group pressures may push them towards a Negro college even more relentlessly than the contradictory hopes and admonitions of their elders. A Negro graduating from a Southern high school will almost always

⁴⁸ In contrast to what is said here, Alexander J. Morin has pointed out to us the paradoxical possibility that some young Negro militants will find the private Negro colleges so offensively "middle class" that they may prefer to battle it out either at predominantly white colleges or at the larger, public Negro colleges. A number of the early activists at the Negro colleges in the period of the first sit-ins and fights over school desegregation were not militant in this ideological sense; they were prepared to respond to leaders like the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. But the definition of militancy has, of course, changed with the influence in the Southern institutions of Northern-trained, more openly alienated and aggressive Negroes and their white allies. It remains to be seen how these crosscurrents of thought and feeling will play themselves out against the changing spectrum both of integrated and of predominantly Negro colleges.

have several acquaintances at the nearest public Negro college in his state; for the foreseeable future he will be less likely to know anyone at the white colleges he might consider. Nor do white admissions systems work in such a way as to facilitate several Negroes from a single Southern high school going off together to a white school. Yet the prospect of going alone is obviously scary. A few white colleges, such as Roosevelt University in Chicago, are widely known to welcome Negroes, but most are unknown quantities which inspire understandable and often justifiable distrust. Yet unless they are considering a college near home, Negroes often have a difficult time discovering whether there will be a supportive Negro community at a non-Negro institution. Sometimes there is, but it takes time for the word to spread.⁴⁴ Without such a community, individual Negroes are likely to be unhappy, for they are even less comfortable as a minority of one—or even half a dozen—than whites are. (The whites, like Englishmen in the Colonies, can more easily protect their egos by feeling culturally superior.) Negroes may hope to have a lot of white friends, but this seldom means they want to be without Negro friends. This is especially true of dating. Very few Negroes' interest in assimilation extends to serious romance—though, like whites, some are eager to explore the limits (or lack of them) on inter-racial sex. Still, Negro girls are at least as interested as white ones in marriage, and Negro boys are equally reluctant to spend Saturday night alone. Even when sex is not an issue, social life can be a problem for Negroes at white colleges. There are, for example, seldom Negro fraternities or sororities at white colleges, and acceptance into a white fraternity, even if possible, is unlikely to provide quite the same feeling of convivial relaxation.

Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that many college applicants prefer an evil they know (segregation) to a promise they only half believe (integration). Nor is this preference simply a matter of ignorance or paranoia. Every year an appreciable number of Negroes transfer from integrated to all-Negro colleges, and while some of these students make the move for academic or financial reasons, many also cite loneliness and personal unhappiness as major motives. These students may still recognize the academic advantages of an integrated college, and the occupational boost a B.A. from such a college would almost certainly give them, but they find that

⁴⁴ The myth that virtually all Negro undergraduates are at Negro colleges has as its counterpart the myth that there are no white institutions with more than token integration. Tokenism can, of course, mean many different things, and some might argue that 500 Negroes in a student body of 20,000 was tokenism. We do not share this view. Coleman *et al.* (*op. cit.*, p. 419) estimates that in 1965 there were 148 colleges where more than 5 and less than 50 per cent of the students were Negroes. The weighted average size of these institutions was about 10,000 students, but some were quite small. They were found in every part of the country and were evenly divided between the public and private sectors.

the personal price is too high. This price is not, we suspect, primarily the result of racial prejudice but of cultural differences. The Negro who goes to a residential white college discovers that social acceptance and intellectual ease depend on his changing in a host of small ways and some big ones. This discovery is not unique to the upwardly mobile Negro. All first generation collegians, especially those from predominantly lower-class ethnic minorities, make this discovery. Some, having made this discovery at a private residential college, may transfer back to a commuter college near home. Others anticipate the problem and become the principal clientele of white ethnic colleges. Such colleges provide the upwardly mobile with credentials, and to some extent with skills, while not asking them to change their ways as much as a predominantly Anglo-Saxon, residential college would. By boosting their alumni into middle-class occupations, these colleges encourage further changes later on, and indirectly make it possible for the sons and daughters of their alumni to feel relatively comfortable in non-ethnic institutions. The Negro college is evidently beginning to play a similar role.

This raises the question whether Negro colleges will be able to hold the children of their own alumni, a challenge which white ethnic colleges have also faced. As we have said, the Negro middle-class parent often makes understandably great efforts to protect his children from discrimination, just as his own large car could once have been seen as in part an escape from Jim Crow transportation. The defensively closed character of the black bourgeoisie, plus the tendency already referred to of all alumni to overestimate the merits of their alma mater, will help the Negro colleges' effort to attract second-generation young people. On the other hand, the Negro middle class seems to be even more education-conscious than its white counterpart, and this is likely to create interests and pressures which lead children towards integrated colleges. The Census reports that 40 per cent of the 17 and 18 year old Negro students with white-collar parents are in private schools, and conscientious white schoolmen are trying to encourage this trend in many places.⁴⁵ As a result, the abler children of college-educated Negroes are often well enough schooled, well enough heeled, and widely enough sought after to compete on equal terms with white college applicants. Their choice of college is therefore likely to be influenced by the same considerations as the choices of comparable whites, and in most cases they will want "the best place I can get into." They will therefore usually choose a nationally known college, and it will usually be an integrated one. This choice will be most likely for those who realize, as most such Negroes probably will, that college is for them merely a prelude to graduate or professional school.

⁴⁵ Coleman, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

It is far from clear, moreover, that even upwardly mobile Negroes who are the first in their families to attend college will want to use Negro colleges as decompression chambers. Like other ethnic minorities, especially urban ones, the majority may prefer a big, pluralistic, public commuter college. Such a college does not suffer under the stigma of segregation, yet neither does it make the stringent psychological demands of an integrated residential college. It holds out the promise that Negroes with its B.A. will be able to leave the ghetto and enter the white world if he wants, but it does not demand that he make the break today. A Negro can come to such a college, attend classes, take his exams, collect his grades, credits, and diplomas and go home every night to his family and friends around the corner. A commuter college of this kind may be less demanding socially, despite the fact that it is predominantly white, than a residential Negro college would be. The commuter college does not ask its Negro students to acquire the habits and values of the old Negro middle class, much less of white society.

Public commuter colleges need not, of course, be integrated. But of the 40 cities with more than 50,000 Negroes in 1960, only four had public, multi-purpose, four-year colleges founded for Negroes. These were Baltimore, Houston, Jackson, and Nashville. In addition, Washington, D.C., had a public teachers college and a federally financed university. The latter, Howard, describes itself as private but charges less than most private universities, Negro or white. Charlotte had a junior college for Negroes. In addition, and perhaps as a portent of things to come, three of Chicago's eight junior college campuses are now overwhelmingly Negro. Once a college becomes all-Negro it is likely to develop the familiar pathologies of *de facto* segregation, which, while not identical to the legacy of *de jure* segregation, show depressing similarities. Chicago's Negro campuses, for example, are reported to use less demanding textbooks than the white campuses, and to set lower standards for academic success. In most cities, however, the danger of *de facto* segregation at the college level is relatively remote. Most public colleges have large enough watersheds to pull in whites as well as Negroes, and high enough admissions requirements so that their current worry is getting more Negroes, not holding onto anxious whites.

When all these considerations are taken into account, what kinds of students can we expect to find remaining within the Negro college system, and what kinds can we expect to see opting out? The answer depends, of course, partly on what becomes of the Negro college themselves—a question we will discuss in our next section. At this point, we need only make clear that when we talk about Negro colleges we mean just that—colleges not only founded for Negroes but catering almost exclusively to them. We are not talking about

the minority of Negro colleges which will attract white students in large numbers and will thus cease to be Negro colleges in any basic sense.

Who, then, will attend the Negro colleges? First, there will be some students who come from homes so isolated from the main currents of American life that they do not sense the occupational advantages of a degree from an integrated school. Second, there will be some whose aspirations are so limited that these advantages are irrelevant—e.g., girls who plan to teach school wherever their husband works and assume that he will work in a big city or small Southern town, where there is a chronic shortage of accredited teachers willing to teach Negro children. Third, there will be a shrinking minority which cannot scrape together enough money to attend any white college. Fourth, there will be a sizeable minority whose upbringing and schooling have so unfitted them for academic life that they cannot get into, or stay in, any nearby white college. Fifth, there will be a substantial group who cannot find an integrated college nearby which has a large enough Negro subculture to make them socially comfortable, and who for any one of a dozen reasons will not go away to such a college. Sixth, for a long time, there will be the residual "social" minority, comparable perhaps to some of the Jewish students at Brandeis, whose parents will want them to meet the right people and marry the right spouses and to remain within the protective community. Seventh, there will be a small "nationalist" minority which, while aware of the occupational advantages of a "white" diploma, and perhaps also of the academic limitations of Negro colleges, will still have an ideological preference for the tyranny of the black bourgeoisie (even as an enemy) over that of the white. Finally, there will be a few whites who, for a mixture of idealistic, exploratory, and neurotic reasons prefer to spend at least one and occasionally four years at colleges where almost all the other students are Negroes.

As the foregoing list makes clear, we do not think that there will be a significant number of Negroes in any income or ability group for whom an all-Negro college will represent the best available academic or occupational choice. We doubt very much that there are a significant number of Negroes for whom this is true even today. We are not saying, however, that no Negro should *ever* attend a Negro college. As our list indicates, there will be many times when, despite the academic and occupational disadvantages, this choice makes sense on social or psychological grounds. We certainly do not think that most Negroes will be happy in institutions where they are almost the only Negroes around. The chief benefits of such heroism are usually reaped by the whites involved and by later generations of Negroes.

IV. THE FUTURE OF THE NEGRO COLLEGES: THE INSTITUTIONS

If our analysis of the potential clientele of the all-Negro college is correct, what is to become of the 123 institutions founded for Negroes which are still extant in 1966?⁴⁶ The colleges seem likely to be caught in much the same bind as other ethnic colleges have been, but without the legitimacy which comes from transmuting ethnic into sectarian separatism, without the financial resources available to most white ethnic and sectarian groups, and with fewer powerful friends. Their traditional, first-generation, lower-income constituency will increasingly turn to unselective publicly-subsidized commuter colleges, while their prospective second-generation, middle-income constituency will often see no reason to choose their parents' alma mater over a hospitable integrated institution. Like Catholic colleges, private Negro institutions can respond to this challenge in one of two ways. Some will undoubtedly try to forget their past and participate fully in the academic revolution, seeking students and faculty of all colors and discriminating only against the academically inept. A few may reject integration as impractical or undesirable, at least on more than a token basis. Instead, they may try to legitimize their separatism through one of the quasi-religious mystiques commonly grouped under the rubric of "black nationalism." This "solution" to the racial dilemma is not, however, likely to be common. Moreover, in the near future, most Negro colleges are likely to go on very much as they now are.⁴⁷

The leading Negro college presidents, working against great odds to maintain and improve the quality and viability of their own institutions, have also had to bear the burden of spokespersonship for their group of colleges and often for the Negro population as a whole. When asked about the eventual fate of their colleges, virtually all of them are inclined to answer that in due course theirs will become integrated institutions. Any other answer would suggest that there is no genuine prospect of establishing a program which might attract white students. In theory, a Negro college president might argue that his college is good enough for whites but that he does not want them. If he took this stance, however, he would probably be called an Uncle Tom, a black nationalist, or both.⁴⁸ While some Negro college presidents are Uncle

⁴⁶ Enumerating Negro colleges is by no means easy, for many are unaccredited, many are tiny, and some do not answer their mail. We rely here on McGrath (*op. cit.*, Appendix A), which appears to be the best available list.

⁴⁷ The dilemmas of the Catholic college alluded to here are discussed in more detail in a forthcoming article by the authors in *The Public Interest* and in their forthcoming book, *The Academic Revolution*.

⁴⁸ On the rhetoric and history involved here, compare Howard Brotz, *The Black Jews of Harlem, Negro Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Negro Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1964), Chaps. 4 and 5.

Toms, and others privately sympathize with the advocates of "black power," almost all go along publicly with the ideal of integration. (The most significant exceptions to this rule are the presidents of a few public colleges in the Deep South, who find themselves in the difficult position of simultaneously placating the white supremacists who appoint them and the increasingly assertive Negroes whose children they educate. Such men usually find it expedient to say as little as possible about the future of their institution.)

The fact that college presidents advocate integration does not, of course, mean that it will inevitably come. On the contrary, we expect that only a small handful of the colleges founded for Negroes will attract substantial white enrollments in our time. This in itself need not be a disaster. Like every minority group, Negroes need institutions they can call their own; and in the American context a college is one of the most servicable institutions a special interest group can have. The symbolic functions of a college for a community, almost needless to say in America, are extremely important; it constitutes an assurance of having arrived, a resource for leadership, and a focus for devotion almost comparable to a cathedral. More palpable service to their constituencies, whether of students or of local communities, is more difficult to trace; but here also some all-Negro colleges will continue to be of considerable value.

In the pages which follow we will examine both the prospects for integration and the prospects for useful service on a segregated basis in various sorts of Negro colleges. We discuss different sorts of Negro colleges separately, in order to emphasize that Negro colleges are not all alike, and probably will not all go the same way. Their futures are linked to one another only insofar as all are linked to the ups and downs of the civil rights movement and white racism.

Wealthy Private Colleges for Negroes

We have already suggested that there are a few privately controlled Negro colleges which are in almost every sense the elite of the Negro academic world. We include in this category the Atlanta group (Atlanta University, Clark College, Morehouse College, Morris Brown College, and Spelman College), Dillard, Fisk, Hampton, Howard, and Tuskegee. These institutions are relatively affluent. In 1964 their combined endowment had a market value of \$100 million. At one time the leading foundations were hesitant to help these colleges, on the understandable ground that their help would mean perpetuating segregation. This purist assumption—if one were fighting the evil of segregation, one did not also have to worry about other evils, such as the inadequacy of the colleges which the present generation of Southern Negroes would attend—has now been abandoned. Upon its abandonment,

the leading private Negro colleges were among the institutions which benefited most. They are also the institutions with loyal alumni, at least some of whom are relatively well off and able to contribute to fund drives.

With the exception of Tuskegee, they are all located in fairly large cities, and with the exceptions of Tuskegee and Hampton, their cities are among the South's most cosmopolitan. These colleges generally offer prospective faculty more academic freedom, higher salaries, and better schools for their children than do most of their Negro rivals. They are not, it is true, all intellectually exciting or innovative. The pedagogic leaders in the Negro collegiate world include some of these institutions, but also Lincoln, Tougaloo, and perhaps others in the private sector, and Texas Southern and Morgan State in the public sector. Nevertheless, when young Negro Ph.D.'s from leading universities decide which of many tempting offers to accept, the only Negro colleges they are likely to consider seriously on a long term basis are the wealthy private ones. (In addition, Howard, Morgan State, and Texas Southern offer both relatively good academic credentials, and a number of spirited students and colleagues, as well as attractive social communities.) Similarly, although some young white faculty members will, for idealistic reasons, want to spend a term at impoverished commuter colleges like Miles, or try their wings at Tougaloo or Virginia Union, more will probably be attracted, at least if they have school-age children, into the Fisk or Morehouse league.⁴⁹ In many cases, what begins as a temporary interlude becomes permanent—especially if a man goes to a Negro college without his Ph.D., finds the routine too exhausting to acquire one, and therefore has few negotiable assets if he wants to leave.

Whether such white faculty will be assets in the years ahead is debatable. Some come to Negro colleges with the romantic illusion that the oppressed are more radical, more idealistic or more "teachable" than the affluent students they have known in Northern white colleges. When such men discover that Negro students have no higher motives and fewer academic interests or aptitudes than the whites they rejected, they often become painfully disillusioned. Moreover, when they realize that the damage done by intellectually undemanding home and school life cannot, in most cases, be undone in four years of college, they may want to leave. And their Negro colleagues and administrative superiors may be happy to see them go, both because they have often been a source of political and pedagogic trouble and because their departure confirms the somehow comforting assumption that whites

⁴⁹ The pattern of recruitment for young, white faculty is likely to be increasingly influenced by the formal and informal links already alluded to between Negro colleges and leading white universities. The cost of these programs is now partly borne by the Federal government.

care about Negroes only for neurotic and missionary rather than "sincere" reasons.

Despite such problems, it seems generally safe to say that the wealthier private colleges will be able to maintain the integrated faculties they now have, and that they will be able to attract some professors, both black and white, with good academic pedigrees. Their problems in this regard are likely to be no different from those of second and third rank white liberal-arts colleges. Like such colleges, they will be tempted to add graduate programs in order to improve their competitive position in the academic marketplace; and as in the comparable white colleges, some able faculty will be diverted from teaching promising undergraduates to teaching captive graduate students who lack the energy or resources to attend a leading university. Yet the opportunity to teach such graduate students and the reputation for doing so, will help attract some faculty.

Although these colleges will probably maintain integrated faculties, they are less likely to obtain integrated student bodies. There will certainly be some white students from the North and a few from the South who find the idea of attending a predominantly Negro college ideologically and culturally attractive, but these cadres are likely to be relatively few. They are, moreover, likely to come from liberal, permissive families and to find the puritanical (if often ineffective) paternalism of these Negro colleges hard to accept. Most will also find the collegiate enthusiasms of their fellow students a disappointment, and few will stay four years in the South. If private Negro colleges are to achieve more than token integration, then, they will have to attract white students largely from their own environs. Here they will be in direct, and hopefully non-ideological, competition with reputable white institutions. The white commuter from Atlanta who considers Morehouse will also be considering Emory, Georgia Tech, and Georgia State. Morehouse's only advantage so far as most whites are concerned is likely to be its lower admissions requirements. Similarly, the white student considering Fisk has the alternatives of Vanderbilt and George Peabody in the same city, and the white student considering Dillard can also choose Tulane, Newcomb, Loyola, or the New Orleans branch of Louisiana State. Hampton has less impressive competition, and so, relative to its own standing, does Howard.

In general, however, it seems clear that these institutions are not going to have an easy time attracting white students. The task might be somewhat simpler if substantial sums were made available for white student scholarships. But considering the other urgent needs of these colleges, and the other sources of support available to whites, most Negro college presidents would find it hard to justify deploying their limited resources in this way. We therefore doubt that any of these colleges will become predominantly white in

the foreseeable future. Indeed, with the exception of Howard, whose professional schools are often the cheapest and sometimes the best in the Washington area, we find it hard to imagine any of the leading, private, Negro colleges attracting even a large minority of whites in the next decade or so.

One alternative would be for these colleges to try to become the Negro counterparts of Brandeis—nearly separate but truly equal. Today there are several serious obstacles to such a course. First, by place of residence and family backing, Jews are likely to have attended the very best elementary and secondary schools in America, while Negroes, outside of a tiny established elite, are likely to have attended some of the very worst. In the second place, and for similar reasons, although Negroes are more numerous than Jews in America, a much smaller proportion of them go to college. Thus, in order to put together a student body which was intellectually comparable to Brandeis, a Negro college would have to make itself the first choice of a very large share of all talented Negro applicants to college. Under current conditions, with white colleges combing the country for such students, this seems almost inconceivable.⁵⁰ In part, the problem is that no Negro college's B.A. carries the same weight as one from Harvard, Oberlin, or Berkeley.⁵¹ Equally serious, not even the best endowed Negro colleges can match the combined resources of Northern white colleges in bidding for promising Negro students. Furthermore, Brandeis succeeded in part because, aside from Orthodox Yeshiva, it had no Jewish competition. Too many Negro colleges are within social and academic hailing distance of one another for any one of them to corner the market on Negro talent. The Negro college scene is, in this respect, more akin to the Catholic than the Jewish one. Boston College, Georgetown, Fordham, and Notre Dame compete with one another as well as with non-sectarian colleges for promising Catholic students; Fisk, Howard, and Morehouse do the same. The analogy is imperfect in another respect, however. Irish Catholic colleges began to achieve distinction only after their ethnic ties had been attenuated and they began drawing from the entire American Catholic population. This gave them a much larger potential constituency than the Negro colleges. Catholics are not only twice as numerous as Negroes, but also twice as likely to send their children to college.

Instead of trying to become Negro Brandeises or Notre Dames, the leading private Negro colleges might try to play the same role vis-à-vis nearby Negro ghettos that the Jesuit colleges once played (and sometimes still do) vis-

⁵⁰ One reason for Brandeis's success is that Jews still find it marginally harder than other students with comparable credentials to get into selective private colleges.

⁵¹ Nonetheless, Richard Plaut reports that in 1953-55, two-thirds of the Negroes who ranked in the top tenth of their graduating classes in segregated Southern high schools preferred a Negro college. We assume the proportion was always lower in the North, and that it is lower in the South today. But we know no data on this point.

à-vis Catholic ghettos. Just as Boston College helped Americanize the Boston Irish, while at the same time partially and temporarily sheltering them from Anglo-Saxon competition and hostility, so Howard might serve Washington Negroes, Fisk might serve Nashville Negroes, and so on. The problem here is that, with the possible exception of Tuskegee, these colleges already aspire to do more than just serve poor local boys. Boston College, Fordham, and St. Louis University have only recently begun to go residential and recruit middle-class Catholics from all over the country. The leading Negro colleges did this some time ago. Indeed, residential education has been of the most decisive importance in deprovincializing Negroes from farms, small towns, and urban ghettos, as well as sheltering them from the punishments of the housing market and other forms of local white hostility. The Negro residential colleges had truly to act *in loco parentis* for Negroes newly off a Delta farm or a comparable small-town setting. Yet the provision of even moderate amenities and the gathering of urbane Negroes, some of them from the North, have given many poor local Negroes a sense that the elite Negro colleges are pretentious and snobbish. For reasons already suggested, the top Negro private colleges are wedded to the old Negro middle class by their histories and to the new Negro middle class by their aspirations. Even if they should wish to emphasize the less invidious style of the latter rather than the haughtier (toward the Negro poor) attitude of the former, their primary appeal will tend to remain, for reasons already presented, to social rather than intellectual or vocational ambition. This means they will get mostly the party boys and will find it very hard to alter their present collegiate character, even if they want to.

Non-Elite Private Colleges for Negroes

When we turn from the top dozen private Negro colleges to the sixty-odd obscure ones, the prospects of integration diminish to the vanishing point. These colleges typically have no endowment whatever, no alumni capable of supporting them at more than a token level, little time or imagination to develop programs which would get federal or foundation support, few contacts with the men who distribute such funds, and no obvious appeal to white philanthropy, faculty, or students.⁵² They tend to be very small—only one or two enroll more than 1000 students, and most have fewer than 500. As a result, they operate with a faculty of 20 or 30, including badly exploited wives, and a budget of perhaps half a million dollars. Many of these colleges are

⁵² There are, however, a few entrepreneurs in the foundations and in federal agencies who will develop a program for a college, fund it, and then hope the college puts the money to good use.

run as if they were the personal property of their presidents—and a few almost literally are.

Recruiting even minimally competent faculty to such colleges is likely to remain difficult. Almost all these colleges are located in small towns or rural areas where local whites are unlikely to be sympathetic, and local Negroes are unlikely to have finished high school. (There are, however, a few exceptions, notably Miles in Birmingham and LeMoyné in Memphis—private commuter colleges which try to play the same role vis-à-vis their urban constituency that the Jesuit colleges have for theirs.) Faculty considering a job in one of these colleges must usually accept not only starvation wages and poor schools for their children, but gruelling teaching loads and isolation from their former friends and colleagues. With little or no time or money for travel to professional meetings or to centers of cosmopolitan culture and with only fifteen or twenty educated families in the town, faculty in such institutions are thrown in upon each other, perhaps even more insistently than in a comparable small, white, denominational college. Predictably gossip rather than ideas becomes the staple of sociability. The intense pressures from all levels of white society on the one side and from the Negro poor (and increasingly the Negro and white student allies of the poor) on the other side add to faculty tensions. In addition, there is often covert or overt conflict between Negro and white faculty. It is therefore hardly surprising that the faculties at these colleges are almost uniformly poor, and the intellectual atmosphere oppressive.

Nor are efforts to upgrade faculty at these colleges likely to have more than marginal effects. Negro faculty have, for example, been recruited for summer institutes at leading Northern and Southern universities. These institutes have not only sought to pass on the newest findings in a discipline, but to lessen pedagogic rigidity and encourage an atmosphere of learning rather than teaching in the home institutions. These summer institutes have given leverage to occasional younger, more enterprising faculty members who benefit from awareness that they were not alone in their struggles, and not entirely crazy for struggling at all. Yet the problems which the institutes have faced are grave indeed, as we have learned from our own experience, as well as vicariously. The models they set may not only be unrealistically high in conventional academic terms, but they may also suffer from the opposite fault of being too unconventional and innovative in terms of the libraries, the administrations, and the entrenched home guard of the Negro institutions. Brought one-by-one or two-by-two from their colleges the faculty members are often realistically fearful of changing even a textbook in which someone may have a vested interest. They are frequently under the

thumb of an older department chairman to whom the president has had to grant almost seigniorial rights because he needs men with Ph.D.'s to retain or obtain accreditation. Like most white colleges, these institutions often feel obliged to let go an effective teacher who has only an M.A. while retaining men with Ph.D.'s of any sort. Almost all the impoverished private Negro colleges seem to be heavily dependent on refugee and emigré faculty, whose foreign credentials look good on paper even when their English is bad and their pedagogy worse. (There are some famous exceptions—one of them, a man whose very foreignness coupled with his courage enabled him to cut through racial barriers that native Americans found impenetrable and to open vistas for students as few local professors could do. Even an individual of this caliber might have been lost if his college had not been supportive.)

Those who believe in the primacy of either racial integration or academic values are likely to respond to this bleak picture by suggesting that these fifty or sixty least promising private Negro colleges be closed down entirely, or perhaps consolidated into a dozen hopefully stronger ones. Taken together, these colleges enroll only about 20-25,000 students, which is between an eighth and a tenth of the Negroes now in college. Although their generally low tuitions may make some of these colleges more accessible to commuters than distant public ones, where the students would have to pay for their subsistence and might not so readily find part-time work, it still seems likely that most of these students in the less adequate private colleges could manage to make their way to public ones with little additional hardship—remembering the very great sacrifice many Negro college students and their families make in the way of earnings foregone and college expenses anxiously assembled. As we shall see, however, these public institutions are not always much better staffed, seldom have more freedom of inquiry or action, and have little more prospect of integration than the majority of private Negro colleges. It could be argued, nevertheless, that a student's chances of intellectual and social growth are somewhat better at a public college simply because these colleges are larger and therefore more diverse. The public colleges' academic advantage may, moreover, increase in the years ahead if Negro voters make their weight felt in legislative appropriations.

As a practical matter, however, the poor, private Negro colleges can neither be closed down nor forced to consolidate any more than their white counterparts can. They may be academically inadequate, but neither their trustees nor the general public see that as a sufficient argument for killing a live institution. So long as these colleges give an otherwise unattainable sense of importance to their trustees, administrators, faculty, and alumni,

most will endure.⁵³ Not even loss of accreditation seems to kill them. Seventeen of the twenty-one private Negro junior colleges and twelve of the forty-nine private four-year colleges were without accreditation in 1964, and the proportions will probably rise if the Southern Association carries through on its promise to apply the same standards to Negro as to white institutions. Yet loss of accreditation did not persuade even the federal government to refuse a college or its students financial help. On the whole, however, Negro colleges get very little money from Washington except for student assistance. Federal aid programs do not always go to only the rich, but they do go to the enterprising. If they could band together, the struggling and unaccredited Negro colleges might support a Washington lobbyist who could help them out, the way the Council for Assistance to Small Colleges assists its members. But cooperation among these colleges is hard to come by—even a joint building program among neighboring colleges encounters the usual suspicious, competitive small-business mentality.⁵⁴

For better or for worse, then, most private Negro colleges seem likely to survive. They will continue to recruit most of their students from all-Negro Southern high schools and to send a substantial proportion of their graduates back to teach in those high schools, unable to break out of the cycle of mis-education and deprivation. Eventually their clientele may shrink, partly as a result of the widening price differential between private and public Negro colleges and partly as a result of increases in the proportion of Negroes in the South attending integrated high schools. The latter development is, however, likely to be slow if it comes at all. For the foreseeable future there will probably be enough devout small-town and small-city Negroes with steady if modest incomes to support the private colleges, even when they cost more and offer less than their public rivals.

As we have seen, for those individuals who get their degrees from these colleges, opportunities for economic and social mobility can be greatly enhanced at least within the segregated system. For those students who do not get certified in this way, but who drop out somewhere along the line and do not return, there may still be some "value added" in basic skills of literacy,

⁵³ Anybody who thinks these colleges will just fade away should attend an alumni reunion at one of them, as one of us recently did. Negroes are as addicted as whites to ceremonies where modest achievements can be translated into mutual admiration societies, and where even these achievements may be momentarily transcended in loyalty to an older if not larger vision of the self. Negro colleges like other colleges have their "trade routes," in which ministers send along promising students from their Sunday Schools, politicians boost the promising or not-so-promising children of local influentials, and all the rest of it.

⁵⁴ There are some cooperative programs among Negro colleges, especially in the Atlanta University group. In other cities, however, the obstacles to collaboration have been even greater than in Atlanta, and several programs have withered after nominal establishment.

consumer sophistication, and knowledge of what the job market offers. However, if one considers the need of Southern Negro communities for intramural leadership, the private colleges hold out the possibility of becoming more useful to a wider constituency.

One possible road to such usefulness would be for them to become authentic "community colleges," servicing not just the young Negro high-school graduate in need of credentials, but local Negroes of all ages and with all kinds of nonacademic needs. This approach is, of course, akin to the "land-grant idea" referred to earlier, and also to the "Tuskegee idea." The basic premise behind this approach is that in the foreseeable future the Negro community will not get the kinds of help it needs from institutions which are directly subservient to local whites. If this is true, private Negro colleges could play an important role in channeling outside money and ideas into the local Negro community and in organizing local Negro efforts at self-help.

A number of private Negro colleges have already begun to serve as conduits for federal funds aimed at Southern Negroes, running programs which no white-controlled public agency would touch. (The most famous case is Mary Holmes Junior College, which provided cover for the Child Development Group of Mississippi to run a federally-financed community organizing and pre-school program of extraordinary distinction.) At least in theory, private Negro colleges could become the administrative and organizational base for service programs ranging from pre-college training such as the federally sponsored Upward Bound program to adult job training, prenatal health care, and legal assistance. Such a role would inevitably be precarious. Resources which were available from Washington for controversial programs in 1965 began to dry up in 1966 as the national political mood about Negroes changed and this sort of cycle will be repeated.

A community college of this kind would not be very academically respectable, for in order to serve a still uneducated and impoverished constituency, it would have to eschew the pretense and the hope of working only with academically-trained professionals and pre-professionals. Adopting this role requires a degree of self-confidence and self-direction which few colleges, Negro or white, have. The same problem arises in even more acute form when one thinks not just of reaching out into the community but of providing a realistic education for the students who come from that community to the college. It seems clear to us—although most faculty at these colleges, or anywhere, would not agree—that it would be more profitable to teach most of these students other things than the traditional subjects by traditional methods. We are more hopeful about efforts to blend academic instruction with more practical activities. Such efforts began at places like Miles and Tougaloo, which tried to establish programs which would allow civil rights

activists to mix study with "field work." But in general, Negro educators resent such proposals as condescending, unless leading white colleges are doing the same thing.

Another possibility might be to try to develop a distinctively "black" curriculum. Most academicians regard such an idea as preposterous, arguing that there is no such thing as "Negro sociology" or "Negro literature" (much less "Negro chemistry"). In the broadest sense this is undoubtedly true, for any particular brand of sociology or literature can usefully be viewed in a larger and more universal context. "Negro sociology" is in this sense part of "American sociology," and indeed of unmodified "sociology." But just as the American university curriculum in part reflects the particular situation, past and present, of Americans, and differs from the curriculum in a Japanese or Polish university, so the Negro college curriculum might take as its starting point the culture from which its students come and for which they are headed. There are already some efforts in this direction, such as courses in Negro history or African history, or on the legal problems of integration. Yet no Negro college has yet tried to give these subjects the importance and legitimacy which, for example, Catholic colleges traditionally gave "Catholic" subjects. (Lincoln University in Pennsylvania has, however, moved some distance in this direction.) Nor has any Negro college attempted to develop professional training programs geared primarily to solving the large, seemingly intractable, problems confronting Negroes in America. Howard Law School, it is true, trained a generation of civil rights lawyers who helped attack the legal underpinnings of segregation, but there are few other comparable examples of Negro colleges' training "revolutionary professionals," much less professional revolutionaries.

A college which emphasized Negro culture and Negro problems would have a limited clientele. It would not appeal to those young Negroes—and there are many—whose strongest desire is to forget the fact that they are black. The Freedom Schools operated in Mississippi during the summer of 1964 found, for example, that French was one of the most popular subjects, presumably because it was both remote and non-American, yet "white."⁵⁵ We do not believe that anyone should have to study "Negro" subjects simply because he is himself a Negro. Negro students should be free to study medieval history as well as slave revolts, just as Negro sociologists and novelists have struggled to feel free to write about nonracial themes. We are only arguing for the creation of options and experimentation. (The Freedom Schools found even more students interested in Negro history than in

⁵⁵ Thomas Pettigrew notes that French was unavailable as a subject in the Negro high schools of Mississippi, and this barrier made it seem all the more attractive.

French.) We believe that all colleges, black or white, should do far more than they now do to build part of their curriculum on the world of their students outside the classroom, that is, on the actual culture from which the students come. The sports, the jazz, the comics and other fiction, the television shows, the cars that already interest them could be made the subjects of discussion and criticism and the take-off points for broader and deeper study.

Yet we cannot emphasize enough the complexities of efforts to provide relevant curricula. Howard offers courses in Swahili and Yoruba, Atlanta University in African studies. Will such matters necessarily mean more to young Negroes than Dante to street-corner Italians? People are always being told what their traditions are—and then that these are mythical. Even so, American ethnic groups have revived many dormant nationalisms, turning themselves in the process into people of one book or many. The Black Muslims have made former convicts literate. The question of what is relevant is always mediated by ideology, as well as by other forms of experience. And only through experiment can the limits of possibility be explored.

A substantial number of young Negroes cannot, we think, be reached any other way. These students are often violently anti-white, and they are not likely to become less so in the foreseeable future. They tend to shun both public Negro colleges which are overtly repressive and responsive to white legislators, and private Negro colleges which accept white standards of excellence and concentrate their energy on getting students into white graduate schools. Seeing no other academic opportunities, they often reject education entirely, as another white conspiracy (like religion).⁵⁶ Most drop out before college, and the rest soon after entering, even though their doing so is pretty clearly self-defeating. (The Negro who wants to resist the white society around him has a greater need of a good education than the Negro who wants to assimilate, as the Black Muslims have always said.) The problem is to devise a form of education which helps people cope with the white world without making them either completely alienated from it or subservient to it; just as the larger problem is to devise forms of upward mobility which allow able Negroes to maintain creative tension between themselves and the white world instead of being wholly co-opted by it. While it is clear that most Negro colleges want no part of black nationalism, black power, or the other slogans and resentments which animate so many young Negroes, it is conceivable that out of seventy private Negro colleges at least one or two might go this route.

If neither the "community service" nor the "nationalist" orientation were

⁵⁶ Compare the description of the "young Negro hangers-on" in Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau's, *The New Radicals: A Report With Documents* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 23.

workable, another option for some of these poor private institutions would be to stop competing with better situated colleges, white or Negro, and start competing with the still woefully inadequate secondary schools. Poor schooling probably does more damage to 14-17 year-olds than to 18-21 year-olds. Furthermore, Southern Negroes today have few real alternatives to their mediocre local high school; they do have alternatives to mediocre private colleges. In principle, a private college might simply become a residential secondary school. In practice, this would entail an intolerable loss of status, a reversion to the very position many of these colleges escaped only a generation back. The same result could, however, be accomplished gradually and covertly by establishing an "early admission" program for ninth, tenth, and eleventh graders, along with cooperative arrangements allowing sophomores, juniors, and seniors to do much of their work at big, integrated universities. The marginal colleges would thus provide an escape for students whose local secondary school was hopelessly inadequate, and a gateway to some comparatively lively cooperating university. In theory, such a scheme could be largely financed by the federal government under its Upward Bound program. Even so, few would-be college presidents or professors are likely to find it attractive, and this means it is not likely to be tried. And pressure from whites for such a program is almost certain to be self-defeating because it would be taken as condescension.

Public Negro Colleges

So long as old-style segregation persists in the South, and middle-class Negroes cannot exercise an effective voice in the operations of predominantly white colleges, there is at least a theoretical argument for the preservation of Negro-run private institutions responsive to the needs and hopes of Negro parents and children. Because they are private, and often in some small measure shielded by a denominational tie (as in the resourceful instance of the American Missionary Association), the possibility for relatively free-wheeling experimentation is always present. The public Negro colleges are nominally less free, because they are responsive to white legislators, local Regents or state systems of higher education, and the journalistic monitoring of other watchful whites. Under these conditions, separatism seldom facilitates experimentalism or innovation.

While integration would probably not help in this regard, it might well reduce provinciality for both Negroes and whites. The prospects, however, for integrating most existing public Negro colleges are poor. In the twelve years since the *Brown* decision, only three public Negro colleges, all in Border States, appear to have attracted substantial numbers of whites. These are Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri; Bluefield State College in

West Virginia; and West Virginia State College. Most of the whites coming to these colleges are commuters who have no convenient or economical alternative. Commonly, they return home again when their classes are over, leaving the student union and even the athletic teams in the hands of the residential Negroes. Those white students who have the money and inclination to leave home for college still choose to attend traditionally white colleges. It is, as Southern liberals often say, easier to achieve "vertical" integration in classrooms than "horizontal" integration in dormitories.

The West Virginia and Missouri experience has several unusual features. First, these traditionally Negro public institutions were fortunately located. There were no white public institutions nearby to which commuters could turn, and there were a lot of relatively poor whites nearby for whom a commuter college was the only plausible route to a B.A. Very few other public Negro colleges meet these conditions. Many are located in sparsely settled rural areas and have relatively few students of any color within commuting distance. Most of those in urban areas have a white competitor within commuting distance.

Even where the public Negro college *does* have a large "natural" white clientele, a state legislature may not be willing to do what is necessary to ensure integration. In Maryland, for example, Morgan State was for many years the only public institution in Baltimore. When whites began to demand a public commuter college for the Baltimore area, however, the Maryland legislature never seriously considered developing Morgan to serve this purpose. Instead, a new University of Maryland campus was begun in the Baltimore suburbs, ensuring a large measure of *de facto* segregation for the foreseeable future. Similarly, Texas Southern was for many years the only public institution in Houston. But when Houston whites began to demand a publicly subsidized commuter college, the Texas legislature met this demand by negotiating a take-over of the hitherto private and undistinguished University of Houston, not by expanding Texas Southern. As in Maryland, this meant that *de facto* segregation would probably persist for the foreseeable future. While poorer Southern states might be harder pressed to maintain a dual system, most of these states would be under even stronger ideological pressure to do so. Even states like North Carolina and Florida, which are, by Southern standards, relatively liberal on the race issue and have progressive state systems of higher education, do not seem politically ready to attempt the integration of established four-year Negro institutions.

Both to justify nonintegration and out of guilt for doing so, some state systems of higher education have already done a great deal to upgrade the physical facilities and salary scales of the public Negro colleges; any Northern visitor can be taken on a tour to see these handsome new plants, "better

than for our own," whose library budgets and tables of organization may also reflect the use of universalistic criteria in allocating money. (Racial favoritism may still occur in fringe benefits, and the white state universities, as distinct from the white state colleges, are ordinarily much better off both in annual and capital appropriations.) Just as in the white academic world, public institutions backed by state taxing power are likely to have a growing competitive advantage in recruiting faculty over all but the very top private ones. But we should again underline the large differences among the Southern states in the financial support and academic leeway given their Negro and indeed their white institutions—a leeway of course subject to change in some measure with the election returns.

And what about Negro influence on those returns? If Southern Negroes choose to employ their steadily growing electoral power to make a political issue of higher education, they could bring about a more equitable allocation of funds between the white and Negro public institutions than that which unevenly exists already. But such pressures are unlikely to bring much integration, although they may bring better education. Those Negroes who want integration will be able to send their children to predominantly white public colleges. Integrationists, both black and white, may disapprove of all-Negro institutions on principle, but it will be hard to demand that such institutions be closed so long as Negroes are voluntarily choosing to attend them. Substantial numbers of Negroes will, moreover, keep choosing these colleges so long as they are easier to get into and easier to stay in than integrated institutions. Practically speaking, this means that separate Negro institutions will almost certainly survive until there is a network of unselective junior colleges and state colleges within commuting distance of most Negroes in a state.

Residential public Negro colleges will, however, find it increasingly difficult to attract big city Negroes from either the North or the South, since these students will in most cases have better opportunities available to them at the same cost. Instead, residential public Negro colleges will attract mostly Negroes raised in small and medium-sized towns, educated in segregated schools, and unwilling or unable to compete in white colleges. Some of these students will plan to join the old Negro middle class in their home towns, usually by becoming school teachers. Others will hope to break out of this mold by going to a large city, North or South, where the walls of segregation are more permeable, economic circumstances less pinched, and the round of daily life more tantalizing. The more ambitious of these city-oriented Negroes will, however, presumably want to escape small town life when they go to college, heading for an integrated institution or at least for an urban Negro college like Morgan, Texas Southern, Tennessee A & I in Nashville, or Alabama State in Montgomery. Only the cautious will delay the transi-

tion, going to isolated and (at least to their parents) reassuringly provincial colleges like Fort Valley State in Georgia or Prairie View A & M in Texas. In some cases, these institutions will raise their students' sights to a more cosmopolitan level, ensuring that they "can't go home again." More often they will probably confirm students in their self-imposed limitations, ensuring that they *will* go home again, albeit in a white collar job.

Despite the affluence of the public Negro colleges relative to most private ones, both in terms of salaries and working conditions, these institutions will have an extremely difficult time competing for competent faculty, and an even more difficult time persuading whatever faculty they get to deal with their students in an imaginative way. These colleges have very little to tempt a talented professor, whatever his color. Except for such leaders as Texas Southern, the public Negro colleges are among the least favored institutions in the least favored states in the nation. The public Negro colleges, moreover, suffer in many instances from having been until recently *de facto* teachers colleges, with all that that implies not only for academic prestige but for the character of the faculty against whom a newcomer would have to struggle if he wanted to innovate. All but the most saintly professors require the support of a few gifted Negro students every so often to reassure them that their difficult mission is not in vain. For a few activist faculty, student strikes, sit-ins, or other signs of life may provide some support. However, once there are enough Negroes at white public colleges in a given state to make these colleges seem not only academically attractive but socially manageable, the public Negro colleges are likely to get very few gifted Negro students. Such a trend will almost certainly make faculty recruitment even more difficult than it now is.

Looking a generation ahead, we suspect that the Southern situation will increasingly resemble that in Ohio and Pennsylvania. These are relatively industrialized states with median incomes comparable to what the South might have in a generation. Negroes in these states have had the vote since they arrived in force, although their even now relatively small numbers limit their political influence. Both states have a number of public colleges which are open to Negroes. But both states have also had a public Negro college for many years. There has been no significant demand to close these two colleges, yet neither has attracted appreciable white enrollment. Neither college has made any great contribution to the lives of Negroes in its state, beyond certifying them for appropriate middle-class jobs. Nonetheless, 40 to 50 per cent of the Ohio Negroes who go to college choose Central State, and 25 to 30 per cent of the Pennsylvania Negroes who go to college choose Cheyney State.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ For estimates of total enrollment among Pennsylvania Negroes, see William H. Gray, Jr. "Pennsylvania College Enrollments," *American Teachers Association Bulletin*, December,

Like the poorer private Negro colleges, then, public Negro colleges are for the most part likely to remain fourth-rate institutions at the tail end of the academic procession. Perhaps the most important thing that could be done to improve all such colleges, black or white, would be to ensure that their students knew there was a larger and more cosmopolitan world which they might, with effort, join. Able young professors who teach in such colleges for a year, or even a summer, open this vista for some students. Sometimes, in fact, they can endanger such students by too rapidly deracinating them—as happens in white colleges also of course—without being able to provide them with an alternative to their traditional and safer destination. Such instances will lend support to the more permanent faculty who feel threatened or antagonistic to the newcomers and who hope to see them go back home again without inflicting the pain of change on local faculty. (Local Negroes have often endured as much pain as they think they can stand, just in becoming professors. Negro M.A.'s will often struggle for the Ph.D. when most comparable whites have either given up or gained that prize, and the struggle is seldom ennobling.) Yet so long as "carpetbagger" faculty keep returning, they may be able to support more lively resident faculty and to reach a few restless students each year. This will be especially possible if there continue to be summer programs which bring students from these colleges to major university campuses, help them explore ideas in a new way, develop their confidence that they might survive or even flourish in such an environment, and try to give them a realistic sense of the possibilities open to them at the graduate level.

Helpful as such forays may be, however, they do not touch the basic problem of educating large numbers of academically untrained (and in most cases unmotivated) students. These students' intellectual limitations differ only in degree from those of their white counterparts in hundreds of colleges across the land. The problem is not likely to be solved by integrating these whites and Negroes into the same institutions—though some other problems may well be solved. The most that a college can probably hope to do for such students, white or black, is probably to improve their basic skills a little, provide them with a foretaste of white-collar life, and give them the diploma they

1964. Gray's data must, however, be treated with caution. Many colleges reported Negro enrollment in round numbers, which suggests they were guessing. Others did not report at all. If Gray's data were correct, Pennsylvania Negroes would be only a quarter as likely as Pennsylvania whites to enter college. This would be well below the national ratio, which appears to be about 5:2 rather than 4:1. Jaffe, Adams, and Meyers, *op. cit.*, suggests that the overall college entrance rate of Negroes in the North approximates that for the nation as a whole, and it is hard to see why Pennsylvania should deviate dramatically from the Northern norm. Since all these estimates are subject to wide margins of error, they should be treated with considerable skepticism.

need to enter the white-collar world. As for the life of the mind, we doubt that any program can make it attractive or accessible to many students who have been intellectually starved for their first seventeen years.

The problem here is similar to that posed by young people who have been emotionally thwarted in their early years. Psychoanalytic therapy can help some of them, but it requires such effort as to be impractical for large numbers, even though techniques can be invented that work with a few individuals. Yet in academic as in psychiatric affairs, one cannot simply give up. Leadership is needed from the academically exclusive universities to help invent remedial programs which will improve basic skills among despairing and often antagonistic student bodies. Such leadership is necessary, quite apart from the technical and human problems involved, in order to make working with inept students seem respectable as well as feasible. But on a large-scale, long-term basis, the burden is likely to fall on the state colleges and junior colleges, which would require enormous resources to inaugurate the necessary programs. Since academically intractable white students also need programs which can link the life of the mind to the life of the street, it seems both intellectually and politically necessary to try to integrate such colleges. Without a united front of needy Negroes and whites, it is hard to see how the necessary intellectual or financial effort will be made. Yet such a united front seems almost as visionary a hope now as when the Populists first broached it, only to sour on it, in the last century. The initiative will probably have to come from above; it usually does.

This essay presents a dissenting view of prevailing concepts of education and approaches to educational reform. Reforms currently directed at American schools are grounded in conceptual and institutional frameworks that fail to confront the most fundamental problems of our age. The authors outline the nature of these problems, suggest ways in which education in America both reflects and exacerbates the problems, and finally sketch an educational model they feel is more appropriate to the challenges of modern America.

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Education and Community*

We assume that the most fundamental objective of education is the development of individual human dignity, or self-realization within community. The broadly stated objective can be specified in many ways, emphasizing either individualism or social association. However one defines dignity or fulfillment, the nature of the society within which it develops is critical. As Kateb (1965, p. 456) points out:

First, the relation between social practices and institutions and the self is not simply one of support or encouragement. To put it that way is to imply that there could be selves without society, that society is at most a device for helping the self to do what it could do alone but only very laboriously, and that eventually the self can outgrow society and be realized in splendid isolation. The plain truth is that without a society there are no selves, that, as Aristotle said, the community is prior to the individual, that the selves to be realized are given their essential qualities by their societies,

* The authors are indebted to a number of colleagues and students, and to authors listed herein. It is our pleasure to acknowledge the helpful contributions of Robert A. Nisbet, Paul Goodman, Herbert A. Thelen, and Joseph C. Grannis.

and that the process of self-realization is a process of continuous involvement with society, as society not only shapes but employs everyone's inner riches. The upshot is that thought about possible styles of life or about the nature of man is necessary to give sense to the idea of individuality. Far from being an oppressive encroachment, social theory (utopian or not) is a basic duty.

Kateb's point applied to education means that educational policy should be based on deliberation and inquiry into needs of the individual within community. Every educator faithful to this premise should be able, therefore, to explicate and clarify the particular conception of society or community upon which he justifies educational recommendations.

I. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Contemporary American civilization can be interpreted with reference to two general concepts: missing community and great society. The former notices effects of industrialization, urbanization, specialization, and technology that tend to destroy man's sense of relatedness, to disintegrate common bonds, to increase apathy, to depersonalize activities, and to reduce identity and meaning in the human career. In contrast, the vision of a great society exudes a sturdy optimism in man's progress, a desire to accelerate urbanization, technology, and economic development, on the assumption that such inevitable historical forces can be harnessed to make man more free and more secure to allow him to be more "human" than ever before. Education for the great society involves raising teacher salaries, building more schools, using computers and audio-visual devices to supply training and meet the manpower needs of the "national interest." Seen from a missing community perspective, however, major objectives of education involve the creation and nourishment of diverse styles of life which allow for significant choice in the reconstruction of community relationships—formal training and "national interest" are of minor significance. Before delving into the two theories, we must examine the concept of community, for its definition lies at the heart of the distinction between these two views of American civilization.

Redefining Community

Nineteenth century sociologists (and earlier thinkers as well) compared human relationships and groups by referring to a general construct bounded at one end by the concept "community" and at the other by "society" (Tönnies, 1963).¹ The former signifies a closely knit, generally self-sufficient, rural

¹ In the foreword to this edition, P. Sorokin mentions eternal parallels between the work of Tönnies and Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others. In the introduction, J. C.

group in which the extended family serves not only the function of procreation but also the functions of economic production, education, recreation, religion, care of the sick and aged, safety, and defense. Individuals in such a group know each other well; they share common experiences and traditions; they depend upon each other and assume responsibility for solving group problems. Style of life varies inappreciably from one generation to the next.

A sharp contrast to this type of group is mass society, characterized by large numbers of people within an urban industrial environment, influenced by many institutions each of which performs the separate functions of education, religion, economic production, defense, medicine, recreation, care of the aged, and legal and political control. People shift their places of residence, change their occupations, and follow living styles quite different from those of previous generations. Because of mobility, specialization, and a rapid rate of change, people have less in common with each other and weaker ties to a basic or primary group; their allegiances and loyalties are diffused among many social units instead of focused on one.

Relationships within a community have been described as "organic," and "natural," while societal relationships are seen as "mechanical," and "rational." Community becomes an end in itself, while society is a means toward other separate ends. Thus did Tönnies distinguish between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society), the former based on shared intimacy and interdependence—the folkways and mores of primary groups; the latter signifying impersonal, logical, formally contractual relationships inherent in commerce, science, and bureaucracy. Tönnies helps to clarify the distinction by asserting that in a community, human relationships are characterized by acquaintance, sympathy, confidence, and interdependence; whereas in a society, relationships reveal strangeness, antipathy, mistrust, and independence.

Conventional sociological definitions of community emphasize (a) a set of households concentrated within a limited geographical area; (b) substantial social interaction between residents; and (c) a sense of common membership, of belonging together, not based exclusively on kinship ties. The essential criterion seems to be a psychological one—"a sense of common bond," the sharing of an identity, holding things in common esteem (Inkeles, 1964, pp. 68-9). Communities are frequently identified by references to legal-political boundaries, ethnic groups, occupational classifications, or simply areas of residence. Standard definitions fail to distinguish among

McKinney and C. P. Loomis discuss analogous concepts in the work of Durkheim, Cooley, Redfield, Becker, Sorokin, Weber, and Parsons.

more specific criteria that *lead to* the development of interaction or a sense of belonging; the above criteria, for example, make it difficult to distinguish between a group and a community. We should like to offer a more differentiated set of criteria, each of which is viewed as a continuum. It is thus possible to have greater and lesser degrees of community depending upon the extent to which each of the criteria described below is fulfilled. These criteria include attributes valued by the authors and encompass characteristics beyond those needed for a minimally adequate definition. For instance, tightly knit groups or communities do not necessarily allow competing factions (attribute 3, below); the Puritans in Massachusetts Bay and the Amish in Pennsylvania are examples. By our definition, such groups constitute less of a community than groups which tolerate more diverse conceptions of "the good life." A community is a group

(1) in which membership is valued as an end in itself, not merely as a means to other ends;

(2) that concerns itself with many and significant aspects of the lives of members;

(3) that allows competing factions;

(4) whose members share commitment to common purpose and to procedures for handling conflict within the group;

(5) whose members share responsibility for the actions of the group;

(6) whose members have enduring and extensive personal contact with each other.

This working definition omits residence, political units, occupations, etc. as necessarily valid boundaries by which to distinguish one community from another.

As we speak of "missing community," we are constantly reminded of the foolishness of wishing for the establishment in the modern world of communities similar to the traditional rural model. We are told either (a) that such communities never did exist; or (b) they may have existed, but they were certainly not very pleasant—on the contrary, that human life in the by-gone community contained anxieties and problems more tragic than the ones we face today; or (c) they may have existed and been delightful, but inevitable forces have pushed them aside and it is impossible to turn back the clock. But these points are irrelevant. Our definition makes no historical claims, nor does it implore a return to days of old. The only claim is that in the modern world, community (as defined above) is missing.

It is not that the number of associations and human groups has decreased. On the contrary, we find more organizations than ever before: professional associations, credit unions, churches, corporations, labor unions, civil rights groups, clubs, as well as families. Yet few, if any, of such groups fulfill our

definition of community, mainly because of the relatively special and narrow functions that each of them serves. The emergence of many institutions, each with specialized functions, has created discontinuities, such as the major one described by Nisbet:

Our present crisis lies in the fact that whereas the small traditional associations, founded upon kinship, faith, or locality, are still expected to communicate to individuals the principal moral ends and psychological gratifications of society, they have manifestly become detached from positions of functional relevance to the larger economic and political decisions of our society. Family, local community, church, and the whole network of informal interpersonal relationships have ceased to play a determining role in our institutional systems of mutual aid, welfare, education, recreation, and economic production and distribution. Yet despite the loss of these manifest institutional functions, we continue to expect them to perform adequately the implicit psychological or symbolic functions in the life of the individual (Nisbet, 1962, p. 54).

What institutions *do* perform psychological or symbolic functions necessary for viable community? In mass society few can be found, and Nisbet traces historical developments that account for their disappearance. He sees at the root of the problem the growth of a centralized economic and political system which, by concentrating on serving *individual* needs, has neglected and eroded community. Objectives of the "great society" are to provide selected products and services: housing, jobs, food, education, medical aid, transportation, and recreation for individuals; and centralized bureaucracies now meet many of these particular needs. But the process of centralization and specialization has caused the breakdown of communication among differing groups, the rise of transient rather than enduring relationships among people, the disintegration of common bonds and the reluctance to share collective responsibility. Whether it is possible to create new forms of community appropriate for urban and industrial society should be of great concern in planning for education. The extent to which one takes this problem seriously depends largely upon whether he accepts a *missing community* or a *great society* frame of reference. These contrasting ways of construing social issues and educational needs are described below. Our intent here is to describe, rather than to defend or justify either view.

The Missing Community

Modern technological society proceeds at an ever increasing rate toward the breakdown of conditions requisite to human dignity. Neither the contented, other-directed, organization man, nor the American female, nor the alienated youth finds genuine integrity or a sense of relatedness to the human community. Experience becomes fragmented, and humans become en-

capsulated, as occupational specialization and social isolation make it difficult for diverse groups to communicate effectively with each other. Human relationships take on mechanistic qualities and become determined, not by tradition, human feeling, or spontaneous desires, but by impersonal machines or bureaucratic flow charts. Career patterns, social roles, and environments change rapidly, producing conflicting demands on the individual, and threatening the establishment of identity. The size, complexity, and interdependence of political and economic institutions dwarf his significance. The destiny of the community appears to be guided either by elite, inaccessible power blocs or by impersonal forces, insensitive to individual protest or opinion. People lack direction and commitment; they betray either lethargic denial of basic problems, ambiguity and conflict regarding value choices, or outright repudiation of a concern for significant choices.²

The first theme prominent in the missing community view is *fragmentation* of life. Modern society, it is argued, accelerates a process of specialization, division of labor, and personal isolation, making it difficult for the individual to relate to other human beings outside of a narrow social class or vocational group. The inability to associate or communicate beyond the limits of one's special "place" is destructive to a sense of identity within community, because community demands the ability to perceive (or at least unconsciously assume) relatedness among a variety of people, institutions, events, and stages of life.

Second, and related to fragmentation, is the theme of *change*. In a way, the essence of American character is zeal for change; yet the exponential rate of social change in modern society tends to destroy the essential stability required to establish a sense of relatedness among people. Social change aggravates the difficulties of one generation's relating to the next; it thwarts the opportunity to observe or sense continuity within the human career; and it places considerable strains on the human personality by valuing primarily adjustment and flexibility.

Third, critics decry our present state of *ideological and aesthetic bankruptcy*. It is argued that modern society, through a reverence for technology, cultivates excessive stress on the fulfillment of instrumental values, and pays scant attention to ends or ideals. Mass culture discourages utopian thought;

² These observations relate to a wide range of phenomena, represented in studies of bureaucracy (Blau, 1956; Whyte, 1956); corporate power (Berle, 1954); political and legal institutions (Mills, 1956; Wheeler, 1965); ideology (Bell, 1962); youth (Friedenberg, 1959, 1963; Goodman, 1956; Keniston, 1965); education (Kimball and McClellan, 1962); work and leisure (Mumford, 1934; Swados, 1957; Veblen, 1957); women (Friedan, 1964); American character (Riesman, 1953; Gorer, 1964); voter behavior (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954); or more generally, the human condition (Arendt, 1958; Royce, 1965). The authors of such studies address themselves to a number of questions, only a few of which are explicitly raised in our characterization of the missing community.

it has slight regard for ideals of beauty and contemplation because it directs its major energy toward producing more products with less effort. This quantitative rather than qualitative emphasis is most evident in the cult of the consumer. Commitment to conspicuous consumption and means of social mobility seem to outweigh commitment to what may be considered more vague or visionary ends such as social justice, personal salvation, or the attainment of inner virtue. Total emphasis on the instrumental and the material (it is argued) is harmful because commitment to more intangible ideals is a prime requisite for building a sense of individual worth.

Fourth, and centrally related to all of these themes, is the trend toward *depersonalization* of experience, typically noted in humanist attacks upon the influence of automation and cybernetics. Delegating to machines a vast number of activities formerly performed by humans may well erode our ability to discriminate the more subtle, less easily communicated differences among human beings—the differences that make each person unique. Not only automation, but a variety of conditions of modern and suburban living (specialization, extreme mobility, geographic isolation of production and consumption) tend to inhibit the development of meaningful interpersonal experience. Outcries against depersonalization—the prospect of man being governed totally by computer-based, predictable decisions—reveal widespread concern over this problem.

Finally, the missing community is characterized by a feeling of *powerlessness*—the sense that no individual has significant control over his own destiny. Powerlessness becomes a central issue in American culture because of its contradiction to premises of liberal political thought; namely that the destiny of the community is determined by the wishes of individuals, by the consent of the governed, rather than by unresponsive elites, aloof bureaucracies, or impersonal forces. But in the face of such conditions as impersonal bureaucracies, the growing influence of corporate structures, and extreme social mobility and change, it is difficult for the individual to see how he affects the determination of social policy or the making of decisions that have profound effects on his life.

Consequences of the above themes can be viewed from a psychological standpoint, leading to internal states of feeling and thought characteristically labeled anomie, alienation, disaffection, identity diffusion, and estrangement of man from himself and community. But a psychological interpretation of these phenomena is difficult to establish for two reasons: first, because of problems in accurately assessing inner psychic conditions, and second, because of the possibility that people may believe themselves to be contented, when in fact they may be unconsciously disillusioned and their community proceeding to a condition of irretrievable disaster. For these reasons, it is

particularly important to examine the various themes not only from the standpoint of reports of "how people feel" but also from more analytic examination of the roles and functions of family, religion, occupation; the procedures for attaining justice in metropolitan and bureaucratic environments; and the legal-political arrangements for resolving various kinds of human conflict. In other words, one might see community "missing" in two senses: in terms of individuals' feelings about it, or in terms of a developing institutional framework inimical to the pursuit of human dignity.

The Great Society

Opposed to the missing community interpretation is the more optimistic view that conditions and trends in modern America will lead not to the demise of but to more hopeful forms of self realization. Our economic, political, and social institutions offer virtually unlimited promise for the meeting of material needs, the establishment of justice, and the cultivation of creativity and other elements associated with conceptions of the good life. Having reached a level of high mass consumption, our system may now proceed to stress the development of advanced forms of human service—education, medical care, recreation, psychological counseling, and community planning (Fuchs, 1966). The accelerated growth of technology offers unprecedented opportunity for solving persistent human problems, whether in making work meaningful, extending the life-span, beautifying the countryside, or increasing the motivation of children to learn (National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, 1966). The political system, having zealously guarded basic rights and freedoms, continues on a solid basis of consensus, while still encouraging dissent and experimentation with new approaches to public issues (Schattschneider, 1960; Key, 1966).

The great society interpretation has answers to points raised in the missing community view. We notice a tendency to deny claims made in the latter. For example, evidence is gathered to show that most people work in small firms, rather than large bureaucracies, performing personal human services, rather than manufacturing goods on impersonal assembly lines (Fuchs, 1966). Advances in communications and transportation, far from creating divisive fragmentation, have produced unforeseen possibilities for people of widely differing backgrounds to share common experience. Automation has not produced impersonal, mechanistic individuals, but has freed individuals to be more genuinely human than ever before (Weiner, 1954). People do in fact have power to determine the destiny of the community through their participation in groups designed specifically for the pursuit of given interests. (Bell, 1962, mentions some of the thousands of groups which Americans join—evidence both that man is not alone and that his groups give him

power to protect his basic interests.) Rather than apologize for a lack of ideological commitment, one might gather evidence of fervent commitment to basic and traditional American values such as equality of opportunity and general welfare. Programs like the Peace Corps, poverty programs, and civil rights advances attest to this. By reference to figures on the publishing industry and on the state of the arts, one might also argue that aesthetic appreciation and activity begin to flourish more than ever.

Although the great society school would accept the existence of many trends mentioned in the missing community view, it would argue that their effects are beneficial rather than harmful. For example, specialization and division of labor are said to provide additional alternatives or areas of choice never before open to the individual. A highly differentiated and specialized society offers greater possibilities for meeting specific interests, idiosyncratic skills, and desires. Though change does proceed rapidly, it has the refreshing effect of ensuring flexibility, a safeguard against stagnation into fixed styles of living and thinking. Automation and technology also have liberating influences, allowing individuals to pursue interpersonal relationships less constrained by the demands of the environment or material needs. While decisions on important matters may be left in the hands of diffuse bureaucracies or distant "experts," these bureaucratic forms and expert fields of knowledge make helpful contributions in the process of decision-making and management of human affairs.

The optimism inherent in the great society view does not dampen its fervor in attacking a number of social problems. The National Commission on Technology and the American Economy refers to several "social costs and dislocations" caused by technological advance: rapid migration of rural workers to the city, decrease in the number of factory production and maintenance jobs, economic distress due to closing of plants, pollution of the water and air, and 35 million people living below the poverty level. Yet the Commission concludes, "Technology has, on balance, surely been a great blessing to mankind—despite the fact that some of the benefits have been offset by costs. There should be no thought of deliberately slowing down the rate of technological advancement. . . ." (National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, 1966, p. xiii). This report and others (e.g. U.S. Department of Labor, 1966) call for bold and inventive new approaches to the solution of serious social problems, but the basic tasks are seen as unfinished business, or clean-up operations, within a general context of unprecedented prosperity and social accomplishment. There is no tendency to debate or question ultimate goals, but only to confront practical problems of putting existing institutions to work, of devising programs to fulfill unquestioned objectives (such as full employment, higher teacher

salaries, or stability in the Negro family). The solution of problems as construed in the great society approach does not require changes in the institutional structure of society at large (Rossiter, 1960).

Two major reasons are offered by proponents of the great society for not questioning current social trends: (a) much of what is objected to (urbanization, automation, specialization, rapid change, etc.) arises as part of an inevitable stream of social development that has inevitable social costs; and (b) challenging the fundamental premises and organization of the society would result in irrevocable rupture, chaos, and destructive revolution, which would shatter the foundations of modern society rather than improve it. This is what Keniston (1965, p. 433 f.) calls the argument of "psycho-social vice."

Finally, the proponents of great society explain away many of the missing community criticisms. They claim that critics who embrace the missing community view cling to an outdated and inappropriate frame of reference, a characteristically Lockean or Jeffersonian view of society—an agrarian community of yeomen, artisans, and gentleman aristocrats living a relatively stable existence, close to nature, with deep-rooted personal relationships and a simple social organization whereby individuals exercise power in a way that in fact determines their own destiny. Great society enthusiasts reject the missing community view by pointing out that the concepts of individuality and community take on entirely new meaning in modern society. For example, consent of the governed should not be grounded in the simple-minded notion that each individual can influence decision-makers in government; realistically, influence must be pursued by joining large pressure groups. Or, meaningful work should no longer be judged in terms of obsolete notions of craftsmanship, or pursuing a task from origin to completion; rather, that white collar administrative work within a bureaucracy has important meaning but in a different sense. Modern society cannot be realistically judged through the lenses of what Keniston calls "romantic regression."

Choosing between Interpretations

An adequate evaluation of the merits of each interpretation requires extended investigation, and this paper is only the beginning of our efforts to move the inquiry along. The outlined interpretations presented above are not intended as comprehensive social theories, but as two broadly sketched descriptive statements which contain, on the one hand, clear overtones of protest against current social development, and on the other, a self-assured optimism with the political, economic, and technological character of the "great society." For the moment, we are more persuaded by the missing community view. We believe that, in general, the great society orientation is more

sensitive to superficial symptoms than to fundamental problems, while that of the missing community attacks major issues directly.

By way of example, consider contrasting approaches to the problem of old age. The great society approach focuses on the attainment of fairly obvious kinds of material needs to reduce direct burdens that the aged can impose on the young: guaranteed medical treatment, guaranteed income, physical environments suited to the physical capabilities of the aged (fewer stairs to climb, convenient transportation, moderate climate, etc.). The missing community approach, however, points up the far-reaching impact of programs aimed only at such specific needs. In catering to the specific needs of the aged, we have created entire communities of "senior citizens," segregated and literally fenced off from the rest of society. Their physical isolation helps to reinforce a self-fulfilling mystique about old age which Rosenfelt (1965, pp. 39-40) describes:

Health and vigor, it is assumed, are gone forever. The senses have lost their acuity. The memory is kaput. Education and new learning are out of the question, as one expects to lose his mental faculties with age. Adventure and creativity are for the young and courageous. They are ruled out for the old, who are, *ipso facto*, timid and lacking in moral stamina. . . .

While the old person is taking stock of himself, he might as well become resigned to being "behind the times," for it is inconceivable he should have kept abreast of them. As a worker, he has become a liability. His rigidity, his out-of-date training, his proneness to disabling illness, not to mention his irritability, lowered efficiency and arrogant manner, all militate against the likelihood of his being hired or promoted. . . .

Nothing is to be expected from the children. They have their own lives to lead. Furthermore, they are leading them, like as not, in distant locations, bridged only by the three-minute phone call on alternate Sundays, if contact is maintained at all. . . . Grandparents make people more nervous than it's worth—easier to get a babysitter, and the youngsters like it better that way.

The aged are not only isolated, but clearly discriminated against when it comes to basic decisions in medical services: the life of a young person is generally more highly valued (Kalish, 1965). A missing community concern with old age focuses on general questions such as the relationship between the quality of aged life and the nature of community, the meaning of retirement in an age of constantly changing careers and universal leisure, the challenge of creating integral relationships among generations.

As another illustration, consider two ways of construing the problem of the automobile in America. As Detroit increases its auto production, the great society proposes solutions to relatively specific problems: build more

highways, clear the polluted air with special devices, and require more effective safety standards. Those viewing the auto from a missing community framework would focus on such issues as (a) the changes in styles of life caused by the auto (e.g. the fact that we may live, work, spend weekends in separate geographic areas) and their implications for "community," (b) the possibility that the auto serves the function of psychological protest against modern society by providing one of the few opportunities for man to enjoy power and freedom and (for young people) privacy, and (c) changes in our sensitivity to the physical environment (the building of highways, gaudy signs, junkyards, parking lots) that affect aesthetic experience and the conservation of natural resources.

The great society neglects basic issues of community by focusing instead on relatively immediate individual needs, and creating *national* organizations to meet them. The President says, "Our goal is not just a job for every worker. Our goal is to place every worker in a job where he utilizes his full productive potential for his own and for society's benefit" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1966, p. xii). The target is the individual worker, the bureaucracy is the Department of Labor, and, of course, we have an eminent national commission on technology and economy which, in a farsighted manner, proclaims that the conditions of work must be humanized, and we must allow for a flexible lifespan of work. Expansive programs are justified and evaluated by reference to the national interest or to "society's benefits."⁸ There is, in great society thinking, a huge gap between the concepts of national interest and the dignity of the individual. That gap is the symptom of missing community. The major issues lie *between* obvious economic needs of individuals and the national interest: the problem of creating complex relationships where humans share common bonds which are strengthened not by consensus but by conflict and diversity, relationships in which they associate for enduring and important purposes and in which national interest is only *one* of many competing ways to justify policy. Whereas the missing community view gives these issues highest priority, the great society approach virtually ignores them.

The great society, in its attention to immediate and specific needs, tends to neglect and stifle consideration of basic, long range issues. The missing community view, on the other hand, attunes itself to forces and trends that suggest ominous consequences for the human condition. This, we feel, provides the sort of healthy discontent required to construe and deal with major prob-

⁸ See for example, Keppel (1966, Ch. IV), who justifies increased federal spending in education almost entirely on the grounds that it will result in more economic use of human resources; that it is, therefore, in the national interest to make a greater investment in education.

lems. Our sense of missing community, though clearly influenced by conceptions of former social organization (in this country and other cultures), is *not* based on a nostalgic desire to restore types of communities long obsolete and inappropriate for the modern world. Community is "missing" not in the sense that "old fashioned" ones no longer exist, but in the sense that we have not yet devised conceptions of community that deal with particular challenges of the modern environment. To further explore implications of the missing community view, we shall examine its relevance to trends in American education.

II. A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE PREMISES OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EDUCATION

The acceptance of existing social trends characteristic of the great society advocate is perhaps one of his more serious limitations. He sees the present as manifesting historically irreversible conceptions of society, e.g., technology, urbanization, or centralization. Desirable outcomes of obvious historical forces are labeled "progress" (e.g. increased leisure), while adverse consequences are called the "price of progress" (e.g. the increasing loss of privacy or the threat of nuclear war). Applied to education, this perspective postulates that we have a type of education, with us here and now, that is obviously consistent with our equalitarian democratic heritage; and although it may have problems, we can build on the foundation that history has provided. But from the missing community point of view, one scrutinizes historical trends as possible *roots* of present problems—roots that may need to be destroyed rather than built upon. The process of evaluating tradition (rather than accepting it as a foundation) allows one to identify a broad range of alternatives and to question the extent to which they may be applicable to present choices. Honest inquiry leads one to ask whether future actions should be built on prior historical choices or whether one might reconsider premises underlying the initial choices themselves.

Because of its apparent inability to re-examine, in either contemporary or historical terms, major premises underlying its approach to education, the great society view manifests a narrow construction of what education is and ought to be. It accepts as given the premises that education is (a) formal schooling, operating as (b) a public monopoly, (c) modeled after the organizational structure and utilitarian values of corporate business. Great society proposals for educational change accept these as traditional, inevitable conditions rather than simply as one peculiar set of options against which a number of alternatives may be continually argued and tested. Below we shall raise questions concerning these premises, questions which sug-

gest that it is time, not simply for "reform," but for a radical re-evaluation of our present conception of education and schooling.

Education as Formal Schooling

To most Americans the term *education* is synonymous with schooling, defined as formal instruction carried on in an institution which has no other purpose. In conventional rhetoric one "gets" an education by going to school. One therefore improves education by improving schools. Whether we read progressive (Dewey, 1900, 1902), traditionalists (Rickover, 1960), public educational statesmen (Conant, 1959), prominent professors venturing into curriculum reform (Bruner, 1960), or contemporary analysts of education in America (Kimball & McClellan, 1962; Benson, 1965), we find universal agreement that better education requires better schooling.

Federal and foundation moneys are channeled into hundreds of projects designed to improve instruction in the schools. New approaches to instruction such as team teaching, programmed instruction, the nongraded schools, use of computers, simulation, educational television are all designed as methods for improving schooling. Millions are spent in pre-school training programs to prepare the "disadvantaged" for success in school, to prevent adolescents from dropping out of school, to train teachers to teach in schools. In addition to the traditional elementary-secondary-college sequence of schools, we aim to improve education by creating more schools: summer school, night school, graduate and professional schools.

The proliferation of schools leads one to ponder whether it might be possible to become educated without going through a process of conscious formalized instruction in institutions designed only for that function. Bailyn (1960) notes the emergence of formal schools in the Anglo-American colonies as an historical development responding to radical social changes. He boldly suggests that even before formal schools emerged, people acquired an effective education through less formal processes.

The forms of education assumed by the first generation of settlers in America were a direct inheritance from the medieval past. Serving the needs of a homogeneous, slowly changing rural society, they were largely instinctive and traditional, little articulated and little formalized. The most important agency in the transfer of culture was not formal institutions of instruction or public instruments of communication, but the family. . . .

. . . the family's educational role was not restricted to elementary socialization. Within these kinship groupings, skills that provided at least the first step in vocational training were taught and practiced. In a great many cases, as among the agricultural laboring population and small tradesmen who together comprised the overwhelming majority of the population, all the vocational instruction necessary for mature life was provided by the family. . . .

What the family left undone by way of informal education the local community most often completed. It did so in entirely natural ways, for so elaborate was the architecture of family organization and so deeply founded was it in the soil of stable, slowly changing village and town communities in which intermarriage among the same groups had taken place generation after generation that it was at times difficult for the child to know where the family left off and the greater society began. . . .

More explicit in its educational function than either family or community was the church. . . . It furthered the introduction of the child to society by instructing him in the system of thought and imagery which underlay the culture's values and aims. . . .

Family, community, and church together accounted for the greater part of the mechanism by which English culture transferred itself across the generations. The instruments of deliberate pedagogy, of explicit, literate education, accounted for a smaller, though indispensable, portion of the process. . . . The cultural burdens it bore were relatively slight. . . . (Bailyn, 1960, pp. 15-19).

The modern American, however, no longer construes family, church, or other community agencies as vital educational institutions. He is in fact still in the process of distilling from other institutions their normal educative functions and transferring them to the school; e.g., vocational training, auto safety and driver training, rehabilitation of the disadvantaged, early childhood training, homemaking. The consequences of assuming that education necessarily takes place in school, or *should* take place in school, have been profound and far reaching, and require serious re-examination.

The allocation of the educational functions of society to a single separate institution—the school—suggests that such an institution must have a unique responsibility and that the separation must somehow be intrinsically related to this responsibility. This assumption becomes highly suspect, however, when we look at three important aspects of the separation: (a) we conceive of education as necessarily “preparation,” and we carefully separate “learning” from “acting,” “doing,” or productive work; (b) we separate the school environment from the “noninstructional” life of the community at large; and (c) we construe teaching as a specialized occupation, isolated from the world of action and decision-making—a world that is considered to have no pedagogical function.

Education as preparation. The establishment of formal schooling is commonly justified on the ground that we need a specialized institution to prepare children and youth for life as productive adults. The value of education is seen as instrumental, leading to ends extrinsic from the processes of formal instruction itself. We get an education *now* so that at some *later* time we can earn money, vote intelligently, raise children, serve our country, and

the like. The preparatory emphasis implies closure—education is begun and finished. Graduation or commencement signifies the termination of learning and the beginning of real life. Education in America most often consists of formal training through discrete courses and programs. How many institutions have we designed to foster education, not as preparatory activity but as a legitimate end in itself, insinuated as a continuing integral element throughout one's career?

Preparatory aims of formal schooling are often embedded in a concept of growth. As Bruner remarks, "Instruction is, after all, an effort to assist or to shape growth" (Bruner, 1966, p. 1). To implement such a mandate, schools have isolated children and adolescents from adults and have focused most of the formal training on young people. This, however, betrays a confusion between biological and mental development. Let us assume that the schools should be primarily concerned with mental-emotional development (they can have relatively minor affects on biological growth). First, we wonder whether it is possible to make a useful distinction between people who are "growing" versus those who have "matured" with regard to mental-emotional development. One could argue that adulthood, far from being a period of stable maturity, is no more than a continuing process of mental-emotional growth (and biological change) presenting conflicts and problems of adjustment as "stormy" and challenging as growth during childhood and adolescence. Marriage, child-rearing, occupational decision, pursuit of leisure, adaptation to geographic and occupational change, and adjustment to retirement and death continually demand growth by adults. With the entirety of a human life cycle before us, we would ask, when is mental-emotional maturity reached? If growth, change, and decay continue until death, then why confine education to the early years of biological development?

Second, by assuming young people to be dynamic and growing and adults to be static and ripe, one is led to postulate that adults have needs essentially different from the needs of young people—that conflicts and differences *between* generations are greater than conflicts and differences within a given generation. We would suggest, however, that members of differing generations do have common problems and educational needs, and the needs of members of the same generation may be radically diverse. Compare for example, an unemployed man of 40 with an unemployed teenage dropout, both of whom lack literacy and vocational skills. Could they not share with benefit a common educational experience? Or suppose an oppressed ethnic group is attempting to combat discrimination. Members of that group from all generations face a common problem. Conversely, groups *within* a generation may have quite different educational needs: a 30-year-old mother on public assistance versus a 30-year-old attorney attempting to establish a law

practice; or a teenage girl from a broken lower-class home versus a teenage boy from a stable upper-class family.

Our exclusive emphasis on preparation raises another basic question: Is it possible that, in spite of certain commonalities across generations, childhood and adolescence constitute in themselves integral parts of the human career, with certain roles, needs, and behavior that may be quite unrelated to the demands of a future adulthood? Schools are designed mainly to implant in students knowledge, attitudes, and skills revered by adult scholars and educators, yet we can legitimately question why it is necessary to stress almost exclusively adult values before children and youth have attained that biological and social status.

We also note a certain pragmatic folly in education as preparation for future adulthood in the modern world. A leading educational innovator remarks on "the colossal problem of educating youngsters for jobs which do not exist and for professions which cannot be described" (Brown, 1963, p. 14). Is it even possible to prepare children to behave fruitfully in a future world, the dimensions and complexities of which educated adults are presently unable to grasp?

The tendency of formal schooling to isolate children during a period of "preparation" for adulthood has produced a rigid system of age-grading which has as one effect a fractionation of the human career. This tends to hinder the development of meaningful relationships among generations and cultivates a fragmented, rather than continuous concept of self. The prevailing conception that children can learn only *from*, rather than with, adults and the forced submission of youth to the rule of adults amplifies the conflict between generations and encourages a posture of dependency, a sense of powerlessness that may carry over from youth to adulthood.

School and the community at large. A large portion of school training is separated from, and has no significant effect on students' behavior outside of school mainly because of the isolation of the school establishment from problems, dilemmas, choices, and phenomena encountered beyond school walls. Teachers readily attest to students' capacity to "tune-out" or memorize but not apply lessons taught in school. There is a sense of unreality inherent in living in two discontinuous worlds, if one is to take both seriously.

The progressives tried to handle this separation by bringing more "real life" activities into the school. They tried to match work in school with work in real life, introducing various manual skills and decision-making activities similar to those occurring outside of school. Modern efforts in curriculum reform have pursued the same idea through the development of simulation activities—attempts to make school relevant to more instructional life. But

simulation still occurs within *instructional* contexts and is, therefore, detached from actual and significant concerns. It may cultivate an attitude that learning or life or both are synonymous with playing games. The attempt to make school "fun" by exploiting the motivational power of competition or curiosity in children simply avoids the challenge of applying learning to life outside the school. In spite of progressive efforts in the direction of anti-formalism (for example, allowing students more individual freedom, emphasizing play and a variety of arts and crafts), they did much to solidify a conception of education as equivalent to formal schooling. In fact, the most dramatic way for the progressive to demonstrate his ideas was to found a new *school*, which soon became isolated from genuine conflicts and decisions of students' lives beyond school walls.

Teaching as a specialized occupation. Formal schooling provided the basis for a new specialized "profession of education." As Cremin (1964) points out, the profession was quick to isolate itself from other professions and fields of knowledge. It also built an education establishment dedicated to the study, servicing, and expansion of formal schooling as a separate and discrete institution, often accumulating powerful vested interests irrelevant to the real improvement of education (Conant, 1963, 1964). As an alternative to the unquestioned policy of requiring professionally trained teachers in schools, one might argue that in fact students could gain valuable education from each other and from a variety of "untrained," though interesting individuals, be they blue-collar laborers, politicians, bureaucrats, criminals, priests, athletes, artists, or whatever. To the extent that schools are staffed by professional educators, learning tends to become isolated from the significant concerns of the community, and the narrower functions and tasks of the *school* come to dominate the broader purposes of education.

Education as Public Monopoly

That schooling was eventually expanded as a stable and universal service through governmental compulsion rather than private voluntary associations, raises questions regarding the political philosophy that underlies such a system. American political thought has traditionally distinguished between society (a collection of various private groupings) and government (the combination of political and legal organs that make up the state). As Tom Paine described the distinction,

Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness: the former promotes our happiness positively; the latter negatively, by restraining vices (quoted in Lindsay, 1943, p. 124).

Lindsay's comments on the distinction illustrate the special value that Americans placed on voluntary associations:

The English or the American democrat takes it for granted that there should be in society voluntary associations of all kinds, religious, philanthropic, commercial; that these should be independent of the state at least in the sense that the state does not create them. The state may have to control and regulate them. Questions concerning their relations with the state are indeed continually turning up, but it is always taken for granted that men form these societies and associations for their own purposes; that their loyalty to such associations is direct; that it therefore does not follow that the state will prevail in any conflict between such associations and the state (Lindsay, 1943, p. 120).

The spirit of this laissez-faire philosophy implies that the state exists to facilitate a plurality of diverse interests inherent in men's *voluntary* associations and enterprises. The commitment of a community representing such a plurality of interests was applied to many domains of experience: to religion where sectarianism flourished; to economic affairs through the development of overlapping and competing business enterprises. Traditional notions of ordered artisan industries controlled by disciplined guilds, agriculture controlled by the feudal lords, mercantile trading policies encouraged and regulated by a central government, monopolistic industry sanctioned by restrictive state charters, all of these institutions fell before the laissez-faire economics practiced in America. It was assumed that the life of the community at large would be infused by the vigor and drive of private enterprise and association, that natural laws of competition and cooperation would prevent any serious conflict between private interests and the public good.

As was not the case in religious institutions and business enterprise, pluralism in the schools was short-lived. The concept of the common school took firm roots in Massachusetts early in the nineteenth century and spread to the other states. The common school was apparently conceived as a deliberate instrument to reduce cultural and religious differences. "The children of all nationalities, religions, creeds, and economic levels would then have an opportunity to mix together in the common schoolroom" (Butts & Cremin, 1953, p. 194). Once the common school was firmly established, pressure grew to establish secondary schools and to open the private academies to all. The schools faced a critical choice: once the common-school concept was accepted, how would the traditional commitment to pluralism be worked out? When children from diverse economic, ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds came together, how would the differences be recognized and handled?

Rapidly increasing immigration from Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century created in the common school a major test for the pluralistic philosophy. Some Americans viewed the floodtide of newcomers as an opportunity to renew and invigorate the national and ethnic dimension of American pluralism. In 1915 Horace Kallen sentimentally envisioned

... a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their kind. The common language of the commonwealth ... would be English, but each nationality would have for its own emotional and involuntary life its own peculiar dialect or speech, its own individual and inevitable esthetic and intellectual forms. The political and economic life of the commonwealth is a single unit and serves as the foundation and background for the realization of the distinctive individuality of each *nation* that composes it and of the pooling of these in harmony above them all (Kallen, 1953, pp. 29-30).

But not all Americans had faith in the "distinctive individuality" of national groups. Fearing that continued cultivation of national differences would be disruptive to society, the common schools apparently stressed the need for pooling or assimilating immigrants into a common melting pot.

In addition to tension created by religious sectarianism, free enterprise, and ethnic diversity, the nineteenth century labored under severe strains created by the process of rapid industrialization. Evidently the public school responded to these strains by stressing the common values of routine monotonous work, progress, and the Horatio Alger hope of social mobility.

In the end, public schools attained a virtual monopoly on the life of youth between ages six and sixteen. This development represents a clear shift in political philosophy. It signifies a blurring, if not total rejection, of the distinction between society and government, formerly so crucial to the American democrat; that is, it indicates a loss of faith in the ability of a pluralistic system of private associations to provide an education that would benefit both the individual and his nation.

Perhaps at this point in history it was necessary and useful for the common school to serve a cohesive and integrating function by emphasizing a common heritage, common aspirations, common learnings, common dress, and a common routine within the school. One could suggest, in fact, that the school simply reflected the needs and requirements of the society by stressing *integrating* elements in the society, rather than the diversity, so blatant and obvious. Granted that the society might have been on the brink of disintegration and in need of cohesive institutions at that time, uniformity and conformity have been continuously characteristic of public education ever since the development of common and secondary schools. One might

argue theoretically that even though education is public and compulsory, it can conceivably encourage and reinforce cultural diversity by providing a wide range of alternative types of education. This, however, has not been true of public education in America. On the contrary, the schools have attempted to file down or erase distinctive cultural traits, denying that important cultural diversity ever existed; the instruction and procedures of the school reflect a mandate to persuade youth that all groups share a common language, common political and economic institutions, and common standards of right and wrong behavior. And although it is somewhat more stylish to recognize the importance of "individual differences," these are construed in psychological rather than cultural terms. In so far as the recent effort to educate slum children has forced us to recognize cultural differences, these are still construed largely as cultural deficiencies.

We are concerned with two general effects of the decision to make education an exclusive, compulsory, public function.⁴ The first relates to the way in which the public monopoly has fundamentally altered the nature of childhood and adolescence in America. Young people spend more than half of their working hours from age six to their early twenties trying to meet demands of formal schooling. This has destroyed to a large extent opportunities for random, exploratory work and play outside of a formal educational setting. One could argue that, psychologically, it is most important for youth (and for that matter all humans) to spend a significant portion of their life in spontaneous, voluntary kinds of activity, as in Erickson's (1962) suggestion of a psycho-social moratorium, rather than in regimented, required, planned learning tasks. By denying to students basic responsibility and freedom, public schooling prevents development of a sense of competency in making personal decisions. Though schooling requires large quantities of work ("industry"), its evaluation system generally assumes the work of youth to be inferior to work of adults (teachers). The public institutional milieu of the school discourages the development of intimacy among students, or between students and teachers. Schooling prevents exploratory, experimental activity, it prohibits total involvement in any single interest, it refuses to delegate to students responsibility for seeking their own "education." If public schooling were only one among many major areas of experience for young people, these would be less important criticisms. What makes the criticisms most significant is the fact that schooling has a virtual monopoly on youth's time and energy, possessing the power to suppress the quest for individuation through extra-school activity.

⁴ The fact that state laws allow youth to fulfill educational obligations by attending private as well as public schools does not diminish the influence of the public monopoly. A

In addition to psychological dangers, the monopoly carries as a second major threat its potential for creating cultural uniformity, destroying diversity in points of view, in styles of life, in standards of taste, and in underlying value commitments. The standard rebuttal for this criticism is to point out that although we do have required public education, it is controlled by local communities, it is not a national system. One can, therefore, have radically diverse types of education, depending upon the unique needs of each community. In theory this answer seems persuasive, but in fact there are a number of forces at work in modern America—mass media, the publishing industry, national curriculum development programs, and professional educators—which combine (however unintentionally) to produce overall institutional similarity. If one examines programs in schools throughout the country, one finds an incredible similarity among curricula of different communities. (The apparent differences between schooling in slums and suburbs cannot be accounted for by assuming that slum dwellers have chosen to have one type of education, suburbanites another.) Although public schooling should not bear all of the responsibility for this cultural uniformity, the fact that it has captive control of youth allows it to accelerate the process of cultural standardization. Our objection to such a trend is based on the assumption that the essence of freedom lies in the opportunity for significant choice, and that choice becomes increasingly limited as individual and cultural differences are blurred or erased.

Given the failure of the school to support a vital pluralistic tradition, one might ask why must education be carried on as a publicly controlled compulsory activity? Law and medicine, certainly as vital as education for society, have remained largely under the control of the private sector. Communication and transmission of knowledge to the community at large, equally important, is accomplished by powerful, but essentially private media industries (books, newspapers, cinema, television). To meet basic subsistence needs, we use a system of production and distribution run mainly by private enterprise. Spiritual-religious activities are exclusively reserved for private associations. Curiously, public schools are required to provide ideological indoctrination (the American Creed) of an order comparable to religious institutions, yet we have refused public support for "religious" education. In the field of citizenship education, the public schools provide instruction for citizen participation in political process, but in fact that instruction is

relatively small proportion of children do attend private schools (approximately 16 per cent at the elementary level and 11 per cent at the secondary level). Moreover, even private schools must conform to publicly established standards.

obstructed by myths and misinformation; the most effective training for political life occurs within various private interest groups, or parties.

Education Modeled after Corporate Bureaucracy

Education, having developed into a concept of formal compulsory instruction publicly sponsored, could conceivably have taken many forms. Public schools might have become coordinating agencies which channeled the students into a variety of educational experiences provided by existing political, economic, cultural, and religious institutions. Schools might have become supplementary agencies, like libraries, appended to small neighborhood communities. In the long run, however, education adopted the prevailing institutional structure in the society at large: the factory served by an industrial development laboratory and managed according to production-line and bureaucratic principles. Architecturally, the schools came to resemble factories (instruction carried on first in rooms but more recently in large loft-like spaces, with different spaces reserved for different types of instruction) and office buildings (with corridors designed to handle traffic between compartments of uniform size). Conceivably, schools could have been built like private homes, cathedrals, artists' studios, or country villas.

The schools came to be administered like smooth-running production lines. Clear hierarchies of authority were established: student, parent, teacher, principal, superintendent, and school committeeman, each of whom was presumed to know his function and the limits of his authority. Consistent with the principle of the division of labor, activities were organized into special departments: teaching (with its many sub-divisions), administration, guidance, custodial services, etc. The process of instruction was seen by the administrator as a method of assembling and coordinating standardized units of production: classes of equal size, instructional periods of equal length; uniform "adopted" books and materials that all students would absorb; standard lessons provided by teachers with standardized training. Departures or interruptions in the routine were (and still are) discouraged for their potentially disruptive effect on the overall process (e.g., taking a field trip, or showing a film that requires two periods' worth of time, or making special arrangements to meet with students individually). Conceivably, the schools could have been organized on a much less regimented basis, allowing a good deal of exploratory, random, unscheduled sort of activity. However, as Callahan (1962) persuasively argues, the corporate bureaucratic model, guided by the cult of efficiency, exerted a major influence on the organization and program of public education.

In our view the effects of corporate organization in education lead to three

major developments all of which have important contemporary implications: (a) the research and development mentality which limits its attention to finding or building technology and instrumentation to achieve given specifiable goals, rather than questioning or formulating the goals themselves; (b) the increasingly fragmented school environment, which is sliced according to administrative and subject matter categories prescribed by educational specialists rather than according to salient concerns of children, youth, or the larger community; and (c) the trend toward centralized, coordinated decision-making for schools by a combination of agencies in government, business, universities, foundations, and "non-profit" research and development institutes.

The research and development mentality. The great society seeks to build a highly educated final product (a graduate) at the lowest possible cost per unit. Armed with such a mandate, policy makers and educators scurry to devise and implement techniques that will achieve visible "pay-offs" in the "terminal behavior" of students. A host of new devices and programs emerge: nongraded schools, advanced placement courses, independent study, programmed instruction, self-administered TV and cinema, computer-based instruction. They are lauded and increasingly in demand for their apparent effectiveness in speeding up the educational process by "individualizing" instruction for students. The Federal government invests millions of dollars through universities, research and development centers, and private industry to produce more efficient methods. Administrators use the techniques both as yardsticks by which to evaluate and as symbols by which to advertise their schools and build their personal reputation. Policy makers and curriculum advisers beg for definite answers concerning which methods are best. But who seeks reasons for the emphasis on acceleration and efficiency? Why read at age three? Why learn quadratic equations at age ten? Why study American history a year or two earlier? Why try to think like an MIT physicist or an anthropologist at all? The research and development mentality thrives on gadgets, engineering metaphors, and the fever of efficiency, but rarely questions the purposes to which its technology is applied.

A new and fashionable manifestation of this general mentality is the current emphasis on systems. The aim of this approach is to describe in schematic (and often mathematical) detail relationships among all components in a system (i.e., a curriculum, classroom, school, or school district) and to evaluate the extent to which given objectives are being achieved by specific components or the system as a whole at certain points of time. Using diagnostic information provided by intensive testing, the job is to build a related set of components and experiences that will lead to specifiable ter-

minal behavior. The general purpose is to *clarify* and *increase the effectiveness* of the entire process through which a given input is changed into an output that meets given criteria or standards of performance. The responsibility of systems development is limited to devising techniques for attaining objectives previously fed into the system; the formulation of ultimate aims is delegated to external sources. (The systems engineer boldly proclaims, "You tell us what you want, and we'll program it.") Though one could build a system that would allow for flexibility and even respond to changing objectives, we believe that in essence the systems approach avoids rather than recognizes or deals with the most important problems of education, namely objectives and substance. The excessive concern with technique, rather than a searching examination of ends, results in a tendency to accept as legitimate those objectives that can be translated into operations and those products which can be schematically and quantitatively measured.

Despite its "practical" outlook, the R & D mentality constantly runs up against the "relevancy problem": the fact that children and youth do, in fact, see the content of school as bookish and artificial, unrelated to the decisions and actions that lead to important consequences either in school or in the outside world. Both students and teachers attempt to right the disproportionate emphasis on abstract words and thought by stressing instead concrete procedures that provide a context of action and decision—prompt attendance, assignments completed, tests taken—and success. The progressive approach to the relevancy problem was to abandon rigid work and grade standards without recognizing that these constraints served the fundamental function of providing structure, definition of task, and consequences of decisions that are palpable and immediate. The new R & D proponent is somewhat more sophisticated: instead of stressing the concrete procedures associated with abstract verbal tasks, he seeks to simulate the real tasks of the outside world. Students play war, peace-making, monopoly, empire building, showing all the involvement of adult poker and bingo players. Although the R & D specialist sees the conceptual relationship between elements of the simulated activity or game and real life decisions, does the student? Perhaps the student simply learns that adults get their intellectual kicks out of playing games, rather than dealing with real problems in the noninstructional world. At any rate there is some evidence that what students learn from playing games is how to play games, not how to construe either academic or worldly problems more effectively.⁵

Unfortunately, the underlying difficulty cannot be corrected by R & D

⁵ Unpublished work by Mary Alice White of Teachers College, Columbia University suggests this conclusion.

specialists. It is a result of the fact that we have chosen to divorce schooling from problems and choices that have genuine significance for youth and community. Since the kind of learning we prescribe is not intrinsically important to students, we invent trivial tasks and procedures to capture their attention, and we contract with engineers and R & D centers to do this as efficiently as possible. Significant problems and decisions emanate not from R & D laboratories (questions of basic objectives are beyond their concern), but from strains and dilemmas in the world beyond school walls. In short, educational reform must be construed in more fundamental terms than what is implied in transferring the students attention from nature study to meal worms.

The fragmented school environment. In the spirit of Durkheim's analysis of the effects of division of labor, Thelen comments that one of man's most important inventions was the development of concepts about how to organize human activity. But organization requires division and fragmentation which can, at times, have undesirable results:

We have made hard and fast divisions between thinking and doing, creating and applying, planning and acting, preparing and fulfilling. The age of reason, the development of science, the domination of organization, and the simple increase in density of human population have interacted among each other to create these divisions. But these divisions have made modern life purposeless. For as long as we maintain the division we shall never have to find an organizing principle to integrate the parts. The organizing principle we have thus succeeded in avoiding is *purpose* (Thelen, 1960, p. 215).

The school, faithful to principles of bureaucratic organization and division of labor, has fostered the development of a number of specialized compartments many of which have no apparent relationship to, or communication with, each other: English, social studies, science, math, physical education, home economics, industrial arts, guidance. Boundaries between the departments often arise from legitimate distinctions among subject matter or fields of knowledge, but lack of communication among fields can be attributed to the parochial interests of human beings who place the highest priority on their own area.

Fragmentation may also be seen as arising from underlying disagreements over the fundamental purposes of education. In broad terms we might classify differing objectives as: work skills (competencies required for successful careers and bread-winning), socialization (values and skills necessary to perform in the role of citizenship), psychological guidance (development of mental health), intellectual excellence (acquisition of knowledge and cultivation of various mental abilities). These categories are by no means mu-

tually exclusive, but suggestive of distinguishable factors or values used to support various educational prescriptions. To this list we would add a less commonly stated objective: social reconstruction, that is, the effort to justify schooling as a vehicle for the establishment of a particular social order. Many progressives saw the school as a microcosm of a particular kind of ideal society. Other groups, from Puritans and Amish to Nazis and Communists, have similarly valued schooling as an instrument of social reconstruction.

The corporate educational enterprise tends to minimize conflict among differing objectives and fields of interest; it accommodates a number of philosophies and priorities by establishing isolated compartments, allowing each to pursue its own goals in peaceful co-existence. The "philosophy" of the school is articulated by a simple *listing* of all the differing objectives and course offerings. We have no quarrel with the diversity of objectives and subjects. On the contrary, our commitment to pluralism strongly supports them. We do, however, object to the organizational principle which attempts to minimize conflict by isolating and separating various interests from each other. This attempt has the effect of aggravating fragmentation in community. It discourages tendencies to relate various purposes of man in community within comprehensive social theory; it stifles healthy ferment that might arise from tough public discussion of the merits of different specialties and objectives.

New corporate coalitions. Current efforts to construe education as a system of fully articulated components intended to shape terminal behavior are increasingly evident in mergers among communications, electronics, and publishing industries: Time-Life, Inc. owns television stations, a text-book company, and has recently become associated with General Electric; Xerox owns University Microfilms, Basic Systems, Inc., and American Education Publications; other mergers include RCA with Random House, IBM with Science Research Associates, and Raytheon with D.C. Heath and Company. These companies or their subsidiaries, often with the assistance of university research and development centers, are planning programs, financed by federal funds, to "solve" America's educational problems. Similar coalitions of government, industrial complexes, and universities have long cooperated in the development of America's war hardware and space exploration. The Federal government raises research and development funds, university and industry supply engineering talent and laboratories, and industry manufactures and distributes the final product. A prototype of this pattern applied to education is the urban Job Corps training center, financed by the Federal government which contracted with private corporations to recruit staff,

refurbish physical facilities, and manage the centers. Industry then turned to universities to help train personnel, and to advise and evaluate the operation. Presumably this type of coalition could expand its horizons beyond special groups (such as drop-outs, unemployed, pre-school disadvantaged, or Peace Corps and Vista volunteers) and reform all public education in the country at large.

We view with suspicion the emergence of national super-corporations venturing into education production. It signifies most obviously the demise of any hope that education might be rooted in the concerns and pursuits of primary communities. It offers unprecedented possibilities for cultural uniformity, as the large coalitions begin to sketch long-range plans for the production of standardized educational kits or packages to be marketed throughout the nation. The packages will be designed within professionalized and bureaucratized organizations, single-mindedly devoted to educational "projects" as isolated goals. The great society evidently assumes that since the government-industry-university coalition seems to have solved problems of economic affluence and defense, it should therefore be able to solve educational problems.

It should be clear from our basic criticisms that we seriously question this assumption. In the next section we shall review the nature and deficiencies of contemporary approaches to educational reform. First, however, let us summarize the three criticisms we direct at the present education enterprise: (a) it fails to accept as legitimate, or to support, the rich educational potential available in noninstructional contexts—conversely it conceives of education narrowly as mainly formal instruction occurring in schools; (b) by becoming a compulsory public monopoly, it neglects the educational value of diverse public and private associations; (c) it is organized by the model and motivated by the values of corporate industry and bureaucratic civil service.

III. THE DIRECTION OF MODERN EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

For the most part, none of the deficiencies in education discussed above are being challenged or attacked by current reforms in American education. On the contrary, what we have attacked as questionable premises and assumptions are being further strengthened in the emerging programs.

Conventional Reform

1. *Redesign of content.* Stimulated in part by massive federal funds spent to improve courses in the physical sciences and mathematics in the late fifties, projects now burgeon in virtually all subjects of the curriculum. The

attempt is generally to restructure or rethink the content of existing courses or to introduce into the schools courses previously taught in the university. These curriculum projects are sometimes heralded as revolutionary in nature because of the great financial resources expended and because of the participation and leadership of university experts outside of the education establishment. The much trumpeted "structure of the disciplines" has presumably replaced most other considerations as the foundation of curriculum building. While we applaud increased attention given to the substance of school programs, we fail to see any fundamental departures from the past; new programs take the form of conventional courses of study designed to fit into or extend the conventional school offering.

2. *Increased use of new media.* Emphasis on the technological challenge of creating more effective and persuasive educational messages absorbs much of the effort in educational innovation. Courses of instruction conceived and constructed by content specialists are being embellished through the application of new and glamorous "multi-media" devices: slide-tapes, educational television, programmed instruction, demonstration apparatus, language laboratories, simulation devices, and films. These serve the laudable objective of communicating more fully and more effectively knowledge that the experts consider worth transmitting. We wonder, however, whether the new media are not valued primarily for their mesmeric quality, rather than for any qualitative change in the students' perception of subject matter-in-school. These new forms of communication have a significant impact on the organization of schools, on scheduling, and possibly on the teacher's role in the classroom; but it is doubtful that they will affect in any profound way the role of the student or the way he perceives his task in school.

3. *Reorganization of school environment.* New approaches to the scheduling and grouping of students and teachers have allowed greater sensitivity to individual differences, more efficient use of staff energy, and opportunities for flexibility. Team teaching, the nongraded school, independent study, large-group instruction, and homogeneous grouping are examples of a general concern for making the school program more responsive to obvious and long-standing inefficiencies. Departures from traditional forms of school organization have been aided by more effective information dissemination systems and architectural innovation. Such advances as those in media development may make schooling more efficient, but we wonder whether they provide any major breakthrough in the student's ability to explore new learning roles or new relationships with adults.

4. *Use of high-speed information processing.* Another salient focus of current reform is the data processing revolution, which is making it possible

for schools to obtain, store, manipulate, and retrieve vast amounts of information. Taking attendance, constructing schedules, and issuing report cards by computer are only a small beginning. New agencies formed primarily to collect and disseminate information hold momentous possibilities for more efficient use of diverse resources and information. Through this process, schools from different geographic areas will be able to share instructional materials, communicate new ideas, and receive feedback on them with a minimum of administrative red tape. The more efficient information retrieval becomes, the more options the educational specialist has, but is the student included in the choice-making process? How is this rapidly retrieved information to be related to some concept of the good life in the great society? Can teaching and learning be construed as something besides information processing?

5. *Intensive recruitment of talented personnel.* Apart from innovations in content, specific techniques of instruction, and personnel organization, quality education is said to depend primarily on the profession's power to attract more talented people into the field. Increased salaries, financial assistance to students, increasing diversity of specialized roles made possible by developments in the areas mentioned above are seen as transforming education into an unusually challenging and attractive career. Federal legislation as well as support from private foundations provides impetus for these changes, and apparently the prestige of the educationist is already on the rise.

Talented specialists will undoubtedly enhance the image of the profession, but will they deliberately disturb the questionable assumptions which underlie the very concept of specialized fields of educational experts? Or in a less radical vein, will they alter conventional schools and utilize technology in a variety of educational settings to benefit a broader spectrum of the population than those in the 6-22 age range? Will they plan types of community education which minimize formal requirements, but provide a number of exciting voluntary opportunities running the gamut from literacy training to political action to training in the fine arts? Will they consider encouraging youth to work beside adults in real jobs, and will they allow adults more opportunities for both formal study and play?

We predict that new talent and technology will not be directed toward such innovations, because the new breed of specialist has no particular stake in viewing problems broadly. He has more to gain by applying his skills to reform *within* the existing establishment, constrained by a number of vested interests. To name a few, the publishing industry will not promote a "product" unless a profitable market can be shown to exist; the parent views education mainly as a vehicle for economic and social mobility and therefore

withholds support from programs that do not offer such a guarantee; the teacher has a deep emotional investment in traditional bodies of knowledge and conceptions of teaching that would be threatened by radical change.

At first glance, one might applaud recent great society programs for their apparent circumvention of establishment constraints, their presumed departure from the status quo. The Job Corps, for example, through its relationship with private enterprise, government, and university might conceivably have developed a fresh approach. Unfortunately, however, its objectives were conservative ones of literacy, hygiene, vocational skill; it adopted the traditional institutional models of college dormitory life and military training; and its instruction is guided by the advice of "experienced" educators. The program as a whole serves the vested interests of business by educating young people to "fit in" to employment in the corporate world.

6. *Orchestration of modern techniques.* One might argue, of course, that while all of the various reforms suggested above are less than radical or revolutionary, if they were allowed to converge in a single school it would truly be the "school of the future," offering education of unprecedented quality. The curriculum would contain the latest approaches such as the "new math," PSSC physics, advanced placement courses, new approaches in reading, and the teaching of "advanced" concepts and skills at younger ages. Wide use would be made of films, slides, tapes, language labs, programmed instruction, overhead projectors, and educational television. By way of organizing and grouping, it would provide for team teaching, nongraded sequence, and independent study. It would employ the latest contributions in information processing to take advantage of educational resources beyond the school building. Its staff would be composed of talented teachers equipped with the best liberal-arts education and the experience of closely supervised practice teaching. The teachers would be constantly evaluating and revising the curriculum in cooperation with professors from nearby universities and media experts from a regional educational laboratory. The system would include a "comprehensive" high school catering to the needs of diverse types of students—those with aspirations for business, commerce, and technical occupations as well as those interested in the professions.

We doubt whether a school system like this exists anywhere at present, but from Brown's description (1963) one would assume that the nongraded Melbourne High School in Florida approximates the model. The school environment is designed to respond to individual educational needs (grouping by achievement rather than by age, giving students keys to laboratories and study rooms for use after school hours), and thrives on a spirit of innovation. Although the school seems to foster a more relaxed attitude toward the

student than most, its program continues to isolate youth from adults and the school from the community, and it doesn't include students in significant decisions which might fundamentally alter the role of youth in the school or community. The educational philosophy relies heavily on the judgment that "the primary purpose of education is the development of the intellect" (Brown, 1960, p. 145). Again we are reminded of a business analogy: allow employees enough personal latitude to increase productivity—but prevent the radical conversation which questions the value of the product itself.

Radical Reform

1. *Utopianism.* Reforms which question underlying assumptions of modern education have been carried out largely in isolated schools. Plans and proposals for such schools have often assumed hypothetical or unrealistic conditions of community, or no outside community at all. They resemble the utopian experiments of the nineteenth century or the Walden II of the twentieth. Real examples in education have usually taken the form of private boarding schools, e.g., Putney and Summerhill. Such schools have attempted to establish a broad, coherent inner community in which education is viewed not as the province of an isolated, separate system or as a nine-to-five task. The decision to build a separate educational community is generally occasioned by the fact that the existing community would not approve of or condone aspects of programs that the utopians seek to establish; for example, giving children total freedom to choose the kind of education they want, allowing them to develop their own norms regarding relations between the sexes, or, more generally, delegating to them responsibility for governing their community.

Utopian schools have concentrated heavily on the reduction of adult control over students and have broadened the notion of education to include far more than the completion of traditional or newly thought-out intellectual exercises—for example, by providing more opportunity for artistic expression, craftsmanship, manual labor, experience in child-rearing and self-government. Because activities in such schools are insulated to a large extent from pressures of the community beyond, they can explore possibilities for radical innovation that would not be possible otherwise. The catch comes, of course, when the "citizens" of such educational communities find it necessary to return to the larger society. How does the student cope with the re-entry problem, after having been educated within a system of values many of which contradict those of the "real world"? As one college student remarked, "The trouble with girls from Bennington is that they think they've been to Heaven. Where is there to go after that?" Presumably former citizens of utopian educational communities are prepared to have an impact on the

great society, an effect which will move it in the direction of the values and aspirations reflected in the utopian school. Common sense, as well as psychological evidence, (Webster, 1962) indicates that the graduate of a utopian school is more likely to move back into the mainstream of the great society and slough off the effects of an extraneous and temporary educational environment. The major argument for the isolated, utopian educational community—that it is the only feasible and realistic way to implement radical reform—is vitiated by the questionable, long-range consequences of such ventures. They probably have little permanent impact either on the students or on the society to which the students return. In practice, they appear more as temporary aberrations of affluent intellectuals than as viable educational models worthy of emulation.

2. *Reconstruction of the system.* Instead of radical reform through utopian withdrawal, it is still remotely possible that fundamental change might be brought about in the nature of both the institution and the larger community within which it operates. Some might, in fact, point to progressive education in the first half of this century as evidence that general educational reconstruction is possible. We disagree. On the basis of Cremin's (1964) history of "pedagogical pioneers," we would characterize most of the progressive movement not as an effort to change the system radically, but as moderate reform or utopian model building. Though countless changes were made in schooling (creating within the school an "embryonic community," emphasizing creativity and freedom of inquiry and manual as well as symbolic learning, and in many cases involving adults of the community in school programs), the progressives continued to focus on improving the *school* as a means to better education. Whether the school was a utopian community in microcosm or simply a more relevant and humanitarian way of leading youth through verbal mazes, in either case there was no attempt to reconstruct the total context through which the community pursues its educational aims.⁶

As something of an exception to this generalization, Harold Rugg (1936) deserves special comment. He saw the school exercising its responsibility as the major agency of education within the community by using the total community as its workshop or laboratory.

If we should trail one of the new school groups for a week or two and record what they did, we should find that the students spend much of their time outside of their

⁶ This is not meant to criticize the efforts of "progressives" in general, many of whom focussed on problems in the wider community such as revising patterns of political representation, establishing social welfare services, or curbing abuses of monopolistic business. Our point is directed only toward the relatively narrow efforts of professional educators known by the progressive label.

assigned classrooms—for example, in the library, shops, laboratories, studies, auditorium, and offices of the school itself. The scenes of their activity, however, are not only the entire reaches of the new-school plant but also the whole community and the region round about—the government offices, stores, markets, industries, the water supply, the docks, and the like. Pupils survey the layout of the town, collect pictures and old records, and interview old residents, city officials, social welfare secretaries, and a host of others (Rugg, 1936, pp. 340-341).

As a stop-gap measure, Rugg suggested that the "nearest approach to a School of Living" is to build the whole educational program of a community around the life of the school itself. While Rugg prescribed a utopian school as an immediate solution, in the long run that school was to insinuate itself into the adult activities of the community, both as a method of study and as a means of social reconstruction.

An impressive modern proposal for radical reform within the context of the broader community is Herbert A. Thelen's *Education and the Human Quest* (1960). Thelen makes a provocative plea for the community to conceive of education as consisting basically of four parts: personal inquiry, group investigation, reflective action, and skill development. The school should be considered only one of a number of possible contexts in which to pursue the development of these areas, and the education in a particular community would be planned by a broadly based "citizens' education council." Adult citizens in their regular jobs would assume educational responsibility for each other and for the youth. Youth would participate in "out-of-school" activities such as vocational exploration, recreation, social-political action, religion, etc. This is not simply a proposal for more "field trips" or "projects," but an attempt to create in a more permanent sense whatever institutional arrangements may be required to implement a broader conception of education. Thelen translates this idea into organizational-financial terms, and proposes that the citizens' education council present a budget for all the educational efforts in the community, with the school budget as only one part of the total—that part enabling the school to carry out its particular mandate (most likely in the fields of skill development and the guiding of personal and group inquiry).

The spirit of Thelen's work is genuinely radical, and strikes at the center of a number of common assumptions behind both conventional and "reformed" schools. He sees education as a function of the total community, not the province of specialized "education" experts. While there is some tendency for him to view education across generations as a one-way street (adults are constantly helping or guiding young people to learn those things that adults value), at least he is concerned that different generations carry

on a dialogue. Unfortunately, like Rugg's futuristic scheme, Thelen's proposals have apparently fallen on sterile soil.

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR EDUCATION IN COMMUNITY

Since we believe that efforts at reform have generally failed to consider the fundamental importance of *contexts* in which education is pursued, we begin by conceptualizing alternative modes of, and environments for, learning. Imagine a hypothetical community in which learning is pursued in three quite different contexts: the "school" context, the "laboratory-studio-work" context, and the "community seminar" context. Subjects or problems for study and also the relations between students and teachers would be construed quite differently in each of these contexts.⁷

The school context. There is a clear need for systematic instruction in basic literacy skills, health and hygiene, driver education, and the like. Learning of this sort is pre-planned, programmed, and formalized. The teacher has clear objectives or "terminal behaviors" in mind as the products of instruction. Most of the activity in schools as we now know them falls in this category. This is not to suggest that school-based learning should continue to follow traditional subject matter lines, nor that instruction be didactic and rote. On the contrary, school learning should be problem-centered and exciting and should constantly consider reorganizing basic content to make it lead toward more powerful insights and understandings; for example, coordinate and symbol systems used in graphs, charts, and maps, might be combined with linguistic analysis and musical notation in teaching a course in symbolics. Technology has thrust upon us rich possibilities for more effective instruction through (a) greater opportunity for self-instruction, (b) availability of multi-media approaches, and (c) more accurate assessment of student needs and progress. Teaching within a school context may take many forms: tutorial between teacher and student, student with computer or programmed instruction, students in small groups, or large groups watching films. The distinguishing feature of the school context is that it concerns itself only with those aspects of education involving systematic, planned instruction. It should be clear from the explanation of the following two contexts that we see this kind of learning as only *one* among three critical types.

⁷These "three contexts" are discussed in a mimeographed document, *Walden III*, by Joseph C. Grannis and Donald W. Oliver, presented to a seminar at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1965. Similar ideas are also contained in an earlier paper by Grannis (1964).

Laboratory-studio-work context. In the laboratory context, the major objective is not formal instruction, but the completion of a significant task, the solution of problems which the learner wants to attack, regardless of educational by-products that dealing with the problem might bring. The physical location of the laboratory context might be a factory, art studio, hospital, library, science or industrial laboratory, political party headquarters, or government agency. The activity of participants would be governed, not by a skill or a product that is programmed for students to learn, but only by the developing nature of the problem-task itself. Such problems might include painting a picture, rebuilding an auto, writing an essay, promoting a concert, organizing a protest demonstration, lobbying for legislation, selling insurance, programming a computer, acting in a play, nursing in a hospital, competing in a sport, participating in conservation and wildlife management, caring for children, planning and participating in a church service, broadcasting on radio and television, making a dress, printing a newspaper, making physical and chemical experiments, serving as a guide at the UN, organizing a raffle to raise money, or even creating instructional materials for use in a school context. Laboratories are contexts for learning in the midst of action; learning occurs not because it is planned, but only as an inevitable by-product of genuine participation in problem- and task-oriented activities. The laboratory is seen not primarily as apprenticeship or vocational training for breadwinning, but rather as the opportunity to satisfy broader humanistic and aesthetic goals. At present many adults are engaged in laboratory contexts—that is, their jobs—which are not recognized or supported for their educational value. Young people are deemed not “ready” to participate until they first spend twelve to sixteen years in “school.” We believe the laboratory offers important educational benefits at all ages; it should not be restricted to adults.

Community seminar context. The purpose of the seminar would be the reflective exploration of community issues and ultimate meanings in human experience. The seminar would provide an opportunity for the gathering of heterogeneous or homogeneous groups, for youth and/or adults, to examine and discuss issues of mutual concern. Seminars might begin by focusing on problems specific to members of the group (e.g., the meaning of productive work for people unemployed, retired, or dissatisfied with their jobs). Discussion might be stimulated by outside provocateurs who present new ways of viewing economic, ethical, or aesthetic questions. Seminars could have at their service a qualified resource staff that would gather information (readings, films, TV programs) and make arrangements for experiences, such as field trips, to observe unfamiliar ways of life, technological innovations, social problems in action. In addition to relatively specific prob-

lems (What kinds of working conditions are we entitled to?) and general public policy questions (How should the community be zoned?), we would hope that the seminars would concern themselves with the broadest questions raised in planning for education in community. Other possible topics include: understanding various conflicts between youth and adults, the functions of the family in modern society, attitudes toward nonconformity and deviance in the community, prejudice and pluralism among ethnic groups, changing mores in sex and religion, various approaches to child-rearing, the use of increased leisure, population control, protection of the consumer, moral implications of advances in biology (e.g., selective breeding), reconstruction of the political and legal system, evaluation of current programs sponsored by government and private agencies, creation of new professions and problems of vocational retraining. The major thrust of the seminars would be reflection and deliberation, though the questions discussed would be highly relevant to the laboratory context or the world of "action." Learning in the seminar would not be pre-planned, nor would there be specific tasks or problems to solve. Questions would be raised, investigated, and discussed—this process, regardless of numerous and unpredictable possible outcomes, is of high educational value. Generally both youth and adults are denied the kind of learning afforded by this context; the time of youth is monopolized by school, and that of adults by jobs or "laboratories."

Points of clarification. The contexts described above are intended to convey the major point that education consists of three important facets: systematic instruction, action, and reflection. The facets are not listed in order of importance, nor chronologically. All three should occur concurrently at all stages of life. A child learning how to read in a school context can participate in a laboratory project of building a model airplane (using the symbolic skills acquired in "school"); he can also discuss with children and adults in a seminar what to do about noise control for the local airport. An adult interested in politics might study government systematically in school; he might participate in the "laboratory" of a political campaign; and in the community seminar, he might lead discussions on political organization appropriate for the modern community. While some communities may choose to place most young children in the school context and allocate much of adult education to the seminar, we see no logical reason for this particular arrangement. Our scheme allows for various mixtures of the three components to be tailored to the needs of various stages of life or to the unique requirements of different types of communities.

Who would fill the leadership roles in such an educational scheme? If formal school comprises only one-third of the educational program, will professional educators be put out of work? Possibly, but not necessarily. Those

most qualified to carry on instruction may well be teachers and educators currently working in schools. Thus many teachers and administrators would stay in schools (although advances in technology suggest radical changes in their roles and jobs even if they do stay there). Since learning in school would occupy only a small portion of the student's day—perhaps three hours—one might expect school staffs to dwindle. If, however, adults also used the school for instruction, then the school's student population would increase, even though any given student spent only a small amount of time there. The demand for professional educators would remain high.

Leaders in the laboratory contexts would be experienced persons in the various laboratory areas (engineers, lawyers, mechanics, poets, politicians, athletes, secretaries) who would be given released time to take on educational responsibility for youth and adults interested in laboratory activity. It is possible that professional educationists can be converted into laboratory leaders; for example, an English teacher could take on apprentices in the writing of poetry, but in his laboratory role, he would be interested primarily in the creation and analysis of artistic works, not in teaching. The laboratory context would rely primarily upon private enterprise, government, the arts, labor, etc. to provide creative practitioners willing to assume on-the-job educational responsibility. If we are willing to recognize as teachers the vast number of talented practitioners in such fields, we shall approach a dramatic solution to the manpower problem of finding enough intelligent "teachers." By taking advantage of the educational value of the on-the-job activities, we may begin to break the strangle-hold by which the education profession has restricted our conception of education.

Community seminars could be run by professional educators, businessmen, politicians, parents, laborers, policemen, boy scouts, gang leaders, criminals, musicians, or journalists. The community seminar, perhaps more than the school or laboratory, raises the issue of incentive. What would induce people to participate in such activities? The success of such programs depends upon the willingness of various organizations to provide released time for leaders and participants. Financial arrangements must insure that such activities do not economically penalize participants. On the contrary, it would be reasonable to give monetary rewards for participation in educational activities. Paying people for undergoing training is already done on a large scale (neighborhood youth corps, Jobs Corps, scholarships and fellowships, prizes and rewards for high grades, in-training programs of businesses, etc.), and is quite consistent with the idea of making an investment in the development of human resources. We would assume that, given the time and money, the tasks and issues explored in these contexts could be sufficiently exciting to attract wide participation.

A community concerned with implementing some of these general ideas would require coordination of several resources, including private voluntary agencies such as churches, businesses, museums, and libraries, political parties, economic and political pressure groups, and social service organizations. It would require flexibility and attention to individual differences; yet to avoid the problems of fragmentation or specialization, it would have to facilitate participation in common experiences through which members could relate across economic, racial, political, ethnic, or occupational lines.

Implementing a program along these lines seems at first glance an administrator's nightmare, involving the coordination of disparate agencies and the cooperation of people with conflicting vested interests. Will colleges recognize the value of laboratory and seminar experience in their admissions policy? Would the education establishment be willing to relinquish much of its control over the learning of youth? Would business accept for employment people with varying, rather than standardized educational backgrounds? Who would have the power to accredit educational programs, and what new criteria would be needed? At the moment, we have no satisfactory answers for such problems, and we recognize the difficulty of putting some of these ideas into practice. It is possible, that in implementing the three contexts, an educational bureaucracy as rigid as the present one would evolve, with tight scheduling and compartmentalization equal to, or worse than, the current system. All we can say at this point is that implementation must be guided by serious attention to criteria for building community (such as those mentioned above, p. 64), else the purpose of educational change will be defeated. It thus becomes clear that when we speak of educational change, we speak of social and community change—a process for which few people have useful administrative guidelines.

Moreover, we hesitate to suggest specific plans or models, because we feel these should arise from the basic concerns of particular communities. We envision no national model that could be replicated across the land. Instead, there should develop a plurality of structures and programs. Jencks (1966) has suggested ways in which private groups could compete with each other and with the public education establishment by offering qualitatively different types of education, sensitive to community needs. In a single community, schools, laboratories, and seminars might be run by businesses, parents' groups, teachers, and churches—each competing with each other for students. It should be possible to fund competing enterprises without allowing a single centralized bureaucracy to gain total control. In some communities, literacy training may be a major problem (e.g., an urban slum); in others technical re-training (e.g., an area with a rapidly growing electronics industry); other areas may have particularly acute problems in human relations, or even in the use of leisure time.

Basing education on the needs of particular communities does not imply that students (youth and adults) are being trained for life within that community only. On the contrary, with communication and transportation breakthroughs likely to continue, all communities are becoming more dependent upon each other; their problems are therefore increasingly generalizable. The production of a TV program to publicize the plight of migrant workers involves the same considerations as producing a program to plead for better equipment for the local football team. Organizing tenants to protest against landlords involves processes similar to organizing real estate brokers to protest to Congress. Painting a picture of harvest time is in many ways similar to painting a scene of industrial smokestacks. A discussion of the boring process of cotton picking may be helpful in a later discussion on the meaning of work in an assembly-line. We see no reason to be alarmed that a community's education be focused on critical contemporary issues. If critical, they are, by definition, of relevance to other communities in other times.

To what extent is this tri-school proposal related to the problems of missing community? Will our recommendations result necessarily in the fulfillment of the criteria of community mentioned earlier (p. 64)? The proposal is not offered as a panacea; it is not intended as a model of community itself. We see the three contexts as vehicles that may broaden our search for solutions. (The existing schooling establishment generally inhibits and stifles that search.) The contexts of *action* and *community reflection* provide alternative techniques of search not ordinarily available in present schooling. Recognizing the educational value of these activities may help to nourish common commitments. The sense of community may also be improved by the dissolution of artificial barriers that tend to fragment certain experiences—barriers based on age, ethnicity, occupation, and especially the distinction between students and those who participate in "real life." We clearly recognize the dilemma between allowing for flexibility and diversity on the one hand, and the need to increase communication among different styles of life on the other; but the proposal argues that attacking this dilemma be acknowledged as an educational activity to be supported and encouraged; it also suggests new contexts in which this attack may be pursued. Conventional educational reforms largely ignore such problems by restricting their concept of education to formal instruction.

Assuming that one could find a community willing to alter its patterns of education along some of the general lines mentioned above, where would it turn for direction? Much of its work would move over uncharted waters. There are, however, a number of educational experiments that could be used as possible illustrations of the broader view. Such projects are not

necessarily aimed at the construction of community; their efforts may focus on narrower educational matters. Nevertheless, they represent interesting approaches that could be adapted to particular community needs. The following examples have come to our attention, but we feel certain they comprise only a small portion of the total available catalogue. Additional examples should be sought and recorded.

Some Examples

In connection with Harvard's Research and Development Center, Robert Belenky, James Reed, and Jonathan J. Clark have instituted a combination preschool and school study group, which we would consider an excellent example of a laboratory activity. Four kinds of people are involved: university educationists, mothers, youths, and young children from a lower-class ghetto in Boston (consisting of two public housing projects: one white and one Negro). Under the supervision of the educationists and mothers, the youths teach young children in a basement recreation room of the Negro project. The educationists and mothers take field trips to explore a variety of the more progressive schools in the greater Boston area to provide information from which to discuss the kind of school experience they would like for their children. There is hope that these discussions will lead to constructive dialogue with the formal school establishment, and, if need be, political and social action to bring about a change in the formal schools. One member of the educationist group is from the ghetto, an artist skilled also in methods of social action and protest. Rather than viewing this project as an educational program to improve formal education, i.e., the schools, one might view this as a continuing educational program in its own right. Rather than construing this kind of activity as mainly temporary, compensatory, or rehabilitative (though it may in fact be the latter), why not consider this as one of a number of normal educational opportunities in which adults and youth might choose to engage?

A second example is a radio club sponsored by an electronics firm in Concord, Massachusetts. Two days a week a group of youths comes to the main factory and works with engineers and technicians, building ham radio sets, exploring radio theory, and exchanging technical information. Presently this club is extracurricular, piled on top of what for many high school students is an already overburdensome amount of school work. Why not include adult "hams" as well as young people? Why not construe this as a genuine educational setting and allow the participants to account this time against the school or work responsibilities in their normal schedules?

Some churches are becoming increasingly involved in activities designed to restore community in urban areas. While many of their efforts may be

seen as traditional welfare and settlement house services having relatively small influence, others reveal a broader concern for the total pathology in community. Church-sponsored projects have combined the buying and renovating of slum housing for low-income people with manpower training and protests for civil and consumer rights. The Urban Training Center for Christian Mission in Chicago participates in a number of such activities and uses these programs as major parts of a training process for prospective ministers. Trainees live in the slums with the poor (they are given only a few cents for several days), and they participate in action projects like the above as workers for various sponsoring groups. After periods of intensive involvement working in the community, the seminarians withdraw for reflection and deliberation. They are temporarily released from immediate pressures of the day, given time for study and discussion of general issues. The UTC's approach combines the laboratory with the community seminar context and seems to have success in both areas.

Another church-sponsored project illustrates a type of community seminar. Sponsored by the Presbytery of Detroit, the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan, and the Michigan Conference of the United Church of Christ, the Detroit Industrial Mission (DIM) sends clergymen into industrial plants to initiate contacts with men who organize small discussion groups among the workers. Topics are drawn from concerns of the workers themselves. The mission does not preach any particular point of view, but attempts to foster better communication and deeper levels of understanding among all groups in industry. The responsibility of staff members is merely to arrange opportunities for men to say to each other what they think about human and ethical issues that occur in the plant. This illustration has a number of interesting characteristics: (a) it was initiated and carried out by a private, voluntary group, without public funds or public officials; (b) its purpose was to provide neither vocational training nor an opportunity to philosophize about "great books," but rather to raise fundamental questions of immediate relevance and importance; (c) the "teachers" operate from a clear ideological base, but are not interested in evangelical conversion; (d) the "students" are not seen as preparing for some distant goal, but as learning to make better decisions here and now; and (e) there are no sharp age or status distinctions—men at different points in their careers talk sincerely with one another.

The Highlander Folk School, in the Cumberland Mountains of Tennessee, began in the Depression as a labor school to teach workers in the South how to organize and run unions. Often the center of controversy, it offers another example of an environment of reflection directly related to community action. A nonprofit institution supported by private donations and

foundation grants, Highlander runs resident adult education programs, teaching adults how to teach others to deal with social problems. The programs consist mainly of workshops arranged in response to specific pressing issues. For example, in 1960, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee asked for help in evaluating their own future program. A workshop was held, yielding the decision to concentrate upon voter registration. The School is the scene of many workshops related to civil rights issues and has always been racially integrated. The emphasis is not only on the making of policy decisions, but also on leadership training and the dissemination of knowledge gained through the Highlander programs. Concerned with the most explosive of social issues, the School has been attacked in the courts (the state revoked its charter), investigated for subversive activities, and destroyed by fire. Similar institutions could be developed as retreat seminars, not limited to a single community, but available as resources to many.

Conclusion

The deliberate effort to view education in community from three vantage points and to look for contexts, outside of the formal school, where people learn is only the first step in any important effort at educational reform—but it is the hardest. After one wrenches oneself loose from the paralyzingly constricted posture that all true education must be programed, planned, compulsory, and public, and it must all happen in schools, one's imagination trips over a host of exciting places for youth and adults to learn, by themselves, and in association with one another. Only after this first step has been taken do really important questions of educational policy arise:

What does the educational system have to do with the system of government, of economics, of politics? It is all very well to say that education is for the purpose of maintaining our nation or developing a world order, but what does that mean? Does it mean that every individual must be made literate, wise, loyal and conforming? . . . Is a school a cultural island, separated from the community mainland by the same kind of thing that separates fantasy from real life? Does the school lead or follow the community or both? We hear a lot about the need to "involve" citizens in school problems. Who, how, why? Is it just to keep them quiet? or to manipulate them into contributing more money? Is school supposed to "induct youth into the community"? What does that mean? . . . Can the school do the job alone? Or is the school only one part of a community-wide educational system which exists in fact whether the school board knows it or not? (Thelen, 1960, pp. 13-14)

Critics of this position tend to ask for specific blueprints and definite answers to such policy questions. They ask for outlines, schedules and programs, raising such issues as: How much time would students spend in school? Would the rest of their time be completely free or planned and su-

pervised in some way? Who would pay for extra-curricular activities? How could adults be released from their jobs to take responsibility for community education? How would legal authority be allocated among community agencies? Would state departments of education change their requirements? Would colleges accept students with this sort of education? Would the students perform better on standard tests and attain standards of "excellence" comparable, for example, to European education? Can we demonstrate that education organized around these ideas would have any real pay-off in later life?

To answer such questions directly at this point would be inappropriate. Until people in a community have argued about and accepted some of the premises in this paper and are vitally concerned with implementation for their particular situation, it would be foolhardy for armchair professors to prescribe programs. Providing blueprints in the abstract, not tied to a specific situation, would be inconsistent with our premise that education should arise from real needs and issues within community, not from the drawing boards of distant national planners.

We are chastized for evading the issue of practicality, as critics throw up their hands in despair with our "unrealistic," "unfeasible" ideas. This basic criticism and questions like the above reflect a commitment by critics to the present system, a reluctance to search for fundamental deficiencies in the status quo. The major issue from our point of view is not our inability to give blueprints and specific answers to such questions; financial, logistic, and administrative problems of plural educational contexts are relatively minor difficulties. Instead, the major issue is whether or not we can find people willing to begin serious discussion on premises and ideas rather than only on blueprints and programs. The next step lies not in a more concrete plan, but in a *search for a group of people*, some "missing community," with the courage and energy to re-examine how education, most broadly conceived as the interaction between reflection and action, can invigorate the lives of all its citizens.

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Articles in various general periodicals (e.g., Fortune, August 1966) have described the entry of large corporations into the educational field. The present discussion concerns the possible effects of this development, particularly on the traditional centers of influence on educational policy.

Discussion

THE EDUCATION INDUSTRIES

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We cannot dissociate the intervention of these industries into education from their general behavior in economic, technological, and political life. By and large their behavior is motivated by the aggrandizement of their spheres of activity, for profits and power and to be busy and important. Everywhere we see an abuse of technology—in communications, in transportation, in urban affairs, in foreign aid, and (not least) in the horror of our neo-imperialism. The right use of technology is to simplify the environment, not clutter it; to provide necessities and conveniences, not gimmicks; to tailor itself modestly to human functioning, not to overbear it and strait-jacket it. None of this proper use is apparent in the general behavior of these corporations, nor in the government that subsidizes them. I do not give them the benefit of the doubt in education.

The situation, rather, seems to be as follows (I described a typical personal experience in the November *Commentary*): There is a lot of government and foundation money for the schools; corporations have hardware, tests, or the produce of printing presses to peddle; by lobbying, promotion, and cooking up nominal connections with the school establishment, they cut in on the melon. The procedure is inauthentic, unprofessional, unscientific, and characteristic of American society at present. There has been no cautious analysis and experimentation over many years. It is not as with DNA or quasars where, because of technical advance, we have new data and new theory; rather, some faddish rehashing of old ideas suddenly gets enormous capitalization. Further,

those who are intimately and humanly involved in the actual function, the teachers and students, are not the source of the ideas; their needs are not expressed and taken into account. Decisions on education are made by a school establishment—whether superintendents, school boards, Harvard, or the National Science Foundation—that is allied in spirit with the corporations. Throughout, there is an emphasis on extrinsic motivation and social engineering for national goals that are, in my opinion, foreign to education or democracy or the decent future of mankind.

Crash programs to wage wars on Sputnik or poverty, or to export the Great Society, are heavily funded; in this atmosphere of emergency, the mass-manufacturers move in. Tailor-made, piecemeal, and spontaneous efforts are impatiently brushed aside or wilfully aggrandized till they lose their salt. It is necessary to show that something "tangible" and "commensurate with the magnitude of the problems" is being "done." Nevertheless, in education, as in the sciences and fine arts—and, for that matter, in social welfare—one cannot *do* it this way. It would be a better bet to go back to the grass roots; but this would mean dismantling the school establishment, and that will be the day! (If I may ask a pointed question: Since a chief lesson of the Woods Hole conference, written up by Professor Bruner, was the inadvisability, and indeed impossibility, of testing and grading, how is it that Harvard has not blasted the College Boards?)

Inevitably, any great influx of dead capital—hardware, tests, textbooks—into an enterprise decides many disputed issues and predetermines future direction. When an activity is on a small scale and open to personal improvisation, it is possible to diminish the consequence of bad prior decisions; for instance, a perceptive and affectionate teacher, in a small-enough class, can modify or bypass the mistakes of the parents, school board, superintendent, curriculum, and text-book manufacturers. Classically, teaching has always been considered an art. At present, however, it is presumed that

- (1) for 100% of the children
- (2) divided into types and conditions that we can ascertain,
- (3) we know what is good for them, as instruction or training,
- (4) we know the methods to achieve these aims
- (5) in graded steps that can be tested at regular intervals,
- (6) and we have qualified specialists and appropriate apparatus to execute these programs.

Every part of this presumption is dubious; the package is quite improbable. Yet the more we capitalize the school establishment and the education industries, the more we trap children and teachers in this schema of abstractions. In a period of historical transition, when we should be emphasizing human scale, molecular experimentation, intuitive improvisation, student democracy, we

are underwriting top-down deciding and processing for questionable (and hopefully transient) national goals. And even in this context, the motives of the education industries are not *bona fide*!

I am unimpressed by the argument that the demands of mass education and expanding population make the schema inevitable. By its imperialism, gobbling up every educational function, the school establishment has helped to create—and keeps creating—these dilemmas. As I have repeatedly urged (but *nobody* will discuss it), the framework of abstractions that constitute the sociological reality of a “school” is *not* the best environment for the education of the majority of children and adolescents, including most of the bright. We ought to spend the money on many alternative paths of growing up in the world, that are more for real and more intrinsically motivated. And in the schools and colleges themselves, if we dispensed with much of the administrative super-structure, including the take of the education industries, there would be plenty of money for small-scale artful education. Further, if we made licensing realistic to the actual function of teaching and if we permitted conditions in which teaching and learning could occur, plenty of excellent young persons would choose and *stay* in this career.

In these remarks I do not mean at all to impugn educational technology itself, but the structure of establishment and industries in which it is now forthcoming. Given a better set-up, both of much less school-going and freer schools, there would be an important place for new technology of instruction—e.g., for autodidactic purposes, as adjuncts of apprenticeship in real occupations, to make up background, to reenter an academic track when desired, to allow the underprivileged and embarrassed to go at their own pace, etc., etc. It is to be hoped that in ten or twenty years education in America will look very different, both in institution and content, from our present spirit-breaking and stultifying procedures. In this change, new technology may be a major, even decisive, factor. But it must be thoughtful and artful—and despite the claims of drug-manufacturers and education-manufacturers, these qualities do not emerge in “basic research” in big corporations, but, as ever, among loners and small teams imbued with love and zeal. And what is needed is a knowledgeable buyers’ market, not an establishment with a directorate interlocking with the suppliers. Whom must the giants of the education industries satisfy? They live on subsidy, parental panic, and superstition—a self-proving system of testing and grading (and hiring and paying) that perhaps has no relation to learning or achievement. (For instance, the school grades correlate among themselves, but not so well with performance in graduate school. Do they correlate *at all* with worthwhile life achievement?)

In our schooling, as in other parts of our society, we have an overgrown system that does not work. We do not then overhaul the system; instead, we

cope by increasing and rigidifying the administration, and buying hardware and standardizers. Then we discuss, as in this symposium, the threat of the education industries. Frankly, I do not think they warrant a serious pedagogic discussion. The problems they pose are political. And—perhaps fortunately—the explosive alienation of the young is such that we shall have to face these political problems before we can turn to more interesting educational problems.

DONALD W. OLIVER
Harvard University

The entry of "big business" into the field of education will, I think, bring about no radical change but will rather consolidate further our present conception of what it means to educate and be educated. For our conception of education is and will be conditioned not so much by any major changes wrought by the new education industry, but rather by professional school administrators, teachers, and university educationists, including such new faces as Bruner and Zacharias. And at rock bottom, this conception is grounded in the culture of classroom teaching which is everywhere so strikingly similar in this society.

The posture of the teacher is presently patterned on a professional model. The teacher is available to serve a client. The client has needs; the teacher has professional knowledge and skills which can meet these needs. The teacher is to suppress his own interests in the service of the client; in fact, to put the teacher's interests above those of the client is the essence of "unprofessional" behavior. There are, of course, other conceptions of teaching, e.g., the creative artist who chooses to teach on the side. This latter conception begins not with the needs of the student, but rather with those of the teacher, and assumes that he has creative impulses which spill over into the effort for public expression and communication. As a teacher, he simply seeks to include students in a dialogue about the process through which this expression takes place. The two models lead to strikingly different attitudes toward the task of teaching: the professional teacher sees himself primarily as one who is "giving" something to the student, something that has aesthetic, economic, or personal value; the artist sees himself as extending his own personal insights into a field of study in his effort to communicate with a semi-outsider. The professional teacher sees himself as the middleman between the creators of knowledge and its potential benefactors; the artist sees himself as a legitimate inter-

preter of knowledge in his own right, and simply includes the student in the process of interpretation.

The artist in the classroom is neither prevalent, nor, in fact, particularly valued. He balks at established curricula, which makes administrators nervous and parents fearful, and oftentimes confuses children. He is constantly told that the school is for the students, and not a place for the teacher to push his pet fancies. When small avid groups of students congregate around him, he is reminded that school is for *all* the students, not just the few who see some perverse value in his unique conversations.

So we begin with the fact that most teachers see themselves as professionals. In their training, they want to be shown how to become professional; they want to learn how to purvey the wisdom of the culture in a reasonably standard and explicit way. In short, they want to know how to do their job.

It is obvious to me that "new" concepts in teacher training and curriculum, such as the discovery method and inductive teaching, take off from the professional model. They have to do with devices, strategies, modes of organizing content; they have very little to do with a change in the definition of the basic posture of the teacher.

It is this well-established professional conception of teaching which makes it so easy for the industrial community to exploit the current revolution in information processing, packaging, and communication toward an educational end. The obvious analogy is medicine. Research and development create practically useful medicines, which are mass-produced by pharmaceutical companies and dispensed by or through the professional physician.

In these terms, the problem of teaching is construed less as the need for more creative artists to teach, but rather as the need for general scientific solutions to meet educational problems. We look not for unique personalities to provide a leavening for the flat culture; we create teams of increasingly specialized professionals to administer fully tested teaching "systems." The ultimate educational context then is not the free-flowing human dialogue; it is the student in the booth strapped up with a variety of teaching-learning devices monitored by a professional teacher. The implicit image is the operating room or the blood-cleansing kidney machine.

If the teacher is a professional, his services must be based on explicable operations and lead to predictable consequences. And what can provide more palpable purposes and predictable consequences than a *structured sequential spiraling concept-centered well-articulated automated multi-sensory* curriculum? Obviously, such curricula must be built and approved by the purveyor of the conventional wisdom of the culture, the academic. They must then be

"tested," revised, and evaluated by the educationist. Finally they can be packaged and mass-produced by the education industry.

But this is precisely where the analogy between teaching and medicine breaks down. One of the most powerful modern educative contexts is that provided in the process of *creating* a curriculum. It is here that the teacher and scholar ask themselves what is worth knowing, how one validates and justifies knowledge, how one transmits it. The *product* of a curriculum development program comes to have special meaning to its creator; to the teacher to whom it is given, the product may well appear artificial and contrived; to the student it is third-hand material. In short, the process of curriculum development, of assessing the value of knowledge, of relating it to significant action is a powerful educative process. One does not need to participate in the creating of aspirin, however, to have it relieve a headache. And it is because the analogy breaks down at a critical point, that I am quite certain that schools will not change in any fundamental way until there is a more general social revolution which brings into question basic interpretations of education in relationship to human fulfillment. The hard fact is that many human beings are either too fickle or too stubborn to make the aspirin analogy hold up. Too many human beings will simply resist or "adapt to" the structured sequential spiraling concept-centered articulated automated multi-sensory curriculum. The concept of school in the minds of clients (students and parents) and teachers alike is too powerful to allow for educational reform to be successful, and neither the professional educationist nor the new barons and packaging specialists of the education industry are about to change that.

In sum, the good professional teacher will get somewhat more of what he has been seeking: a means of regularizing his behavior so that he knows what he is doing and can rationalize and explain it to his clients. Doubts will be resolved regarding the appropriateness of the artifacts of instruction; the text, the film-loop, the TV set, the overhead projector, the simulation room will be integrated into a predictable experience. (There has always been a latent guilt about the exclusive use of textbooks.) The less predictable, more creative "teacher" will be "promoted" to the job of creating curricula and trying them out on small experimental classes; fewer students will then be subjected to the erratic disjointed curricula formerly devised *ad lib* by these people.

Some of the more creative artist types who now blunder into teaching and struggle for life within its quasi-professional strictures will be culled out. As the classroom context becomes more aseptic, such people will make fewer blunders and avoid teaching altogether. But this has been happening anyway.

In short, formal educational institutions have struggled for the last fifty years to define their role and the roles of the people who practice within them. There has been considerable conflict and ambiguity regarding that role: Are schools knowledge factories, custodial agencies, a means of employing odd types of adults who choose not to do "productive work" in the society, or just a place to get out of the weather? As most families acquire two cars and color TV, the school can probably afford to become a repository for complex communication machinery. This may rock the boat slightly, but I doubt very much that it will change its direction.

GERALD HOLTON

Harvard University

Without giving the "education industries" question the detailed discussion it deserves at this time, I can perhaps simply list a few of the main concerns which one hears raised, and comment briefly and informally on them.

1. *What fundamental analogy or image does the education industry have of its mission?* The worried academic asks: Will the product and methods of handling it be analogous to the case of the automobile, lately identified with the phrase, "unsafe at any speed," and often cited as an example of an industry's low commitment to research and high commitment to promotion? Or will the analogy be television? One is reminded of the phrase, "the vast wasteland." Or the aerospace industry, thriving on cold and hot wars? The answer here, I think, is that the fundamental pattern for the relationship between industry and education is just now being invented. It has to be a partnership in a very complex consortium in which the teaching profession, the academic subject-matter specialists, the industries, the regional laboratories, the financial granting agencies, and the schools of education—above all the last—have to be full and strong partners. The proper shaping of this fundamental pattern of association will, in my opinion, determine the health of the educational enterprise more than any other single factor.

2. *Where lies the loyalty of the educational industry?* Is it to the subject matter—for example, to physics or biology or English literature? Or to social engineering? To a high return on financial investment? Again, it is easy for academics to become frightened at this point; one needs only to remember the lesson of the educational equipment industry which, for the last fifty years, has been waging a bitter and fairly successful fight against the dropping of the import tariffs, behind which it has protected itself from vigorous competition. Until recently, the educational equipment industry was cen-

tered in two or three large firms, none of which had an effective scientific staff or any real interest in a systematic renovation of the tired old catalogues.

Again, the proper answer seems to be that a new invention has to be made: a shared loyalty between presenting good subject matter, fulfilling a social mission, discharging the financial obligations, and—at least as important as all of these—realizing clearly that the whole private enterprise system will be severely compromised if it turns out that the first two of these loyalties are made subservient to the third. One remembers a warning made by the subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee of the House and Senate, after their hearing in June, 1966, on technology and education: "It appears that the vital function of programing—preparation of the content of education—is falling too frequently to the hardware manufacturers when it should be handled by educational experts. It would be tragic if control of curriculum and the content of courses were to pass by default into the hands of large corporate producers of the hardware or software end of the business. Teaching aids and devices should be developed to meet explicit educational objectives and needs, rather than to broaden markets for particular products."

3. *How can quality be guaranteed?* To many academics, the vision of educational industries entering the market is one of slick entertainment and mass appeal entering the classroom. The packaging possibilities are, of course, immense. One can readily envisage the assaults on the school systems, the press, the students and their parents.

But again, the problem is one that can be handled if both the education profession and the education industries take seriously the need for evaluation and for wide public dissemination of the results of evaluation. This, it may be added, is by no means available at present, as may be readily found by trying to get reliable data on the effects of the current national courses sponsored by government agencies and carried out by academics—or even if one tries to get reliable data on the number of students who actually take such courses. The key to the preservation of quality is public evaluation by independent agencies; and here again, the schools of education and perhaps the regional labs and the research and development centers will be the backbone of any successful consortium involving the education industries.

4. *How will variety and diversity be preserved?* Particularly in a field such as education, the American school system (as almost the only such system in the world) has the right to expect variety and diversity instead of monolithic national uniformity; but there are also strong pressures militating against this hope, and working toward a mediocre consensus. It is an unhappy fact that, just as the cars and TV programs of rival manufacturers tend to look the same, just as the rival political parties, rival newspapers, and indeed rival college texts tend to be far more alike than different, so also are there

strong monopolistic tendencies in current curriculum development. It may be that the private philanthropic foundations, if they keep their courage, will be the main bulwark against this trend.

5. *How can we assure the continued recruitment of bright authors and innovators?* Since Sputnik, a whole generation of curriculum developers have been persuaded to leave their laboratories, libraries, or classrooms and spend a substantial period of hard work on curriculum development. They were motivated partly by a fairly clear social mission, and partly by the promise that there would be some protection for the integrity of their work. But now, apparently at the instigation of the American Textbook Publishers Institute, the government agencies such as USOE have insisted that government-financed projects publish their results without copyright protection. The full results of this policy are still to be discerned; but it can be regarded as a warning flag of the kind of effects which industry may have on the conditions of government sponsorship of academically based curriculum development. It is essential that safeguards of all kinds are preserved which will continue to make participation in curriculum development projects appealing to the best people, even when these projects are carried on not within industry but, as at present, largely in the academic world.

6. *Who will ask the big and dangerous questions?* Particularly if the work of the educational industries should be a great success, it will become increasingly difficult to make fundamental changes, even when clearly needed—witness our present commitment to an ever-larger private transportation system based on gasoline-burning vehicles instead of electrically powered small cars or highly efficient public transportation. Who will dare to say that he has failed to produce a sound curriculum if it is a great commercial success? Who will be alert enough to discern that what a branch of learning needs at a particular time is, e.g., an expensive interdisciplinary or history-and-methodology oriented course that would be much more difficult to sell than a more straightforward, more easily teachable, more narrow pre-professional course? Who will continually re-examine what implications scholarly developments in a given field have for theories and facts presented in the classroom? Who will take responsibility for teacher training, and subsidize the institutions responsible for it, even if there should be no clearly identifiable large market?

In reporting these common questions, I do not want to imply that the established academics or government agencies now have a monopoly on being right and wise. On the contrary, if the consortium of which I have spoken above is properly constructed, one can indeed be hopeful that the answers to these questions and the solutions to current problems will be better than those now available.

The reaction of teachers to the introduction of the new educational technology will play a major role—perhaps the crucial one—in determining whether the technology will be effectively used or whether it will be generally neglected in the learning process.

Apprehension surely will develop among teachers—indeed, the first symptoms have already appeared. So far there has been little done to dispel this apprehension. The profits that await the “education industries” have been elaborately projected but the precise benefits of the technology to society are still extremely nebulous.

The education industries’ seizure upon the writing of Marshall McLuhan in the promotion of its wares is frightening, to say the least. As difficult as it is to penetrate the thinking of Professor McLuhan, it certainly suggests an ultimate society of robots over which man eventually will lose his control. To contemplate that the machine will some day replace the human mind leads one to conclude that man’s very cause for being will also disappear. Such a conclusion is so preposterous that it warrants no further pursuit. Thus, in considering the possibilities of the emerging education industries, we must look upon them only as new and exciting tools to be used by man in his own pursuits.

The technological revolution in education is occurring at the same time as another widespread revolution. Teachers are assuming a more active role in shaping public decisions affecting education. For the education industry and governmental agencies to bypass teachers in making decisions on the new educational technology would be almost as serious an error as ignoring the reactions of parents.

It is difficult for any person or group feeling threatened by technological unemployment to be receptive to what arouses fear. All that a teacher can do in discussing the new technology is allow others to judge the degree to which his attitudes are determined by self or group interest and the extent to which his views deserve serious intellectual consideration in making the final decision.

Just as a book can replace a teacher for many kinds of learning, so a machine can replace both. In my generation, phonographs, slide projectors, film projectors, radio, television, and a succession of other modern audio-visual mechanisms have been found to have applications in the learning process. The teaching machines represent the latest and most advanced examples of these new aids. That all of these can enhance learning if properly used is axiomatic; that they have not replaced teachers is evident.

The original hopes of authors and inventors, however, about the learning value of their products generally have not been realized. High enthusiasm for the latest book or for the most advanced gadget eventually has given way to its incidental, subordinate, or occasional use in the learning process. Has this been the result of the hostility, power, and inflexibility of the teaching profession, or has it been due to the nature of learning itself?

That established professions, including that of teachers, tend to be conservative and slow to change tested practices is a reasonable hypothesis. Probably many teachers, particularly at the collegiate level, have not used long-established technological developments in the learning process as much as they could. But this failure must not be laid only at the teacher's door. Too often in the past, technological equipment which may have been perfectly sound as hardware has failed to gain acceptance among teachers because of its deficiencies in the software of programming and the user's lack of the necessary technological knowledge. Our experience with the massive waste surrounding the use of the language laboratory and educational television can be attributed largely to these shortcomings. If we are to use effectively the possibilities which can be envisioned in the emerging educational industry, we must be certain that the machines which are developed will be usable by those who will put them to work. This means that the massive expenditures necessary for development of the new industry must be accompanied by like expenditures in the training of the users. Multi-million dollar teaching machines gathering dust in school basements or in federally supported "area research centers" offer no promising prospect for improvement of educational practice. Nor will it be enough for the industry to sell only those who control the purse strings. It will be necessary to direct the sales pitch also to the prospective user.

It might seem that brilliant men who are capable of conceiving and developing such sophisticated devices for the storage, classification, and retrieval of information would be capable of controlling the learning process itself. That they cannot is fact. Learning is not a hard science like the sciences which make possible automation with its predictable outcomes under controlled conditions.

As long as learning remains a difficult-to-direct and unpredictable process affected by a variety of internal physical and psychological forces and external influences, it is unreasonable to expect a manufactured product to do what both parents and teachers have great difficulty doing—coping with the varying characteristics of children and the many and changing environmental influences affecting their learning. Aspirations, motivations, pressures, conflicts and fears may influence learning more than the practice or drill which a machine may provide.

There would be no need for teachers for those aspects of learning which can be machine-programmed if all children had an intense desire to learn, superior power of concentration, a high degree of intellectual self-confidence, no yearning to be out-of-doors on a beautiful day, no dreams of other pleasant outside experiences, and no problems of personal adjustment with their family, peers, or both. It takes an able person to develop a learning machine based upon a sensible learning theory, but it takes an equally capable person to make effective use of that device in contributing to the learning process. Teachers should have no fear of being replaced by the educational industry. The education industry should not become too optimistic about its ultimate market and profits.

If teachers and entrepreneurs both would see teaching machines as they see books, their respective fears and hopes would become much smaller. A book is a form of programmed learning. Once it is assembled, it remains fixed; but science, scholarship, life, and learning do not remain fixed. The scholar-teacher keeps abreast of what has not yet been recorded in any book or what has been entered in later books or books not available to the learner. This is what makes the competent teacher so vital in the learning process along with the enthusiasm, understanding, sympathy, and other human attributes that make learning a rewarding experience for the student.

Teachers always have had the advantage over books and their authors when it comes to stimulating, leading, and arousing interest and curiosity among learners. In releasing creativity, fostering idealism, examining values, and generating thinking, the live teacher has had the advantage over the writer of books. The teacher has been superior to the book in dealing with the shy, the troubled, the careless, the over-confident, the lazy, and the many other types of children. Does anyone doubt that the same will not be true with respect to other media?

Indeed books have certain advantages over some of the more impersonal machines; the author can reveal some of his zeal and personality. On the other hand, televised teaching often may be superior to books in bringing an outstanding human personality into the learning process. Yet, without the supervision of a teacher, a learner can daydream while exposed to television almost as much as he can when looking at a book.

Perhaps biochemistry or genetics may make some kinds of learning predictable without the careful overseeing of a teacher, but educational technology cannot. Yet, it can provide teachers with more time to deal with the complex emotional and environmental influences affecting learning. May teachers learn to use our technology effectively and wisely for the good of mankind.

Teachers must be given an opportunity to learn about the products of educational technology, an active part in criticizing and evaluating them, and a

key role in deciding upon their purchase and use in the learning process. Otherwise, the industry, the teaching profession, and the public will suffer the consequences of wasteful spending on ineffective devices or the loss of learning arising from failure to utilize the best combination of professional service and applied technology.

Regardless of what is done, the survival of the teaching profession in spite of automation is a safe assumption for both teachers and industry to make.

EDWARD L. KATZENBACH

Raytheon Company

Much has been said and written over the past two years about the entry of industry into education: its significance, its potential for good, and its dangers—both real and imaginary.

Let me state at the outset my conviction that there is an enormous potential for good in the developing partnership between education and industry. Yet, as in all endeavors in which cooperation is essential to success, understanding is of primary importance.

In the interest of mutual understanding, it might be well to review briefly the various perspectives involved: the perspective of industry on education, the perspective of education on industry, and the perspective of the education industry on itself.

The perspective of industry on the field of education is not one generally encountered either on the campus or in the education association. Industry looks upon education both as a business opportunity and as a service opportunity, knowing full well that the scope of the business opportunity will be in direct proportion to the quality of the service and the understanding with which it is performed. I know of no market in which a constant orientation to the needs of the customer is more vital to success.

An example of the seriousness with which I believe industry is approaching its responsibility to and involvement in education, is the following statement from the five-year business plan of Raytheon Company's Education Division:

Of all his undertakings, man's greatest success has been his extension of the universe of his knowledge. His knowledge has incredibly expanded his natural endowments—his muscular power, his dexterity and speed, his ability to hear and be heard and to see and be seen. Man's memory, too, has expanded. He can recall more things and order his knowledge as never before.

Technology has been the great transducer. Technology each year puts new demands on the specialist. His scope of activity is narrowed and he must carefully at-

tend to few subspecialties. That such a trend will continue simply must be accepted as a fact of life.

It is no mere truism to say that a man must know more and more about less and less; it is part of the ecology of technology. This being the case, man's learning life becomes longer and longer; and the value of time in the learning process is increasing exponentially.

It is the mission of this division, therefore, to save time, and hence cost, by analyzing a problem as a problem and solving it with combinations of software and hardware. Ours is a problem-solving business, whether the problem be literacy or skill training or education. Ours is basically an intellectual product.

In defining the education market, or the knowledge market as it is sometimes called, industry views education in its broadest sense, embracing the full and ever-widening spectrum of learning situations—in the primary and secondary school classroom or on the college or university campus; in business, industry, civilian government, or the armed services. It is a most interesting phenomenon of our times that the knowledge requirements of modern society are increasingly being met beyond the bounds of formal education. And formal education is itself participating in this phenomenon.

The business-industry-government share of total annual education expenditures has increased steadily since World War II. Of the more than \$70 billion now being expended each year on education, some \$50 billion are being expended on formal education and more than \$21 billion by business, industry, and government.

The U. S. Department of Defense alone has some 300,000 men and women on full-time duty as teachers and instructors. It has a "campus" equal in total area to the cities of Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York combined. More than 6000 courses are taught on it. In addition, it has students at one hundred universities—from Tokyo to Geneva. A million servicemen are currently taking correspondence courses. Each year nearly 100,000 servicemen earn high school certificates, 3200 qualify for bachelors degrees and 900 earn masters degrees.

This year, American business and industry will spend something on the order of \$15 billion to educate its own. While a portion of these funds is being invested in training, the bulk is going toward scientific, engineering, and management education in highly sophisticated company schools.

General Motors, for example, has its own degree-granting institution. IBM spends almost as much on the education of its own as is being spent on public education in the District of Columbia. Many companies have extensive employee education programs ranging from skill training to management development. Raytheon provides extensive services in the education and training

of customer personnel in the theory, operation, and maintenance of complex electronic systems.

Many companies enroll their people in specially-tailored university courses, the content of which they specify. If a company cannot obtain what it needs in this way, it can purchase courses from a for-profit teaching company—an essentially new and uniquely American institution which has arisen in response to the growing demand for continuing education beyond the years of formal schooling.

There are several other areas in which it is important to understand the perspective of industry on education. The student, the educator, and the role of research, for example, are seen in quite a different perspective when viewed from the other side of the school-yard fence.

The student is anyone who has a learning need—whether he is in a classroom or on the job and in the need of intellectual refurbishing.

The educator-consultant, while sometimes criticized by the education community for time spent outside the classroom, is viewed by industry as an honored expert teaching elsewhere.

The distinction between on-campus and off-campus research has, with the advent of the large non-profit research institutions, largely disappeared. This is true in both the physical sciences and the social sciences.

Formal education—while sometimes referred to as lethargic, conservative, slow—looks, from the point of view of industry to be on the whole dynamic, innovative, and forward-looking. Formal education is doing a good job and has provided the base for that education which performance must be done outside.

Of the several major elements which might be said to comprise the perspective of education on industry, three stand out in my mind as being of paramount importance and most in need of clarification if the fruits of a working partnership between education and industry are to be fully realized:

One is the educator's view of industry as being motivated solely by prospects of profit, with perhaps the lingering concern that the profit motive sees the end as more important than the means.

The second is the educator's view of the size of the companies that are now seeking to serve his field and his concern that companies, by virtue of their size, will be in position to control curriculum, the content of courses, and the methods of instruction.

The third is the educator's view of industry as being more product- than problem-oriented and his concern that, as expressed by Dean Theodore Sizer of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, education faces the risk of being inundated by products that are "technically exciting but intellectually inadequate."

These concerns on the part of educators are understandable and, I might add, they are shared by companies in the education industry. Awareness of

the enormity and importance of the task, and of the social responsibility of industry to education, has caused companies in the field to study closely their perspective on themselves and their role in and potential for creative contributions to American education.

For example, my own company entered the education field after intensive study and analysis of trends in education, of the problems and needs expressed by educators, and of the scope and nature of services then available to the education community from industry.

The management concluded that, by assembling a well-rounded array of learning resources and by working closely with the education community on effective solutions to important problems, the company could make significant and creative contributions to advances in the teaching/learning process.

Our approach was pragmatic. We acquired a system or, the elements of a system: a textbook company which produces, in addition to school and college texts, a variety of audio-visual materials; a scientific apparatus company which manufactures the wherewithal to learn by doing; a company which produces a multi-media teaching and student response system which can be used for programmed, automated instruction; and a company which manufactures closed-circuit television systems, language and learning laboratories, and dial-access and learning center systems. This industrial complex is capable of providing both intellectual content and a variety of electronic and other means for enhancing and enlivening its presentation.

We are well aware of the fact that our ability to earn a profit in the education field will depend on our ability to provide a valuable and wanted service. We in industry must immerse ourselves in the problems of education and of the individual learner. To lay ready-made solutions or interesting but isolated pieces of equipment on the doorstep of the educator and then walk away is to fail—both as a business and as a source of service. For industry, there can be no difference between the motive for profit and the motive to serve.

The education community has traditionally been supplied by a large number of relatively small and specialized companies. We believe that there is an increasingly important role to be played by the larger companies with a depth and flexibility of resources that can be brought to bear on complex education problems. There is little danger, I believe, that companies will try to control curricula and course content or dictate methods of instruction. Were industry to function solely outside the education community, such might be the case. But new curricula and advances in teaching and learning techniques developed by education with the aid of industry become the products not of industry but of education. As the customer, the educator has the final say.

In my opinion, industry has in the past been more concerned with products

than with problems and their solutions. Our company, like others, feels that intellectual content must precede the technological means for its presentation. A machine or a system is only as good as the intellectual product that goes on, or in, or through it. To be effective, instructional materials and teaching/learning tools must be developed in concert.

We are aware that we must sell a product of high intellectual quality if we are to sell to intellectuals and that to sell to the classroom we must know the classroom and buy from the best of those who teach there. Those who develop new curricula, who write texts, who develop programmed instruction, who consult and advise on the problems of education—these are the people who will establish and maintain our reputation.

We consider the teacher and the textbook, now and in the future, to be basic to the American education process—and the challenge to education technology to be that of finding means of extending the effectiveness of the teacher and the textbook in the classroom.

Raytheon's learning resources begin with problem-solving services to educators. Solutions to most complex teaching and learning problems call for combinations of software and hardware, some of which exist outside the company's resources and some of which may not yet exist at all. We are not wedded to any particular system or to any one technology. The nature of the problem will dictate the means for its solution.

Competition in the education industry will doubtless be intense. It will be waged on quality not, I would hope, on price. There will be intense rivalry for talent and for higher quality services and products with which to interest the schools and colleges.

Companies will welcome tests on and experiments with their products. In fact, much needs to be accomplished by way of research and testing to determine the true effectiveness of new education techniques in saving time and thus dollars, in providing a proven level of knowledge acquisition, and in advancing the teaching and learning process. It is difficult to see how education can do other than gain from competition among companies seeking to serve it.

Let it be quite clear, however, that the education industry is well aware at this point that it has much to learn from the classroom, much to absorb in the research centers, and many more questions to ask than answers to give.

On the other hand, industry has a great depth of resources in research and development, technology, systems management, and other areas. More important, it is, I am convinced, motivated by a keen sense of social responsibility and the strong desire to render a truly significant service to the American people by providing a truly significant service to American education.

Therein lies the challenge to the education community—to establish its ob-

jectives and to communicate them clearly to industry, to enumerate its problems and to tap the resources of industry in the search for creative solutions, to assert its freedom of choice among the many services and products offered, and to impose upon industry its sternest criteria for intellectual quality.

The education community will, in turn, find industry both willing and able to meet the demands of a creative, working partnership. Such a partnership will greatly benefit the student, the teacher, and the nation as a whole.

The Editorial Board welcomes comments on articles, reviews, and letters that have appeared in the REVIEW. Communications should be addressed to: HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 13 Appian Way, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. Letters from readers will be published at the Editors' discretion.

To the Editors

CHILDHOOD AND THE EDUCATION OF INTELLECTUALS

To the Editors:

David Hawkins seems to me to have done (HER, Fall, 1966) just what a good philosopher should do in suggesting a value-system we didn't know we had, or at the very least, one we have never been able to justify. In reading his article, one often has a sudden vision of a completely new way of looking at childhood. What right have we indeed—we find ourselves asking—to force our adult standards on defenseless childhood. Terrible memories of cultural mutilation by misguided missionaries come to us and for a moment we see ourselves as missionaries from down the years, perverting the precious age of innocence.

Can we now say: "But on the other hand. . ."? On the other hand something must be said, but I do not think it will justify sinking back into the easy chair of our old ways. Professor Hawkins' main point has great power and should haunt the highpowered reformer for the

rest of his days. Yet I confess to a self-concept which includes a hot-rodder's attitude towards acceleration (at least the academic variety), and so I welcome the Editors' invitation to defend myself by commenting on this article. Defense here consists, I think, in projecting a powerful alternative picture on the mind's screen—not in giving a detailed set of counter-arguments.

In the first place, I think it not unilluminating to compare Professor Hawkins' views with that of apologists for Southern slave-owners who argued that the happy, ignorant slave is poorly served by the reformer. To this view, I think one should reply as follows:

1. It is not clear that very many of the slaves were particularly happy most of the time, and it seems highly probable that those few would have lived longer and in better health and with no obvious loss of happiness if they had also the rights of free men.

2. The unhappy ones would certainly have had better expectations as free-men.

3. In any case, it is singularly inappropriate for those who obviously benefit from a system to be those who decide whether it benefits others without giving others the choice of alternatives and the means to make this choice (i.e., education).

By analogy, I think that children who are really satisfied with being children longer than necessary are less common than is needed for Professor Hawkins' case. We all know that children very often abhor control by others and are anxious to join the ranks of autonomous beings just as soon as possible. Even those who do not consciously wish for this autonomy will often realize later that they were better served in the long run by early acquisition of the weapons for survival in the adult society. And finally, the overriding consideration should surely be the obligation to enable the child to evaluate rationally his own future as soon as possible. I find the suggestion that we should keep the kids in the cradle as long as possible morally rather repulsive. I do not think Professor Hawkins is explicitly committed to this suggestion, but I think he's too close to it. I doubt if I shall ever hate anyone as much as the schoolmaster who nearly prevented me from skipping the ninth grade; and while I wish the best to all the happy slobs who linger on in the schoolhouse slums of intellectual dependence, I would bitterly oppose condemning all children to that state of servitude. (Oh, Readiness, what crimes have been committed in thy name!) Nor is their environment an intellectual slum just because of some remediable defects in the way we treat the kids. There are plenty of those defects, and I heartily endorse Professor Hawkins' cry for "equal rights for kids" (to enjoy learning, etc.) insofar as achieving those rights is his aim and it is possible within the overriding consideration of

the apprenticeship role. But in his implied or explicit criticism of scientific evaluation, acceleration, curriculum compression, etc., I hope he will forgive me as a friend for feeling that he has cast himself in the role of Uncle Tom Hawkins!

Education has just achieved something of vast importance in this country. It has emancipated the college-age group, who for the first time realize as did Negroes and women before them that they have simply been exploited by a privileged group wholly lacking in demonstrable moral or intellectual superiority. The battle for equal rights will be grim, but it must eventually lead to the formal accolade of the franchise for the 18-year-old, amongst other things. Since I believe that the average 18-year-old's education and maturity is quite probably attainable by the time he or she is 14, I hope to see the period of apprenticeship markedly shortened. Release the slaves, say I, although to do so we must work as slaves ourselves. In that work, let us take childhood as seriously as Professor Hawkins does, but let us take seriously too the idea of the adult hidden in the child, waiting for us to let him out.

MICHAEL SCRIVEN
Indiana University

LAW AND THE SCHOOLS

To the Editors:

I have read Professor Freund's article, "The Law and the Schools," (HER, Fall, 1966) with intense interest. Working from the opposite end of the spectrum—I am a schoolteacher—I had come independently to conclusions strikingly similar to his, both as to the value of trying to teach legal thinking in secondary school and as to the preferred approach.

Recently I signed a contract with a publisher to produce a high school text on constitutional rights. The co-author is John C. Pittenger, a lawyer and politician. From the first, he and I were determined to find ways to force students into engaging in what Mr. Freund calls the "built-in dialectic" of the law instead of learning pat answers telling the superiority of the American Way.

A common method of embarking on the task of bringing a new discipline into the high school curriculum is to start with a class of superior students, then to work and rework the materials until they are within the grasp of those of more moderate ability. Following this prescription, Mr. Pittenger and I are trying out our ideas on the dozen members of a freshman seminar in Harvard College. As a starter we have put our young men and women to intense study (one week each) of four cases on which the Supreme Court was narrowly and often bitterly divided during the 1965-1966 session: *Schmerber v. California*, *Miranda v. Arizona*, *Rosenblatt v. Baer*, and *Elfbrandt v. Russell*. A typical assignment went as follows:

Schmerber v. California [involving a case in which police took a blood sample from an allegedly drunken driver to test for alcohol, over the protest of the individual and of his counsel]

Make a careful study of all the opinions in the case. You will also need to look up three closely related decisions—*Rochin v. California*, 342 US 165; *Breithaupt v. Abram*, 352 US 432; and *Mapp v. Ohio* (superseding *Wolf v. Colorado*, 338 US 25). Other cases you would be well advised to study are *Boyd v. US*, 116 US 616; *Weeks v. US*, 232 US 383; *Mallory v. Hogan* (superseding *Twining v. New Jersey*, 211 US 70).

After study and reflection write an opinion stating how you would decide the case and why you reject the arguments of the justices with whom you disagree. This must be no more than 1,000 words.

You will be asked to defend your position in class.

Question for discussion: How would you instruct police as to means and circumstances of taking blood samples to test for alcoholic content that would stand up in court?

Note that we sent students back to prior opinions and changing precedents in the hope that they would gain some sense of the "self-critical thinking" of the Court (again to quote Mr. Freund), as well as of the way the law is a web of constitutional fiat, legal principles, precedents, and judicial gloss. We carried this out in more sophisticated detail later, with an assignment on the history of the law of treason, which involved an elaborate exercise in the use of the Harvard Law School Library: how to find lower court and state decisions, how to "shepardize," how to use the index of legal periodicals. Like Mr. Freund, we were concerned that our pupils gain a sense of the law as an ongoing process through "a vicarious participation in the process of legal thinking." But perhaps the most important thing was that they had to come to class after class prepared to do battle by publicly defending a position and the logical process by which they had come to it. There was no way to avoid "built-in dialectic."

No need to describe our course further, save to say that we now move from the rarefied atmosphere of the Supreme Court to the law in action, as it may be seen in the lower courts. Our students have been sent to observe and bring back reports on municipal and district

courts in action. They will also investigate and report on contemporary problems in the administration of justice, such as methods of providing counsel for the indigent, proposed substitutes for bail, and the uses and abuses of wire-tapping.

So far the results of the experiment have been gratifying. The class has learned about concepts such as "substantive due process" and the intricacies of the Fourteenth Amendment, not because they were told to, but because they had to in order to go about their business. As they have become more aware of complexity, they have become less glib. Some of them have already become surprisingly skilled in the use of the Law School Library. Most importantly, they have again and again come face to face with difficult situations in which ethics and law are inextricably mixed, situations which force them continually to ask themselves where to draw the line between the rights of the individual and the safety of the public.

But I do not want to claim too much. It is one thing to deal with a small group of highly intelligent, highly motivated Harvard and Radcliffe freshmen who have the run of the Harvard Law School Library; it is quite another to teach a class of thirty average high school students of varying ability and little motivation. The problem is more than one of developing materials for these students. There is also the problem of training teachers. Despite Mr. Freund's confidence, legal thought is esoteric for the layman, and the study of legal literature demands an expenditure of time and energy that the average, overburdened, high school teacher cannot command. So that while I agree with Professor Freund on end and means and have staked a good deal on a project that seems to mesh with his purposes, I

am somewhat appalled at the difficulties that lie ahead.

HENRY W. BRAGDON
Phillips Exeter Academy
Harvard University

To The Editors:

There is surely a need for more law to be taught to people who are not, and will not be, lawyers. And there is a special need to approach the subject in a more sophisticated way, as Professor Freund makes clear. The problem that presently demands attention is not really a paucity of course offerings. At the Berkeley campus of the University of California, for example, the current catalogue lists some forty-six courses about the law and the legal systems. These courses appear in such diverse departments as social welfare, journalism, and anthropology, as well as the more conventional offerings in business administration, history, and political science. Other major institutions are similarly rich in law-related courses, as recent surveys indicate. The need, therefore, is not for an increase in the gross input, but rather for a re-examination and perhaps a reorientation of the content of what is offered. It is to that particular need that Professor Freund so incisively directs our concern.

It is not really the liberal-arts college undergraduate who demands our attention, however. The neglected student is the elementary and secondary pupil, who learns about the law little and late, if at all. What he is now likely to learn in school has little relevance to the law with which he will come in contact—or to the often abrasive way in which the law will affect him at the intersection of two busy streets or at income-tax time. He needs to know not what the statute says, for that is easy

enough to learn if it is important, but how the legal system works. He needs to appreciate the rationale of our system of justice, not its bare precepts. And he needs this exposure before it is too late to erase ingrained cynicism or to catch the alienated student in the process of dropping out of the formal educational system.

There is undoubtedly a shortage of good materials from which to teach elementary and secondary students about the legal system. But that deficiency is being remedied through collaborative efforts of teachers and legal scholars. The more important deficiency has to do with teacher training and preparation. Consider the case of the typical candidate for a degree of Master of Arts in Teaching, or any prospective pedagogue enrolled in a comparable course of graduate study leading directly to the classroom. In a large university, there are many law-related courses, theoretically available to such a student. But the courses in the law school are out of the question for many reasons. Political science and legal history courses are generally too sophisticated or too abstract to be of much value to the prospective social studies teacher. Courses about law offered in the education school are designed for administrators; they deal with contracts, insurance, and negligence on the playground from the most practical angle. None of these courses, therefore, will be of much help to the teacher who wants to learn, during the year of professional training, how to teach about the legal system.

What is called for is a special course for teacher-candidates, quite different from any that now exists. It should be the joint offering of the law faculty and the social science or social studies branch of the education faculty, with an occasional assist from the history

and political science people. It should entail some study of the history and present operation of the legal system, but should not neglect the classroom applications of the material covered. While the main emphasis should be on public law subjects—constitutional law, government regulation of the economy, administrative law, and the like—private law fields—such as tort, property, and contract—should receive more attention than they have heretofore in Bill of Rights workshops and National Defense Educational Act Institutes dealing with the law.

Along with the substantive emphasis that forms the core of such a course, there should be some study of the process of developing one's own materials for teaching about the legal system. It is here that Professor Freund's precepts are particularly germane; for the approach to the preparation of materials—even those which may never be used beyond the walls of a single classroom—should be as responsive to his admonitions as the design of the college courses themselves. If the elementary and secondary units that result from the teacher's own work do not embody, or at least reflect, what Professor Freund tells us about the variant approaches to the legal process, they will be poorer and less useful to that extent.

Finally, there must be some continued attention given to the subject matter of such a course once the prospective teacher leaves the college classroom to enter his own. In-service refresher programs and summer workshops provide a partial answer to this need. But perhaps more effective would be the organization of local, school-wide or system-wide, legal-system study laboratories. Each would serve to keep teachers informed about and aware of current legal developments. Specialization

would be feasible in proportion to the number of teachers involved in each group. Most important, such sub-structuring of the teachers who have been trained in understanding the legal process and the legal system will keep alive the lessons learned on the campus.

ROBERT M. O'NEIL

University of California, Berkeley

ON MATHEMATICS EDUCATION

To the Editors:

I have been asked to comment on the special issue devoted to the intellectuals and the schools (HER, Fall, 1966), and, because of my interest in mathematics education, to take particular note of Morris Kline's "Intellectuals and the Schools: A Case History."

It is fair to begin by saying that I am in definite disagreement with Kline's views about the school mathematics curriculum. For the purpose of the present context, however, I am not interested in presenting an opposing view about the substantive issues Kline touches upon. Rather, I want to criticize the general intellectual level at which he continually debates the issues—not only in the *Harvard Educational Review*, but in many other publications as well. Apposite to Kline's own title, my remarks could well be titled "How Not to Conduct a Case Study." I have organized my remarks under four headings.

1. Kline continually asserts conclusions without presenting any evidence to support them. On p. 508, Kline says that in the new mathematics curriculum, motivation is "completely absent," but the only evidence given is the repetition of Kline's own view that motivation should be provided by applications to the natural sciences. The pertinent and relevant sort of studies would be empirical ones aimed at the actual anal-

ysis of student motivation. Not only does Kline not mention any such studies, he does not even acknowledge the need for them.

On the preceding page, Kline asserts about the new curriculum, "The applications themselves are not taught." To those of us familiar with this curriculum, this assertion is recognized at once as simply false. My point here is not its falseness but the fact that Kline presents no evidence to support this bald conclusion. The least he could do is to cite some particular texts he has examined on this point and detail the record of his findings.

On p. 510, Kline asserts that university mathematicians failed even in their task of training future mathematicians. No evidence of any sort is given for this extraordinary claim.

2. Kline is uninformed about mathematics education in this country. On p. 506 he says, "Arithmetic had been taught as a series of mechanical processes." He seems to be totally unaware of the large body of research by Brownell and others on meaningful arithmetic and the impact of this research on the traditional curriculum.

In his opening paragraph (p. 505) Kline seems to acknowledge that something may be learned from investigations of the learning process, but neither in this article nor in other publications of his that I have read do his comments reflect any substantial knowledge of the literature on mathematics learning, even on the kind of topic in the curriculum Kline favors. Research literature on these matters has been produced in considerable volume at least since the time of Thorndike in the twenties.

3. Kline is often misleading, particularly in writing for readers who are not very conversant with modern mathematics or mathematics curriculum. On pp. 506 and 507, Kline gives an exam-

ple of how the associative and commutative laws of addition are used to give students an understanding of the basis for multidigit addition. In connection with this example, he says, "To add 23 and 30 the student is now expected to exhibit the following argument." Here follows in the text the example. What the uninformed reader is not told is that the explicit reference to the associative and commutative laws is only introduced to *help* the student understand the mechanical algorithm he is expected to learn and master. What Kline needs to read and answer is the body of research (Brownell, Gibb, etc.) which shows that algorithms that are taught and learned in a meaningful, not purely mechanical, fashion, are remembered longer and used with greater accuracy. (This research, by the way, goes back at least to the thirties.)

On pp. 507 and 508, Kline denigrates the place of deductive proofs in learning and doing mathematics, and goes on to assert: "... in the creation of mathematics, the thinking consists not of logical arguments but of guessing, conjecturing, generalizing from specific examples, and imagining a plan of attack." And on p. 510 he characterizes the deductive pattern of mathematics as its "superficial aspect." The misleading thing about these remarks is that mathematicians know a great deal about the deductive structure of mathematics, but practically nothing of a serious or systematic nature about mathematical thinking. The uninformed reader might think that Kline knew a great many things about conjecturing and generalizing from specific examples—knowledge at a psychological depth comparable to the logical depths of knowledge about the deductive structure of mathematics. Unfortunately, no such serious psychological literature on mathematical thinking yet exists, and certainly

Kline has not contributed to the small existing literature on the subject.

On p. 508, in discussing the commutative law of multiplication, Kline asserts, "However, it is no longer wise to ask: How much is $3 \cdot 4$?" To put it bluntly, this is arrant nonsense. No modern elementary mathematics curriculum with which I am familiar suggests that the multiplication facts be neglected or omitted. More importantly, if Kline wants to make this kind of provocative statement, he should at least offer *some* empirical evidence that students in the modern curricula do not do as well as other students on standard arithmetical tasks.

On p. 510 Kline tries to explain why most mathematicians do not agree with him. He says, "Most have turned to purely mathematical problems and the formalization, axiomatization, and generalization of what is already known. Such tasks are far easier [than the traditional ones]. Since this is what most mathematicians now do, it is not so surprising that this is what they think mathematics education should train young people to do." Again, it is certainly misleading to give the uninformed reader the impression that the current problems of pure mathematics are "far easier" than those of applied (or traditional) mathematics. This is a very personal opinion of Kline's and should be so indicated. It is not a belief shared by most mathematicians.

On p. 511, in his concluding paragraph, Kline suggests that the proper role of the universities is "to develop strong school teachers and officials and to let them, as experts in their own area, solve their problems." The implication of this and other passages is that school systems were doing this before the recent decade of school curriculum reform. In fact, however, a high percentage of school mathematics texts written

before 1955 had as senior author a university mathematician or professor of mathematics education. School systems have never played the role in curriculum development Kline is now assigning them.

4. Kline's language is often exaggerated. On p. 506 he describes the new mathematics curriculum taught to teachers in NSF institutes as "totally new material of unproven worth." On the next page he accuses the new curricula of introducing "hundreds of new terms" (of course, no data are quoted). On p. 508 he says of students who go to elementary school, most . . . never get to college," which certainly is a gross exaggeration for our present society.

These various comments of mine apply to a short article of seven printed pages. What I have tried to show by a reasonably detailed analysis of the text is that Kline writes about complex and difficult matters with simplistic ease and confidence. Intellectuals who want to talk about the schools surely have as a first challenge to talk at an intellectually responsible level. Kline, it seems to me, does not meet the challenge.

PATRICK SUPPES
Stanford University

THE TEACHER IN PURITAN CULTURE

To the Editors:

I appreciate your kindness in giving me the opportunity to read Wilson Smith's excellent article (HER, Fall, 1966), and your suggesting that I comment on it. May I say that, if anything, he has been too kind to our intellectual ancestors. He did not mention the town which compelled the village drunk to keep the school in order to earn his welfare payments.

I think that tutorial teaching at Harvard in the colonial period was quite

as bad as the food and the sanitation, and that all of them would have been intolerable to us moderns. My only difference with Dr. Smith is that he seems surprised that the colonials did not have an attitude towards teaching which, so far as I know, came into existence as one of the reforms of the nineteenth century. The Puritan had very little "vocation" for teaching as distinct from education. In part, his attitude was due to the fact that college students were mere children, with very annoying habits. In part it was due to the fact that educational institutions offered no professional training in law, medicine, the ministry, or teaching. The Puritan also felt that the acquiring of an education depended on the learner, not on the dispenser of the information. Puritans assumed that the individual would dig out what he needed for himself without any particular assistance from his master or tutor. In short, the colonials were men of another century, and we can't expect too much from them by our standards.

CLIFFORD K. SHIPTON
Harvard University Archives

ON THEORIES OF INSTRUCTION

To the Editors:

I would be surprised if you have not received a variety of comments on David P. Ausubel's review (HER, Summer, 1966) of Jerome S. Bruner's small volume, *Toward a Theory of Instruction*. Please count my vote in favor of Ausubel! Perhaps you will allow me a few paragraphs of explanation or justification.

One unfortunate characteristic of Bruner's book is its disregard (tantamount to disrespect?) for the work of leading educational psychologists of the past—and the present. Thus, the book

is dedicated not to any one like Thorndike or Köhler or Hilgard, but to Francis Friedman, a late professor of physics, whose wise questions (says Bruner) "made me aware of what a theory of instruction might entail" (page ix). Striking much the same note, the concluding sentence of the volume expresses the author's hope "that in pursuing a theory of instruction we shall have the courage to recognize what we do not understand and to permit ourselves a new and innocent look" (page 171). The present writer is as ready as the next fellow to applaud "courage" and "innocence"; but in intellectual matters a word or two may also be said favoring thoughtful verification over "courage" alone, and sophistication over "innocence." The point is that free-flowing vigorous prose cannot substitute for accurate, carefully qualified thought.

Another unfortunate characteristic of the volume under review is the excess of *ex cathedra*, apodictic (and not always valid) pronouncements. The following quotation from page 373 is an example. "It is as important that a good mathematics course be justified by the intellectual discipline it provides or the honesty it promotes as by the mathematics it transmits. Indeed, neither can be accomplished without the other." This certainly sounds like the doctrine of "formal discipline," which was long ago demolished by Woodworth, Thorndike, and Judd (to mention no others). Perhaps, in a manner of speaking, the doctrine was over-demolished. But to suppose—as apparently Bruner does—that "intellectual discipline" and "honesty" in, say, the social sciences and everyday life can be effectively and economically inculcated by "a good mathematics course" is to defy the evidence not only of everyday experience, but also of decades of careful experimental

study. Bruner appears here again to indulge in strong, smooth-flowing prose, to the sacrifice of the very "intellectual discipline" which he extols.

A third source of disappointment in the volume—at least to the present writer—is the virtually exclusive attention to *school* instruction in the *cognitive* realm. No doubt this is the type of teaching to which the term "instruction" commonly applies. To fail to give serious notice, however, to noncognitive aspects and noncognitive types of learning—and, correspondingly, of teaching—does seem to result in an extremely incomplete, emasculated view of all that should go into instruction. It is the difference, might one say, between the perfect computer learning-program and the perfect live teacher. Instruction surely involves many more dimensions than the purely intellectual.

Finally, Bruner's exposition (like most if not all others in this field) suffers from its failure to recognize fully the wide variety of resources—institutional, material, and personal—on which school instruction rests. I refer to such factors as traditions, customs, laws, and public opinion (all of which affect instruction directly or indirectly); to the basic role of controlling officials, such as state governors, legislators, boards of trustees, superintendents, and principals; to the organization, administration, and financing of the educational establishment; to such factors as facilities, equipment, instructional materials and supplies; to curricula (standardized) and instructional methods (regulated); to the problems of teacher-training and re-training; to the effects of educational-staff relations on the morale both of teachers and of pupils, with resulting effects on both teaching and learning; and so on. All of these factors affect instruction: actually, in composite, they *determine* instruction. In short, the

keys to an understanding of instruction are *social, political, and financial*, as well as technical or purely educational. Even in only a brief brochure "toward a theory of instruction," realism would seem to require that such factors receive some attention.

The acknowledged shortcomings of education in general, and, of instruction in particular, should not (by implication) be laid at the door of educators and instructors alone—because educators and instructors are not in control, and cannot, alone, effect the necessary changes. The same thought was expressed recently by the U. S. Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe II, when he said in another connection, "the fault lies not with the [educators] themselves, but with those who determine their budgets, *with those who set the conditions for their labors*" [italics supplied].* Does not a responsible "theory of instruction" have the obligation—moral, social, and surely intellectual—to make this fact crystal-clear? And would not such clarification improve any "theory of instruction," as well as lead more rapidly to the improvement of instruction itself?

The editors of *Harvard Educational Review* deserve unstinted admiration and thanks for maintaining freedom of critical expression, by publishing Professor Ausubel's review of this book.

HERBERT S. CONRAD
Washington, D. C.

ADOLESCENTS' ACCEPTANCE OF AUTHORITY

To the Editors:

The article by Fred M. Newmann in the Summer, 1965 number of the *REVIEW*

* From an address before a panel on "Education: The Federal-State Relationship"

raises a number of interesting methodological points. Without questioning the acceptability of calculating Pearsonian correlations for the kind of data he was dealing with, and leaving aside a number of other methodological questions, the main point of the present note is to suggest that his report does not take the analysis of his material far enough. This may be due to his use of a principal-components technique which frequently renders the interpretation of factors extraordinarily difficult.

By taking his Table 3 as a starting point, and using the information about reliability coefficients in Table 1, it is possible to make a complete analysis of the variance in terms of general (bipolar) factors, specific, and error factor in accordance with the four-factor theory of Sir Cyril Burt.¹ With seven iterations, extracting two bipolar factors using the simple summation method, a complete analysis of Newmann's correlation matrix is presented in Table 1 below.

These results do not invalidate Newmann's interpretations, which are based on two sets of data. From the negative correlations, he deduces the existence of three bipolar relationships between: *competence vs. group will*; *legality vs. autonomy*; and *efficiency vs. tradition*. From the principal components analysis, he deduces that "most of the variation among the categories is accounted for by the *unique* contribution of each variable rather than by the variables' linear relationships to each other." The analysis according to Burt's theories and techniques enables us to verify these two conclusions on a sounder basis and to take the argument a stage further.

at the annual convention of the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders, Washington, D. C., November 18, 1966.

¹ *The Factors of the Mind* (London: University of London Press, 1940), pp. 101-4 and Appendix I.


TABLE 1

Factor Composition (7th iteration)								
Item	Factors				Variances			Total
	I	II	I	II	Common	Specific	Error	
1	.175	.299	.031	.089	.120	.820	.060	1.000
2	-.516	-.271	.266	.073	.339	.621	.040	1.000
3	.271	-.102	.073	.010	.083	.867	.050	1.000
4	-.413	-.365	.171	.133	.304	.626	.070	1.000
5	.267	-.248	.071	.062	.133	.747	.120	1.000
6	-.413	.310	.171	.096	.267	.563	.170	1.000
7	.221	.358	.049	.128	.177	.743	.080	1.000
8	-.129	.593	.017	.352	.369	.491	.140	1.000
Totals			.849	.943	1.792	5.478	.730	8.000
Percentages of variance			10.6	11.8	22.4	68.1	9.0	100

Item 1 Competence
 2 Legality
 3 Impartiality
 4 Group will

Item 5 Efficiency
 6 Tradition
 7 Autonomy
 8 Favoured policy

FIGURE 1



In the first factor, *competence*, *autonomy*, and *efficiency* are certainly set over against *group will*, *legality*, and *tradition*. In addition, a fourth pair are set over against each other: *impartiality* vs. *favoured policy*. The analysis also reveals the quantitative relationships between the eight criteria in question. The interpretation of this factor is that it signifies the bases on which the adolescents interviewed by Newmann accept constitutional authority. This acceptance is either in terms of professional expertise (the bureaucrat's right to innovate) or alternatively in terms of conformity with precedent (the compulsion on the bureaucrat when innovating to conform with existing laws and traditions). Thus, *impartiality*, *efficiency*, *autonomy*, and *competence* are set over against *legality*, *tradition*, *group will*, and *favoured policy*, in a bipolar relationship.

The second factor, also bipolar in nature, arranges the adolescents' criteria in the order: *favoured policy*, *autonomy*, *tradition*, and *competence* at one pole with *group will*, *legality*, *efficiency*, and *impartiality* at the other. The effect of these two dichotomies is to group the eight criteria in four quadrants as shown in Figure 1 below. The second factor can be interpreted as the distinction made by this group of adolescents between a traditional, opportunistic conservatism which depends on an intuitive knowledge of the fitness of particular policies and of particular individuals to govern, as opposed to the desirability that democratic practices and principles, married with the effective implementation of agreed decisions by an unbiased authority, should prevail.

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PROFESSOR NEWMANN REPLIES:

Mr. McLeish's analysis sheds little, if any, light on the original data. I have two major objections to the factors he extracted. First, it should be noted that his two factors account for only 22 per cent of the total variance, which underscores my finding that most of the total variance is not explained by common factors, but by specific contributions of each of the eight criteria. Second, McLeish's factors are difficult to interpret. Though he neatly describes the first factor as the polarity between "professional expertise" versus "conformity with precedent," it seems to me that *efficiency* and *impartiality* are essentially incompatible and should not be loaded together. Also, why should *favoured policy* be clustered with *tradition* at the other end of this first factor? McLeish's second factor raises similar problems: why should *efficiency* be clustered with *group will*, and why is *tradition* opposed to *legality*? Now let us try to distinguish between factors I and II. What is the qualitative difference between "professional expertise vs. conformity to precedent" on the one hand, and "opportunistic conservatism vs. democratic practices with effective unbiased implementation" on the other? I find interpretation of these factors most confusing.

I chose not to present results of my factor analysis in the original article (because of the relatively low portion of total variance accounted for), but now it may be useful to report that my principal components analysis yielded four factors. After rotation (an oblique solution, using Carroll's bi quartimin criterion), loadings emerged as shown in Table 1 below.

As should be expected, these factors reflect major bipolar relationships appearing in the correlation matrix

(p. 321 of the article): *efficiency vs. tradition; group will vs. competence; legality vs. autonomy* (with *impartiality* not impressively related to anything). If we must apply factor analysis, I believe principal components with the rotation here reported yields a more interpretable set than Burt's solution. However, there is no need to fret over alternative interpretations suggested by different solutions when each solution delivers a set of factors accounting for only a small portion of the total variance.

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THE LOGICAL CONSISTENCY OF LANGUAGE

To the Editors:

Until now, I never understood how anyone, except elderly ladies with nothing

better to do, can work up enough righteous indignation to go to the trouble of writing a *letter to the editors*. But, after reading R. M. Martin's reply (HER, Summer, 1966) to Herzberger's paper (HER, Fall, 1965), I find I am quite capable of understanding it. All it takes is something very good attacked in a very shabby way.

Martin's points divide, exhaustively, into two categories: unwarranted complaints and invalid criticisms. In the first, there is a host of disparaging remarks about semantic notions presupposed by Herzberger. All reflect a failure on Martin's part to consult the relevant linguistic literature cited by Herzberger in footnotes 13, 16, and 22 of his paper. In the second, there is one argument based on an elementary logical fallacy. This argument says that the proof in Herzberger's paper, if it were correct, would "assure the consistency

TABLE 1
Principal Components Analysis of Eight AJI Variables
(N = 72)*

Variable	<i>h²</i>	Factors			
		I	II	III	IV
competence	72	49	17	66	11
legality	73	-69	10	47	15
impartiality	98	23	-53	02	-80
group will	69	-69	-01	-46	03
efficiency	67	07	-65	00	49
tradition	55	-28	61	-07	-31
autonomy	74	55	15	-60	22
favorable policy	53	37	63	-02	03
Latent Root		1.77	1.53	1.25	1.07
% of Trace		22.09	19.10	15.58	13.33
Cum. % of Trace		22.09	41.18	56.77	70.10
Standard Error of Factor Coefficient:	.24				

* Decimal points omitted from communalities (*h²*) and factor loadings. Significant loadings (those exceeding twice the standard error of factor coefficient) are italicized.

of mathematics." This argument of Martin's would constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of Herzberger's proof if it were correct. However, Martin's argument breaks down because it fails to distinguish between the solution to a problem and the reduction of one problem to another.

Among the unwarranted complaints are the following:

Herzberger comments,

The standard explanation of [analytic] sentences [such as "All kings are male"] is that the meaning of the predicate-phrase is already contained within the meaning of the subject-phrase, so that the sentence imposes upon the world a vacuous claim which cannot but be fulfilled.

Martin remarks,

No analysis of "contained in" as used here is given [and "contained in"] begs for clear analysis.

But the references cited in footnotes 13 (which footnotes the very passage in which this comment of Herzberger's occurs), 16, and 22 provides a formal analysis of this notion of containment. Again, Herzberger comments,

... we can think of the analytic sentences of a language as those sentences which are "asserted" by the language itself.

Martin remarks that

it is by no means clear without ado that natural languages assert anything at all, for, presumably at least, they contain neither axioms nor postulates nor any clear-cut rules of logical consequence. Of course, we can supply such, but the result is then no longer a natural language but rather a "regimented" or "semi-formalized" one.

But had Martin taken the trouble to consult the references cited by Herzberger, he would have found an account of how it is possible to regard analytic sentences as those asserted by the language even though the language does not have axioms or rules of inference and is not changed into a semi-formalized one by adding such. The idea is that the principles which permit us to regard certain sentences of a language as analytic and so asserted by the language are constructions in semantic theory. Since this theory is about the semantic structure of natural language, such principles constitute empirical claims about natural languages, not proposals for reconstructing natural language or actual reformulations of them.

There is no point in going on to other cases where first Martin ignores the references that explain the semantic concepts Herzberger uses and then complains that Herzberger fails to explain these semantic concepts. The two given are typical. Since an author has the right to presuppose another's work so that he can develop it further without repetition and a critic has the obligation to consult the presupposed work, Martin is guilty of a serious breach of basic scholarly standards.

Turning to Martin's critical argument, we find,

[Herzberger's proof] sounds as though it were about natural languages only, but actually it can be interpreted as applying to language-systems as well. The exact logical form of the argument then comes to light clearly, as well as its absurdity. For what the author claims to have "proved" is that all language-systems are consistent—or at least that the set of analytic truths of any language-system [is]. In this way the consistency of mathematics is assured.

Martin's phraseology ("actually it can be interpreted . . .") conveys the false impression that it was Martin who discovered the application to language-systems. Before debunking Martin's argument, it is necessary to dispel this false impression. Accordingly, we may cite passages where Herzberger himself points out this application. He says, "Even in an artificial language, the analytic sentences must necessarily form a logically consistent set." (p. 478) He criticizes Carnap for saying that "it cannot be the task of the logician to prescribe to those who construct language systems what meaning postulates they ought to take" by arguing that Carnap "neglects to include a requirement of consistency" so that "we might reply that the logician does have the task of restricting the freedom of 'those who construct systems' by prescribing to them what sets of postulates they cannot accept on logical grounds." (p. 478, footnotes 19 and 20)

As indicated earlier, Martin's argument breaks down because it fails to distinguish between the solution to a problem and the reduction of one problem to another. The problem of whether mathematics is consistent *can* be reduced to the problem of whether it can be encompassed in a semantical system having a consistent set of meaning postulates, i.e., if each mathematical truth can be expressed by an analytic sentence of the system. This reduction is trivial. But such a reduction is quite different from establishing the consistency of mathematics. Because the

reduction is a trivial extension of Herzberger's proof, Martin gratuitously supposes that proof also claims to offer a solution to the problem of establishing the consistency of mathematics. But, although Herzberger would agree that mathematics can be shown to be consistent if it can be encompassed in such a semantical system, he would quite rightly deny that his proof provides any basis for the further step required, namely, that mathematics can be encompassed in a semantical system having a consistent set of meaning-postulates. This proof surely cannot be wrung out of Herzberger's argument, and so his argument cannot "assure the consistency of mathematics."

In connection with natural languages, Martin writes, "...even if we do not speak here of language-systems but only of languages, the consistency of mathematics is still presumably established if mathematical truths are included among the analytic sentences of natural languages. Hardly a less cogent argument could be given." Again: Herzberger's proof shows that if mathematical truths can be shown to be analytic, the consistency of mathematics would be assured. However, his proof most emphatically does not establish the antecedent of this conditional. The last sentence of the immediately preceding quotation of Martin's can only be true of Martin's own argument against Herzberger.

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Book Reviews

THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA:
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR.

by Perry Miller.

New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1965. 338 pp. \$7.50.

Perry Miller worked with such vigor and insight that he will embarrass any future historian who tries to use him in the way that Miller used the articulate intellectuals of the past: as an index to the general social history of his period. Profusion characterized his last book, just as much as it did all his earlier work. But *The Life of the Mind in America* is also all that a good posthumous book may have the misfortune of being. It is both a monument and a ruin. It is grievously incomplete, having touched only three of nine topics that Miller had set out for himself. It is unevenly revised. It is also a product of Miller's later years, when he evinced a doggedness at adapting into inappropriate contexts some of the brilliant insights from his best work. This bent crops up in *The Life of the Mind*, especially in the first section on "The Evan-

gelical Basis" of pre-Civil War thought, though much less in the long treatment of "The Legal Mentality," in which he incidentally puts forward the elements of a new, intellectual interpretation of the origins of the Civil War.

In its incomplete state, *The Life of the Mind* yields a sense of intellectual history that is quite different from the diagnosis that Miller communicated in *The New England Mind*, and that is possibly different from what he hoped to communicate through the whole structure he planned. The difficulty lies in the section on the revival, which Miller presents as the inward engine of American feeling in the nineteenth century. Formal theology he treats as an academic exercise that some men pursued in isolation from their society. The fact that Miller left his own discussion of formal religious thought for a stage of the work that he did not reach, combined with the obvious enthusiasm that he felt for the revival flare, gives to his incomplete work an anti-intellectual tone that is foreign to his main contribution.

Miller's interpretation of the revival implies a conception of how Americans were trying to work changes upon their own psyches, both individual and collective; and it is here that his style of intellectual operation leads him into distortion. He insists that nineteenth-century evangelism was peculiar in that it sought to save men as communities rather than as individuals. Yet the process itself remained an individual transaction between the evangelist and the struggling Christian. At most, some additional push to conversion came from a miasmatic influence of the congregation in which the worshipper found himself, while the multifarious associations that grew in the church life of the period were important mainly as expressions of the community sense for which individuals were reaching. Because Miller's kind of intellectual history does not stoop to consider the social conditions and events that affected minds, Miller has little way to believe that organized community action had much reflex effect upon thought. He can hardly consider some of the standard themes of American religious history, such as the way the traditional sect-to-church cycle was diverted into denominational organization. He thus ignores not just the old grub-work of intellectual historians who count book bequests or newspaper circulations but also any more adventurous arguments for the concept of the sociology of knowledge. He can conceive of the revival as an expression of the diffuse activism of the American character, but he is estopped from considering what the new and much-touted associations may have been doing to encase and routinize thought. When he notes contemporary observations that the revival impulse waned or grew stale at times, he takes this fluctuation much as a primitive kind of economic history might

have taken the tidal ebb of "bad times." When one looks to him for any attempt to "explain" how the American mind changed—how Americans learned new intellectual styles or frames of reference—nothing comes forth. For all of his own activism, the American mind as he describes it has little observed connection with the rest of experience.

Even in his fragmentary discussion of technological thought, he attends more to ideas as moral evaluation than to ideas as a form of problem-solving or practical response. Sensing that the "American railroad was a creation both of vital impulse and of mathematical intellect, of heart and head," he yet sees no problem in explaining how such a combination could have been achieved, and devotes himself instead to rehearsing the details of how men managed to label canals and railroads and other undertakings "sublime."

Because Miller's impulse is moral rather than explanatory, his primary contribution is descriptive; sensible to details of response, he works like a religious naturalist whose real talents run along the path from contemplation to observation. Without giving serious attention to explaining things, he yet generates in profusion the items and categories that may enter into other men's play with hypotheses.

He is thus useful and suggestive even for subjects that he barely mentions. The "books" of his work that Miller planned but did not live to write included one to be titled, "The Battle-field of Democracy: Education." We have lost much in not having this section, since one thing that the history of education needs—and even more than do some other fields—is the kind of fresh, complex reading of its sources that Miller performed when he entered any area of thought. Without this detail, we must be content with Miller's gen-

eral assertion that "*the American problem*" in education, as well as in law or theology or literature, was the "contest between nationalism and cosmopolitanism." By analogy, the same themes that Miller develops in tracing the debate over codification should apply also to educational controversies: the desire of conservatives to preserve a disorderly but familiar, natural array of institutions and standards; the willingness of reformers both to cry up emotionalism and to import formalistic patterns from Britain or Europe; the sense that success in reconciling this conflict over standards might shore up a sense of community against the rising threat of national disunion; and men's resignation in fact to a pale neutralism that evaded issues. In such a structure, educational bureaucracies that emerged during the 1840's and 1850's performed much the same functions as the timid kinds of legal reform to which the generality of lawyers finally gave assent.

In order to discern these functions, we need to look past the most accessible tags of Miller's work—past the repeated insistence on how Americans of that period were preoccupied with the notion of "the sublime," past even the recurrence of head-versus-heart as a dichotomy that defined much of American thought—and examine instead his independent "moral" response to controversies that plagued the development of American law.

Those controversies were three (although they all reduce to the problem of what kind of law was congenial to the American spirit): whether courts should accept the English common law as a basis for decision, whether some courts should also adopt and follow equity proceedings as distinct from strict law (common or statute), and whether the mass of traditional or miscellaneous accumulated law should be

reduced to "codes" that would make law more accessible, simple, and clear. In following out these controversies, Miller has obvious fun in exposing the way people shifted their arguments from one side of a dispute to another. During the generation after the Revolution, for example, patriotic Americans who saw resistance to old-world ways as part of resisting tyranny denounced the efforts to have the common law received as precedent in courts; adoption of common law was, they said, a slavish adherence to corrupt English ways from which Americans had supposedly succeeded in freeing themselves. Only a little later, men who seemed to speak for the same liberal tradition came to defend the common law as a bulwark of liberty. In more complex ways, men saw the common law as an available system of orderly principles and yet also came to defend it as a natural, organic, even "evolved" growth that was more rational than any man's attempt at rational devising of legal principles.

More to the point on which his insights into the Civil War turn, Miller traces out many elusive or tangled threads in the legal attitude toward codification: how men took to Blackstone as a kind of regularized, orderly version of the common law; how they then resisted Benthamite attempts at formal codification as a dangerous attack on the refinements of law and of lawyer status; and how they yet came to accept limited codification as a necessary statement of legal neutrality at a time when American society seemed running toward violence and disaster. Because legal thinkers feared popular violence in general and violence toward property in particular, they sought repeatedly to impose a spirit of "negation" on American law, believing, as Miller puts it, that "if nothing were

permitted, no violence would result." Because men who would now be labeled conservatives thought that way, they were inhibited from some of their efforts to achieve prestige for jurists as leaders in American society; they were inhibited, especially, from pushing equity procedure as a way of giving judges greater discretion than "democratic" Americans were willing to concede. But the flexibility that equity allowed was needed to cope with the novel problems of a society that was turning to complex industrial organization. The dilemma meant that the fear of violence was leading men to inhibit the very thought processes that they needed to cope with the new society.

Miller does not, in *The Life of the Mind*, offer a formal interpretation of the coming of the Civil War. But he does reveal a rhetorical preoccupation with precisely that subject, by returning to it in the perorations that he allows himself at the ends of several chapters. At first, he seems only to note certain interesting ideas that were entertained by lawyers who lived through the Civil War years, such as the idea that the "vulgarization of discourse" that erupted in the anti-Negro Dred Scott decision was a prime reason why the United States took up war as a natural social instrument. Less tentatively, Miller records and endorses Theodore Sedgwick's view that to rely on precise written law would have been to create a focus of authority, that such authority would incite jealousy, and that this jealousy would then erupt into resistance and violence. And finally Miller states his own view: that the nation was "betrayed into war" by an attitude of "legalistic negation" intended to protect all kinds of property and institutions, including the property-institution that was slavery.

If this last dictum is fed into the

standard array of explanations of the Civil War, it comes out in contradictory ways: as the explanation that the War was caused by the moral problem and evil of slavery, and also as the explanation that the War was somehow a psychological "tragedy" (Miller uses the word), and thus the apparently unnecessary result of men's failure to think in rational ways that would contain violence. The first of these explanations is usually labeled "liberal" among the ways historians have thought about the War; the second is usually labeled "conservative" or at least weakly "moderate." That Miller also alludes to the War as a "majestic folk struggle" suggests that he belongs in the company of those to whom the moral issues of the War are less important than the kind of fun and games that were dramatized in the Civil War centennial celebrations. And when he also calls the War a "holocaust of property," he seems in that "moderate" tradition that sees the conflict as having been framed by irresponsible politics both before and after.

It is probably fair to blame the surface tone of Miller's language on his having absorbed some "tragedy" and "horror" vocabulary from those competent historians who never quite believed that the results of the Civil War had been worth the cost. This first-level meaning says something about Miller's intellectual style: he was obviously fonder of reading source material than he was of reading other historians, and he thus was somewhat vulnerable to the formulations left by the historians he may have read in earlier, more impressionable years. But this means only that some language in Miller needs to be read, according to scholastic procedure, in more than one sense: in this case, both for its literal reference to other historical thought, and for the way it fits into the more live, personal context

that he has established in his own writing. In this live context, "property" means more than the obvious Southern property values that suffered from the fighting and outcome of the Civil War. It means also that whole regime of simple real property and stable commercial practice to which the old common law was fairly well adapted. By insisting on legal "negation," lawyers thus denied more than the possibility of violence; they denied the "purpose" which was implied in the kind of technology and economy that many Americans were creating in the years even before the Civil War.

The view that the Civil War was a "tragedy" was of a piece with the revisionist attitudes toward the two World Wars, and especially with those views that saw popular hysteria and Rooseveltian machinations as causes of American involvement in World War II. But Miller's dicta on the Civil War smack of something different: they suggest the views of those hyper-realists who accept many of the specific accusations leveled against Franklin Roosevelt, but who then deduce that Roosevelt was dishonest or blameworthy only in not offering firmer, explicit leadership toward the interventionist goal. Thus Miller implies that Northern thought did suffer grave psychic defects in the years just before the War, but that it suffered from something quite other than a "war psychosis," something other than the inability of politicians to present effective resistance to the mounting wave of violence. It suffered from the unwillingness of a society and its leaders to admit to the purposive paths they were taking toward a new and different kind of social pattern. Because they denied where they were going, they failed to communicate those purposes to a recalcitrant agrarian, "propertied" society, they encouraged that other society to see the

developing clash as an easy one, and they therefore communicated false "signals" that made war all the more likely.

Two things are requisite if the kinds of insight that Miller suggests are to become accessible as part of cumulative knowledge: more systematic, restricted ways of describing the structures and needs of whole groups, and more inclusive methods for ascertaining and describing the attitudes of groups. These requisites are so chill and "methodological" that we easily accept the extent to which we still depend on the flexible idea-scanning and idea-transformation that is carried out by men like Miller. But the pedestrian techniques of content analysis can still produce a more reliable equivalent for such statements as that the revival "impulse was grinding to a stop" in the late 1830's. The difficulty, of course, is that such quantitative checking is worth the effort only when major points need to be substantiated, or when general propositions need to be given solid foundation. It is this selection of both a strategic problem and a theoretical concern that justifies the extent of pick-work that went into Richard L. Merritt's *Symbols of American Community*. But for the broad sweep of intellectual history, with its accumulation of sensed turns and twistings, we will always have to depend on the Milleresque writers, even when we lament their occasional vaults into perverseness and idiosyncrasy.

The Life of the Mind presents a challenge to conventional notions about what is legitimate in historical method and style. Never doubt one thing: Miller's understanding came to operate in ways different from what many scholars have taught each other to believe is decent method. None of the ordinary recipes for verification and proof

dictated what went into the warlock's last cauldron. Rather: a burst of sermons by evangelical toads, a dropping of prefaces from the caves of early law professors, a gleaning of teeth dropped from the jaws of mechanical dragons, and only the faintest cobwebs from the tracteries of secondary literature. All were heated over a memory so selective that there survived only whatever elements could be amalgamated into a single brew. Miller is sensitive to what he keeps calling "magic words," and he himself brings forth some of the magic words of recent historiography—"community" and "nostalgia" most notable among them. There is nothing here of the biography-counting skepticism that would tell us never to label the radical reformers of that period as mere compensatory nostalgics. There is nothing of the word-counting content analysis that would tell us just how the terms of "community" rose and fell in the verbalizing of Americans. There is instead the massive confidence that a private being had in itself the best possible system for storing words and generating ideas.

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THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AND THE
PRIVATE VISION: A SEARCH FOR
AMERICA IN EDUCATION AND
LITERATURE.

by Maxine Greene.

New York: Random House, 1965.

185 pp. \$1.95.

This is a highly original and significant study of the common school. Where others have written of political strategies, setbacks and the eventual triumph of the common school, Professor Greene has contrasted the rise of the common school with the development of an au-

thentic American literature. Both the schoolmen who supplied the rationale for the common school and nineteenth-century American writers were concerned with the American Dream. Yet, she observes, "[a]t the very moment the school reformers were speaking their rhetoric of assurance and hope, the artists were writing of ambiguities, of human impotence and fallibility, of wildernesses, wastes, dualities." (p. 4) In analyzing their divergent views on the good life and the effectiveness of the common school in helping men to live it, Professor Greene has added significantly to our understanding of the common school and its place in American social and intellectual life.

There was considerable difference in the vantage points from which the schoolmen—James J. Carter, Horace Mann and William T. Harris—and the writers—Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and Mark Twain—viewed the prospects of man, society and the common school; and Professor Greene leaves the clear impression that the differences in their perspective account, in large part, for the radical divergencies in their vision. Whereas the writers mixed with society and drew up their personal experiences in formulating their interpretation of the American Dream, the schoolmen chose to "stand on high places, looking over the heads of the illiterate and disinherited through the glass of reason and warranted possibility." (p. 6) From their rarified vantage point, the schoolmen confidently described how public education would save both man and Republic.

Professor Greene's examination of how the writers viewed the American Dream has uncovered a number of interesting facts which generally have been ignored by educational historians

who, perhaps unwittingly, have created the image that only ignorant and self-seeking men opposed the common school. It now seems that some of the greatest minds in nineteenth-century America entertained serious doubts about the efficacy of the common school; several writers even went so far as to view the school as both oppressive and unsuitable for carrying on any kind of education. The Transcendentalists were the severest critics. Both Bronson Alcott and Henry David Thoreau had taught briefly in the public school and had quit because they deeply disapproved of the harsh discipline which was intended to make the child moral and obedient. As the Transcendentalists thought that human nature was imbued with goodness and dignity, they could neither approve the methods of discipline nor the educational objectives of the schoolmen. Learning the values of society and the scraps of information necessary for getting a job would not, they maintained, enable the individual to realize himself and his place in nature. The ideal man of Emerson, Thoreau and the others was the authentic individual, alert and sensitive to his own inner responses to nature. Unlike the schoolmen, who tended to view education as a matter of inculcation and control, the Transcendentalists regarded it as a personal affair. Self-control would come as each individual learned to listen to his own inner voice; it could not, they argued, be taught in the classroom. The truly educated person was, as Emerson described him, the one who "ventured to trust himself for a taskmaster."

The Transcendentalists were equally sensitive to the dangers of using the school to reform society—unfortunately, this cannot be said for the early leaders of the common school or, for that matter, the more recent champions

of progressive education. Emerson and Thoreau, in particular, were suspicious of any scheme to reform society, for they held the view that each individual must liberate himself. Society had too many imperfections to be of much use. Moreover, when reform does not come from within there is a danger that it will not represent an authentic expression of the individual. Not only was there a danger of "hypocrisy and vanity" on the part of the reformer himself, to use Emerson's words, there was also an even greater danger that the reformer, in his efforts to save the whole society, would lose sight of the rights and well-being of the individual.

There were other major writers who, for very different reasons, expressed skepticism about the redemptive powers that Horace Mann and the other schoolmen were claiming for the public school. Professor Greene notes that while Hawthorne shared the schoolmen's belief in the dark forces which lay within man, he could find no reason for believing that the school or any other institution, for that matter, could bring about his perfection. In effect, Hawthorne's view of man's moral nature represented a challenge to the very dream of freedom, happiness and equality which the schoolmen promised as the benefit of public education. It also stood in sharp contrast to the McGuffey *Readers* which were used to teach that goodness and happiness were a matter of social conformity. The writings of Herman Melville and Mark Twain pointed to a different set of problems which the schoolmen had also failed to consider: the arbitrariness of social and moral orthodoxies, the difficulties which result from imposing a foreign way of life on the immature and innocent, the meaning of self-identity and fulfillment, and the nature of a truly meaningful education.

Although we are familiar already with the main ideas and the quixotic idealism of the schoolmen, Professor Greene nevertheless has succeeded in giving us a fresh perspective from which to assess their significance. When compared to the writers, the schoolmen appear, Professor Greene's sympathetic and gentle treatment notwithstanding, as narrow and rigid men who were generally incapable of grasping the subtle issues with which the writers were struggling. Unlike the writers, the schoolmen took for granted the American Dream of freedom, equality, and happiness, but they failed to see that it carried certain implications for what actually went on in the classroom. In their hands, education became a matter of discipline, control, and adjustment to the dominant social values—which were mainly pecuniary and highly moralistic in nature. Because they thought it was necessary to erect barriers against the "evils of anarchy and lawlessness," to use Mann's phrase, it was inconceivable to them that the school might be used to liberate the student's powers of origination. Even their idea of self-government reflected their Puritan background. In commenting on Mann's ideas, Professor Greene observed that "'self-government' for him—or 'self-control'—was to be learned through mastery of the pre-existent laws. Like most moral precepts, these laws were largely negative." (p. 23) A further contrast between the writers—with their intellectual doubts and uncertainties and their basic humaneness—and the schoolmen can be seen in the textbooks that were used in the common school. In referring to the McGuffey *Readers*, Professor Greene writes: "The views transmitted were given the absoluteness of the catechism; and the *Readers* built a hundred bridges between the Puritan past and the children of the

unregenerate present, who were told they could only be American if they learned what was true." (p. 56)

Professor Greene's examination of how the schoolmen responded to the social issues of their times is equally informative. While the writers were holding up the vision of what America might become and criticizing the shortcomings of their society, the schoolmen were defending the status quo. "Educational spokesmen," she reports, "talked as if a moral as well as an economic victory had been forever secured, and the logic of their traditional arguments led them to play increasingly conservative roles." (p. 123) The only issue to which they lent their support was abolition, and even then Mann barred any discussion of anti-slavery in the classroom on the grounds that it might antagonize the businessmen who were profiting from the cotton trade. After Emancipation, however, the schoolmen reverted to their defense of the status quo. When it came to championing the rights of the Negroes, they were afflicted with what Whitman called "hollowness of heart." Professor Greene rightly indicts them for having "helped (innocently perhaps) to make the Negro 'invisible' in the sense in which Ralph Ellison used the word." (p. 127) The National Education Association, she finds, had several opportunities to challenge educational inequalities in the South, but it failed to exert real pressure. In fact, the schoolmen joined forces with the Catholics in opposing the Hoar Bill which represented the only realistic chance of establishing common educational standards throughout the nation. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the schoolmen were loyal supporters of business in its struggles with the nascent labor movement. Order and respect for authority were still their major concern.

In her last chapter, which is the most enigmatic, Professor Greene comments on the promise of progressive education and the prospects of the schools today. In the progressive schools, it seemed that the original promise of the Dream at last would be realized. Children were being taught to fulfill themselves and to work co-operatively toward common social goals. "Such a community, made up of distinctive, self-realizing yet co-operative individuals, would in time be fulfilled as democracy—itself going on to create, to realize an ever-richer quality of social life." (p. 161) Commenting on the state of present-day education, Professor Greene seems less sure of its prospects. She notes that educators no longer "talk, as in the 1830's, of moralism and defense of the status quo," nor are they seeking to build, as in the 1930's, a "new social order." Education has become a craft, and is "no longer a carrier of dreams."

The new morality of teaching is a morality linked to the belief in "making sense," in the usefulness of conceptualization, forming the confusing world. No longer do teachers expect to pierce the "veil": they are preoccupied with instructing in the categories out of which the "real" is now composed. . . . To know has come to mean to be familiar with cognitive forms. To be has come to be identified with inwardness, at least for some—the existential innerness which escapes all formulas and sermons and cannot be realized by any public Dream. (p. 164)

"The Dream," she vaguely concludes, "may be maintained if we can define wider and more inclusive meanings, less overweening goals." (p. 166)

In spite of all its virtues, the book contains several limitations. The most

serious shortcoming is her tendency to make sweeping generalizations that either create needless confusion or misrepresent the facts entirely. For example, Professor Greene states that the writers were "almost without exception, men with 'dark' perceptions of life." (p. 4) This is a key generalization because it is used to contrast the optimism of the messianic schoolmen with the pessimism of the writers; yet an examination of her highly readable and perceptive treatment of Emerson, Thoreau and Whitman seems to contradict it. The real point upon which the writers could agree was that the schoolmen's optimism about the regenerative powers of the school could not be supported by either reason or experience. On the other issues—the nature of man and the purpose of education—they held widely divergent views; the Transcendentalists, in particular, cannot be attributed with having "'dark' perceptions of life." An example of misinterpreting the evidence is her claim that education is no longer a "carrier of dreams." (p. 164) This generalization fails to take account of Reconstructionists like Theodore Brameld who still argue that social reform is one of the main responsibilities of the school. Again the person who has read Edgar Z. Friedenberg's *Coming of Age in America* might also find it difficult to accept Professor Greene's assertion that schoolmen are concerned with the "existential innerness" of their students.

The book's other limitations are more "sins of omission" than of commission. The most important is the lack of discussion about the relationship between the schoolmen and the writers. Horace Mann, the schoolman treated most extensively, lived at the same time and in the same geographical area as many of the writers who were pondering the prospects of man and his ability

to become educated, yet the reader is left in the dark about whether he had any personal contact with the writers or their ideas. A discussion of why the schoolmen failed to enter into a dialogue with the writers would have enriched her book even more. The messianic attitude of the early schoolmen is another point that deserves special attention. Professor Greene portrays them as determined men who saw in the school a means of creating the "Heavenly City on earth"; it would have been helpful if she had applied her incisive intellect to uncovering the origin of the messianic tradition in American education. These omissions, however, do not diminish the significance of the book. That it has suggested new lines of inquiry, in addition to raising disturbing questions about the true significance of the early leaders of the common school, makes it an even more significant achievement.

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TEACHERS AND UNIONS.

by Michael H. Moskow.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966. 288 pp.
\$8.50, \$5.95 (paper).

Before reviewing this book, I must make a confession. For many years I have been deeply involved in the issues and controversies with which it deals. Central to any treatment of the subject is a struggle between two teachers' organizations—The National Education Association and The American Federation of Teachers. I was a member of the Educational Policies Commission of the former from 1936 to 1942, and I wrote two monographs for the Commission—*The Education of Free Men in American Democracy* in 1941 and *Point Four*

and Education in 1950. And I was President of the Federation from 1939 to 1942. Consequently, like all human beings and living organisms, I am not without bias. The reader should keep this confession in mind.

A word should be said at the outset about the author of *Teachers and Unions*. Moskow is Assistant Professor of Management at Drexel Institute of Technology and the work is labelled *Industrial Research Unit Study No. 42* of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania. The approach to basic problems in the field of professional education, therefore, is marked by a degree of objectivity and a range of knowledge which add greatly to the value of the study. He brings to the problems of the teacher the experience in labor relations of both private and public enterprise.

The central subject of his inquiry is the role of the teacher in public elementary and secondary schools in "decision-making." Because of the operation of many factors, including the consolidation of school districts, the swift advance of urbanization, the growing complexity of the educational enterprise, the extension of the program of teacher training, and the increase in the years of tenure in the profession, the position of the teacher in society has been profoundly changed. The author stresses throughout his study the growing militancy of teachers and their demand for a voice in the making of decisions. The American Federation of Teachers calls this process "collective bargaining," while the National Education Association employs the words, "professional negotiations." But Moskow concludes that "the similarities between the approaches of the N.E.A. and the A.F.T. are much greater than the differences." (p. 5)

The study embraces a vast range of relevant questions and materials. It begins with an analysis of the relation of the administration of public education to our society, its economic base, the structure of the system of schools, the roles of local and state boards of education, the impact of social forces in the community, and the expansion of enrollment. Moskow then presents in detail the legal aspects of collective bargaining, with particular reference to legislation in the states of California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. This presentation is followed by a discussion of the "labor market for public school teachers," including data on sex, age, race, training, marital status, tenure, salaries, and the general characteristics and conditions of the labor and life of teachers in the public schools of America. The author then discusses the rival teacher organizations, the question of "exclusive recognition," the appropriate bargaining unit, the form of decision-making, the scope of bargaining power, and the issue of "written agreements."

The research that went into this work is most impressive. In addition to several independent studies of considerable scope, the author canvassed thoroughly the relevant literature. He includes also a vast amount of material which is commonly neglected by the narrow educational specialist. In other words, he places the problems of education and the teacher in their social, economic, and political setting. The quality of his scholarship is excellent throughout.

The time has arrived for placing the role of the teacher in historical perspective. We must realize, first of all, that education is always an expression of a particular society, with its distinctive culture, at a given time and place in

history. In 1890 the Bureau of the Census reported the closing of our geographic frontier. At the same time, according to our historians, we passed over the great watershed marking the transition from an America which was preponderantly rural and agrarian into an America moving ever more swiftly along the road of industrialization and urbanization. In his inaugural address in December, 1962, as president of the American Historical Association, Carl Bridenbaugh characterized the present age in these words: "It is my conviction that the greatest turning point in all human history, of which we have any record, has occurred in the twentieth century." And then he added:

So pervading and complete has been the change, and so complex has life become—I almost said overwhelming—that it now appears probable that mid-nineteenth century America or Western Europe had more in common with fifth century Greece (physically, economically, socially, mentally, spiritually) than with their own projections into the middle of the twentieth century.¹

It is not surprising, therefore, that the present is an age of crisis in education. Never before in our history, even during the period that witnessed the launching of the "common school," which its father Horace Mann proclaimed "the greatest discovery ever made by man," did we give so much attention to the problem of the role of the school in the preparation of the younger generation for life. Manifestations of this explosion of our concern may be seen in the extraordinary expansion of enrollment in our secondary and higher schools, the involvement

¹ *The American Historical Review*, January, 1963.

of the federal government in the educational program at all levels, the attention given to the problem by the president of the United States, the space and time allotted to education in our media of mass communication, the controversy over the program for the training of teachers, the widespread tendency to blame the schools for all of our failures (whether in the realm of juvenile delinquency or Soviet scientific achievements), and the emergence of the one-time subversive idea that the school should play a leading role in the development of the "Great Society." Some observers seem to believe that this explosion was set off by the soaring of Sputnik I into the cosmos in October, 1957. Undoubtedly this event was a moving force in the enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958.

The swift advance of industrialization and urbanization has affected profoundly the status of the teacher. In our early agrarian society, the school, though very important for the survival and development of our democracy, was in a sense a minor educational institution. The child, boy or girl, acquired most of the knowledges and skills necessary for life in the relatively self-contained farm household and rural neighborhood. The preparation of the teacher for "school keeping" and teaching "reading, writing, and arithmetic . . . to the tune of the hickory stick" was very limited. An elaborate program of teacher training therefore was considered unnecessary. It seemed entirely appropriate to ask a bright boy or girl graduate of the eighth grade to return to school and teach the things he or she had just learned. Under these conditions, teaching was not a highly regarded calling. It ranked low among the occupations as a life career. It was poorly paid, marred by insecurity of

tenure, and hedged about by all sorts of restrictions. It was generally regarded as a task suited to the undeveloped powers of youth approaching manhood or womanhood, as a stepping-stone to marriage or some adult calling or profession. As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, many teachers in the most progressive states were under twenty-one years of age and the great majority left the school after one, two, three, four, or five years of teaching. Those who remained longer were often looked upon as a "little queer," as culls who could not "make the grade" in the rough and tumble of life, as women who failed to find husbands or as men who feared to compete with their peers in the economic struggle.

This conception of the teacher was given satirical expression by Washington Irving in the character of Ichabod Crane. Many an American citizen has doubtless greeted with a chuckle of approval the observation of Henry L. Mencken: "The average schoolmaster . . . is and always must be essentially an ass, for how can one imagine an intelligent man engaging in so puerile an avocation." And how often have we heard a banker, a physician, or even a college professor evoke condescending laughter with George Bernard Shaw's famous gibe: "He who can, does: he who cannot, teaches!" But how many know that the great dramatist in his introduction to *The W.E.A. Education Year Book* in 1918 also said: "He who can do, does: he who can think, teaches"? Distinguished foreign travelers likewise noted the low status of the teacher in America.

The teacher has, furthermore, often been regarded as something less than a first-class citizen or a complete person. A study in the 1940's of the opinions of school board members in the Middle West revealed that they were inclined

to frown upon teachers' accepting fees for speeches, living in apartments if unmarried, failing to attend church, playing pool or billiards, going to public dances, or joining a teacher's union. They were very much opposed to teachers' smoking in public, playing cards just for fun, teaching controversial issues, making political speeches, or running for political office. Also, they were decidedly of the opinion that a woman should not teach after marriage.² The teacher, moreover, has always been the natural prey of busybodies and pressure groups, probably because of the weakness of his position in society. Without shame and often in the name of patriotism, they act as if the school belonged to them and the teachers were their liveried servants. They strive to throw out textbooks, determine methods of instruction, force their special interests into the curriculum, and secure the discharge of qualified teachers of independent mind.

The situation, however, has been changing in some respects in recent years. According to studies reported by Moskow, the percentage of male classroom teachers increased from 14.1 per cent in 1919-20 to "approximately 30 per cent" in 1961-62; the median age of teachers reached the level of 41.7 years; and only 20.3 per cent of all teachers "had completed less than 4 years of college while 34.7 per cent had completed 5 or more years of college education." Most interesting perhaps is the change in the marital status of women teachers. Only "29.3 per cent were single," while "57.9 per cent were married, husband present" and "12.7 per cent had been married but were widowed, separated, or

divorced." However, in 1963 multiple job-holding among male teachers was 18.7 per cent compared with 7.4 per cent for male employees in "all industries combined." In spite of marked improvement during the past century, the "annual separation rate" also remains very high—"approximately 13 per cent" as compared with "4 per cent for all manufacturing employees." On the other hand, the average salary of teachers in terms of dollars has increased tremendously during the twentieth century, from \$256 in 1890 to \$6,164 in 1964. (pp. 60-65)

Perhaps the most striking change in the status of the teacher, however, has occurred in the realm of relations with community, state, and nation. This change is presented and documented in *Teachers and Unions*. In any earlier generation, the very idea that teachers, organized in unions or associations, could successfully challenge boards of education and state legislatures would have seemed preposterous. But that is precisely what is happening today. Moreover, teachers are beginning to take an active interest in community affairs and in politics. In this domain the A.F.T. has undoubtedly led the way. By way of illustration, reference will be made to the activities of the Fiftieth Annual Convention meeting in Chicago in August of this year. Among the resolutions presented and debated in great detail were the following subjects: the method of the draft, restraints on visiting speakers in colleges and universities, defense of intellectual freedom nationally and internationally, extension of voting rights to age eighteen, position on the war in Viet Nam, support of candidates in the 1966 congressional elections, defense of civil rights and opposition to racial segregation, defense of teacher rights and academic freedom, enactment of a law granting self-govern-

² Lloyd Allen Cook and Elaine Forsythe Cook, *A Sociological Approach to Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 447.

ment to the people of the District of Columbia, support of the Supreme Court decision on reapportionment. These resolutions were discussed freely and without fear, in the presence of newspaper reporters, by teachers from all levels of the school system. Apparently the teacher is beginning to reject the status of an "idiot" as conceived in ancient Greece, that is, a person who "remained aloof from communal activities." In the past we have expected persons who were not permitted to be real citizens themselves to teach citizenship to the young!

The conclusion seems to be warranted that in the years ahead, unless some form of dictatorship should triumph, the teacher will play an increasing role, not only in deciding financial compensation and conditions of work, but also in shaping educational policy. And this larger role means that the program for the preparation of the teacher will have to be significantly broadened and deepened. He or she can no longer be regarded as simply a technician or craftsman. The teaching profession is destined to become an important force in American society. This development would seem to call for the merging of the N.E.A. and the A.F.T.—and Moskow predicts that "this process will take approximately five more years to be accomplished." (p. 258)

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PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION.

by T. M. Stinnett, Jack H. Kleinmann, and Martha L. Ware.

New York: MacMillan Co., 1966.

ix + 309 pp. \$6.95.

COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS: AN APPROACH TO SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION.

by Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow.

Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966.

768 pp. \$9.00.

Myron Lieberman in 1956 wrote *Education as a Profession* which predicted the widespread adoption of collective bargaining by teachers. Despite the lack of enabling statutes and teacher disinclination to negotiate at that time, Lieberman thought both the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers would gradually accept some form of collective bargaining. After careful scrutiny of reports on employee relations with the federal government and on the organized professionals within industry, he disposed of arguments that bargaining by professionals must imitate those trade union policies and procedures which disturbed many teachers.

Both the N.E.A. and the A.F.T. have now made some of the changes prophesied by Lieberman. The two groups have not yet merged, as Lieberman recommended in his 1960 book *The Future of American Education*, but their behavior, if not the nomenclature of tactics, grows more alike each year.

Enough states passed bargaining laws in 1965 alone that two full-length books in 1966 celebrated the extension of "collective negotiations" to education. Michael Moskow, a young labor economist who studied under George Taylor at the University of Pennsylvania, joined with Lieberman to

produce a text aimed at reviewing and analyzing developments between 1960 and 1966. At the same time three N.E.A. staff members led by T. M. Stinnett, the Assistant Executive Secretary, collaborated on a book which develops the rationale for the N.E.A. approach to "professional negotiations" in education.

Although not an authorized N.E.A. publication, the latter book was written by those who had prepared the *New Guidelines for Professional Negotiations* which reflects the increased sophistication of the N.E.A. in 1965 over 1963. The book draws heavily on these guidelines and on a limited number of N.E.A. studies and model agreements. The Lieberman-Moskow book, after a leisurely introduction to the subject, dwells much longer on the problems of organizational recognition, unit determination, and the scope and process of negotiations towards an agreement.

Both books explore the question of why the trend towards teacher negotiations has accelerated in recent years. Even the N.E.A. spokesmen cite the 1961 A.F.T. win in New York City as the major spur to heightened organizational competition over the right to represent urban teachers before their school boards. Both mention as relevant the decline in blue collar employment and the increased recognition of the rights of public employees exemplified by President Kennedy's Executive Order 10998 in 1962. Both are quite wrong in suggesting that the reduction in number of school districts (and alleged trend towards bigness) may be a causal factor, for that essentially rural school consolidation movement has been rather glacial in such states as Connecticut and Massachusetts which have passed negotiation laws. Historians may find more promising the off-

hand comments on contemporary victories in the civil rights movement (Stinnett, *et al.*, pp. 5-6) and on the deterioration of slum schools in large cities (mentioned by Lieberman and Moskow, p. 59), for these factors have made once docile urban teachers much more militant.

The Stinnett book emphasizes the recent history of the N.E.A. in developing stands on the roles of the superintendent (he should be a "statesman" which means he should stand aside while teachers scrap with the school boards) and of the state board of education (which the N.E.A. prefers to the state labor employment boards as the regulatory agency). Instead of strikes the N.E.A. advocates use of "sanctions," actually an array of possible devices which restrict the flow of new teachers and sometimes pull out veterans from the ranks of a recalcitrant school system. Credit for the idea is given the American Association of University Professors, but the N.E.A. has perfected state and national adaptations in order to exert pressure on economy-minded governors, legislatures, and local boards.

The complaint that careful investigation slows the sanctioning process is countered by a list of 19 "quick action procedures," none of them strikes but all of them first aid measures applicable while a Professional Rights and Responsibilities Committee studies the need for major surgery. The narrators grow petulant, even precious, in chiding the National School Boards Association and American Association of School Administrators for not commending the N.E.A. leadership for resisting delegate pressure to apply sanctions before the Utah investigation was complete. The charge that full sanctions (with good teachers really

leaving the schools of a city or state) could cause long-term and possibly irreparable damage to the schools and to children is not refuted, partly because so far their application has caused governors more embarrassment in attracting new industry than obstacles in attracting new instructors.

The Lieberman-Moskow volume scans the immediate past for examples of experiences which are then evaluated as usable precedents. In most chapters the authors contrast policies in Canada where negotiations have been commonplace for more than a decade, rulings in the private sector, and recent decisions in other branches of public employment. With such precedents American education may not need relive the history and mistakes of the American labor movement; too many laws and rulings reflect the accumulated wisdom garnered from past breakdowns of employee-employer relations.

Lieberman and Moskow want the teachers' majority organization in any system to enjoy exclusive recognition but with safeguards for individuals and minority organizations. They want administrators separate from employees (for their own good) and do not feel a short term strike less damaging than long term oppression or depression of teacher morale by poor working conditions. Furthermore, Lieberman and Moskow disagree with the Stinnett group over the scope of negotiations. The former would limit contract negotiations to matters of compensation and conditions of work while leaving broader educational policy-making to the school boards. They expect the state to set and police standards preserving fair elections and proper accounting for resources while prohibiting racial and other kinds of discrimination in teacher organizations. They express doubt about the ability of

state boards of education and their staffs to achieve objectivity in light of past ties to local school boards, superintendents, and the N.E.A. affiliates generally.

The Stinnett book is at its thinnest when one looks for ideas on the process of negotiations. The focus in both books, perhaps naturally, reflects the struggle so far to gain first some measure of recognition and then to determine which and how many units should negotiate for teachers and supervisors. The Lieberman book, when dealing with the role of the superintendent, hides behind the Neal Gross data on role conflict in the superintendency instead of assessing the consequences of superintendent action as board spokesman or third party adviser. In reviewing relevant research on teacher-administrator relations, Lieberman and Moskow ignore the recent work of Griffiths and others in tracing teacher transfer and promotion patterns in New York City. They slight the recent work on creative year-round bargaining in industry, although a few such developments are mentioned in passing.

The Stinnett book more often defends a single position (although ambivalent on the strike question) while objective criticism of all sides characterizes the Lieberman-Moskow volume. The prose of the Stinnett book, by comparison, is crisp and spare. Contract these excerpts from the closing paragraphs of each:

Twenty years of history have been compressed into five. There are those who continue to debate the desirability of such change and some who bemoan its speed. But the change is here, and its pace will quicken rather than slacken in the years just ahead. Teachers, administrators, and school

board members—those directly concerned with public education in this country—should, if they have not already done so, begin now to devise negotiation policies and procedures. They and their leaders are the ones who must develop and set the new public policy which will establish effective and satisfactory negotiation relationships among them. This job must not go by default to others. (Stinnett, *et al.*, p. 205)

In the near future at least, the results of collective negotiations will be markedly divergent from school district to school district. In some school districts, the experience of school boards, administrative personnel, and teacher organizations will lead to unrealistic expectations and consequent disillusionment with the results. The important part is that with due regard for local circumstances, it is important for everyone concerned to be aware of developments in other states and school districts. Policies proved successful elsewhere can rarely be adopted in a local situation without some modification, but few school districts, if any, are so unique that they would not profit from the experience of others. If all those concerned with collective negotiations in public education show due regard for the experience gained elsewhere, they will be much better equipped to solve the problems that arise in their own states and school districts. (Lieberman and Moskow, p. 413)

These final paragraphs portray the comparatively terse chauvinism of the N.E.A. book and the wary if somewhat redundant prose of the critics outside. The Lieberman book more than compensates by including not only the state laws, model agreements, and copy

of Executive Order 10998 common to both appendices, but also several provocative arbitration and fact-finding reports.

This round of "first books" may help most of all those wondering how to shape new legislation in the other thirty-five states. But some of the issues sure to confound policy-makers get short shrift in these early works. For example, on such issues as class size or teacher load, will collective negotiation allow for massive changes ahead in the technology of teaching or in the reorganization of schools? Lieberman in 1956 argued for both educational assistants and greater investment in instructional technology to increase teacher productivity. He has not in 1966 explored whether teacher demands at the bargaining table might forestall or accelerate such developments. Furthermore, if negotiations flounder over such questions as extra compensation for teachers in slum schools or longer days for some staff members, then schools may well remain unresponsive to local conditions. If teacher acceptance of innovations becomes negotiable then the rate at which education changes may remain sluggish—to the possible peril of the clientele.

Can the superintendent speak for the program, for the children, as Stinnett suggests? Or must he inevitably side with the board as their chief advisor and paid executive? If he is the board spokesman, and the board is primarily tax-conscious, who will speak for the pupils, for the rest of the "public interest"? Moskow and Lieberman predict larger units for bargaining, perhaps even at the state level (where teachers already try to persuade legislatures to fix minimum salaries and improve pension plans).

Meanwhile, what changes in selecting local school boards will be necessary?

For example, might teacher negotiations make it necessary to represent the "clientele" of school systems, especially parents and certain employees, more deliberately than at present in order to see that schools serve others than those who staff them. Boards in the past have overlooked the teachers' need for open communication and for frequent consultation; as the pendulum swings boards must now balance the claims of workers with those of consumers and with the programs of other policy-makers who would break the bonds of racial isolation, fight the defeatism and congestion of the city, and deal with the ravages of mobility on family life.¹ Should negotiations simply rearrange the balance of power between those who manage a bureaucracy and those who staff it, the prospects for broader educational reform may be dampened by still another formalized set of constraints. In the end this question and not that of "who is in what bargaining unit" may be the more important one in assessing collective negotiations in education.

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PROFESSIONALIZATION.

edited by Howard M. Vollmer and
Donald L. Mills.

*Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966. xviii + 365 pp. \$6.95 (text),
\$9.25.*

This would have been a much better book if Vollmer and Mills had written

¹This may well mean more favorable staff ratios or extra equipment and more experienced teachers in high turnover schools, not to mention revision of transfer policies. The interests of the teachers do not automatically coincide with the needs of other people's children.

it rather than collected it. The main difficulty, though not the only one, inheres in the literary form known as the "collection of readings": the book lacks coherence. Articles grouped loosely under broad and somewhat overlapping headings (such as: "The Social Context of Professionalization," "Relations among Occupational Groups," "Professional Associations and Colleague Relations," "Client and Public Relations," "Professionals and Complex Organizations," "Professionals and the Government") talk past one another and often indistinctly to the topic under consideration. The editors, obviously concerned with the unity of their book, attempt to solve the problem of coherence by supplying commentary to link the selections. The solution fails for the most part because the articles are too disparate, the comments often too general. It is exceedingly difficult either to build a case or to lay out the lines of controversy, even by judiciously selecting articles, when the field itself lacks a rich supply of theory and research. The task requires authors, not editors and commentators.

One should not take the editors' description of the book's contents too literally. "Readings have been selected and interpreted," they say, "in a manner that stresses the dynamics of occupational change, rather than structural differences between occupations. The book focuses attention more specifically upon characteristics, antecedents, and social consequences of the process of professionalization as it affects a wide variety of occupations in modern society." (p. vi) In fact, the articles describe structure far more than the developmental process implied in the term "professionalization." (Oddly enough, the selection by Caplow dealing directly with the stages of professionalization is one of the weakest in the volume, its

argument contradicted in several particulars by a well-known and far more rigorous paper by Wilensky that, regrettably, fails to find its way into the collection.)

The chapter on "Professional Controls" illustrates the structural as distinct from the developmental focus of this book; and what is true of this chapter is true of most others as well. Its selections include Caplow's discussion of occupational stereotypes and mores, Becker and Geer's analysis of how medical students reconcile occupational ideals with the everyday demands of their work, excerpts from the *Annals* describing the ethical codes of a variety of occupations, Fichter's treatment of the evaluation of work performance in the clergy, and others. Nowhere in the chapter does one find a discussion of the development of professional controls. To say that in becoming professionalized, the members of an occupation "become increasingly concerned with the problem of defining the essential ingredients of a professional occupation and of drawing distinctions between what is and what is not professional conduct" (p. 126) is merely to dress a structural proposition in developmental clothing. Nothing is said about the process.

A book that doesn't do what its writers claim for it may still be useful, and this one is. The reader is taken through a series of chapters each of which deals with an important topic; he has to supply his own comparative analysis, however, because Vollmer and Mills use their selections illustratively and provide little analytical apparatus for comparing occupations or for developing a unified argument. The chapters vary in how well they succeed. Although time does not permit a thorough review of each one, the chapter called "Individuals and Professionalization" (slightly

mistitled), for example, comes off reasonably well, successfully illuminating several facets of the relationship between person and occupation. It includes selections on the aggregate characteristics and mobility patterns of members of professions, on the motivations for selecting an occupation (dentistry), on the stages of a medical career, on the relationship between type of law school attended and the nature of subsequent law practice, and on the process of identifying with occupations (in physiology, philosophy, and engineering). The editors, both through commentary and the selection of articles, make it clear that the topic requires exploration of institutional arrangements, psychological characteristics, temporal sequences of events, and the connections among them. The treatment of the topic is scarcely complete, but one leaves it with the sense that a problem area has been explored and that there are issues common to a range of occupations despite their obvious differences. Chapters that do not succeed as well contain contributions that overlap too much in content and that approach the general topic at levels of generalization too disparate to provide a reasonably unified formulation.

The editors' commentaries—brief introductions to each chapter and passages linking consecutive selections—lack bite. Instead of sharpening the issues, directing attention to contrasts and similarities, developing an argument or critique, they fragment the discussion with descriptive statements tied to each selection. The effect is to exaggerate the discontinuity between selections within chapters.

What contribution does the book make? It raises a number of issues pertinent to occupational life and to the development of occupations toward and away from professionalism. It discusses

a broad range of occupations; and although it does not go very far in providing a basis for comparing them systematically, it makes the reader consider them in their variety and at least think about the comparisons. It contains a number of first-rate contributions: papers and excerpts that stand on their own as important contributions to the analysis of occupations.

Actually, this is a non-book; it is more like a reference work with useful selections drawn from widely scattered sources and enough footnotes to lead anyone interested in the problems more deeply into the literature. It lacks the coherence of the better texts in the area, yet the texts seldom come up to the quality of the better selections in this volume.

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THE SCHOOLCHILDREN.

by Mary Frances Greene and
Orletta Ryan.

New York: Pantheon, 1965.

227 pp. \$4.95.

I see pictures in my school. I see pictures of Spain and a pictures of Portofino and a pictures of Chicago. I see arithmetic paper a spellings paper. I see a star chart. I see a flag of our America. The room is dirty. . . . The auditorium dirty the seats are dusty. The light in the auditorium is broke. The curtains in the auditorium are ragged they took the curtains because they was so ragged. The bathroom is dirty sometime the toilet is very hard. The cellar is dirty the hold school is dirty sometime. . . . The flowers are dry everything in my school is so so dirty.

Two years ago I was teaching a group of fourth grade children in a segregated

classroom of the Boston Public Schools. Housed in an antique building, assigned substitute teachers, given boring, antiquated textbooks, the children in this schoolhouse had been driven into semi-submission by an authoritarian discipline-structure. Despite all, the children smiled, talked, fought back, and held onto reality. Thrown into this mess, I found myself fascinated by the guts and eloquence of the pupils who sat before me and I soon began to listen with great interest and with admiration to some of the things those children said.

The nerve and style that those pupils demonstrated when we talked in class, or when they wrote a private paper for me such as the one which is quoted partially above, encouraged me finally to reward good writing with good writing and to put before my pupils some of the open and honest slum-poetry of the Negro author Langston Hughes. Although this poet's voice was not in all cases the same as the voice of the children in my class, and while the people he was describing were speaking usually in a manner essentially dated, belonging to a decade already past, still, what he said and how he said it made a dent on them. And that dent was probably an even deeper and more powerful one than the impact that his words had already had on me.

For this reason it was with great disappointment that I learned of my dismissal, ostensibly for teaching material not on the curriculum. Isolating a single poem about a slum-landlord and his tenant—a poem which had become the storm-center, of, dispute—the Deputy Superintendent pointed out that it was written in a conversational and somewhat ungrammatical style. "We are trying to break the speech patterns of these children," she said to the press, "trying to get them to speak properly. . . . This

poem does not present correct grammatical expressions and would just *entrench the speech patterns we want to break.*" [My italics]¹

She added, according to another Boston paper, that "although Langston Hughes 'has written much beautiful poetry, we cannot give directions to the teachers to use literature written in native dialects.' Such literature, she maintained, defeats one of the primary aims of the Boston schools by perpetuating the very speech patterns and language problems the schools hope to correct."²

Probably it won't come as a surprise to any reader if I say that I have taken an even greater interest than before in the manner of conversation which the Boston schools have labeled "native dialect" and which they have set themselves the task of rooting out. I also have tried to study and to listen to and learn about the ordinary ways that many children speak to each other when they are not being forced into a middle-class mold. And mostly I have been interested in the kinds of talk that have been current among the Negro children in various city slums.

A recent book that has achieved a certain degree of popularity, and which has aroused much interest, is concerned with the same subject. The book is *The Schoolchildren* and it bears a subtitle, "Growing Up in the Slums." Its authors are Mary Frances Greene and Orletta Ryan, both schoolteachers and both teachers of fourth grade in the New York Public Schools. They have written a highly entertaining and dangerous book.

First — as entertainment — nobody reading this book, I guess, will question that it offers loads of fun. The book re-

cords, with the devastating caricature of an electric guitar, the insults and injuries and oddities and outrages, syntactical and human, of the children in two of the worst New York City slums. Three or four verbal gimmicks—"gets" when "get" is called for, the frequent and at times quite useful abnegation of various usages of the verb "to be," an uninhibited reliance on helpful swear-words—are given repeated run-throughs in these pages until we begin to feel that we could almost write the lines ourselves. At times it can be rather powerful and even moving, although what it moves us to is more often amazed laughter than anything like concern or compassion or effective revolt. Out of the bones of suffering and the blood of much real misery, the authors of this book have brought back some remarkable jokes. To the suburbanite and to the academician—who are the ones who buy and love this kind of book—the jokes may be funny and the dialogue may seem full of fire and spice. To the inhabitant of the ghetto, however—to the child and to the adult—the retailing of their suffering over canapes and cocktails represents a serious offense.

We have already heard the amused wives of pleasant professors tittering gaily over these snippets, while they poured soda into bourbon, and asking us humorously whether "the children really talk that way." It is not easy, and it does not often seem worth it, to try to convince them that they do not. The book has already persuaded them of its veracity by its own lively momentum; and at this point, the pleasant lady is not ready or willing to allow anybody to take her fun away. The book is, in fact, a very persuading piece of literature. The only problem is that the things that it persuades us of are wrong.

¹ *Boston Herald*, June 13, 1965.

² *Christian Science Monitor*, June 19, 1965.

It is not so hard, after all, to bring back juicy tales from lively children. Popular novelists and resonating tape-recorders do it easily. It is a much harder thing to frame materials of this sort within a context of sufficient understanding and moral intelligence so that the reader can in no case come away with the mistaken impression of inherent squalor and personal ugliness which this book conveys. Few books by right-thinking people can ever have conveyed so many wrong ideas. The best that these authors seem able to attribute to their children is a sort of screwed-up sense of horrible humor. Yet even here, it is seldom to the children's credit; rather it is almost always humor unintended, the unconscious comedy of children who are funnier than they know because they are funny, in fact, only in a supercilious listener's mind.

After the question of accuracy, a number of secondary issues are posed by this book. One of them has to do with the teaching competence of its authors. Another has to do with the ideological and moral vacuum which they seem to represent.

On teaching competence: it is hard to read far in this book without racking one's brain to figure out what on earth the authors were doing all year long besides jotting down notes. Did they do nothing at all except ask a few timid questions, play a few rock 'n' roll records, and then pass out to their pupils the same old inappropriate junk-curriculum which they themselves admit bores the kids to death? It may be that a silence on the subject of their teaching is expected to convey an impression of calm wisdom. In fact it does not. It presents a picture instead of rather dull classrooms, of desiccating children and of teachers with an apparent desert of ideas—of two ladies sophisticated

enough to find the thinking of their fellow teachers boring but offering absolutely nothing of any real creative interest in its stead.

Other teachers are dealt with ruthlessly and amusingly in this volume, and the militant proto-liberals, with their dogmatic teaching formulae, are effectively raked over. Yet the authors themselves can come across with nothing better. They lambast the noisy enthusiasts but retire themselves into mute inscrutability. The best things in this book are repeatedly mouthed by the worst people—while the authors, in a kind of pseudo-psychiatric silence, offer almost nothing.

Only rarely do we get a brief glimpse of what might be really going on: a moment when the children are dancing, a fragment about math-instruction, a class discussion about Martin Luther King. Mostly we get nothing. No teaching. Only voices. But to present the voices of the children in their humor and grief and pathos, and not to describe the system which has held them and which holds them in this situation, does not seem fair. It is like a kindly and calm-headed description of the writhings and self-defilings of the Jewish victims of the Nazis by an author who, however, never lets down her guard long enough to tell us (a) how she happens to be just standing there, (b) what she is doing about it, (c) whether anything in the outer world which caused these things may possibly be turned over or reformed. An unedited and unnarrated film of the gas-chamber at Auschwitz might have shown its strangulating and defecating victims to have been a pretty messy-looking crew. In the same way the present book, despite all good intentions and all inspired moments, achieves a grotesque and dangerous end-product.

The children are shown primarily in the extreme postures of brutality. Little explanation is given and no consistent protest or intelligent outcry is recorded. I find this incompleteness a serious failing, although I do think that it is a half-picture which the kind of people who read this book will probably find comforting.

A few years ago a West Coast teacher wrote a vicious piece of literature bearing the title *White Teacher in a Black School*.³ The book, lacking either the interest or the reportorial intensity of the present volume, was in essence a violent diatribe, posed in the guise of a spiritual journey, on the inferiority of the Negro community and the hopelessness of Negro kids. Nothing could have pleased the school administrators of Boston or Mississippi more. It confirmed in print what they had been saying for a decade. The problem is that *The Schoolchildren*, too, a relatively benevolent book and certainly one that is not intended to be harmful, has already had the same effect. Here too the comic pathos and the mixed-up bitterness of the slum kids are in ugly evidence; but here, where we would expect it, there is no compensating voice of insight on the part of the authors into their own ambiguous role within these schools or into the very fact that such a pair of schools exist. It is as if we were to have all of Dickens' capacity for caricature and perhaps one quarter of his capacity for writing but not one ounce of his capacity for anger or for eloquent compassion. A passage like the following, reinforced in dozens of other places, is obviously going to have a memorable effect:

In the three months since school be-

³ Robert Kendall, *White Teacher in a Black School* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964).

gan, several teachers have quit. . . . One was the first science teacher, a young woman in English tweeds and walking shoes and long brown hair, who entered a fourth grade to give a lesson on magnets. The children threw the magnets out the window, she left and was replaced after many weeks by Mr. Wilcox. Another was a girl with a face like a line drawing and somber eyes. She'd asked for a Harlem school but got a low fifth grade; her gentle personality began to suffer from the all-day attacks and senseless violence. The day before Hallowe'en, she brought in whipped-cream cakes for a party. The kids blew the whipped cream through the centers of cakes, plastered it on walls, ceiling, each other. She went out to get rags and did the cleaning-up herself, but then nothing happened the rest of the morning. In fact, the room grew very quiet just at noon. When she went into the coatroom, she found the pockets of her cashmere coat had been defecated in, and left within that hour. (p. 121)

Occasionally the wall cracks and we get a glimpse of something different:

JOSIE. In Children's Village, you gots to wear a blue skirt all the time, and you gets a new mother and father for the whole time you be there. They be your own.

LEANORE. Listen, where I was I wore a blue skirt with one big pleat and two *small* pleats in back. A nice jacket, very short. No matter how you will, that jacket will not meet that skirt. On the back of your head, this lovely blue hat with two streamers made of that black, bumpy ribbon. Blue socks or white, depending on the day, and those socks had to be in perfect condition. (p. 144)

Suddenly something really sounds familiar. It is as if, after acres and oceans of devastation, the authors have suddenly noticed that there are, in the ghetto, a few particles of possible poetry too. It is reminiscent of the best writing that certain teachers have been bringing back in recent years from some of their students in the slums. When I read this, I thought of the work recounted recently by the New York teacher Herbert Kohl, and of the work of the pupils of the English author David Holbrook.⁴ There was nothing safe or bland or sentimental about the works of Mr. Kohl's or Mr. Holbrook's students. But the terrors of the street and the cruelties of the city had been transmuted in their classrooms into something valuable and strange. The gut realities, the moral infections, were there, but they were not, as in this book, exposed to fester. They were presented not as the untidy subject for our amazed laughter but as the deeply moving and deeply valued ingredients of life and art. It was this—the capacity to transmute pain into poetry, the ability to do more than listen with capable sophistication but to move onward to a point of inspired teaching and of personal involvement—which distinguished Mr. Kohl and Mr. Holbrook and which is severely lacking in this book. It is not what is said, but what is not said, which is the cause of failure. It seems astonishing that two teachers who appear to care so deeply about children should have so little to say for what they themselves would do, could do, or have done with the raw materials of life and pain that they were given—and again that

they have so slight a sense of obligation to take arms against a situation so intolerable, and so little of the imperative courage to protest.

We send down for 1.1 (first grade, first semester) readers but there aren't any. The book room sends up 2.1, hoping we can make out. Math book is from fourth grade. No phonics book. No math workbook. No beadboards. No alphabet cards, and they don't know what comes before *i* when they alphabetize. They need simple dictionaries. Mrs. Weiss says supply money goes into replacing books that get lost or destroyed. (p. 53)

This is an apt passage because it seems to show rather openly what is lacking in these authors and it tells us precisely how far they are willing to go in the gentle direction of revolt. A Harlem principal faced with conditions he felt intolerable not long ago stormed City Hall and paid for an advertisement in a New York City newspaper. He got Mayor Wagner to his school-building and he changed the conditions of schooling for his children. Reading *The Schoolchildren*, page after bitter page, one wonders exactly what these two observant ladies were doing; and one asks whether it ever occurred to them that anything in their schools might ever, by their own act and at their own initiative, be seriously changed. All books about pain need not be cries to revolution. But a book on a subject like this that leaves a reader with nothing better than a laugh and a tremor and a final shrug of resignation is propagating apathy.

That's just the way it is. Two real nice teachers and a whole lot of crazy kids. . .

A book that can leave us with this feeling is more dangerous perhaps than a book which is written out of opposi-

⁴ Herbert R. Kohl, *An Exploration of Children's Writing* (Hampton, New York: The Hampton Day School, 1966); David Holbrook, *The Secret Places* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1965).

tion to the children. For to espouse the children's cause abstractly, and to accept in real life, day by day, the situation that imprisons them, is not to help them but to paralyze them.

On one page of this volume, after a naive eulogy to the library ("captions, displays, pictures of Negro children running in the wind"), the authors tell us of the way that the Negro pupils treat their books.

The major problem is: arithmetic books and readers are written and colored in. Five hundred books are missing from the library at the end of a semester. The profile of George Washington (in a library book) has drips coming out of Washington's nose, a tongue drawn out in ink so he can lick them up. (p. 123)

If the moment ever came when the authors might look upon those nose-drippings as absolutely normal, predictable and, on the part of the patriotism that George Washington represents, more than well-deserved, then they might not sound so snotty themselves; and they might begin to be able to undergo the nightmare of the school-building not on the pitying, safe, and distressful side of the teacher but on the urgent and insurgent side of the kids. In my own schoolbuilding, I saw pupils who disliked bitterly the daily embarrassment of saying a pledge of allegiance to the flag. There was good enough reason. There hung the flag—unwashed, its colors fading. Beneath it stood the wall of peeling plaster, of windows cracked and covered, sashes rotting and frames bolted or nailed shut. On the shelves stood the desiccating textbooks; and in the halls and classrooms walked the calm and unruffled school-ladies who smiled and simpered, patted and pitied, and preached endlessly the virtues of goodness and honesty and patriotism

and democracy before returning each day to their own all-white neighborhoods at safe distances and a highway's passage from the all-black slum. Then I saw those children not liking to recite stupidity a pledge of allegiance to a flag of imperfect democracy which included everybody except them. It seemed to me absolutely natural, and it still seems so today. What does not seem natural is the squeamish astonishment of these two New York teachers when a couple of their own more gutty students demonstrate a similarly healthy disrespect. The Negro child who looks at that profile of the Father of Our Country with awe and reverence is the one that I would worry about, not the one who decorates his nostrils. Stealing five hundred books and improving George Washington's looks seem small potatoes beside three hundred years of slavery and a series of grim decades in these sordid city slums. And the tortured kid who brings home a few free books, snatched gratis from the City of New York or the Office of Education of the United States, is not going to raise anybody's taxes or put any public school system in the red—although as a matter of fact he just might get to like *reading* a couple of those books, and so might his brothers or sisters too, because these may well be the first good books that they have ever had beside their beds.

One of the rare moments in this book when the authors somehow get away from the dialogue of devastation and begin to touch on something deeper is the following snatch of talk having to do with junkies loitering in the doorways of the slums:

MONTY. They gets blood on the floor because they misses their bein, too.

RICHARD. They sleep on garbage buckets in the basement. My father

tried to get 'em out with his Derringer; but sometimes they get so high they can't get off the piles.

REGGIE. But they can't help themselves. It's their life. They don't want to hurt no one, just themselves.

MONTY. You has to be so careful with that needle, and be sure you go in your bein, and carry a baby's nipple over the tube or you hurt someone.

REGGIE. They feel they in the snow—walking in tennis shoes in the snow. They feel like they in another world. I don't mind if I was an addict—they *warm* in winter. (p. 78)

The last part seems to me to be tremendously moving. There is something very terrible and very beautiful about a Negro child who finds himself envying even the sky-high junky because that junky at least is warm in winter. The irony and the bitterness, however, which emerge from a reading of this book are contained in the recognition that that child will *never* be warm in winter, nor safe in summer, nor saved in any other season, so long as his salvation is going to depend upon the timid intervention of such gentle souls as these.

Out of Ireland have we come.
Great hatred, little room
Maimed us at the start.
I carry from my mother's womb
A fanatic heart.⁵

This is presented as an epigraph to the volume. When I reread it after finishing the book, I thought of the eloquence and the bravery of Yeats beside the final resignation of these authors. It seemed to mark the difference between writing that is ephemeral, because only enter-

taining, and writing that is inspiring and grand. Yeats indeed showed a fanatic's heart. The authors of this book do not. Or, if they do, they have not shown it in their writing. On the contrary, they have shown us the milkwarm heart of their times. One quotation from a poet suggests another, sometimes, and, reading that paragraph, I was reminded of some other lines by Yeats. The lines are from "The Second Coming," and in them the poet seems to be lamenting the absence of strong moral fiber among the good men of his time. "The best lack all conviction," Yeats wrote, "while the worst are full of passionate intensity."⁶ If that was true of Yeats' era, it seems even more true of our own, and the present book, if it does nothing else, confirms it. Where, and after what prompting, will there appear the unembarrassed courage and the need to level, lambast and tear down the unjust structures that we have created and by which we are continually compromised? Perhaps in some Americans, at a later date, that willingness will be present, but unhappily it is not present in the discreet society of the 1960's, nor is it present in this book.

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INQUIRY IN SOCIAL STUDIES.
by Byron G. Massialas and
C. Benjamin Cox.
*New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1966. 353 pp. \$6.95.*

Here is a troubling book: a sophisticated, almost revolutionary development of a certain liberal tradition in social studies which presents an arresting alternative to the separate disciplines approach to social studies, but which still does not come fully to grips

⁵W. B. Yeats, *Collected Poems* (New York: MacMillan, 1961).

⁶W. B. Yeats, *op. cit.*

with several difficult problems it poses for itself.

The main thrust of *Inquiry in Social Studies* is the elaboration of a method for developing concepts and generalizations in the classroom. To illustrate, one class discussion, reported by the authors, began on the subject of the development of nationalism in medieval England and France, and came to focus on the definition of a nation, as a result of a student's asking how the textbook's definition—which included independent government—would apply to the Jews prior to 1948. The discussion moved eventually to the idea of national consciousness as a conception that persons have of themselves in relation to other persons, and the students are reported to have ended up on "a higher level of analysis," talking in terms of measuring the level of intensity of sentiments on the basis of overt behavior. In another discussion, this same class (one presumes) inferred from their text a number of assumptions about exploration, which were subsequently questioned for their validity. These assumptions, converted to hypotheses, included ideas as diverse as the following:

If there is a country whose people make their living from the sea, then these people will be the first to explore and colonize new lands.

If the opportunity exists, then it is the nature of man to explore the unknown.

If there is a period of great discovery and rise in business, then there will be a rise in the standard of living. (p. 125)

The finally accepted versions of such statements as these are the generalizations the classes aim to produce, though every generalization, at least in Massialas and Cox's view, must be seen as be-

ing subject to continuous reconstruction.

In distinguishing between concepts and generalizations, and in approaching both eclectically rather than by way of the social science disciplines as such, Massialas and Cox have followed a course first charted years ago by Harold Rugg and his students, and subsequently pursued, for the most part, in elementary social studies. Theirs is, in fact, the first book in this vein to appear at the secondary level, and its being addressed to teachers of older children is clearly a factor in its favor. The greater ability and disposition of adolescents to think formally has encouraged Massialas and Cox to use modes of stipulative and deductive reasoning, for example, that the elementary school people have shied away from.

The critical operations in the authors' method of inquiry are the definition of concepts, the classification of phenomena in terms of the concepts, and the formulation and testing of relationships between the classes of phenomena. Six phases of the method are held to comprise a model of critical or reflective thinking in social studies: orientation, hypothesis, definition, exploration, evidencing, and generalization. Like the steps of Dewey's conception of problem solving, these phases are represented as having a certain psychological naturalness and are meant as well to be a set of heuristics to guide the inquiry. They are not treated as strictly separate modes of thought; for instance, definition is actually involved in all phases of the method, though it becomes one's central concern just before a systematic exploration of the data of a problem. Similarly, the method is more fluid as to the inductive and deductive drift of inquiry in various phases than this sketch of the model might suggest. Massialas and Cox have

supplied excerpts from the transcripts and logs of a number of classroom discussions, from which the flexibility and openness of their method can be inferred as readily as from their abstract rationale for it.

Two broad questions about the authors' conception of inquiry in social studies will now be considered, each of which is rather hard to frame. One has to do with the appropriateness of discussion as a vehicle for inquiry, and the other, which we will turn to first, concerns the viability of any general model of inquiry for social studies.

Massialas and Cox flirt with the problem of a general model. They discuss with some enthusiasm the attempt by Hanna and his students to identify all of the generalizations now established by the social sciences and to categorize them on the basis of their relation to nine or ten "basic human activities"—education, communication, and the like. The assumption seems to be made, certainly by Hanna if not so certainly by Massialas and Cox, that when all the generalizations are in hand, some superarrangement of them can serve as the foundation or framework of the curriculum. The Stanford effort, however, has already turned up thousands of generalizations and, like the brooms of the sorcerer's apprentice, they seem only to multiply when one tries to reduce them to manageable proportions. Paradoxically, this happens not simply because there is so much social science knowledge of man to be expressed in a generalized form, but because almost any nontautological generalization about social phenomena must be qualified, either by existential reference or by a set of other generalizations, in order to be fully acceptable. In this respect, Massialas and Cox's *practice* (which one infers especially from their examples) of considering whatever generalizations

seem to be assumed or implied by the material at hand (often a text) and of stressing the process of generating and testing generalizations might seem to be a reasonable solution.

The authors themselves are not convinced that the way out is this easy, as is apparent from their discussion of the social science disciplines. In an early chapter of the book they attempt—not very successfully, one feels—a brief characterization of each of the disciplines, emphasizing especially their central concepts. A revised model at this point might take these concepts as a vocabulary, and the rules for generating and testing propositions as a grammar of social science inquiry, leaving the determination of the actual statements (generalizations and others) to the exigencies of the problems one chooses to deal with. Massialas and Cox appear at times to be doing just this, a practice which leads one to ask still another question. How much mileage does one lose from using concepts in isolation from their disciplines, particularly in isolation from the family or set of concepts from which a given concept has been lifted? Any method of inquiry in social studies which is truly "interdisciplinary," rather than just a mishmash, must find a way to combine a general model of rules and heuristics with a *systematic* vocabulary of concepts. Unhappily, this is still not the end because the concepts of the disciplines, for example the anthropologist's concept of culture or the economist's concept of standard of living, are also hard to separate from the techniques of the respective disciplines, and even from the contexts to which they are addressed. Nevertheless, to start from a general model, as Massialas and Cox have done, rather than to start with the separate disciplines, seems to make sense, at least for a substantial part of the sec-

ondary school social studies curriculum and preceding a more intensive study of one or more of the disciplines as such (including history "as such," which may be the most difficult of all).

The first chapter of *Inquiry in Social Studies* dwells at some length on various problems or areas of conflict in contemporary society, and a later chapter reviews a number of theories of value or strategies for dealing with value judgment. However, this thinking is not integrated into the authors' model of inquiry, and, significantly, only a hypothetical discussion of race relations is presented to illustrate "value inquiry," rather than any real classroom examination of a contemporary issue (unless one counts a discussion of the Bible vs. science).

My comments about discussion as a vehicle for inquiry can begin where my remarks about the disciplines left off. Massialas and Cox rely very heavily on teacher-orchestrated talk about secondary sources, with a slight bow to "social science research projects."¹ Apart from feeling that students might be involved much more in document analysis, small group experiments, and so on, I have some misgivings about the discussion as such. It is, to be sure, considerably more open than discussion managed by a teacher who is determined, as even some of the new style "discovery" teachers are, to fish out of the students predetermined conclusions. This is evidenced by some of the authors' transcripts of lively exchanges between students. Nevertheless, one

wonders where individual students are left in this process—not only whether they are all "included," but how the phases of the group's inquiry, as regulated by the teacher, correspond to the development of individuals' thinking. It might be argued that the interaction of a group can best provide the model to be internalized by the individual, and that a group is most likely to engage the individual's thoughts and feelings. Still, one wants to be able to discriminate between the performances of different individuals, and one may want to be responsive to their differences in style of thinking, level of cognitive or social development, interests, and so on, as well as differences in the attainment of the behavioral objectives *per se*. Massialas and Cox write at some length about the difficulties of evaluating reflective thinking, the inadequacies of currently available measures, and the development of more appropriate instruments and techniques for evaluation. From their way of presenting the inquiry method and their description of their own teaching experiments, it appears that they have so far been more interested, or at any rate more successful, in evaluating the group's rather than the individual's performance. Perhaps as ways of accomplishing the latter are developed, they will themselves become models of inquiry processes that are alternatives to the grand discussion.

In the chapters "What Research Says About Reflective Thinking and Learning" and "The Teacher as Researcher," the authors make much more explicit and discriminating use of research than has been customary in textbooks on secondary social studies. A startling omission is the work of Piaget and Vygotsky, which illuminates considerably the possibilities and significance of formal thinking in adolescence, and which

¹ A list of titles and brief descriptions of projects proposed by a class of high school juniors and seniors are included: for example, an analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute in terms of different interpretations of Marx, and a comparison of the output per man-hour in the kibbutzim, the cooperatives, and the independent farms of Israel.

suggests some of the important dimensions of individual development and differences that research in social studies must investigate.

In the spirit of the book itself, one counts on the authors to pursue these questions further. Written with clarity and consistent purpose, it is a fine invitation to others to join in this inquiry with them.

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TEACHING PUBLIC ISSUES IN THE HIGH SCHOOL.

by Donald W. Oliver and
James P. Shaver.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1966. 330 pp. \$4.50.

This book is a report on Project Social Studies, headed by Professor Oliver at Harvard University. Unlike most current social studies projects, it has not made the structure of a discipline or inductive teaching its central features. Oliver and Shaver prefer inquiry and its hypothetico-deductive model to the contrivances and seductions of inductive teaching. They recognize that all thinking in everyday living and science, social and physical, has inductive and deductive elements. They are equally convinced that knowledge of the structures of disciplines is irrelevant to the purposes and program of general education. In their judgment, general education should provide an understanding of the value conflicts embedded in questions of public policy. A social studies program that successfully pursued this end would need to call upon the knowledge of many disciplines, and a curriculum structure that reflected this need would be organized around problems or historical crises, not around the inner logic of a discipline. To put

matters more bluntly, they believe that "[w]hen one views a potential social studies program with such objectives in mind, focus on the academic scholar as the model of intelligent citizenry seems inadequate." (p. 237)

In order to engage students in reflective study of the legal-ethical dimensions of public policy, it is necessary for teachers to relate social science knowledge to the life outlooks of students. A failure to do this means that such knowledge lacks personal relevance or meaning. It is this personalistic emphasis that a concern with the inner logic of a discipline is likely to neglect. A scholar who can identify the structure of his discipline is able to tell us what knowledge is of most worth to that discipline. It may not be the knowledge most known to scholars in the discipline, and certainly it may not be the knowledge of most worth to the student who has come to feel that his personal theories are inadequate. In addition to disciplines with structures, and curriculums with structures, we have students who in some way have structured reality so that it makes some kind of sense to them. Everyone has a warrant for what he believes no matter how lousy it may be. Oliver and Shaver observe the real problem in structure for any social studies teacher when they say:

Any social studies program must face the fact that the student comes to class with a "social theory" already in mind, one which allows him to function quite well. He brings to the instructional setting a fairly stable set of interrelated personal constructs which affect how he reacts, both emotionally and intellectually, to political and social events. Instruction must be seen, therefore, as a more challenging task than simply providing the intellectual tools of the aca-

demical; rather it is one of shaping, changing, and developing intellectual and emotional orientations already present. In this respect, the social sciences undoubtedly differ from mathematics and the physical sciences; the student is less likely to have highly developed constructs in the latter fields because their domain of study is less a part of common public discourse. However, the distinction is by no means clearcut; the American experience with the teaching of evolution, as well as Galileo's earlier problem in attempting to reorient thinking about the physical universe, illustrate the fact that even when biological or astronomical interpretations contradict the conventional wisdom of the community, teaching involves more than the discovery of structure. *What makes social science theory or knowledge especially exciting, in fact, is its potential for feeding, expanding, or contradicting the student's already existing personal theories of social reality.* (p. 232) [italics supplied by reviewer]

If Oliver and Shaver are to achieve a curriculum that has personal meaning for students, it is necessary, they feel, to create a structure with a wider base than can be found in any single university discipline. They have attempted to integrate content from several disciplines under the concept of democratic constitutionalism. The theoretical treatment given to this concept in Part Two suggests that they are limiting their content to political science. But this is because they recognize political science as the one discipline that is largely concerned with the efforts of government to cope with the value differences of organized interest groups. The actual materials of instruction that they have developed illustrate borrowing of con-

tent from more than one discipline. It is apparent from this book that Oliver and Shaver theorize less well than they produce instructional material. The material is brilliantly conceived—but when they talk about it, the reader is likely to become confused over what they are attempting to accomplish.

The material takes the form of case studies of several kinds. All cases are designed to produce an emotional impact upon the student. In addition to cases, they have developed materials on the historical, legal, sociological, and psychological background of cases. These materials are to be used by teachers to provoke dialogue between students, and within each student. One of the preferred dialogues is the adversarial use of Socratic teaching. It is well calculated to produce in students a re-examination of their social theories.

Both the instructional materials and the teaching techniques are intended to confront students with value conflicts. Oliver and Shaver do not entirely agree with Gunnar Myrdal in his claim that our major value conflicts are between those held on the general plane and the specific exceptions made to them. They believe that Myrdal has overlooked the existence of conflicts within the general values, called by him the American Creed. Situations can arise that put a value such as free speech in conflict with another value such as peace and order, or safety of life and limb. Oliver and Shaver deliberately confront students with such situations. One of their examples places the "equal protection of the law" principle in the 14th Amendment in conflict with the "states' rights" clause of the 10th Amendment. Because these values are not absolutes, they can be compromised, and the task for each student of public controversy is to work out his own solution to the conflict.

In order to do this, the student must be aware of certain methodological snares. He has to learn the difference between a factual question and a value question, and between each of these and a question of definition. Regardless what "solution" a student reaches, it should be methodologically clean. Rational consent is one of the ultimate values upon which Oliver and Shaver make everything else depend.

Human dignity is also treated as an ultimate value, but the authors grant that this value can be interpreted in a variety of ways. They are willing to accept any interpretation, if I understand them, as long as it is reached rationally and is consistent with one's other values. If Oliver and Shaver have a weakness, it is in their value theory. They seem unable to decide whether ultimate values are necessary to their curriculum model. An ultimate value appears to be acceptable to them as long as it is not precisely defined. Since an ultimate value is meaningless until it is interpreted, and since many of our value conflicts are over conflicting interpretations, it is not clear to this reviewer why an undefined ultimate value such as human dignity has any real function in their treatment of policy choices.

Certain writers have established the similarities as well as the differences between descriptive and evaluative concepts, and it is a mystery why Oliver and Shaver did not draw upon their insights. Both kinds of concepts depend upon the use of criteria, and logically there is no difference between a normative definition and the descriptive ones of social science. The criteria that we use for defining concepts should be consistent with any philosophy to which we subscribe. If Oliver and Shaver want to help students formulate better social theories and, in turn, better social philosophies, the kind of comparative

studies that trace differences in defining criteria back to differences in philosophies would very much be consistent with their general model for the study of public conflicts over policy questions. This relationship between criteria and philosophies also exists in the area of consequences and their evaluation. If people can't agree on whether certain consequences are desirable, their difference is usually rooted in a dispute over appropriate criteria by which to determine desirability, and this difference is in turn traceable back to differences in basic philosophy.

Philip Smith, president of the Philosophy of Education Society, in his recent book *Philosophy of Education*, is more clear and to the point than Oliver and Shaver when he discusses the three meanings that may be given to the expression that x is good. We may say that x is good and offer as our warrant that x leads to y . This is an instrumental view of x , and anyone who approves y is prone to approve x as a means to it. A second way of saying that x is good is to say that it is entailed by s . This intrinsic valuing of x is derived from a philosophy (let s equal democracy) to which the person who likes x has subscribed. Finally, a person may say that x is good and offer as his only reason that he likes x . Smith warns that a person had better be sure of his likes and dislikes. If our likes, some of them at least, are inconsistent with our basic character, with our usual way of structuring experience, trouble is likely to arise from such discrepancy. The Oliver-Shaver attempt to help students improve their social theories and philosophies would suggest that Smith's analysis would be helpful to them. We as teachers may not be justified in insisting that students share our philosophy and therefore our criteria when they attempt to define concepts and assess con-

sequences. But we have the obligation as scholars of inquiry to push them toward greater consistency in their definitions and evaluations. They can achieve such consistency only as they reflectively choose to subscribe to some philosophy which is perceived by them as better than any alternative. Of course, not everyone need subscribe to the same philosophy. Oliver and Shaver are in favor of consistency. They indicate this preference in their discussion of the use of analogies as part of the teacher's strategy. But I am not sure that they are talking about philosophical consistency. They may simply mean logical consistency. Such consistency can be achieved by a person whether he has a philosophy or not. It won't tell him much, however, about how to make value choices that are consistent with something besides each other.

One suspects, however, that Oliver and Shaver have a philosophy but simply have not made it clear. One further suspects that they are more pragmatic and relativistic than they have cared to admit. It is also possible that the material they have designed and tested reveals more about their basic philosophy than the theorization that appears in their book. What the material reveals is good, very good indeed. The book is a major and brilliant contribution to the literature on curriculum and instruction.

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LANGUAGE AND CULTURE.

by Herbert Landar.

New York: Oxford University Press,
 1966. 274 pp. \$3.75.

The title of this book, as well as some advertisements for it, will suggest to many that it is an examination of the

relationship between language and other aspects of culture. Part of it is indeed so, but the greater part of the book deals separately with various aspects of linguistic theory and cultural theory, presumably as a necessary foundation to considering the relations between the two. In both the linguistic and cultural sections, the author appears to stick mainly to conclusions which could be regarded as well established, the chief exception being his presentation of some of the views of Morris Swadesh on very remote genetic relationships of languages. (cf. Fig. 9, p. 197) As a result, linguists are likely to regard the linguistic sections as excessively elementary and simplified, and anthropologists may feel likewise about the cultural section; although members of either discipline might benefit from reading the sections dealing with the other, a member of neither discipline could benefit from reading both. Perhaps because of its combination of broad scope and moderate length, however, the book is not the best introduction to either linguistics or cultural anthropology. On the other hand, probably no introduction to either field alone attempts to cover so much material so compactly. In spite of its shortness, some sections of *Language and Culture* would have been improved by editorial pruning—or perhaps by expansion to clarify the significance of what appear to be digressions, e.g., the bare chronology of Egyptian dynasties which takes up much of the short chapter entitled "Ancient Writing."

Those looking for a penetrating exposition and critique of the ideas on language-culture relationships of Boas, Sapir, Whorf, Hoiijer, etc., are likely to be somewhat disappointed. In his concern for theoretical and scholarly soundness, Landar avoids any really extensive discussion of the kind of "moonshine"

ideas (as he calls them) of language-culture relations which have attracted students to this field. He concentrates instead on comparative linguistics as used for evidence of historical connections between cultures. The author does hold out the hope in his conclusion that someday someone will introduce some "sunshine" into the now moonlit areas of language and culture and find something more than a nocturnal phantasm there—but there is little speculation as to what might then appear in the light of day. Perhaps Landar's reluctance to speculate stems from a fear of intellectually seducing unprepared students. Certainly one could argue that teachers should be moderate in plying beginning students with some of the enticing speculations of Whorf, *et al.*, until further empirical testing and analysis in this area is accomplished.

One important issue in the area of language and culture which the author does raise briefly (pp. 221-224) is the extent to which Sapir shared what has often come to be spoken of as the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity"—the notion that there is a strong influence of the grammar of one's mother tongue on habitual thought, and that each cultural world-view is distinct inasmuch as it is determined by a particular language, as well as being reflected in the language. According to Landar, this proposal should probably be called the "Whorf hypothesis." Landar states that Sapir's name became attached because Whorf, a student of Sapir, quoted a passage from his teacher but used it in a context and sense not originally intended by its author. As he points out, both men died within a few years of meeting, and Sapir left no published evaluation of Whorf's use of his words. Sapir made many other important contributions to anthropology and linguistics, and nearly all the

writing on the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis" was done by Whorf rather than Sapir, although Dell Hymes in his recent reader has unearthed one further short published statement by Sapir which appears to be highly relevant.¹

Sapir's earlier writings, especially his famous book *Language*,² suggest that if he did come to favor Whorf's position in later life, he would have had to make a considerable intellectual reversal. Landar assumes that Sapir was intellectually steadfast and implies that there is an alternate, Durkheimian interpretation of Whorf's quotation from Sapir, although he does not explain in detail what this interpretation is. Certainly there are legitimate grounds for wondering how much of a Whorfian Sapir became in his last years, and a slavish coincidence of views between two men of such active intellect would be unlikely. Nevertheless, in this reviewer's opinion, there are good grounds for supposing that Sapir did change his mind on the language-thought-culture relation, perhaps in part due to Whorf's stimulation. David Mandelbaum, in his edition of Sapir's essays, published after the latter's death, tells us that Sapir used to remark that if he had to write *Language* over again he would change certain things—just what is not specified.³

Also, scattered through Sapir's writings one finds various premises which if collected in one place imply certain language-culture relationships. For instance, Sapir was one of the first anthropologists to develop the still somewhat

¹ Dell Hymes (ed.), *Language in Culture and Society: A Reader in Linguistics and Anthropology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

² (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921).

³ David G. Mandelbaum (ed.), *Selected Writings in Language, Culture and Personality: Edward Sapir* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

controversial concept of modal personality for particular cultures. Sapir also had a clear notion of style at many structural levels of speech as expressive of personality, and he had the notion of linguistic "drift"—tendencies in a language toward directed change by increasingly favoring one stylistic alternative over another. It is no great step from these views to the notion that a particular kind of modal personality might favor a particular style of speech in a language and that this preference, in turn, might result in a directed drift of the language toward the ultimate incorporation of favored stylistic variants as necessary and inflexible features of a later stage of the language. By assuming a reciprocal interaction between culture (including language) and modal personality, one arrives at the view that a language which has come to express a particular type of modal personality and associated world-view can also influence the development and maintenance of the personality type and world-view in new members of the society, who must learn this language as their mother tongue.

John Carroll, in his edition of Whorf's essays on language,⁴ makes it clear that Whorf had a long-standing but somewhat naive interest in finding hidden meaning in language before he studied with Sapir, and that the more sophisticated views on the psychological and cultural significance of language for which Whorf is known were developed after meeting Sapir. Therefore it seems likely that Sapir had at least the role of sympathetic critic in Whorf's development of the concept of "linguistic relativity."

The writings of Edward Sapir are

⁴ Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings*, ed. John Carroll (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956).

wide-ranging and remain suggestive to anthropologists and linguists today. If Landar's book inspires others, as it has the reviewer, to take a fresh look at Sapir's writings for his views on language and culture, it will have served a useful purpose. In itself *Language and Culture* is rather sketchy and leaves one with many hints and unanswered questions, but the interested reader can find in it a good number of references to places where he can delve further into the problems raised, and find some new problems as well.

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THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND RELIGION:

THE LEGAL CONTEXT.

by Sam Duker.

New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

238 pp. \$2.75 (paper).

THE BIBLE AND THE SCHOOLS.

by William O. Douglas.

Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1966. 65 pp. \$3.75.

These two recent additions to the church-state literature neither supply new dimensions to the commentary nor furnish fresh insights into the constitutional problem, but each does serve a function.

The Duker work, a volume in the Exploration Series in Education, is in many respects unique in its usefulness. At the outset, the author very briefly sketches the route of a constitutional case, from the trial in state or federal court, through final determination by the U. S. Supreme Court; he goes on to define the role and meaning of *stare decisis*, mootness, dissents, and the like. (Simplistic? Yes, but an astonishing number of otherwise well-informed citizens exist in total ignorance of this vital

process.) Subsequently, the author examines the constitutional status of parochial schools, the "child benefit" theory of public expenditures, and the range of issues related to religious instruction and ceremonies in public school classrooms.

The uniqueness of Professor Duker's approach lies in the device he employs to illuminate these areas. He has laid out selected excerpts from the component elements of each of the twelve Supreme Court cases of the past two generations embodying today's constitutional doctrine of religion in the public schools.¹ These excerpts include relevant portions of the opinions—majority, concurring, and dissenting—and often parts of the opinion of the court below, of arguments of counsel, and of the texts of statutes under construction.

Materials of this nature are something ordinarily encountered only in a law library or in a constitutional treatise or casebook—an unlikely source for enticing the non-specialist readers to whom Professor Duker's work is addressed. Yet here it is, all foregathered in a paperback: glimpses of the wisdom, the foolishness, the wit, the peevishness, the bias, the commitment, the logic, and the occasional eloquence of the judges and advocates, and above all the uneven but generally forward

thrust of the nation in keeping religion and the public school apart.

That the book lays no claim to scholarly attainment, contains very little textual analysis, and is almost totally devoid of editorial gloss comprises its virtue. A student or teacher in a college survey course in government, an above average member of a high school civics class, or a conscientious citizen seeking out some of the raw materials that lie beneath, say, the religion column in the *Times*, can readily examine at close range the workings of the constitutional process in a field where slogans and epithets have long enjoyed ascendancy over understanding.

Mr. Justice Douglas' book is quite another thing. The imagination boggles at what so senior a Justice—he has actually participated in ten of the twelve decisions set out by Mr. Duker—and so questing a personality could do with such a subject as *The Bible and the Schools*. One envisages an account of his own metamorphosis, from the "We are a religious people whose institutions pre-suppose a Supreme Being" business in *Zorach*, to the ultimate broadness of the scope he reads into *Engel* and *Schempp*. Or of the upheaval within the Court that the problem of standing-to-sue must have caused and probably still does. Or of the reaction of the Justices to the pressure from overheated religionists during and after the consideration of the school Bible-reading and prayer cases, to the ramifications of the blithe and continuing defiance of these decisions by a countless number of school districts throughout the land,² to the implications of introducing meditation as standard public school classroom practice. One

¹ *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); *Cochran v. Louisiana*, 281 U.S. 370 (1930); *Minersville v. Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); *West Virginia v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); *McCollum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); *Zorach v. Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); *Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); *Schempp v. School District*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); *Murray v. Curlett*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); *Chamberlain v. Dade County*, 377 U.S. 402 (1964). The "twelve" are really eleven, for *Schempp* and *Murray* are companion cases.

² See, for example, "The Clergy and the Dirksen Amendment," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 29, 1966, p. 9.

could expand upon such matters at length.

Alas, this enormous potential remains only that. The Justice's publication is not really a "book." An amplification of an address to the Phi Beta Kappa Associates in New York City delivered in 1964, its actual text barely covers 53 small-sized, large-print pages, and only a fraction deals with the subject matter of the title. In essence, Justice Douglas has compiled a succinct, smoothly ordered tracing of the doctrine of separation and an exposition of the duality of the First Amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses. For garnishment there are brief comparisons and allusions to Hindustani and Islamic church-state developments. There is also an appendix containing several pages of critical bibliography.

The Bible and the Schools would never have been published if its author were not who he is. But as suggested here at the outset, it does serve a function. If you want a loose and limited, yet rather serviceable and easily scanned outline of the development of American church-state perspectives, this book merits a niche, albeit a wee one, on your shelves.

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THE NEGRO AMERICAN.

edited by Talcott Parsons and
Kenneth B. Clark.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1966. xxix + 781 pp. \$9.50.

Professor Parsons describes this collection of writings as "the most comprehensive survey" of race relations in the United States since the Myrdal work of a generation ago, differing from the earlier one, however, in that it is not

the "product of a unified research effort." (p. xix)

With due allowance for the ambiguities of "comprehensive," this is a fair enough statement. It is undoubtedly a good volume, but to say merely that is to judge it harshly; for to bring together such luminaries as wrote the twenty-eight essays here collected and from them to produce a merely good book is to produce a disappointing book.

Not all the available talent is here, of course. The contributors were nearly all recruited from the ranks of practicing social scientists; one notes, however, that many social scientists who over the last few years have made conspicuous and solid contributions to a better comprehension of racial relations in America are missing. Nevertheless, the writers that were selected are a truly first-rate team.

And yet there is not, I think, a piece in this book sure to be of lasting interest. The most likely candidates are the two brilliant articles by Rashi Fein and James Tobin; but are they really so good, or are they just new? We must, after all, be somewhat stingy with our praise of economists, in their long delayed discovery of racial discrimination.

There is a group of articles—ten or twelve, I would say—of excellent quality, but each only a revision of what its author has written just as well before and elsewhere. Which raises the question of when a symposium is superior to an anthology. Both are extraordinarily difficult to review. No one—least of all the reviewer himself—wants to follow a review through twenty-eight wickets. Yet seldom does a collection of essays rise to the level of a unified whole; certainly *The Negro American* does not.

So that there may be no misunderstanding, let me reiterate my admiration for this band of scholars and the

work they display here. There is only one bad article in the whole great tome. Oscar Handlin keeps up his monotonous refrain that "integration is a false issue." (p. 673) To the black nationalists intoning that integration is a menace, Mr. Handlin replies that it wouldn't be good for you, anyhow; to careful observers (such as Fein) who record that racial discrimination is a real economic factor, he replies that poverty is nothing new; and to the civil rights movement that saw a new necessity as well as a new dream, Mr. Handlin gives a stern rebuke for its "inability to define the ultimate goals." (p. 659) He is that familiar figure at public forums, the humorless and assiduous questioner who begins to imagine that he is a party to the debate.

Joseph H. Fichter's piece affronts my prejudices and, if one is to read him as claiming that the civil rights campaign is "basically a religious movement" (p. 417), is substantively questionable. Erik H. Erikson and Paul A. Freund, whom this reader turned to almost first of all and with great eagerness, disappoint. Erikson's piece seems to be a first draft (which in a way is promising) and Freund's is a casual comment which is a great pity, because we must all wish to read what Freund will one day have to say on "the civil rights movement and the frontiers of law." Talcott Parsons writes, as always I suppose, for a special circle. Some of James Q. Wilson's data gets away from him. He writes that (a) Weltner's old district was cut in two—his, "consisting of Fulton County (Atlanta)," and the other, consisting of DeKalb County (p. 445); (b) this "decreased the proportion of lower middle-class whites" in his district (p. 426); and (c) "Atlanta carefully annexes all upper-income suburbs." (p. 427) "A" and "C" are incorrect and "B" is very questionable. All of these are

rather trivial points, but not to Wilson's analysis.

Kenneth B. Clark speaks of the confluence of ideals and necessity in the contemporary world, of how the ancient vision of a nonviolent society comes now to be the only "tolerable or possible" order for men. (p. xvi) If there is a unifying theme to the essays, this may be it. Throughout, there is awareness, sometimes insisted upon and sometimes hovering unsaid but known, that what America *should do* about race and poverty and what it *must do* become the same. This perception, running in sharp-peaked and erratic waves through the nation, has perhaps also been the towline of the social advances of the last generation.

The line can, however, snap back, as it did when pulled a little more deeply and tightly by the famous Moynihan report. That strange episode is now almost more interesting than the report itself. It carries over into this volume, where Lee Rainwater feels a need, that mars an otherwise solid essay, to intimate crucial differences between himself and Moynihan, differences which scarcely are apparent to an attentive reader. Fortunately, G. Franklin Edwards is also on hand and, as a master should, restores order:

The problems of the Negro family . . . are related to a complex of interwoven factors, of which level of educational attainment and income are important components. . . . [T]he behavior of these lower-income families is a practical response to onward circumstances which undermine the well-intentioned, but often unattainable, goals of these units. . . . The elimination of many of these difficulties depends upon a commitment to invest a great deal more of our resources in improving educa-

tional and social services, including more effective family limitation programs. (pp. 289-291)

To which Tobin will add: "the blame [for the worsening of this situation] falls largely on the weakness of labor markets since 1957." (p. 453)

I have always felt that the just side of the attacks on the Moynihan report was Moynihan's failure, repeated in his article in this volume, to explain what his analysis meant for public policy, or his neglect to make clear that he was not recommending any particular policies or programs. This same characteristic preference for analysis and avoidance of either forecast or policy proposals is, I think, the greatest weakness of this book, as it is generally the greatest weakness of contemporary social science. The second large defect of the symposium is its almost complete avoidance of the South, as if it were no longer relevant even to analysis, and this despite Robert Cole's warning "that southern life is not northern life." (p. 276)

Fein and Tobin, the economists, deal richly in policy study. (Interestingly, neither of them, in discussing how to break the cycle of Negro poverty, seems to regard the federal anti-poverty program as worthy of mention.) Robert Dentler wrestles with the very tough and thorny issue of how to integrate schools, and there are in the pieces by

Rainwater, Adelaide Cromwell Hill and F. S. Jaffe, Harold C. Fleming, and Eugene P. Foley measured but deliberative acceptances of the challenge to make social science more responsible for policy leadership.

Too much of this long book reads, however, as if the future did not exist. For example, Dentler raises the "question of the viability of public education" in the large cities, and whether it may not be ineluctably passing into a semi-custodial function (p. 488); and John J. Fischer extends the question by wondering about the correlation between public schools and an open society. (p. 503) I submit that anyone now engaged with American social issues knows that these are absolutely basic and necessary questions; one will in vain look to this book for study of them. I must also confess an impatience that the American Academy of Arts and Sciences convenes distinguished minds primarily to re-tool old analyses and descriptions rather than to anticipate and to contend with the future.

Will *The Negro American* affect public policy? Not likely. Will it guide scholarship? One doubts that. Will the photographs by Bruce Davidson be long admired? Yes. Will the book be used as a reference source? Probably. Will it be read? No.

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The Field Foundation

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DONALD W. OLIVER, Professor of Education at Harvard, has done his major work in the area of social studies curriculum development and evaluation. He is the author (with James P. Shaver) of *Teaching Public Issues in the High School*, and has conducted research on methods of evaluating social studies through the analysis of dialogue. With Fred M. Newmann, he directs the Harvard Social Studies Project and is editing a forthcoming series of case materials on the analysis of public controversy.

DAVID RIESMAN has held the Henry Ford II Professorship of the Social Sciences at Harvard since 1958. He holds degrees from Harvard College and Harvard Law School. The breadth of his interests is reflected by his many published works. *The Lonely Crowd* and *Faces in the Crowd* show detailed and generalizing approaches to American culture and character. *Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays* is concerned with intellectual history and the sociology of knowledge. Recently he has been occupied with undergraduate education, as evidenced by his *Constraint and Variety in American Education* and by his current work with Christopher Jencks.

In this first issue of the thirty-seventh volume of the REVIEW, the editors wish to express their regard for Dr. Howard E. Wilson, who was one of the first editors of this journal. His leadership of the REVIEW was only one of Dr. Wilson's many contributions to education and scholarship. At the time of his death last year, he was Dean of the faculty of Education at the University of California at Los Angeles. His words and the policies he instituted still guide us.



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
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The author analyzes various aspects of the social structure of the school, particularly in contrast to that of the family, and discusses the relationship between that structure and the acquisition of norms which are integral to public and occupational life in industrial societies.

ROBERT DREEBEN

Harvard University

The Contribution of Schooling to the Learning of Norms*

This paper is concerned with the familiar phenomenon known as schooling. It departs from the usual approaches to education in that the problems of instruction and its direct outcomes are of peripheral interest. The main argument is based on the observation that schools and the classrooms within them have a characteristic pattern of organizational properties different from those of other agencies in which socialization takes place and on the contention that what children learn derives as much from the nature of their experiences in the school setting as from what they are taught.

Traditional approaches to understanding the educational process usually deal with the explicit goals of schools as expressed in curriculum content: the cognitive skills involved in reading, arithmetic, and the like; subject mat-

* I wish to thank Barrie D. Bortnick, Andrew Effrat, Michael B. Katz, Larry A. Weiss, and Charlene A. Worth for their invaluable help. The research and development reported herein was performed pursuant to a contract (OE 5-10-239) with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, under the provisions of the Cooperative Research Program, as a project of the Harvard University Center for Research and Development on Educational Differences, Copyrighted © 1967, Dreeben; reproduction in whole or in part permitted for any purposes by the United States Government.

This paper is adapted from Part IV of *On What is Learned in School*, to be published in 1968 by Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. The volume is in a series on The Foundations of Education, under the editorship of Byron Massialas. Used by permission of Robert Dreeben and the publisher.

ter content; national tradition; vocational skills; and a multitude of good things such as citizenship, self-confidence, tolerance, patriotism, cooperation, and benevolent attitudes of various kinds. They are also concerned with pedagogy: methods of instruction considered broadly enough to include motivation and quasi-therapeutic activities as well as didactics more narrowly conceived. One indication that curriculum and pedagogy occupy a central place in educational thinking is the existence of a massive literature reporting research devoted overwhelmingly to problems in these two areas and to evaluations of instructional effectiveness in bringing about curricular outcomes.¹

There is no question but that schools are engaged in an instructional enterprise, but the preoccupation with instruction has been accompanied by the neglect of other equally important problems. It is my contention that the traditional conception of schooling as an instructional process, primarily cognitive in nature, is at best only partially tenable. That is, what pupils learn is in part some function of what is taught; but what is learned and from what experiences remain open questions. Doubtless, the dissemination of knowledge is high on the school's agenda; but does such dissemination represent its peculiar contribution?

Instruction and knowledge, even at a high level, are made available to children outside the school: through the family, the mass media, travel, museums, libraries, and personal contacts with a variety of people. Perhaps the inconclusiveness of research designed to measure the impact of teaching on learning is attributable in part to the fact that many social agencies other than schools contribute to the acquisition of similar knowledge generally thought to fall largely within the school's jurisdiction.

¹ In one near-encyclopedic volume on educational research, the instructional emphases are most clearly illustrated. Nine of twenty-three long chapters are devoted to "Research on Teaching Various Grade Levels and Subject Matters." Six deal with measurement: both problems of measurement *per se*, and of measuring particular types of educational outcomes (cognitive and non-cognitive). Two deal with the characteristics of teachers, two with methods and media; one with social interaction in classrooms. The major preoccupations of educators and educational researchers are summarized in the following statement from Benjamin S. Bloom, "Testing Cognitive Ability and Achievement," in N. L. Gage (ed.), *Handbook of Research on Teaching* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 379:

While it may or may not be true that the most important changes in the learner are those which may be described as cognitive, i.e., knowledge, problem-solving, higher mental processes, etc., it is true that these are the types of changes in students which most teachers do seek to bring about. These are the changes in learners which most teachers attempt to gauge in their own tests of progress and in their final examinations. These, also, are the changes in the learners which are emphasized in the materials of instruction, in the interaction between teachers and learners, and in the reward system which the teachers and the schools employ.

There is a brief treatment of the characteristics of learning environments but with primary emphasis on teaching techniques in George G. Stern, "Measuring Non-cognitive Variables in Research on Teaching," (*Ibid.*, pp. 425-433).

Even though other agencies may resemble schools in their instructional impact, schools do have structural characteristics that distinguish them sharply from other settings—most particularly the family—contributing to the socialization of children, characteristics whose obviousness and familiarity probably account for their neglect. For example:

1. Responsibility for the control of schools and for instruction in the classroom rests in the hands of adults who are not the kinsmen of pupils.
2. Children leave the household daily to attend school but return at the close of the day; that is, they continue their active membership and participation in the family.
3. Schools are distinguished structurally according to level; despite the similarities between elementary and secondary levels, there are conspicuous differences involving:
 - a. variation in the heterogeneity of the student body related to school district size;
 - b. degree of differentiation of the teaching staff based upon subject matter specialization;
 - c. presence or absence of formal provision for tracking pupils based largely on past academic achievement;
 - d. variation in the number of pupils that each teacher confronts daily.
4. Pupils progress through school grade-by-grade at yearly intervals, each time severing associations with one set of teachers and establishing associations with a new set (unlike the family where children's relationships with parents do not follow a sequential pattern of severance and re-establishment).
5. Pupils move through school as members of age-equal cohorts (unlike the family in which the age dispersion of children is characteristically larger than that of the classroom).
6. Classrooms, like families, consist of adult and non-adult positions, but the former have a much larger non-adult membership.

Whatever pupils learn from the didactic efforts of teachers, they also learn something from their participation in a social setting some of whose structural characteristics have been briefly identified. Implicit in this statement are the following assumptions: (a) the tasks, constraints, and opportunities available within social settings vary with the structural properties of those settings; (b) individuals who participate in them derive principles of conduct based on their experiences coping with those tasks, constraints, and opportunities; and (c) the content of the principles learned varies with the nature of the setting. To the question of what is learned in school, only a

hypothetical answer can be offered at this point: pupils learn to accept social norms, or principles of conduct, and to act according to them.²

Social Norms

The concept of social norm has long been important in sociological thinking where it has been treated primarily as a determinant, a prior condition accounting in part for some pattern of behavior: a rule, expectation, sanction, or external constraint; an internal force, obligation, conviction, or internalized standard. Given some pattern of conduct or rate of behavior, sociologists characteristically ask, among other things, whether it represents conformity to or deviation from a norm or whether it is a phenomenon emerging from a situation in which several norms operate. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how norms originate in social settings and how individuals learn them.

Norms are situationally specific standards for behavior: principles, premises, or expectations indicating how individuals in specifiable circumstances *ought* to act. For example, pupils are expected to arrive at school on time. To say that they accept this norm means that: (a) there is such a standard whose existence can be determined independently of pupils' conduct (in this case, the hour they arrive at school); and (b) pupils adhere to the standard in the sense they consider that their actions should be governed by it. Acceptance, then, refers to a self-imposed, acknowledgeable obligation of variable intensity. The content of the norm must be in somebody's mind and communicable by gesture, spoken word, written rule, or sanction.

There are both logical and empirical problems in using the concept "norm."³ First, norm and behavior must be distinguished analytically, for there is a logical circularity in inferring norms from behavior and then using them to account for variations in behavior. Second, norm acceptance and related behavior are empirically distinct; that is, there is a range of behavioral alternatives relative to any norm. Conduct varies, for example, relative both to a given norm and to prevailing conditions, and some norms explicitly acknowledge permissible variation in conduct.⁴

² Several questions pertaining to the connection between the acquisition of norms and the structural properties of social settings are beyond the scope of this paper, and so in places the argument must remain elliptical. For a more detailed discussion, see the writer's forthcoming book: *On What is Learned in School* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley).

³ The empirical problems of identifying norms in a given situation are beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice it to say that identifying them requires that one consider at least the following: verbal statements, behavior, situation, and emotional expressions—none of which when taken alone is sufficient—and the connections among them.

⁴ A variety of conditions can affect the relationship between norm acceptance and behavior. (a) There may be disagreements among persons about what norm applies in a particular situation; behavior where consensus is lacking may not represent conformity to any of the

The Functions of Schooling

Schooling contributes to pupils' learning what the norms are, accepting them, and acting according to them; norm content, acceptance, and behavior can, however, all vary independently. This ostensibly straightforward assertion, however, conceals complexities behind obvious facts. Children leaving the household each day to attend school is an event so familiar that one tends to forget how problematic it is. Herskovits reminds us that "the significance of the distinction between 'schooling' and 'education' is to be grasped when it is pointed out that while every people must train their young, the cultures in which any substantial part of this training is carried on outside the household are few indeed."⁵ The separation of schooling from the household is most characteristic of industrial societies (though not restricted to them), where economic, political, and religious institutions also tend to be independent of the family—independent, that is, in the sense that dominant principles of conduct (social norms) governing relations among kin differ from those governing the conduct of persons in non-familial institutions.

Even though the norms of family life have an important and complex relationship to conduct in non-familial settings, I am concerned here not with that relationship but with aspects of the process by which individuals learn new norms; for when other social institutions in industrial societies have replaced the family as the predominant economic, political, and religious unit and differ from it structurally, principles of conduct appropriate among kin cannot be generalized to them. Since schooling follows a period of life when children are largely dependent on kin, and precedes the period of adulthood when individuals participate as economic producers and citizens, one naturally looks to the school to discover how the addition of new principles of behavior to the psychological repertoire takes place.

Four norms have particular relevance to economic and political participation in industrial societies; those of independence, achievement, universalism, and specificity. I have selected these, not because they form an exhaustive list, but because they are central to the dominant, non-familial activities of adults in American society.⁶ In school, pupils participate in activities

conflicting norms. (b) Behavioral conformity may depend on the explicitly or implicitly conditional nature of norms. For example, although lying is proscribed in principle, there are widely-acknowledged situations in which telling 'white lies' is acceptable. (c) People vary in their desire to conform; they calculate the likelihood and severity of punishment if they do not; they judge the opportunities to conform or deviate; and they determine where their interests lie.

⁵ Melville J. Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 311.

⁶ For technical discussions of the relevance of these norms to industrialism, see Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951) and S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956).

where they are expected to act as if they were conforming to these norms whether they actually accept them at a particular time or not. Through such participation, it is my belief, pupils will in time know their content,⁷ accept them as binding upon themselves, and act in accordance with them in appropriate situations. How schooling contributes to the acquisition of these norms will be discussed in the following pages.

In speaking of independence, achievement, universalism, and specificity as norms, I mean that individuals accept the obligations, respectively: to act by themselves (unless collaborative effort is called for) and accept personal responsibility and accountability for their conduct and its consequences (independence); to perform tasks actively and master the environment according to standards of excellence (achievement); and to acknowledge the right of others to treat them as members of categories often based on a few discrete characteristics rather than on the full constellation of them representing the whole person (universalism and specificity).

In one sense, full adult status, at least for men, requires occupational employment; and one of the outcomes of schooling is employability. The ability to hold a job involves not only adequate physical capacities but the appropriate psychological skills to cope with the demands of work. The requirements of job-holding are multifarious; most occupations, for example, require among other things that individuals assume personal responsibility for the completion and quality of their work and individual accountability for its shortcomings and that they perform their tasks to the best of their ability. Public life, however, extends beyond occupational employment. Although people work in their occupational capacities and in association with others (as clients, patients, customers, parishioners, students, and so on in *their* occupational capacities), they also have non-occupational identities as voters, communicants, petitioners, depositors, applicants, and creditors, to name a few, in which people are classified similarly as members of the same category based on a small number of specific characteristics irrespective of how they differ in other respects.

"The prime social characteristic of modern industrial enterprise," Goode observes, "is that the individual is ideally given a job on the basis of his ability to fulfill its demands, and that this achievement is evaluated universalistically; the same standards apply to all who hold the same job."⁸ Societies in which industrial enterprise is the primary form of economic organization tend to have occupational systems characteristically organized around nor-

⁷ I do not imply that accepting a norm as binding upon oneself implies the ability to formulate its underlying general principle verbally.

⁸ William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 11.

mative principles different from those of kinship units. Some observers, recognizing that individuals must undergo psychological changes of considerable magnitude in order to make the transition from family to economic employment,⁹ have noted yet understated the contribution of schooling. Eisenstadt, for example, in an otherwise penetrating analysis of age-grouping, restricts his treatment of the school's contribution to "adapting the psychological (and to some extent also physiological) learning potential of the child to the various skills and knowledges which must be acquired by him;"¹⁰ his emphasis is too narrowly limited to the cognitive outcomes of schooling. Furthermore, while stressing the transition between family and occupation, most writers have largely ignored the contribution of schooling to the development of psychological capacities necessary for participating in other (non-economic) segments of society. It is my contention that the social experiences available to pupils in schools, by virtue of the nature and sequence of their structural arrangements, provide opportunities for children to learn norms characteristic of several facets of adult public life, occupation being but one.

In the early grades, a formal and prolonged process of separating children from the family begins. It does not involve severing or renouncing kinship ties nor relinquishing the normative principles of family life since most members of society, after all, remain part of some kinship unit throughout most of their lives. Schooling does, however, put demands on pupils to adopt principles of conduct different from those they have come to accept as family members—more precisely, to restrict the premises governing family life to conduct among kinsmen, and to learn new premises that apply to settings outside the family. It is a process in which children learn both to generalize principles of conduct from one setting to another and at the same time to specify what principles are appropriate to which setting.

The Structural Basis of Sanctions

Learning to accept norms and act according to them, like other forms of learning, requires the use of sanctions. In both family and school, patterns of action appropriate to each setting are encouraged and discouraged by rewards and punishments taking the form of both specific, momentary acts and more elaborate patterns of action over time.

I assume that in encouraging and discouraging enduring patterns of be-

⁹ See, for example, Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," in Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, and David M. Schneider, (eds.), *Personality* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 522-31; Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-85. An important exception to this neglect of the importance of schooling is Talcott Parsons' paper, "The School Class as a Social System," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXIX No. 4, 297-318.

¹⁰ Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

havior, a sustained relationship between the parties involved must exist, one that involves more than the reward and punishment of specific acts on a *quid pro quo* basis. In the family, the basis for encouraging and discouraging children's behavior lies in their dependence on parents from earliest childhood and in mutual affection—in effect, the maintenance of a continuous and diffuse relationship based on goodwill. Although rewards for specific acts can replenish the bank of goodwill, it is maintained by gratuitous expressions of concern, friendliness, support, sympathy, encouragement, and the like, not simply as responses to specific acts, but as indications of a more enduring solidarity. Punishment, even if severe, will then mean one thing if administered in the context of sustained affection and another where such feeling is absent.

Problems of reward and punishment confront teachers as well as parents, but the problems differ. First, since children in classrooms outnumber those in families, teachers, because of the limitations on their time and energy, can neither attend to nor sanction each child in the same ways that parents can; they must control a class without sacrificing the school's agenda to the imperatives of keeping order. Second, pupils' school work is customarily sanctioned by means of grades based on the quality of assignments completed. Grades, however, are not inherently rewarding or punishing, at least not at the outset. One critical problem of early elementary schooling is for teachers to establish grades as sanctions; and to the extent that pupils do not learn to accept them as such, grades cannot serve to reward good performance and punish poor. Secondary schools operate on the assumption—not always correct—that pupils have already come to accept the sanctioning quality of grades.

Teaching in the early grades presents a classic problem in the creation of goodwill—finding some appropriate equivalent in the classroom of affection in the family. That is, gratuitous pleasure not tied to specific acts in a relationship of exchange must be created in order to develop in pupils a diffuse and positive attachment both to the teacher and to the school. But the problem of sanctioning does not end with the creation of goodwill and the assignment of grades. The demands of schooling, particularly in the early years, can prove difficult, taxing, and often alien when contrasted with the more protective and indulgent environment of the home. The school day is long; there is much sitting in one place, following orders, completing assigned and not necessarily enjoyable tasks on time; teachers devote less time and interest to each child than parents do—this despite whatever intrinsic pleasures children may find in the school environment. Yet the school must convey to the pupil that certain forms of conduct acceptable at home will be held unacceptable at school, that certain rights he may legitimately claim

from the household will not be honored in the classroom, that however alien they may seem, the tasks that school presents must be confronted and will hopefully come to represent new sources of gratification. To effect such changes, the school must have more resources than grades and goodwill in its kit of sanctions.

Resources available for sanctioning derive initially from two structural characteristics of classrooms: the visibility of pupils and their homogeneity of age. Classrooms are public places in that their membership is collective and visible. Many activities are carried on out loud and in front of everybody (reports, recitations, replies to questions, discussions, praise, chastisement, laughter); pupils perform publicly and are judged openly by the teacher and by other members of the class.¹¹

The similarity of pupils in age is important for at least three reasons. First, age represents an index (even if inexact) of developmental maturity, and by implication, of capacity;¹² and even though children of the same age vary greatly in what they can do, age is still used as a common shorthand to gauge the assignment of tasks, responsibilities, privileges, and the like. Second, it provides classrooms with a built-in standard for comparison, a fixed point indicative of the level of those capacities directly relevant to the activities in which pupils are engaged. Each pupil, then, can be compared and compare himself with all others because the comparisons can be anchored to the standard. Third, it allows each pupil the experience of finding himself in the same boat with others in terms of the characteristics of their social surroundings and in the way they are treated by teachers.

Since many classroom activities are in effect judged in public, the pupil is bombarded with messages telling him how well he has done and—with a short inferential leap—how good he is. If he doesn't take the teacher's word for it, he need only look at the performance of others of the same age and in the same circumstances. The school, in effect, plays on his self-respect. Each pupil is exposed and vulnerable to the judgments of adults in authority and of his equals—those who resemble him in many respects.¹³ If the child at

¹¹ Formal grades, both for assigned work and for general evaluation of performance over several months' time, are customarily given in some degree of privacy; once pupils receive them, whatever confidentiality the teacher maintains in assigning grades usually tends to be short-lived. Pupils themselves turn private into public knowledge, and parents have been known to do the same.

¹² Perhaps the social expectations for and beliefs about the capacities of similar-aged children are narrower than their actual capacities (however these are measured). If so, age is an exaggeratedly "good" index of equal capacity even if the "goodness" represents a self-fulfilling prophesy. There is some controversy about the usefulness of the term "capacity" among psychometricians, but for present purposes, it is beside the point since people often think in terms of children's capacities and act accordingly.

¹³ "Remember that you are as good as any man—and also that you are no better. . . . [But] the man who is as good as his neighbors is in a tough spot when he confronts all of his neigh-

home wonders whether he is loved, the pupil in school wonders whether he is a worthwhile person. In both settings, he can find some kind of answer by observing how others treat him and what they think of him.

Given the standards for and the patterns of behavior that children learn from their family experiences, the schools, in preparing them for adult public life, must effect changes of considerable magnitude, changes that require giving up certain patterns of conduct found gratifying in other settings and adopting new patterns whose gratifications may at best take the form of promissory notes. If knowledge about other forms of socialization is applicable to schooling—and there is no reason in principle why it should not be—the sanctions required must affect people's emotions deeply as is true in some of the most demanding and stressful social situations involving psychological change: psychotherapy, religious conversion, brain-washing, deracination. It is my contention that the emotions aroused in schooling derive from events in which the pupil's sense of self-respect is either supported or threatened, and that school classrooms, permitting the public exposure and judgment of performance against a reasonably fixed reference point (age-adapted tasks), are organized so that the pupil's sense of personal adequacy, or self-respect, becomes the leverage for sanctioning.

Not all sanctions employed in school settings have the potentiality for arousing intense emotions, nor are they similarly diffuse in character. Some, like grades, compliments, admonitions, and chastisements, are contingent upon desirable and undesirable conduct; others, like friendly greetings, gentleness, sympathy, sarcasm, bitchiness, and so on through the whole gamut of words and gestures indicating approval, disapproval, and general attitude are non-contingent. All represent resources at the teacher's disposal—used consciously or unconsciously—and influence whether or not pupils will find their early experiences at school enjoyable enough to act according to its standards.

As suggested earlier, the school provides constraints and opportunities related to its structural properties, the behavior of its members, and its resources available for sanctioning. I have argued that pupils infer principles of conduct on the basis of their experiences in school, that they learn principles underlying the alternative ways of coping with a social situation having a particular set of properties. Over a period of years, they discover which patterns of conduct permit them to cope with the school's constraints and opportunities; and, to the extent that they find that certain patterns of action lead to the successful accomplishment of tasks and bring gratifications,

bors combined." Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1955), p. 56. The opinions of massed equals are not negligible.

they adopt those patterns as the right ways to act—that is, they value them.¹⁴

The Learning of Social Norms

The social properties of schools are such that pupils, by coping with the sequence of classroom tasks and situations, are more likely to learn the principles—social norms—of independence, achievement, universalism, and specificity than if they had remained full-time members of the household.

Independence. Pupils learn to acknowledge that there are tasks to be done by them alone and to do them that way. Along with this self-imposed obligation goes the idea that others have a legitimate right to expect such independent behavior under certain circumstances.¹⁵ Independence has a widely acknowledged though not unequivocal meaning. In using it here I refer to a cluster of meanings: doing things on one's own, being self-reliant, accepting personal responsibility for one's behavior, acting self-sufficiently;¹⁶ and to a way of approaching tasks in whose accomplishment *under different circumstances* one can rightfully expect the help of others. The pupil, when in school, is separated from family members who have customarily provided help, support, and sustenance—persons on whom he has long been dependent.

A constellation of classroom characteristics and both teacher- and pupil-actions shape experiences in which the norm of independence is learned.

¹⁴ For empirical confirmation of the fact that experience in the performance of particular tasks can produce changes in preferences, beliefs, and most importantly in values (norms) and their generalization from one situation to another without verbal instruction in the content of those outcomes, see Paul E. Breer and Edwin A. Locke, *Task Experience as a Source of Attitudes* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1965), especially chapter 6. A statement of the argument of how the actual performance of a task can effect changes in norms—how it *should* be performed—is beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁵ My emphasis here differs from Parsons' in that he views independence primarily as a personal resource: "... It may be said that the most important single predispositional factor with which the child enters the school is his level of independence" (Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 300). Although independence is very likely such a predisposition—whether it is the most important single one is moot—it is part of the school's agenda to further the development of independence to a point beyond the level at which family resources become inadequate to do so.

¹⁶ Winterbottom, for example, lumps independence and mastery together; the indices she uses to measure them involve ostensibly distinct phenomena in that the mastery items refer to tendencies toward activity rather than independence. Marian R. Winterbottom, "The Relation of Need for Achievement to Learning Experiences in Independence and Mastery," in John T. Atkinson (ed.), *Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1958), pp. 453-78. As a definitional guideline for this discussion, I have followed the usage of Bernard C. Rosen and Roy D'Andrade, "The Psychosocial Origins of Achievement Motivation," *Sociometry*, XXII No. 3, 1959, 186, in their discussion of achievement training; also, David C. McClelland, A. Rindlisbacher, and Richard DeCharms, "Religious and Other Sources of Parental Attitudes toward Independence Training," in David C. McClelland (ed.), *Studies in Motivation* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), pp. 389-97.

In addition to the fact that school children are removed from persons with whom they have already formed strong relationships of dependency, the sheer size of a classroom assemblage limits each pupil's claim to personal contact with the teacher, and more so at the secondary levels than at the elementary.¹⁷ This numerical property of classrooms reduces pupils' opportunities for establishing new relationships of dependency with adults and for receiving help from them.

Parents expect their children to act independently in many situations but teachers are more systematic in expecting pupils to adhere to standards of independence in performing academic tasks. There are at least two additional aspects of classroom operation, however, that bear directly on learning the norm of independence: rules about cheating and formal testing. First, as to cheating. The word itself is condemnatory in its reference to illegal and immoral acts. Most commonly, attention turns to how much cheating occurs, who cheats, and why. But these questions are of no concern here (though obviously they are elsewhere). My interest is in a different problem: to what types of conduct is the pejorative "cheating" assigned?

In school, cheating usually refers to acts in which two or more parties participate when the unaided action of only one is expected and pertains primarily to instructional activities. Illegal and immoral acts such as stealing and vandalism, whether carried out by individuals or groups, are not considered cheating because they have no direct connection with the central academic core of school activities. Nor is joint participation categorically proscribed; joint effort is called cooperation or collusion depending upon the teacher's prior definition of the task.

Cheating takes many forms, most of which involve collective effort. A parent and a child may collaborate to produce homework; two pupils may pool their wisdom—or ignorance, as the case may be—in the interest of passing an examination. In both cases, the parties join deliberately; deliberateness, however, is not essential to the definition. One pupil can copy from another without the latter knowing; nor need the second party be a person, as in the case of plagiarism. The use of crib notes, perhaps a limiting case, involves no collusion; it consists, rather, in an illegitimate form of help. These are the main forms of school cheating of which there are many variations, routine to exotic. Thus, actions called cheating are those closely tied to the in-

¹⁷ Thus, the ratios of children per adult in households are 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 in one-, two-, four-, and six-child families, respectively, with two parents present; comparatively few families have more than six children. In classrooms, the ratios of different children per adult at the elementary and secondary levels are approximately 28.1 and 155.8, respectively; *The American Public School Teacher, 1960-61*, Research Monograph 1963-M2, Research Division, National Education Association, April, 1963, p. 51.

structional goals of the school and usually involving assisted performance when unaided performance is expected.

The irony of cheating *in school* is that the same kinds of acts are morally acceptable and even commendable in other situations. One friend assisting another in distress, a parent helping a child—both praiseworthy; if one lacks the information to do a job, the resourceful thing is to look it up. In effect, many school activities called cheating are those in which customary forms of support and assistance in the family and among friends are expected.

In one obvious sense, school rules against cheating are designed to establish the content of moral standards. In another sense, the school attaches the stigma of immorality to certain types of behavior for social as distinct from ethical reasons; namely, to change the character of prevailing social relationships in which children are involved. In the case of homework, the school, in effect, attempts to redefine the relationship between parents and children by proscribing one form of parental support, unproblematic in other circumstances. The teacher has no direct control over parents, but tries to influence them at a distance by asking their adherence to a principle clothed in moral language whose violations are punishable. The line between legitimate parental support (encouraged when it takes the form of parents stressing the importance of school and urging their children to do well) and collusion is unclear; but by morally proscribing parental intervention beyond a certain point, the teacher attempts to limit the child's dependence upon family members in doing his school work. He expects the pupil, in other words, to work independently. The same argument applies to pupils and their friends: the teacher attempts to eliminate those parts of friendship that make it difficult or impossible for him to discover what a pupil can do on his own. In relationships with kin and friends, the customary sources of support in times of adversity, the school intervenes by restricting solidarity and, in the process, determines what the pupil can accomplish unaided. The pupil, for his part, discovers which of his actions he is held accountable for individually within the confines of tasks set by the school.

The comparison between schooling and occupational employment for which school is intended as preparation provides indirect support for this argument. The question here is the sense in which school experience is preparatory. Usually workers are not restricted in seeking help on problems confronting them; on the contrary, many occupations provide resources specifically intended to be helpful: arrangements for consultation, libraries, access to more experienced colleagues, and so on. Only in rare situations are people expected not to enlist the aid of family and friends in matters pertaining to work where that aid is appropriate. In other words, activities on the job analogous to school work do not carry comparable restrictions. Required,

however, is that people in their occupational activities accept individual responsibility and accountability for the performance of assigned and self-initiated tasks. To the extent that the school contributes to the development of independence, the preparation lies more in the development of a frame of mind to act independently than in a vocationalism consisting of the capacity to perform a certain range of tasks without help.

Second, as to testing, and particularly the use of achievement tests. Most important for independence are the social conditions designed for the *administration* of tests, not their content or format. By and large, pupils are tested under more or less rigorously controlled conditions. At one end of the spectrum, formal, standardized tests are administered most stringently: pupils are physically separated, and the testing room is patrolled by proctors whose job is to discover contraband and to guarantee that no communication occurs—these arrangements being designed so that each examination paper represents independent work. At the other end, some testing situations are more informal, less elaborately staged, although there is almost always some provision that each pupil's work represents the product of only his own efforts.¹⁸

Testing represents an approach to establishing the norm of independence different from the proscription against cheating even though both are designed to reduce the likelihood of joint effort. Whereas the rules against cheating are directed more toward delineating the form of appropriate behavior, the restrictions built into the testing situation provide physical constraints intended to guarantee that teachers will receive samples of work that pupils do unassisted; the restrictions, that is, bear more on the product than on the motive. Actually, unless they stipulate otherwise, teachers expect pupils to do most of their everyday work by themselves; daily assignments provide opportunities for and practice in independent work. Tests, because they occur at less frequent intervals than ordinary assignments, cannot provide comparably frequent opportunities; by the elaborate trappings of their administration, particularly with college entrance exams, and the anxiety they provoke, they symbolize the magnitude of the stakes.

It may be objected that in emphasizing independence I have ignored cooperation since an important item on the school agenda is instructing pupils in the skills of working with others. Teachers do assign work to groups and expect a collaborative product—and to this extent require the subordination of independent to collective efforts; judging the product according to collective standards, however, is another question.

¹⁸ By describing the conditions surrounding the administration of tests, I do not thereby attempt to justify these procedures; other means might accomplish the same ends.

To evaluate the contribution of each member of a working team, the teacher must either judge the quality of each one's work, in effect relying on the standard of independence, or rate each contribution according to the quality of the total product. The latter procedure rests on the assumption that each member has contributed equally, an untenable assumption if one has carried the rest or if a few have carried a weak sister. That occurrences of this kind are usually considered "unfair" suggests the normative priority of independence and the simple fact of life in industrial societies that institutions of higher learning and employers want to know how well each person can do and put constraints on the schools to find out. Thus, although the school provides opportunities for pupils to gain experience in cooperative situations, in the last analysis it is the individual assessment that counts.

Achievement. Pupils come to accept the premise that they should perform their tasks the best they can, and act accordingly. The concept of achievement, like independence, has several referents. It usually denotes activity and mastery, making an impact on the environment rather than fatalistically accepting it, and competing against some standard of excellence. Analytically, the concept should be distinguished from independence since, among other differences, achievement criteria can apply to activities performed collectively.

Much of the recent literature treats achievement in the context of child-rearing within the family, as if achievement motivation were primarily a product of parental behavior.¹⁰ Even though there is reason to believe that early childhood experiences in the family do contribute to its development, classroom experiences also contribute through teachers' use of resources beyond those ordinarily at the command of family members.

Classrooms are organized around a set of core activities in which a teacher assigns tasks to pupils and evaluates and compares the quality of their work. In the course of time, pupils differentiate themselves according to how well they perform a variety of tasks, most of which require the use of symbolic skills. Achievement standards are not limited in applicability to the classroom nor is their content restricted to cognitive areas. Schools afford opportunities for participation in a variety of extra-curricular activities, most conspicuously, athletics, but also music, dramatics, and a bewildering array of club and small group activities appealing to individual interests and talents.

¹⁰ See, for example, Winterbottom, *op. cit.*, pp. 453-78; Rosen and D'Andrade, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-218; and Fred L. Strodbeck, "Family Interaction, Values, and Achievement," in David C. McClelland et al., *Talent and Society* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1958), pp. 135-91.

The direct relevance of classroom work to learning achievement standards is almost self-evident; the experience is built into the assignment-performance-evaluation sequence of the work. Less evident, however, is that classroom activities force pupils to cope with various degrees of success and failure both of which can be psychologically problematic. Consistently successful performance requires that pupils deal with the consequences of their own excellence in a context of peer-equality in non-academic areas. For example, they confront the dilemma inherent in surpassing their age-mates in some respects but depending on their friendship and support in others, particularly in out-of-school social activities. The classroom thus provides not only the achievement experience itself but by-products of it, taking the form of the dilemma just described.

Similarly, pupils whose work is consistently poor not only must participate in activities leading to their academic failure but also experience living with that failure. They adopt various modes of coping with this, most of which center around maintaining personal self-respect in the face of continuing assaults upon it. Probably a minority succeed or fail consistently; a large proportion, most likely, do neither one consistently, but nonetheless worry about not doing well. Schooling, then, affords most pupils the experiences of both winning and losing; and to the extent that they gain some modicum of gratification from academic activities they learn to accept the general expectation of approaching their work with an achievement frame of mind. At the same time, they learn how to cope in a variety of ways, and more or less well, with success and failure.

Failure is perhaps the more difficult because it requires acknowledgement that the premise of achievement, to which failure itself can be attributed in part, is a legitimate principle for governing one's actions. Yet, endemic to industrial societies in which many facets of public life are based on achievement principles are situations that constrain people to live with personal failure; political defeat and occupational non-promotion being two cases in point.

As already suggested, the school provides a broader range of experiences than those restricted to the classroom and academic in nature; these experiences are based similarly on achievement criteria but differ in several important respects. The availability of alternatives to academic performance means that a pupil can experience success in achievement-oriented activities even if he lacks the requisite talents for doing well in the classroom.

How these alternative activities differ from those of the classroom is as important as the fact that they do, as evidenced by the case of athletics. Competitive sports resemble classroom activities in that both provide participants with the chance to demonstrate individual excellence; however, the former

—and this is more true of team than individual sports—permit collective responsibility for defeat whereas the latter by and large allow only individual responsibility for failure. That is to say, the chances of receiving personal gratification for success are at least as great in sports as in the classroom, while the assault on personal self-respect for failure is potentially less intense. Athletics should not be written off as a manifestation of mere adolescent non-intellectualism as several recent writers have so treated it.²⁰

A similar contention holds for music and dramatics; both provide the potentiality for individual accomplishment and recognition but without the persistent, systematic, and potentially corrosive evaluation typical of the classroom. Finally, in various club activities based on interest and talent, a pupil can do the things he is good at in the company of others who share an appreciation for them. In all these situations, either the rigors of competition and judgment characteristic of the classroom are mitigated; or the activity in question has its own built-in sources of support and personal protection, not to the same extent as in the family, but more than is available in the crucible of the classroom.

The school provides a wider variety of achievement experiences than does the family but at the same time has fewer resources for supporting and protecting pupils' self-respect in the face of failure. As pupils proceed through successive school levels, the rigors of achievement increase at least for those who continue along the main academic line. Moreover, at the secondary levels the number of activities governed according to the achievement principle increases as does the variety of these activities. As preparation for adult public life in which the application of this principle is widespread, schooling contributes to personal development in assuring that the majority of pupils not only will have performed tasks according to the achievement standard but will have had experience in an expanding number of situations in which activities are organized according to it.

Universalism and Specificity. Unlike independence and achievement, universalism and specificity are not commonly regarded as good things. Parents and teachers admonish children to act independently and to do their work well; few of them support the idea that people should willingly acknowledge their similarity to others in specifically categorical terms while ignoring obvious differences—denying, in a sense, their own individuality.

Ideologically, social critics have deplored the impersonal, ostensibly de-

²⁰ For one attempt to treat athletics condescendingly as anti-intellectualism, see James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). I do not suggest that athletics has an as yet undiscovered intellectual richness; rather, that its contribution should not be viewed simply in terms of intellectuality.

humanizing aspects of categorization, a principle widely believed to lie at the heart of the problem of human alienation—the attachment of man to machine, the detachment of man from man. Often ignored, however, is the connection between this principle and the idea of fairness, or equity. Seen from this vantage point, categorization is widely regarded as a good thing, especially when contrasted to nepotism, favoritism, and arbitrariness. People resent the principle when they think they have a legitimate reason to receive special consideration, or when their individuality appears to vanish by being “processed.” Yet, when a newcomer breaks into a long queue instead of proceeding to the end of the line, they usually condemn him for acting unfairly (for not following the standard rule for all newcomers to a line) and do *not* express any sense of their own alienation (for abiding by the same categorical principle). The contrasts between individuality and dehumanization, fairness and special privilege, are similarly predicated of universalism and specificity; they differ in the ideological posture of the observer, and, more cynically, in his conception of self-interest.

The concepts of universalism and specificity have been formulated most comprehensively by Parsons, though only part of his formulation pertains directly to this discussion. As part of his concern with social systems, Parsons views universalism as one horn of a dilemma—the other being particularism—in role definition; under what circumstances does the occupant of one social position govern his actions by adopting one standard or the other in dealing with the occupant of another position? My concern, however, is not with a selection among alternative, conflicting standards but with the conditions under which individuals learn to accept the obligation to impose the standards of universalism and specificity upon themselves and to act accordingly.

Defining the central theme of universalism raises problems because the term has various meanings, not all of them clear.²¹ The relevant distinction here is whether individuals are treated as members of categories or as special cases. In one respect or another, an individual can always be viewed as a member of one or more categories; he is viewed particularistically if, notwithstanding his similarity to others in the same category or circumstances, he still receives special treatment.²²

²¹ Although Parsons, in *The Social System*, p. 62, considers universalism and particularism to form a dichotomy, he distinguishes them on at least two dimensions: cognitive and cathectic:

The primacy of cognitive values may be said to imply a *universalistic* standard, while that of appreciative values implies a *particularistic* standard. In the former case the standard is derived from the validity of a set of existential ideas, or the generality of a normative rule. In the latter from the particularity of the cathectic significance of an object or of the status of an object in a relational system.

²² The treatment of others does not become more particularistic as an increasing number

The norm of specificity is easily confused with universalism despite its distinctiveness. It refers to the scope of one person's interest in another; to the obligation to confine one's interest to a narrow range of characteristics and concerns, or to extend them to include a broad range.²³ Implicit is the notion of relevance; the characteristics and concerns that should be included in the range, whether broad or narrow, are those considered relevant in terms of the activities in which the persons in question are involved. Doctors and storekeepers, for example, differ in the scope of their interest in persons seeking their services, but the content of their interests also varies according to the nature of the needs and desires of those persons.

It is my contention that the school's contribution to children's accepting these norms that penetrate so many areas of public life is critical because children's preschool experience in the family is weighted heavily on the side of special treatment and parental consideration of the whole child.

To say that children learn the norm of universalism means that they come to accept being treated by others as members of categories (*in addition to* being treated as special cases, as in the family). Schools provide a number of experiences that families cannot readily provide because of limitations in their social composition and structure, one of which is the systematic establishment and demarcation of membership categories. First, by assigning all pupils in a classroom the same or similar tasks to perform, teachers in effect make them confront the same set of demands; and even if there are variations in task content, class members still confront the same teacher and the obligations he imposes. Second, parity of age creates a condition of homogeneity according to developmental stage, a rough equalization of pupil capacities making it possible for teachers to assign similar tasks. Third, through the process of yearly promotion from grade to grade, pupils cross the boundaries separating one age category from another. With successive boundary crossings comes the knowledge that each age-grade category is associated with particular circumstances (e.g., teachers, difficulty of tasks, subject matter studied); moreover, pupils learn the relationship between categories and how their present positions relate to past and future positions by virtue of having experienced the transitions between them. In these three ways, the

of categories is taken into account. If age, sex, religion, ethnicity, and the like—all examples of general categories—are considered, treatment is still categorical in nature because it is oriented to categorical similarities, even if they number more than one, and not to what is special or unique about the person or about a relationship in which he is involved.

²³ In the case of specificity, "the burden of proof rests on him who would suggest that ego has obligations vis-à-vis the object in question which transcend this specificity of relevance" (Parsons, *The Social System*, p. 65). In the case of diffuseness, "the burden of proof is on the side of the exclusion of an interest or mode of orientation as outside the range of obligations defined by the role-expectation" (*Ibid.*, p. 66).

grade—more specifically, the classroom within the grade—with its age-homogeneous membership and clearly demarcated boundaries provides a basis for categorical grouping that the family cannot readily duplicate. Most important, as a by-product of repeated boundary-crossing, pupils acquire a relativity of perspective, a capacity to view their own circumstances from other vantage points, having themselves occupied them.²⁴

Although each child holds membership in the category "children" at home, parents, in raising them, tend to take age differences into account and thereby accentuate the uniqueness of each child's circumstances and to belie in some measure the categorical aspects of "childhood." However, even if the category "children" breaks into its age-related components within the family, it remains intact when children compare themselves with friends and neighbors of the same age. In typical situations of this kind, children inform their parents that friends of the same age have greater privileges or fewer responsibilities than they. Parents, if they cannot actually equalize the circumstances, often explain or justify the disparity by pointing to the special situation of the neighbor family: they have more money, fewer children, a bigger house—whatever the reason; that is, parents point out the uniqueness of family circumstances and thereby emphasize the particularities of each child's situation. The school, in contrast, provides the requisite circumstances for making comparisons among pupils in categorical rather than particular terms.

The second school experience fostering the establishment of social categories is the re-equalization of pupils by means of the high-school track system after they have differentiated themselves through academic achievement in the lower grades, a mechanism that reduces the likelihood that teachers will have to deal with special cases.²⁵ Teachers with a variegated batch of pupils must adopt more individualized methods of instruction than those whose pupils are similar in their level of achievement, and who in so doing would partially recreate a kinship-type of relationship with pupils, treating segments of the class differently according to differences in capacity much as parents treat their children differently according to age-related capacities.

As far as level is concerned, the high school is a better place to learn the

²⁴ For a discussion of relativity of perspective, empathy, and parochialism in the context of the economic and political development of nations, see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), pp. 43-75 and *passim*.

²⁵ The secondary school track system by which pupils are segregated according to academic achievement has conventionally been interpreted as a distributive device for directing pupils toward one or another broad segment of the occupational hierarchy. Although the distributive or allocative function of the track system has pre-empted most discussions, it should not be regarded as the only function; in fact, a very different view of it is taken here.

principle of universalism than the lower school levels because pupils within each track, and therefore of roughly similar capacity, move from classroom to classroom, in each one receiving instruction in a different subject area from a different teacher. They discover that over a range of activities they are treated alike and that relatively uniform demands and criteria of evaluation are applied to them. That is to say, by providing instruction from different teachers in different subject matter areas and by at the same time applying criteria for judging performance and task difficulty which remain roughly constant within each track and across subjects, the school makes it possible for pupils to learn which differences in experience are subordinated to the principle of categorization. The elementary classroom, oriented more to instruction in different subjects by a single teacher, does not provide the necessary variations in persons and subjects for a clear-cut demonstration of the categorical principle.

Although the idea of categorization is central to the norm of universalism, there are additional and derivative aspects of it. One is the crucial distinction, widely relevant in industrial society, between the person and the social position he occupies. A frequent demand made on individuals is to treat others and be treated by them according to the identity that their positions confer rather than according to who they are as people. Schooling contributes to the capacity to make the distinction (and the obligation to do so) by making it possible for pupils to discover that different individuals can occupy a single social position but act in ways that can be discovered as attached to the position rather than to the different persons filling it. Even though all members of a given classroom find themselves in the same circumstances, are about equal in age, and resemble each other, roughly, in social characteristics related to residence, they still differ in many respects—sex, race, ethnicity, and physical characteristics being among the most obvious. Their situation, therefore, provides the experience of finding that common interests and shared circumstances are assigned a priority that submerges obvious personal differences. The same contention holds for adults. Male and female adults are found in both school and family settings; in school, pupils can discover that an increasingly large number of different adults of both sexes can occupy the same position, that of "teacher." This discovery is not as easily made in the family because it is not possible to determine definitively whether "parent" represents two positions, one occupied by a male, the other by a female, or a single position with two occupants differing in sex.²⁶ The school, in other words, makes it possible for pupils

* Children are not left completely without clues in this matter since they do have other adult relatives who can be seen as distinct persons occupying the same position. Yet, families, even of the extended variety, do not provide the frequent and systematic comparisons characteristic of schooling.

to distinguish between persons and the social positions they occupy—a capacity crucially important in both occupational and political life—by placing them in situations where both the similarities between persons in a single position are made evident and the membership of each position is varied in its composition.

Regarding the norm of specificity, again the school provides structural arrangements more conducive to its acquisition than does the family. First, since the number of persons and the ratio of non-adults to adults is much larger in classrooms than in the household, the school provides large social aggregates in which pupils can form many casual associations (in addition to their close friendships), in which they invest but a small portion of themselves. As both the size and heterogeneity of the student body increase at each successive level, the opportunities for these somewhat fragmented social contacts increase and diversify. The relative shallowness and transiency of these relationships increase the likelihood that pupils will have experiences in which the fullness of their individuality is *not* involved as it tends to be in their relationships among kin and close friends.

Second, upon leaving the elementary school and proceeding through the departmentalized secondary levels, pupils form associations with teachers who have a progressively narrowing and specialized interest in them. (This comes about both because of subject matter specialization itself and because the number of pupils each teacher faces in the course of a day also grows larger.) Although it is true that children, as they grow older, tend to form more specific relationships with their parents—symptomatically, this trend manifests itself in adolescents' complaints of parental invasions of privacy—the resources of the school in providing the social basis for establishing relationships in which only narrow segments of personality are invested far exceed those of the family.

A second facet of universalism is the principle of equity, or fairness (I use the terms interchangeably). When children compare their lot—their gains and losses, rewards and punishments, privileges and responsibilities—with that of others and express dissatisfaction about their own, they have begun to think in terms of equity; their punishments are too severe, chores too onerous, allowance too small compared, for example, to those of siblings and friends. Children's comparisons with siblings, who are almost always different in age, usually prompt parents to resolve the sensed inequities by equalizing age hypothetically. "If you were as young as he, you wouldn't have to shovel the walk either." "He is only a child and doesn't know any better." The pained questions to which these statements are replies are familiar enough.

Among children in a family, age is critical in determining what is fair and

unfair.²⁷ In a sense, it is the clock by which we keep developmental time, changing constantly though not periodically. The personal significance of age is heightened among children because any given age difference between them is "larger" the younger they are. Thus, the difference between a four-year-old and an eight-year-old is "greater" than that between a fourteen-year-old and an eighteen-year-old because, on the average, there are greater developmental changes occurring during the earlier four-year span than during the later one. When life's circumstances change rapidly, when one is still in the process of learning what is one's due and what is due others, and when younger children do not have to fight the battles that older ones have already won, determining whether one is being treated fairly on any given occasion can be difficult.

Among young children, then, age provides a variable standard for judging questions of equity, a more fixed standard among older ones.²⁸ In the context of the transition between childhood and adulthood, two children *within the same family* (except if they are twins), cannot easily settle a question of equity by referring to their ages—they may acknowledge that the older child is entitled to more, but not how much more—because they differ in age, because the meaning of age differences changes, and because there can be disagreement over the coefficient for converting age units into units of gain and loss.

In school classrooms, the age of children is nearly constant; the problem of settling equity questions attributable to age variations found in families does not arise. Teachers cannot treat all pupils identically, but they can use age similarity as a guide for assigning similar instructional tasks to all members of a class and to communicate, implicitly or explicitly, that they all share the same situation together.

Even though age differences found in the family (and their associated problems of equity) are not present, problems of fairness and unfairness do arise in classrooms; they originate when pupils who are supposed to be treated similarly are not so treated. Grades, for example, according to the

²⁷ There are, of course, events in family life where the explanation that renders inequities fair lies not in age but in circumstances—"Your brother could stay home from school and watch television because he was sick (and you weren't)"—and in other personal characteristics besides age, such as sex—"It isn't safe for girls to walk home alone at that hour (but it's O.K. for your brother)."

²⁸ The contrast between age as a constant and as a variable in questions of equity is evident by comparison with Homans' treatment of age: "One of the ways in which two men may be 'like' one another is in their investments [age being one]. Accordingly the more nearly one man is like another in age, the more apt he is to expect their net rewards to be equal and to display anger when his own are less." In the context of this statement, age is the fixed criterion for assessing the fairness of rewards as one man compares his gain with that of another. George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 75.

usual procedure, must be assigned according to the quality of work completed; equivalent products should receive the same grade. Marking similar work differently, or unequal work the same, represents unfair grading; a similar principle holds for the punishment of offenses—the punishment should fit the crime, and similar forms of misbehavior should be treated alike—and for the assignment of tasks and responsibilities according to difficulty and onerousness. But there are secondary considerations that enter the process of evaluating performance: how hard pupils work and how much they have improved. These criteria cannot readily replace quality of performance unless teachers, pupils, and parents are willing to acknowledge the justice of various anomalies (so defined, at least, within the scope of American values): for example, pupils who do excellent work with little effort receiving lower grades than those who produce mediocre work through feverish activity.

The contrast between classroom and family is pronounced. Equity in the former is based by and large on how well pupils perform and how they are treated in a setting whose characteristics are alike for all. From the vantage point of an outside observer, objective conditions within the classroom are similar for each pupil as are the tasks assigned; pupils, in other words, find themselves in the same boat. Within the family, on the other hand, each child rides his own boat, and judgments about equity derive from that fact.

As argued earlier, equity involves a comparative assessment of one's circumstances: gains and losses, rewards and punishments, rights and duties, privileges and responsibilities. To determine whether his circumstances in a given situation are equitable, an individual must learn to make comparisons by which he can discover whose circumstances resemble his own and whose do not, who is treated like him and who is not; he must also discover the relationships between his circumstances and the way he is treated.

Schooling, then, through the structural properties of classrooms at each school level and through teachers' treatment of pupils, provides opportunities for making the comparisons relevant for defining questions of equity far more effectively than does the family. The process is similar to that (above described) of learning the norm of universalism in general. Both within the classroom and within each grade, age and, to a lesser extent, other personal and social characteristics provide a basis for discovering both similarities and differences in categorical terms. The existence of grade levels, distinguished primarily by the demandingness of work and demarcated by the device of yearly promotion, and the progression of pupils through them year by year make it possible for children to learn that *within the context of the school* certain qualities that determine their uniqueness as persons become subordinated to those specific characteristics in which they are alike. Thus, fourth and fifth graders, despite their individuality, are judged accord-

ing to specific criteria of achievement; and the content and difficulty of their assigned tasks are regulated according to the developmental considerations symbolized by grade. The fourth grader having completed the third grade can grasp the idea that he belongs to a category of persons whose circumstances differ from those of persons belonging to another.

Family relationships are not organized on a cohort basis nor do they entail anything comparable to the systematic, step-by-step progression of grades in which the boundaries between one category and another are clearly demarcated. Although a child knows the difference between family members and non-members and can distinguish even the categorical distinctions within his own family, his experiences in a kinship setting do not allow him to find as clear an answer to the question of whether his circumstances are uniquely his own or whether they are shared. In other words, these relationships are not structured in such a way as to form a basis for making the categorical comparisons basic to the universalistic norm. Specifically, they provide little or no basis for the repeated experience of crossing boundaries from one category to another so important for learning to make the comparisons involved in judgments of equity. Moreover, since parents treat their children more in terms of the full range of personal characteristics—that is, according to the norm of diffuseness rather than that of specificity—the family setting is more conducive to the special rather than the categorical treatment of each child (since the boundaries of a category are more clearly delineated if one characteristic, not many, constitutes the basis of categorization).

A Conceptual Caveat

The argument of this paper rests on the assumption that schools, through their structural arrangements and the behavior patterns of teachers, provide pupils with certain experiences unavailable in other social settings and that these experiences, by virtue of their peculiar characteristics, represent conditions conducive to the acquisition of norms. I have indicated how pupils learn the norms of independence, achievement, universalism, and specificity as outcomes of the schooling process. A critical point, however, is how the relationship between experience and outcome is formulated.

There is no guarantee that pupils will come to accept the four norms simply because these experiences are available;²⁰ for example, they may lack the necessary social and psychological support from sources outside of school or sufficient inner resources to cope with the demands of schooling. These are reasons external to the school situation and may be sufficient to preclude

²⁰ Nor should one conclude that these experiences contribute to the learning of only the four norms discussed here and no others.

both instructional and normative outcomes. Forces internal to the schooling process itself, however, may be equally preclusive since the same activities and sanctions from which some pupils derive the gratification and enhancement of self-respect necessary for both types of outcome may create experiences that threaten the self-respect of others. Potentialities for success and failure inhere in tasks performed according to achievement criteria. Independence manifests itself as competence and autonomy in some, as a heavy burden of responsibility in others. Universalistic treatment represents fairness to some, cold impersonality to others. Specificity may be seen as situational relevance or personal neglect.

Within industrial societies, where norms applicable to public life differ markedly from those governing conduct among kin, schools provide a sequence of experiences in which individuals, during the early stages of personality development, acquire new principles of conduct, principles instituting additions to those already accepted during early childhood. The family, as a social setting with characteristic social arrangements, lacks the resources and the "competence"⁸⁰ to effect the psychological transition for reasons earlier enumerated in detail. This is not to say that only the school can produce these changes. Of those institutions having some claim over the lives of children and adolescents in industrial societies—the family, child labor, job apprenticeship, mass media, tutoring, the church—only the schools at the present time provide adequate, though not always effective, task experiences, sanctions, and arrangements for the generalization and specification of normative principles throughout the many spheres of public life.

It is conceivable, of course, that families (and these other institutions as well as some yet to be invented) can provide the experiences necessary for the acquisition of these norms; family life provides opportunities for achievement, for assuming individual responsibility, and for categorical and specific treatment, yet it is more likely than schools to provide experiences that also undermine the acquisition of these norms. The crucial consideration is the relationship between structural arrangements and activities in determining whether one setting or another is more conducive to producing a given outcome, for if two activities interfere with each other or if the situation is inappropriate to the performance of an activity, the outcome is unlikely to appear.

An Ideological Caveat

Although I construe them as norms, independence and achievement have been regarded by many observers of the American scene as dominant cul-

⁸⁰ For a discussion of competence as an organizational characteristic, see Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1957), pp. 38-56.

tural themes or values—general standards of what is desirable.³¹ In view of this, it is important that the argument of this paper not be taken as a defense of national values, although it should not surprise anyone that the normative commitments of individuals who have passed through American schools are generally though not invariably consistent with national values. The main purpose of this analysis was to present a formulation, hypothetical in nature, of how schooling contributes to the emergence of certain psychological outcomes, not to provide an apology or justification for those outcomes on ideological grounds. I have avoided calling universalism and specificity cultural values, even though both are norms, since few if any observers include them among the broad moral principles desirable in American life. Their exclusion from the list of values should further confirm the analytic and non-apologetic intent of this discussion.³²

Having the means to produce a desired result is not the same thing as an injunction to use them in producing it. Of the many considerations entering into the decision to employ available resources in creating even widely valued outcomes, the probable costs involved should give pause. For the norms in question here, whose desirability can be affirmed either on ideological grounds or in terms of their relevance to public life in an industrial society, conditions conducive to their development are also conducive to the creation of results widely regarded as undesirable. Thus, a sense of accomplishment and mastery, on the one hand, and a sense of incompetence and ineffectualness, on the other, both represent psychological consequences of continually coping with tasks on an achievement basis. Similarly with independence: self-confidence and helplessness can each derive from a person's self-imposed obligation to work unaided and to accept individual responsibility for his actions. Finally, willingness to acknowledge the rightness of categorical and specific treatment may mean the capacity to adapt to a variety of social situations in which only a part of one's self is invested, or it may mean a sense of personal alienation and isolation from human relationships.

From the viewpoint of ideological justification, the process of schooling is problematic in that outcomes morally desirable from one perspective are undesirable from another; and in the making of school policy the price to be paid must be a salient consideration in charting a course of action.

³¹ For a general discussion of the concept of "value" and of major American cultural themes, see Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 397-470.

³² The hypothetical nature of this discussion should be kept in mind especially since there has been no empirical demonstration of the relationships between schooling and the acceptance of norms.

The author discusses his reservations about possible outcomes of proposed secondary school courses in religion. He argues that given present legal, social, and curricular constraints, expectations for such courses should be modest at best.

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Teaching About Religion: Some Reservations*

In this paper I will assume that the teaching of religion in the public schools is unconstitutional, and with this premise I want to consider in what ways, other than the straightforward indoctrination that is thus excluded, religion might figure in the instructional programs of the public schools. Specifically, I wish to make a number of points that have a bearing on the desirability and feasibility of two somewhat different kinds of academic work concerned with religion. One of these would consist of courses devoted, either partly or wholly, to the imparting of information about the major world religions; and I am assuming that both the doctrinal content and the history and sociology of these religions would be taken up in such courses. The second kind of academic work concerned with religion would be primarily designed to enable students to develop a measure of understanding of what might be called the religious aspect of human life, i.e. the features of our situation as human beings that perennially inspire one form or another of religious affirmation. Such an understanding would presumably be gained

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by analyses of typical expressions of religious thought and feeling which might be drawn from a variety of sources, among them imaginative literature, biography, and the literature of devotion.

The premise noted above is one which seems to me to be justified both on the ground that it accurately reflects the effective legal situation in which we find ourselves and on the further ground that such a limitation is in keeping with the general spirit and principles of a pluralistic and democratic society as I understand them. With respect to the two proposed methods of introducing a consideration of religion into the academic work of the public schools, my general feeling is that there can be no objection of principle to either one and that in certain circumstances there might be a good prospect that the introduction of work along the lines described above would prove both successful and beneficial. At the same time, however, I am strongly convinced that teaching *about* religion can be successful only if certain prior conditions are satisfied and if our expectations as to the kinds of benefits that would follow from such instruction are realistic. Because I do not feel at all sure, on the basis of such public discussions of this matter as I have followed, that these qualifications are either widely understood or accepted, I propose to devote my paper to a statement of them. Thus, while I may appear at the outset to be giving a general endorsement to proposals for teaching about religion that are currently being advanced, it will become clear, I think, in the course of my discussion, that I do not share either the motives or the expectations of the most vocal sponsors of such programs. Whether a program of teaching about religion to which the reservations I will propose are attached would be of any interest to the latter is a question I will leave until the end.

Let me begin by considering the proposal for academic work that would give young people some basic and accurate information about the major religious communions and their traditions. Quite clearly, this is an application to the elementary and secondary levels of an idea—that of courses in comparative religion—which has enjoyed considerable success in our colleges and universities for some years. It will be useful, therefore, to remind ourselves that the historical and sociological study of religion treats religion simply as one aspect of human culture without any presuppositions as to the validity of the epistemic claims that such religions typically make. No doubt such studies have on occasion been pursued in an atmosphere of enthusiastic religious affirmation; and no doubt, in order to seem worthwhile at all, they must rest on some assumptions as to the importance of religious beliefs and practices within human life itself and for the purposes of a comprehensive understanding of human history and society. Nevertheless, I think it would be widely agreed that these studies really prosper only when they are pur-

sued in rigorous isolation from all forms of religious partisanship and with a high degree of that scholarly objectivity that cleaves unflinchingly to the truth, even when the interests of piety and edification might seem to suggest in its place a certain saving vagueness. I mention this only because I am strongly convinced that we must ask ourselves whether, in transferring this kind of teaching about religion to the lower schools, we are also prepared to have religion discussed there with the same degree of objectivity and freedom that we expect and often get in our colleges. Are we prepared for example to have both St. Francis and Dr. Verwoerd recognized as men who believed themselves to be acting in obedience to the will of God? I do not cite this example because I believe it must somehow shake the faith of persons with religious beliefs, but because I fear that there may be many who think that it would and who will therefore insist that only certain approved and respectable examples of religiously inspired lives be presented to young children.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, let me say that I have no objection at all to the selectiveness and simplification that are characteristic of the stories told to children in the context of genuine religious instruction. What I *am* concerned to point out is the fact that teaching about religion is a quite different sort of undertaking, in which different standards must be applied. I feel very strongly that this distinction with all its implications must be faced before a decision is made to go ahead with a program of teaching about religion. Nothing could be more undesirable than that such teaching should turn out to be no more than a disguised and nonsectarian form of indoctrination in behalf of a diluted and nondescript theism. The history and present reality of religion as an aspect of human culture are just too variegated to lend themselves to any form of instruction premised on the simpleminded assumption that religion is somehow a "good thing." If the ethos that inspires programs of the kind we are considering is to be that of those unpaid television commercials which unctuously instruct us to attend the church of our choice next Sunday, it would be best that the whole project should be abandoned at the outset.

In raising this question I have implicitly posed the first condition which, in my view, must be satisfied before a program of teaching about religion is undertaken. This is simply that we must be prepared to look at religion as a human and historical reality through secular glasses and without ulterior motives of prettification or edification. To many, "secular glasses" imply hostile eyes; and it is often argued that a treatment of religion that bypasses the ultimate issues of the truth or validity of the claims about man and the world that religions make inevitably expresses a skeptical attitude with respect to the possibility of any rational adjudication of these matters. It is not

possible within the compass of this paper to deal adequately with the issues raised by this objection. Here I would only note that such issues as these need not impinge very directly on the kind of instruction that I have in mind. What young people need and what can surely be given them without any great complications arising is simply certain quite rudimentary, clear, and accurate elements of information about the beliefs, traditions, and practices of major religious groups in their own society and elsewhere. If they do not have this kind of information, they will be condemned to live in that extraordinary miasma of myth, fantasy, and downright malicious falsehood that still obscures from us the human reality of so many lives that are lived under different religious auspices from our own. Surely such information can be imparted in a direct and helpful way without there being any need for elaborate precautions on the part of the teacher to avoid the appearance of either endorsement or skepticism. The students themselves can of course be expected to try to push teachers into all sorts of discussions bearing on the truth or morality of this or that tenet of a specific faith, but it does not seem to me to be beyond the powers of a reasonably good teacher to avoid such involvements without seeming—or being—either cowardly or dense. The point is that the story of the religious life and development of a people is deeply interesting simply in human terms without raising questions about the ultimate claim to truth of specifically religious doctrines; it seems perfectly feasible and legitimate for a teacher to limit his consideration of religion to the aspect of it that can be made intelligible in these terms.

There is, of course, no way of being absolutely sure that a given community is really prepared to accept a program of teaching about religion in which the limitations I have been describing are observed. The adoption of such a program will therefore involve a necessary element of risk—a kind of bet made by the responsible persons within the schools on the good sense and civic maturity of the religious groups that compose the community. Unfortunately, the very situations in which some positive contribution to mutual understanding among such differing religious groups is most needed are likely to be those in which the chance of success is smallest and the wisdom of initiating a program of instruction in the schools most dubious. Where a deep-seated mistrust of the intentions of the public school still prevails within particular religious communities, as of course it often does, and where ancient animosities still divide one religious group from another, any effort the schools make in this area will automatically be subject to the kind of hostile scrutiny that can quickly paralyze and discourage even the best-intentioned teacher. We are all unhappily familiar with the type of interest taken in the public school by the zealots of one persuasion or another whose chief satisfaction it is to detect some failure on the part of a teacher to show due

deference to the idols of their special cults, which may be either secular or religious in character. We are familiar too with the stultifying effect upon *all* teaching of the kind of nervous caution that is the teacher's well-nigh inevitable response when he becomes aware of this disposition to "catch him out." My point, then, is simply that the public school should not be called upon to take responsibility for creating a degree of understanding and mutual respect among differing religious groups when it cannot count upon a large measure of support and sympathy for its program within the community itself. It already has enough responsibilities, over and above its specific academic function, without being asked to initiate programs in as sensitive an area of concern as religion typically is and in circumstances where the ground has not been prepared by the prior achievement of a large measure of understanding among the religious groups within the community in question.

Let me now lay down the second general condition which, as I see it, must be observed by a school undertaking a program of teaching about religion. This is, in fact, a double-barreled requirement to the effect that, first, the school must recruit the teachers for such instructional programs from its own staff rather than from extramural religious institutions or schools and, second, that these teachers must have a rather high level of training and competence if they are to be able to do this work successfully. I am not, of course, arguing that outside people—among them both clerical and lay representatives of various religious communities—should never be invited to speak to a class at some appropriate juncture in a program of teaching about religion. What I *am* saying is that the school must not even seem to accept the view that a given religious tradition can be fairly and accurately presented only by one of its adherents. It seems to me that this is precisely what would be conveyed by a school's turning over its program of teaching about religion to an outside team composed of representatives of the major religions. Quite apart from the artificial and—to me, at least—distasteful aspects of such "equal-time" arrangements, it does not seem particularly likely that, to take just one example, local clergymen as a group would have any strong aptitude for teaching within such a program as I envisage; and it is even less likely that a program dependent upon such outside help would develop any real unity of style in its treatment of the materials presented. Indeed, since a satisfactory program in this area would require that "religion" be set in the context of the wider life—economic, political, and technological—of a society, it would clearly have to be staffed by highly competent and experienced teachers who would be able to give the students some sense of the complex historical reality of which religion forms a part. This is the point of the second part of the general requirement stated above. It scarcely needs

saying that such teachers do not grow on trees and that, as it is, they are usually very fully occupied with the tasks already assigned to them by the school. It is particularly important to bear in mind at the start the limited human resources available to such programs since any sudden or incautious commitment to a program of teaching about religion would quickly be crippled by the simple lack of competent staff. Unfortunately, as we all know, once such programs are launched, it becomes very difficult to keep them within the limits that a due regard to the availability of competent staff would impose. I am suggesting, therefore, that a realistic estimate of these human resources and a decision of principle as to the way in which they are to be allocated form a necessary preliminary to any move by a school into programs of teaching about religion.

This matter of priorities brings me to the third requirement which I wish to propose. This is simply the condition that new programs in this field should be adopted only if they are designed in such a way as not to interfere with the integrity of the total instructional program of the school or to reverse the priorities on which we are disposed to base that program over the long run. I have in mind the fact that the inadequate understanding on the part of so many young people of the major religious traditions is only one among the many deficiencies in their general culture for which the schools must seek some remedy. To mention just two such deficiencies, how many young people today have any real understanding of the workings of our economic system and how many acquire even the rudiments of scientific literacy? The answer, I am afraid, must be "Very few." But if so, and if the need for imaginative new programs in social studies and science is as urgent as I think we might all agree it is, what relative weight are we to assign to the need for programs in the teaching of religion and to the claims they would make on the very limited resources of the school and on the already crowded academic programs of most students? My feeling is that that priority must be quite low, both by reason of these competing claims and because it seems wise for the school to commit its resources to programs in which it already has some established competence instead of adventuring into fields in which its degree of capability and its likelihood of gaining acceptance from the community at large are very much smaller. Above all, it would seem to me to be a supreme folly to initiate special courses in religion instead of seeking to introduce more and better materials bearing on religion into the courses in history and social studies that are already being given. Special courses in religion, like the special courses in communism which the urgencies of our time have sometimes led us to establish, are all too likely to involve a violent dislocation of the corpus of studies through an essentially arbitrary isolation of a single aspect of a very complex reality. To be sure, an intense convic-

tion of the transcendent importance of the set of phenomena that is selected for this special treatment may seem, at least to the sponsors of such projects, to justify the monocular and obsessive vision of the social world which they unwittingly encourage. But if the considerations I have been putting forward have any weight, then they must lead us to reject any perfervid, "crash program" approach to the study of religion in favor of one that is cooler and more balanced and stands a correspondingly better chance of outliving the hastily conceived projects of partisan enthusiasts.

I have been arguing that the other urgent demands on the curriculum of the secondary school and a concern for the integrity of our understanding of human society cast very serious doubt on the advisability of introducing new courses in religion into the curriculum. To this conclusion I would propose one exception. In the proper circumstances, I think it would be legitimate to offer as an elective in the senior year a course in which students would have an opportunity to read and discuss a number of books and essays which deal in a relatively informal way with a broad range of the philosophical and quasi-philosophical questions about which some young people at that age are beginning to be concerned. Among these, of course, would be questions of a religious sort as well as others having to do with fundamental moral issues, with the nature and extent of political authority and many others. Under the direction of a good teacher, a course of this kind might make a valuable contribution to the effort of young people to arrive at something that could be called a philosophy of life, although there would always be a danger of its degenerating into a semester-long "bull-session" unless precautions were taken as, for example, by requiring that the students enrolled do a fair amount of writing. The fact that such a course would be offered as an elective for a presumably not very large group of qualified and interested students should help to assure it an intelligent reception and to obviate the other difficulties I have mentioned in connection with such programs. In any case, this is an idea that seems worth experimenting with where favorable conditions exist; and while I would envisage it more as a course in a rather informal kind of philosophy, religious questions would, as I have indicated, have their own important place in it, and discussion of them might be expected to benefit from the wider critical auspices under which it would proceed.

Work of the kind I have just been describing might go some distance toward achieving the objective of the second kind of teaching about religion distinguished at the beginning of this paper. As I noted there, this objective is a more sensitive appreciation of those aspects of human life that give relevance and plausibility to the promises of religious faith. Insofar as this objective is at all feasible, however, it is probably one that is best achieved by in-

direction; and it is likely to depend, as does so much that is most precious in what we gain from our formal education, upon the genius of a particular teacher. It is as likely to be realized through the teaching of literature as it is in a program of instruction explicitly concerned with religion. Indeed, if any of the teaching about religion which I have been describing is done really well, *some* increase in such understanding and sensitivity will very likely result, even though the primary aim of the instruction may have been to convey information. For these reasons, I cannot help thinking that it would be a mistake to try to devise procedures for nurturing what is evidently a quite elusive and not easily analyzable quality of mind. The wisest course would rather be the negative one of avoiding those approaches to the subject of religion which block and stultify such latent powers of sympathetic understanding as a young person may possess, and of allowing the final result to depend on the degree of care and understanding which we bring to the task of teaching about religion or, for that matter, about anything at all.

II

I turn now to a consideration of the benefits that might reasonably be expected to follow from a program of teaching about religion if undertaken in the favorable conditions which I have been trying to specify. I propose to disregard any purely intellectual benefits that would result from simply knowing more about different religions or religion in general; and I will also pass over such collateral benefits in the form of increased harmony and mutual respect among religious groups as may accrue to our society as an indirect result of the greater understanding produced by teaching about religion. I will concentrate instead on the widely held belief that teaching about religion might somehow have a beneficial effect on the moral character of our young people. Sometimes such teaching is even spoken of as instruction in values; but since, for me at least, the term "values" seems more naturally to apply to the contents of a stock portfolio, I shall avoid it and speak simply of moral education and character training. The question which I wish to raise and which I will attempt to answer is simply whether there is any reason to think that teaching about religion in any of the forms which I have recognized as appropriate in the public schools could be expected to have an influence upon the moral character and tendencies of young people.

In attempting to answer this question it will be useful to bear in mind the sort of concern out of which a call for moral education in the schools typically issues. Many people are deeply worried about what they believe to be the failure of our society to transmit an understanding of the underlying moral principles of a democratic society to our young people. They are understand-

ably disturbed by the mindless character of so much of our popular culture as well as by the schedule of national priorities that is reflected in the way we spend our money, not to speak of the brutal impulses that set a crowd of young people to crying "Jump" to some poor distracted creature on a rooftop. At the same time, the weakness of the institutions that are traditionally supposed to assume responsibility for the moral formation of young people—the family and the churches—is only too visible; and in these circumstances it becomes almost inevitable that an appeal should be made to the public schools to do something to reverse these trends. Somehow young people must be given a sense of the importance of simple decency and respect for other human beings, and since these notions form a part of our conception of "citizenship" it seems logical to ask the schools to make an effort to bring young people to a better understanding of what they involve. For the great majority of our population all of these fundamental moral ideals have strong religious associations, so it is quite natural that moral education should be thought of as closely connected with some form of religious education. Since straightforward religious training cannot be carried on in the public schools, however, teaching about religion is often put forward as a kind of substitute which, it is hoped, will somehow accomplish the same purpose of character training.

Although I feel considerable sympathy with the concern felt by those who make this sort of case for programs of teaching about religion, I am very much afraid their hopes are doomed to disappointment. Indeed, I doubt very much whether such hopes would ever be entertained if the conditions I have laid down for such programs had been understood and accepted. Certainly one can agree that to study the religious life of a people is to learn something—perhaps a great deal—about the moral code and the effective priorities by which that life is guided. These insights may in turn stimulate reflections on one's own way of life that prove fruitful and ultimately affect the way one feels and acts. Still, it is quite evident that, if teaching about religion is to be subject to the limitations which I have been proposing, its impact on personal moral reflection must inevitably remain secondary and to a large extent unpredictable. An understanding of the role of the sacraments in Roman Catholicism or of the social bases of Protestant denominationalism may have great value, but it would, to say the least, be unwise to claim that it will provide a sense of moral direction for our young people. While teaching about religion has its own important contribution to make to a soundly based philosophy of life, it cannot generate or revive our sense of what is worthwhile in life nor can it by itself deliver any final evaluation of the religious ideals it reviews. If we try to make the study of religion as an aspect of human culture an instrument for conveying our own moral ideas,

we will only succeed in distorting it and in rendering it incapable of making the contribution which we may legitimately expect of it.

There is another deeper reason why expectations that teaching about religion would have a significant moral impact are bound to be disappointed and it is one that has nothing to do with the special restrictions that are implied by the nature of the scholarly disciplines on which such teaching draws. Even if we were to permit ourselves the widest possible freedom to draw moral implications from such studies, the effect of such moralizing upon the minds and hearts of young people would never be very considerable. The fact is that no amount of talk—no matter how lucid and inspiring and profound it may be—is going to change attitudes and lives unless it is associated with a mode of living and acting that makes it credible and “real” to young people. To some extent, the personality and general style of life of an individual teacher can provide this indispensable nondiscursive counterpart to what might otherwise strike his students as just so much high-minded palaver. Very likely, many people who call for programs of moral education in the schools have been much influenced by the example of such remarkable teachers who are able to make their students believe in the relevance and the possibility of ideals and modes of life of which their environment otherwise gives no hint. Nevertheless, even such rare teachers as these will be hard put to reach many students unless their efforts are supported by the school as a whole and unless the school as a whole provides an environment in which the ideals of concern for other human beings and of fairness in one’s dealings with them are reflected in day-to-day operating procedures. Here, I think, is the true locus of the moral education which, for better or worse, our schools continually provide, and by comparison the content of some special course or set of courses and even the personal influence that may be exerted by individual teachers, important as these may be, pale into insignificance. What I am saying is that if the school can exert a beneficial moral influence on young people, it will do so by providing a setting within which they can see that things are being done for them and not just to them and in which, perhaps for the first time in the experience of many of them, moral words become moral realities. But the corollary to this proposition is that a truly good school will provide sound moral experiences for its young people and will not therefore need any special programs in moral education. On the other hand, a school which is unable or unwilling to do what would make it a good school can not hope to offset the bad moral experiences its students necessarily have by any program of official uplift. If it is so misguided as to undertake one nevertheless, the young are fortunately too shrewd to be taken in.

I am aware that by reinterpreting the problem of moral education in the

schools as a problem that concerns the total relationship of the school as an institution to the individual child I have not solved it or even offered any practical suggestions as to how it might be solved. I have simply been arguing that in a primary sense we educate children by the way we treat them, not by what we tell them—or at any rate not by what we tell them outside some system of practice that can give a concrete sense to the moral notions we impart. It should be recognized, of course, that there are real limitations on the power of the school—particularly the public school—to set itself up as a kind of distinct moral community in which certain ideals of human intercourse are realized to a higher degree than they are in the surrounding society. The school, after all, is supported by the community it serves, and it draws its students and much of its staff from that community. In these circumstances it is bound to run into difficulties if it attempts to act as what Lionel Trilling in a somewhat different context has called an “adversary culture.” We should remember, too, that if our young people are morally confused, so is the society from which they come, and it is more than likely that people in the schools—salt of the earth though they may be—are in some measure affected by the same confusions. At any rate there is a danger that in attempting too confidently to point the way for young people, we may simply fail to understand the problems they face or, worse still, that we may fall into self-parody in the mistaken belief that the example of our own rock-like certitude will be enough to carry them through. Nevertheless, none of these caveats should deter the school from making the attempt, within the limits of prudence and practicality, to become in its everyday procedures and atmosphere the kind of community in which the ideals which we ask our young people to emulate are effectively and visibly realized. If proposals for special programs of moral education in the schools distract our attention from that fundamental task, it would be a misfortune indeed.

III

I come now to the question which I touched on at the beginning of this paper and which concerns the degree of interest that the conception of teaching about religion I have outlined might have for those persons who are currently urging that the public schools do something in this field. In discussing the contributions such teaching might make to moral education, I have already dealt with one major motive behind such advocacy; and I will therefore confine myself here to a consideration of the benefit to religion itself which might be expected from programs of teaching about religion. I am assuming that the expectation of such a benefit is another important reason in favor of these programs in the minds of many of their sponsors.

Essentially I have just one point to make and it is one that reflects a certain conception of religion which I happen to hold but which may not be widely shared. There is no need to dispute the claim that a well-conceived program of teaching about religion might have the effect of disposing some young people more favorably toward a faith that they have come to know better or that it might make the faith of those who are already believers more discriminating and intelligent. This same teaching might, however, have a quite different effect. It might lead to a religious attitude in which any sense of a reference beyond human history and culture is lost and in which religion is finally and not just provisionally treated as a dimension of human existence. Sometimes when I hear religion spoken of as one of the "humanities," I wonder whether something of this kind has not already happened. One does not have to be a Barthian to feel that there is something deeply antithetical to the true religious spirit in any approach to religion which establishes too smooth a continuity between it and the other manifestations of human culture. It may indeed be difficult to imagine "Western culture" without Christianity, but to look favorably on Christianity because of its contribution to this prestigious development is something else again. In its more pernicious forms, religiosity motivated in this way amounts to little more than a worship of ourselves worshipping—a kind of complacent sense of wonder at what man has wrought in God. To be sure, these excesses can be avoided; but I fear that if an effort were made to encourage religious faith by means of an historical study of its role in human culture, the faith nurtured in this way would bear the marks of its origins. I would therefore raise the question of whether persons with religious convictions are wise to propose programs of teaching about religion with expectations of real benefit to the religious life of our young people.

The author reports his study of the effectiveness of visual illustrations. His findings suggest that increasing amounts of detail in illustrations do not necessarily lead to greater learning. The study raises questions about the meaning of "realism" in visual aids.

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Adapting Visual Illustrations for Effective Learning

It is relatively apparent that visual illustrations are rapidly becoming an almost universal means of instruction: slides, photographs, cartoons, transparencies, filmstrips, and sketches are now in use from kindergarten through college. Even though research has established that the use of carefully prepared and relevant visual aids can improve student achievement, there has been no attempt to determine the relative effectiveness of the various types of visual illustrations. Presumably not all types of visual illustrations will be equally efficient in promoting the learning of different types of educational tasks. Justification for the use of various types of visual illustrations should be based on their distinctive contributions to specific types of learning.

RELATED RESEARCH

A review of research in the field of visual education failed to locate any study investigating the relative effectiveness of visual illustrations possessing differing amounts of realistic detail and used in conjunction with oral instruction. In fact, the literature fails to reveal conclusive evidence that any one form of visual aid is more effective than another.

Some research evidence does exist, however, regarding the comparative effectiveness of two or three visual media, i.e., sound motion pictures, silent motion pictures, and still pictures. Many studies (e.g. McClusky & McClusky,

1924; Vernon, 1946; Heidgerken, 1948; Kale & Grosslight, 1955) have found no significant differences in the effectiveness of two or more visual media, such as films and filmstrips. Other studies (e.g. Carson, 1947; Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Slattery, 1953; Ortgiesen, 1954) have shown the superiority of filmstrips over films, while some other studies (e.g. Goodman, 1942; Craig, 1956) have demonstrated the superiority of silent motion pictures over sound motion pictures. There have also been a number of studies (e.g. VanderMeer, 1949; Cogswell, 1953; Bathurst, 1954; Fullerton, 1956) which made comparisons along other dimensions. However, in these studies the illustrations displayed through the various media were seldom equivalent. Even when slides are made from frames of a film, they do not convey exactly the same content as the film. These studies seem to indicate that no valid comparisons can be made unless material equivalent in content appears in all of the media being compared. Caution is therefore needed in attempting to evaluate the research literature.

Each medium has unique characteristics which should be employed to achieve specific learning objectives. Films may be used when motion is required to convey manipulative tasks or processes. Still pictures may be effective in place of films where the film goes too fast, or shifts scenes too quickly, to stress important points. Slides and filmstrips enable the instructor to increase the time students may view the illustrations, to answer their questions, and to make comments.

Many studies attempt to compare the effectiveness of the various media in presenting the same information, but do not give adequate consideration to these inherent capabilities and limitations. In some instances, it would seem inappropriate to compare the effectiveness of a motion picture and a series of slides abstracted from the film in presenting the same information. Each medium should be evaluated in terms of the learning objectives for which it is best designed. Comparisons of different media in relation to one type of learning objective, or where specific objectives are not identified and reported, produce results which are uninterpretable.

REALISM THEORIES

This study was motivated by the apparent inconsistencies between the results of some research on perception and certain established theories, specifically the iconicity theory identified by Morris (1946), the sign similarity orientation developed by Carpenter (1953), the theory of pictorial perception proposed by Gibson (1954), and Dale's (1946) cone of experience. For convenience, these will be referred to collectively as "realism theories."

The basic assumption of each of the realism theories is that learning will

be more complete as the number of cues in the learning situation increases. Each posits a continuum of learning effectiveness extending from the object or situation itself to a simplified abstraction of it—from a motion picture with color and sound, for instance, through a photograph, to (least effective) a verbal description. Their contention is that the more qualities a visual shares with the object or situation to be depicted, the more realistic the visual, and, therefore, the easier the learning. Miller *et al.* (1957) support this assumption as they feel that the chances of an individual's learning in a particular situation are increased as the number of cues is increased. Following this assumption, many researchers, multiple-channel communicationists, have proceeded to fill all transmission channels, especially the pictorial, with as much information as possible (Hartman, 1960, 1961; Murry, 1960; Gropper *et al.*, 1961; Twyford *et al.*, 1964).

However, there is other theory and research suggesting that this assumption underlying the realism theories may be a tenuous one at best. Miller *et al.* (1957) have stated that it would be a mistake to assume that one cue added to another would increase learning by a linear increment. Their contention is that additional cues or excessively realistic cues may be distracting or possibly even evoke competitive responses in opposition to the desired learning. Such cues would be interference and would reduce rather than facilitate learning. Accordingly, Bruner *et al.* (1956) and Travers *et al.* (1964) have suggested that learners do not need a wealth of stimuli in order to recognize the attributes of an object or situation which place it in a particular category. Travers *et al.* (1964, p. 1.19) maintain that "merely confronting a person with stimuli identical to those emitted by the real environment is no guarantee that useful information will be retained."

Travers *et al.* (1964, p. 1.18) feel that the realistic presentation of much content provides unnecessary detail and that the real objective of visual education is "not so much to bring the pupil into close touch with reality, but to help students become more effective in dealing with reality." Travers and his associates feel that this can be done effectively by symbols. Broadbent (1958, 1965) has explained that the reduction of learning as cues increase is caused by the filtering process in the central nervous system which prevents many of the realistic stimuli from receiving active reception in the brain. Jacobson (1951a, 1951b) supports this point of view and states that the brain is capable of utilizing only minute proportions of the information perceived. Travers *et al.* (1964, p. 5.20) explain that in relation to auditory and visual channels "the amount of information which is utilized by the higher centers is vastly less than the informational capacity of the channels involved."

Attneave (1954) conducted research guided by the hypothesis that one

function of the perceptual machinery was to reduce redundant stimulation and to encode incoming information so that only the essentials travel through the central nervous system to the brain. In support of his hypothesis, he states that (1954, pp. 185-86) "lines bordering objects provide the essence of the information to be conveyed." This he feels accounts for the effectiveness of cartoons and stick drawings as conveyors of information. Travers *et al.* (1964, p. 5.25) have stated that visual data is stored in the nervous system in some form isomorphic with line drawings, permitting the individual to remember and reproduce such information with greater facility than more realistic information. This would seem to indicate that those visuals closely representing line drawings and containing the essence of the information to be transmitted would be more effective and more efficient in facilitating learning than would more detailed illustrations, which would have to be coded initially by the central nervous system before being transmitted. Travers *et al.* (1964, p. 1.18) suggest that "inputs of information when received by the human organism are coded and most of the original stimuli initially presented to the senses not only never enters the perceptual system, but is not remembered by the system."

In summary, there is theory and research that seems to indicate, contrary to the assumption of the realism theories, that presenting a student with a wealth of stimuli that approximate "reality" is not necessarily the most effective way to facilitate learning. Because excesses of realism may actually interfere with the transmission of information and because certain kinds of stimuli may not be perceived, it seems necessary for educators concerned with the structure of visual illustrations to attempt to discover those characteristics that will facilitate particular kinds of learning.

HYPOTHESES

This study compares the relative effectiveness of three types of visual illustration sequences used in the instruction of university freshmen about the human heart. It also attempts to determine which illustrated presentation most successfully facilitated four specific learning objectives: knowledge of the location of anatomical parts, transfer of learning (from the oral-visual presentation to a three-dimensional model of the heart), knowledge of terminology, and comprehension. The study tests the following null hypotheses:

- (H₁) There are no differences in immediate retention among students receiving oral instruction complemented by visual illustrations possessing different amounts of realistic detail.

- (H₂) There are no differences in achievement on the four tests (Drawing Test, Comprehension Test, Terminology Test, Heart Model Test) among students viewing visual presentations possessing different amounts of realistic detail.
- (H₃) There are no differences in achievement on the total test among students viewing visual presentations possessing different amounts of realistic detail.

Specific objectives:

1. To measure the relative effectiveness of three types of visual illustrations used to complement oral instruction: abstract linear representations; detailed, shaded drawings; and realistic photographs.
2. To determine at what point further increases of realism in the visual illustrations fail to produce significant differences in achievement in the desired types of learnings.
3. To determine whether or not there is only one visual-learning continuum which may be utilized in facilitating the four types of learning.
4. To measure the amount of immediate retention resulting from the use of visual illustrations to complement oral instruction on four different criterion tests.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The experimental population for this study consisted of 108 freshman students enrolled at The Pennsylvania State University. These students were assigned at random to one of four groups: Group I, $N = 30$; Group II, $N = 27$; Group III, $N = 26$; Group IV, $N = 25$. The three visual groups were considered to be the treatment groups and the non-visual group the control group.

All the students in each group took a pretest, received their respective presentation, and took four post-tests, all in one session. Students in all four groups listened to the same forty-minute recorded oral presentation; at the same time, each group was shown a sequence of thirty-nine black and white slides designed to complement the oral instruction. Basically the same information was presented to each group; the only difference in the treatments was in the degree of realism (detail) in the sequences of illustrations.

The oral presentation was by means of a Sony Photo-Sync tape recorder. The visual illustrations were presented via a Bausch and Lomb slide projector with an automatic time changer. The oral and visual materials were electrically synchronized, in such a way that students receiving the pictorial presentations viewed their respective visuals for equal amounts of time. Stu-

dents in the control (oral) group were shown the name of the part of the heart being discussed during the time the students in the pictorial treatments viewed illustrations. The rate and number of words per minute were identical for each presentation.

The subject chosen—the heart, its parts, and their functions—permitted the evaluation of several types of learning as measured by four tests.

INSTRUCTION

All students received the same recorded oral instruction. Group I saw no accompanying illustrations, but the names of the parts of the heart mentioned were projected on the screen (see plates I-IV opposite page 256).

Group II viewed abstract linear representations (Plate II) of the form and relative locations of the parts of the heart as they were mentioned in the oral presentation. These drawings, like the other illustrations used in the study, are similar to those in many science textbooks.

Group III was shown more detailed, shaded drawings representing the parts of the heart as they were mentioned.

Students in Group IV saw realistic photographs of the parts of the heart being described.

CRITERION TESTS

Each student received four individual criterion tests: Heart Model Test, Terminology Test, Drawing Test, and Comprehension Test. Scores received on these four tests were combined in a composite seventy-eight item test designed to measure total understanding of the concepts presented.

Heart Model Test. Consisted of twenty identification items. This test required students to identify the numbered parts on a three-dimensional model of the human heart. Each part of the heart, which had been discussed in the oral presentation, was labeled on the heart model. The students were provided with an answer sheet with corresponding numbers on which they were to write in the name of the part of the heart which corresponded to the number. (Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 reliability, $r = .923$)

Terminology Test. Consisted of twenty fill-in type questions. This test attempted to evaluate the learner's knowledge of referents for specific symbols, whether presented orally or visually. For example, knowledge of the variety of symbols which may be used for a single referent, or knowledge of the referent most appropriate to a given use of a symbol. (Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 reliability, $r = .885$)

Drawing Test. Consisted of eighteen identification items. This test emphasized symbols with concrete referents. Knowledge of positions, locations, recall of patterns, structures, or settings or parts within an entity could be included in a test of this nature. Students were required to draw a representative diagram of the heart and to place the identified parts in their respective positions. This test was evaluated solely on the student's ability to position correctly the various parts (i.e., valves, auricles, ventricles, etc.) on their diagram representing the heart. (Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 reliability, $r = .906$)

Comprehension Test. Consisted of twenty multiple-choice questions. This test required the student to mentally reorganize material to achieve a particular purpose, perhaps to develop a new view of the material. Specifically, it consisted of multiple-choice items which referred to the position of specific parts of the heart during its functioning. The student was then asked to identify the position of other specified parts at that particular moment. This test required a thorough understanding of the heart, its parts, its internal functioning, and the simultaneous processes which occur during the systolic and diastolic phases.

Total Criterion Test. Consisted of seventy-eight items. Scores received on the four criterion tests were combined in a composite seventy-eight item total criterion test designed to measure total understanding of the concepts presented. (Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 reliability, $r = .873$)

Physiology Pretest. Consisted of thirty-six multiple-choice questions. This test was administered to all participants in an attempt to determine their prior factual knowledge of functional aspects of human physiology. Scores on this test were used as the adjusting variable in the analysis of covariance to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the various treatments. (Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 reliability, $r = .728$)

ANALYSIS OF PRETEST

Analysis of covariance, using pretest achievement on the thirty-six-item physiology test to partial out previous knowledge in the subject area, was used to determine the significance of differences in immediate achievement for the four treatment groups. Comparisons among the individual means of the four groups, via Dunn's "c" procedure, were conducted to determine the effectiveness of the various treatment groups in enhancing student achievement on the four individual tests.

Dunn's "c" procedure was selected because many of the current texts and reference books used by educational researchers are quite sharp in their condemnation of the practice of performing t-tests on each pair of means as a

PLATE I
Oral Presentation:
Group I




PLATE II
Abstract Linear
Presentation: Group II




PLATE III
Detailed, Shaded
Drawing Presentation:
Group III





PLATE IV
Realistic Photographic
Presentation: Group IV



method of testing the hypothesis that, in a completely randomized design, $M_1 = M_2 = \dots M_K$ when $K > 2$ (Sparks, 1963, p. 343). Steel and Torrie (1960) have indicated that in an investigation consisting of three different treatments, the observed value of "t" will exceed the 0.05 level of significance about 13 per cent of the time. This will occur even if differences among the treatment groups are not real. This change in significance level is progressive: the greater the number of comparisons to be made, the greater the chances are of obtaining significant differences between the means, when in fact, they do not exist. Dunn's "c" procedure is based on the student t-distribution. The power of this technique is in the fact that the investigator is required to limit the number of comparisons to be made between the means.

RESULTS

On the total criterion test and on the four individual criterion tests, significant differences were found to exist among the means of the four groups. The F ratios for the adjusted analyses of covariance were all significant beyond the 0.01 level, except in the case of the comprehension test, for which the F ratio was significant beyond the 0.05 level.

- A. On the total criterion test (see Table 1), the various slide sequences facilitated total student learning with differing degrees of effectiveness. In relation to the promotion of student achievement on the total criterion test:
1. The abstract linear representations and the detailed shaded drawings were both more effective than the oral presentation alone and the realistic photographic presentation.
 2. The realistic photographic presentation was no more effective than was the oral presentation alone.
 3. The abstract linear representation was as effective as the detailed drawing presentation.

TABLE 1
Total Criterion Test

Treatment	N	S. D. for Original Test Scores	Mean		
			Physiology Test Score	Total Mean Test Score	Mean Test Score Adjusted
Oral Presentation (Group I)	30	15.59	20.00	41.00	42.92
Linear Presentation (Group II)	27	11.18	20.96	58.59	58.93
Drawing Presentation (Group III)	26	14.04	23.15	58.42	55.16
Photographic Presentation (Group IV)	25	15.90	20.72	38.88	39.61
GRAND MEAN			21.17		49.10

- B. In relation to the promotion of student achievement on the drawing test (see Table 2), the results were exactly the same as on the total criterion test.

TABLE 2
Drawing Test

<i>Treatment</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S. D. for Original Test Scores</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Original</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Adjusted</i>
Oral Presentation (Group I)	30	5.50	7.50	7.89
Linear Presentation (Group II)	27	3.16	14.30	14.36
Drawing Presentation (Group III)	26	3.52	14.81	14.15
Photographic Presentation (Group IV)	25	4.44	10.20	10.35
GRAND MEAN			11.58	

- C. In relation to the promotion of student achievement on the heart model test (see Table 3):

1. The abstract linear representations and the detailed shaded drawings were both more effective than the oral presentation alone and the realistic photographic presentation.
2. The realistic photographic presentation was no more effective than was the oral presentation alone.
3. The abstract linear presentation was more effective than was the detailed shaded drawing presentation.

TABLE 3
Heart Model Test

<i>Treatment</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S. D. for Original Test Scores</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Original</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Adjusted</i>
Oral Presentation (Group I)	30	6.04	10.53	11.12
Linear Presentation (Group II)	27	3.55	16.32	16.62
Drawing Presentation (Group III)	26	3.92	15.46	14.46
Photographic Presentation (Group IV)	25	5.30	8.44	8.67
GRAND MEAN			12.73	

- D. In relation to the promotion of student achievement on the terminology test (see Table 4):

1. The abstract linear representations and the detailed shaded drawing presentation were both more effective than the realistic photographic presentation.

2. The abstract linear presentation was no more effective than was the detailed shaded presentation.
3. The oral presentation alone was as effective as the abstract linear presentation, the detailed shaded drawing presentation, and the realistic photographic presentation.

TABLE 4
Terminology Test

<i>Treatment</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S. D. for Original Test Scores</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Original</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Adjusted</i>
Oral Presentation (Group I)	30	5.07	11.57	12.17
Linear Presentation (Group II)	27	4.43	14.15	14.25
Drawing Presentation (Group III)	26	4.95	14.35	13.32
Photographic Presentation (Group IV)	25	4.81	8.92	9.15
GRAND MEAN			12.27	

E. In relation to the promotion of student achievement on the comprehension test (see Table 5), all instructional presentations were found to be equally effective.

TABLE 5
Comprehension Test

<i>Treatment</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S. D. for Original Test Scores</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Original</i>	<i>Mean Test Score Adjusted</i>
Oral Presentation (Group I)	30	3.58	11.47	11.81
Linear Presentation (Group II)	27	3.83	13.63	13.69
Drawing Presentation (Group III)	26	3.87	13.81	13.22
Photographic Presentation (Group IV)	25	3.87	10.92	11.05
GRAND MEAN			12.44	

INTERPRETATION

In terms of instructional effectiveness, economy, and simplicity of production:

1. The abstract linear presentation sequence should be used to promote "total" student understanding of the concepts presented in the instruction.
2. The abstract linear presentation sequence should be used to promote

student learning of specific locations of the various patterns, structures, and positions of the parts in the heart.

3. The abstract linear presentation sequence should be used to promote student transfer of learning, i.e., the ability to identify the numbered parts on a three-dimensional model of the heart from information presented via the oral-visual presentation.
4. The oral presentation alone should be used to promote student learning of the referents of terms.
5. The oral presentation alone should be used to promote the development of a new view, or reorganization, of the material by the student.

A number of explanations, alluded to under "Realism Theories" (above), might be advanced for the inadequacy of the more realistic visuals, as measured by the criterion tests. It may be that the simplest illustrations are the most effective.

In relation to performance on the terminology and comprehension tests, the oral presentation alone was as effective as the three illustrated presentations. This occurrence might be explained by the fact that students have over the years, received mostly oral instruction and have developed the ability to learn from it.

CONCLUSION

This study represents an initial inquiry into the complex problems of comparisons between media, and of the use of different media to produce maximum learning. The results seem to indicate that the reduction of realistic detail in an illustration does not necessarily reduce its instructional effectiveness and in many cases improves it. Most important, there were significant differences in the effectiveness of different types of instruction for different educational objectives. In the final analysis, it is probably necessary to determine what details are crucial cues for particular lessons.

So far, there has been very little research to determine the specific effects of various types of visual illustrations for either general or particular educational objectives. What is needed is extensive research into and development of various types of visual illustrations, and how they may mediate learning.

It is readily acknowledged that the effects of visual illustrations on learning depend predominately on the characteristics of the students, the characteristics of the content, and the ways in which the content is organized. Even though this study was conducted in a specific content area with a specific type of student, it opens avenues for further research, some of which are suggested below.

1. Since this is one of the first studies which has attempted to investigate the relative effectiveness of various types of visual illustrations in complementing oral instruction, it should be replicated in the same and in other content areas in order to establish confidence in the results.
2. Further investigation, using the present study, is needed to determine the effectiveness of the various visual illustrations in achieving other educational objectives.
3. How would the implications for visual learning, found in this study, compare with the results obtained at the elementary and secondary levels where the pupils have not had the opportunity to be exposed to biological content?
4. Would the results be different if each student were to receive his instruction individually—if students were allowed to program their presentations at their own rate, controlling the amount of time they looked at the illustrations?
5. Similar investigation is needed along different dimensions, e.g. the effectiveness of color in photographs and drawings.

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To the Editors

EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY

To The Editors:

Needless to say, I am delighted by Fred Newmann's and Donald Oliver's "Education and Community" (HER, Winter, 1967). It is encouraging that the critique of monolithic formal schooling as synonymous with education has penetrated Harvard. The question is what to do to see that the vast sums that are now being wrongly allocated for the school establishment are better spent to make the more educational environment that we want. My reckless advice to the authors, where they are situated, is to precipitate a Donnybrook, for instance by naming names of the advisors to the Office of Education and the National Science Foundation and pinpointing the proposals and sums involved. In professional areas, the public might follow if the professionals lead.

For such a campaign, Newmann and Oliver concede too much to the great-society approach. It is not necessary to argue profound issues of community,

anomie, and long range morals and esthetics; on its own terms, the social engineering does not work in essential matters. Very often it costs too much even in money, not to speak of social costs. In *People or Personnel*, I think I was able to show that in such fields as communications, agriculture, neighborhood planning, social services, and schooling, the great-society approach intrinsically, because of its motives, organization, and staffing, often involves a mark-up of 300 to 400 per cent. The 1965 report of the Senate Subcommittee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, *Invention and Innovation*, seems to show overwhelmingly that our dominant method of promoting research and development in technology is inefficient.

Also, the evidence is certainly mounting that in coping with hard-core poverty, underprivileged schooling, job-training (not to speak of foreign aid and foreign "pacification"), our present approach does not work at any cost. People in Harlem demand "participation" in running their own

schools, but naturally they cannot express what they really want, which likely has nothing to do with "schools" at all. They want opportunity for their children to grow up decently into society. If so, it is our professional obligation to disabuse them of the notion that "schools," even "quality education," will accomplish this; to do so, however, will understandably rouse their hostility, at least at first. Similarly, the increasing number of middle-class youth who are dissatisfied with college, and who form "free universities," are mostly not really interested in universities at all, but in a different kind of education, an education in which academic training would be only incidental or would occur under very different conditions. Yet a lot of money has been spent on their "education."

But even academically the social engineering does not, and cannot, work. For it hinders or prevents the finding of vocation and it perverts the development of autonomous professionals with responsibility to client and community. Instead, it tends to produce role-players and organizational personnel. Thus, because of *professional* failure, we have unsafe cars, too many cars, housing that disrupts neighborhoods, the wasteland of TV, blackboard jungles, and so forth. Long years of doing abstract lessons on other people's schedule, being extrinsically tested and graded, keeping one's nose clean and obeying orders, do not tend to produce responsible professionals or engaged humanists. The educational establishment is as bad an example as any.

I take it Messrs. Newmann and Oliver are beginners in this campaign, which is why they are unduly defensive about being called "nostalgic," "romantic," and "anti-technological." Frankly, this is the polite, boring, and deadly way in which our dominant thugs, riding

high, put down human good sense. For we are the radical opposition who question their power and expansion. The issue is not whether to "slow down the rate of technological advancement," we are not asking for that; but whether to respect the principles of technology itself, function, efficiency of quality and cost, prudence, elegance, simplicity, which are now being flouted. I have become resigned to being called a pastoral follower of Jefferson and, of course, something named "Rousseau." Basically, I am an Aristotelian with a keen admiration for Dewey, Veblen, and Kropotkin; but the tack I then take—and which I would recommend to our authors—is to point out that Jefferson and Rousseau were by no means "romantic"; they were terribly realistic about the monopolies, superstitions, and faddishness of the courts, churches, and tyrannies that they were attacking, just as we are now confronted with a superstitious and hoaxing Establishment that has made our country like a conquered province.

My one small complaint about "Education and Community" is the authors' lack of sympathy for Progressive Education, though they are right to criticize the "school" orientation and constipated curriculum to which most progressivism was subject. But Dewey, like ourselves, was beating about for a political lever and he conceived the chimeric idea of protecting the children. Sixty bad years have not improved the situation. Given the home background of both the middle-class and the poor, children certainly need a good deal of therapy in order to revive playfulness, curiosity, initiative, and animal sociability; and this might as well happen in a "school," if the city itself were used as "curriculum." Call it a Freedom school. At the high school and college level, however, learning-by-

doing becomes indistinguishable from apprenticeship, profession, and social and political action. I think Dewey would have agreed that an SDS project or the Free Speech Movement or the Peace Corps (at its best) are good progressive schools, and I still put my hopes on the radical young as a political lever.

PAUL GOODMAN
Institute for Policy Studies

To the Editors:

It is reassuring to see the established order buffeted by Messrs. Newmann and Oliver. It is encouraging to have them plead for a definition of first principles. It is surprising—nay, astonishing—to hear them call, from the heart of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, for pluralism and amateurism in education. What quixotic ideas, not to say professionally subversive.

Alas, what do our brave Davids do, having slain the Goliath of modern education and its bosses? They put in its place a trinity of local agencies that will continue to do what is already done in most places, only they will do more of it and put it on a more institutionalized plane. And what is it they will do? First, the authors want a severely truncated program of study in schools, made up of "systematic instruction in basic literary skills, health and hygiene, driver education, and the like." I don't know what "the like" might include, but I gather that none of the schooling in this new order is to be just the old stuff; it is to be "problem centered and exciting" with "terminal behaviors" uppermost in mind. So it is the old stuff. At any rate it sounds, from their brief description of it, like nothing so much as warmed up progressivism on a short school timetable.

Then, in the considerable time saved from "pre-planned" schooling, the local community is apparently to take over with unplanned laboratories—"contexts for learning in the midst of action" (whose participants, I fear, would not take seriously anybody who expressed himself this way). Here children and adults will play music and games together, paint pictures, act in plays, and tinker with cars. In other words, they will continue to do the sort of thing they now do in a multitude of evening courses across the land, at home, with friends, or otherwise on their own hook. Newmann and Oliver just want to pressure them into doing more of it and doing it under the umbrella of some organization. Togetherness is what is important. And then come the community "seminars" for the roundtable discussion of anything, from the mean to the metaphysical, that may engage the interests of the local people. The seminars appear to be a species of self-administered group therapy. Or they suggest interminable, undisciplined bull sessions about current events—the kind of thing people do, I always thought, at church socials or cocktail parties, at their analyst's or over the back fence.

The authors seem to feel that nobody in their hypothetical community has a home to call his own, a family or parents, a neighborhood or friends, or is otherwise able to engage in the pursuit of happiness according to his private whims—or if he is able, he shouldn't. Far from being concerned with the "development of individual human dignity," Messrs. Newmann and Oliver seem to me throughout to apotheosize the group. In an effort to find "missing community" they have lost the poor chap they want to save, the individual. As E. B. White might say, "Everybody must jump... there

will be no not jumping." How much room is there in this brave new world for the nonjumper or nonjoiner, the outsider, the Thoreaus who want to step to the drummer that *they* hear, or even for the man who would like to stay home and read a book without having to discuss it at the Lyceum?

I would suggest to the authors that it is the individuals of this world, not their institutions, that decide what a community will be. If "community" is "missing" (a doubtful proposition in itself, at least in smaller towns and rural areas), it is not for lack of organized programs or other institutionalized activities which the authors suppose would produce the community spirit they want; nor is it missing because big government has taken over all the responsibilities people are supposed to have carried out locally in a quieter age. It is missing because enough people simply do not want the kind of communal community the authors want. I doubt that they can be made to want it through the chummy clubhouse activities described by Messrs. Newmann and Oliver. Utopias have always foundered on the rock of individuality or, if you like, self-interest.

Still, there is much that is surely right in the authors' diagnosis of our sad condition: the dehumanized humanity of national and great-society programs; the irrelevance, waste, trivia, remoteness, and rigidity of much that passes for schooling (though they may have something different in mind from what I do); the benevolent Big Brotherism of educational administrators who organize their teachers and schools to death—they learn how to do it, I gather, in Ed. D. programs at places like Harvard; the deification of the new technology of education; the tendency of teachers to genuflect before anything called "research" or "innova-

tion." And there is a great deal indeed to be said for some of the things the authors want to do: awaken altruism and empathy in urbanized America; enlarge private and local educational efforts at the expense of public and national efforts; develop pluralism in education at the expense of centralism; rely for a change on that terribly neglected fellow, the layman and the non-expert; promote the truism that schools are only one element among many in the education of a human being.

But unless Newmann and Oliver are willing to shun the wicked world, forget economic growth, forego the blessings of science and technology, and renounce the advancement of knowledge—perhaps they are but one doesn't know since they never get around to those first principles—they are stuck with some kind of extended formal schooling that makes it all possible; and that must leave them less room than they want for spontaneous, undirected, avocational activities. They are stuck with reforming the present system rather than displacing it. They are also stuck, I am afraid, with that intractable material, the human being, whose failures to himself and his community are far more likely to be righted through an education that gives him and his fellows some notion of their common heritage than through voluntary, self-guided togetherness. I hope I may be forgiven for adding that if Newmann and Oliver ever find themselves running one of their community seminars or laboratories, they will have to learn to talk a lot plainer than they do.

JAMES D. KOERNER
Lexington, Mass.

THE AMERICAN NEGRO COLLEGE

To the Editors:

Most educational enterprises in this country were established by some par-

ticular group to give an appropriate training to their own young people—that is, the young people of their own religion, ethnic group, social class, community, state, or occupation. They were thus not missionary enterprises as were the schools and colleges established by Americans in Asia, Africa and even in Latin America. The only significant exception is the Negro colleges, which were in effect missionary enterprises established in our greatest colony, the Southern states, where plantations, with the aid of cheap labor, produced a few staples for the world, and especially, the Northern states' markets.

As plantation agriculture has declined—both in our Southern states and in the erstwhile overseas empires of European powers—all missionary enterprises are being called into question. Frantz Fanon, the black physician from Martinique best known for *The Wretched of the Earth*, earlier wrote *Peau noire, masques blancs* (*Black skin, white masques*) a complete rejection of the colonists who gave European education and faces to black men. He has sharp barbs for those black men who have connived in education supported by white men, that is, by people of European extraction. For him the world consists of colonizers and colonized. Fanon and those who support his view see American colleges for the people labelled Negroes as colonial institutions. Many Negro Americans share his view; it is becoming difficult for people of European extraction—people labelled white—to teach in American Negro colleges. It will probably soon be high crime for any person not classified as Negro to describe any American Negro institution, movement or personage, with or without a measure of objectivity. It has long been near treason for a Negro to do so,

as Franklin Frazier found out when he wrote *Black Bourgeoisie*. None of us has much right to complain of such rejection by our Negro fellow citizens. But while we, be we Negro or white, have no right to complain, we still have the right and duty as human beings and Americans to describe all of our institutions and movements with full objectivity. Effective action depends upon accurate and full knowledge and understanding, especially so in the matter of improving higher education.

What Jencks and Riesman have given us in their monograph on "The American Negro College" (HER, Winter, 1967) is a natural history of a whole group of institutions most of which were started with the missionary intent of bettering the condition of some people considered deprived and in darkness. The intent was probably not to make of American Negroes effective competitors of the people who founded and paid for the colleges. But the issue nowadays is just that: can these colleges produce people who can compete in the open academic, professional, and business markets?

It is the same question that must be put with reference to any set of American institutions of higher (than high school) education. Most of them were established for some particular purpose which they must transcend, but not necessarily abandon, if they are to compete with the better institutions for money, staff, and students.

Jencks and Riesman have given us that sort of full study of these institutions in relation to their effective environment, the environment in which they must survive if they are to survive, and thrive if they are to thrive. The tragedy of this particular set of American enterprises is that they still suffer from their essentially colonial

and missionary status, while, unlike other colonial and missionary enterprises, they exist in the same body politic and economic as the people who colonized them. The national revival solution of an Algeria or an African country will not work. The question is in effect left open as to whether they can surmount their difficulties and take an equal place in the higher educational system of the post-industrial age.

EVERETT C. HUGHES
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THE EDUCATION INDUSTRIES

To the Editors:

The symposium on "The Education Industries" (HER, Winter, 1967) neatly brings out the continuum of views on the potential significance of the entry of new industries into education.

Donald Oliver recognizes that education industries can help greatly to improve upon the job the *professional* educator has been trying to do, but he denies that the professional educator has the right approach to education. Thus the education industries will only help in doing the wrong job better, not in changing the nature of the task itself.

Paul Goodman also has no sympathy for the present way that education is conducted and is distrustful of the intentions of industry. Yet, divorced from the present "establishment" and developed by others than the present industries, he sees "an important place for new technology of instruction."

G. Howard Gould has the teacher's suspicion of the new technology, but, aware that it is here and growing, he stoutly maintains that there will always be a place for the teacher, hoping that if this is said often and loudly it will be so.

Gerald Holton expresses cautious optimism about the potential of the new technology and takes a stance that I wish to explore more fully later.

It is interesting that the editors apparently could not find an educator to represent the positive end of the spectrum. The spokesman for this position, Edward Katzenbach from industry, sensitive to his audience, does not come out unreservedly for the value of technology. There are problems to be sure in its application to education, and industry has much to learn from education which has been "doing a good job." Even when industry learns its way around, everything will be all right because in all matters "the educator has the final say." No word, however, about how this may be assured.

Except for Holton, the discussants take a position that is all too common in discussions of this subject. They assume that the conditions determining whether industry and technology will be good or bad for education are already given and will work themselves out almost regardless of what anyone may do or say.

It seems that only Holton believes in the openness of history to human intelligence and will. The quality of the relationship of industry to education is a problem to be worked out, not a consequence of the nature of the beasts. As he says, "the fundamental pattern for the relationship between industry and education is just now being *invented*." The outcome will be governed by the quality of the thought that goes into its invention. It will, therefore, be of the utmost importance that competent educators participate in the process. If out of suspicion of industry or fear of technology they bow out of the endeavor, then the result may indeed be what they fear most; but this will be because of default and not necessity.

For the process to achieve desired results there will be required leadership by men in education who:

1. understand clearly the basic purposes of education;
2. are sensitive to the accomplishments and failures of present education;
3. are willing to seek out and use in the pursuit of the goals of education assistance from any quarter in which it may be found; and
4. recognize the complexity of the educational task that lies ahead and the opportunity that new technology offers to meet that task successfully.

On industry's side there must be men who:

1. understand clearly the basic purposes of business and technology in modern society;
2. are sensitive to the fact that past experience cannot be simply transferred to education;
3. are willing to take time to listen and learn about education and its needs; and
4. recognize that their true interest lies in the successful solution of the fundamental problems of education, not in the discovery of quick methods to win a profitable market.

Together education and business must work out an understanding of what education is to be in the future and how each should be preparing to make its appropriate contribution. The results should not be pious manifestos about everyone's good intentions but institutional arrangements that can help insure that industry will serve and not control education while opening up to industry access to the channels through which it can make a significant contribution to the quality of education. Perhaps in this way, Goodman's

doubts about our capacity "to tailor technology to human functioning" may be answered.

One such arrangement might be to establish an Education-Industry Council. It should be made up of leaders at the highest levels of both education and industry and would serve as a forum for working out the principles and framework within which the specifics of a new educational technology would be developed in the thousands of day to day contacts between representatives of education and industry. With such an arrangement, education might well lead the way in showing how a major new technology can be infused with a fundamental orientation to the human values it should serve.

NORMAN D. KURLAND
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THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE COMMON SCHOOL

To the Editors:

At the close of the Fourth Provincial Council of Baltimore in May, 1840, the American Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter in which, *inter alia*, they stated:

We can scarcely point out a book in general use in the ordinary schools, or even in higher seminaries, wherein covert and insidious efforts are not made to misrepresent our principles, to distort our tenets, to vilify our practices and to bring contempt upon our Church and its members.¹

A statement of that kind enters a somewhat jarring note at a time when ecumenical endeavor has made such not-

¹Peter Guilday (ed.), *The National Pastorals of the American Hierarchy, 1792-1919* (Washington, 1923), p. 134.

able progress among the Christian churches. Yet it was a serious conditioning factor a century and a quarter ago in shaping the minds of both Catholic and non-Catholic students, to say nothing of their elders. If one were to seek justification in recent literature for the bishops' lament of 1840, he could hardly improve on Professor Tyack's "The Kingdom of God and the Common School: Protestant Ministers and the Educational Awakening in the West" (HER, Fall, 1966). This article offers ample evidence of what the author calls "a pervasive Protestant crusade" in the common schools of Oregon from the 1840's to nearly the end of the last century. Not only has the research that lies behind this article been done thoroughly, but the interpretation drawn from the evidence and the clarity of expression employed by the author leave little to be desired.

In the meager literature on the Catholic Church in Oregon for the years covered by the Tyack article, there are numerous examples of the energies put forth by Protestant ministers, both in and out of the schools, to implement that section of the constitution of the "American Protestant Association" of November, 1842, which sought

to awaken the attention of the community to the dangers which threaten the liberties, and the public and domestic institutions, of these United States from the assaults of Romanism.²

A further threat was posed for Oregon Protestants when the first Catholic boys' school opened at Saint Paul in October, 1843, and was followed the next year by another at Saint Francis

Xavier Mission, conducted by the Sisters of Notre Dame. It was not long before the Protestant ministers saw, to their horror, that there was much truth in Bishop Francis N. Blanchet's prediction that if the sisters opened a school in Oregon City, "even the Protestants will willingly intrust to the good nuns the education of their young girls."³

Professor Tyack has rendered a service in delineating the role of the Protestant ministers in public education in Oregon and in calling for further study of their activities elsewhere. For it was often the "Protestant coloration of the common school," to use his own phrase, that aroused the indignation of the Catholic minority and set them against the public school system and stimulated them to build their own system.⁴ Catholic historians have at times been thought to have emphasized unduly the anti-Catholic bias operating in the public schools and in other segments of American life,⁵ and in some instances such over-emphasis has occurred. Yet as William Kailer Dunn showed in his study, *What Happened to Religious Education? The Decline of Religious Teaching in the Public Elementary School, 1776-1861*,⁶ it was by no means solely the supersensitive reactions of a depressed minority that caused the periodic controversies over the issue of religion in the common

² Notice of July, 1845, *Notices & Voyages of the Famed Quebec Mission to the Pacific Northwest* (Portland, 1956), p. 205.

³ See, e.g., Henry J. Browne, "Public Support for Catholic Education in New York, 1825-1842: Some New Aspects," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXXIX (April, 1953), pp. 1-27; and Joseph J. McCadden, "Bishop Hughes versus the Public School Society of New York," *Ibid.*, L (July, 1964), pp. 188-207.

⁴ E.g., David J. O'Brien in *Cross Currents*, XVI (Summer, 1966), pp. 307-23.

⁵ Baltimore, 1958

² Text in Ray Allen Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860* (New York, 1936), p. 439.

schools. The point would doubtless be demonstrated in other sections of the country as Tyack has demonstrated it for Oregon.

Finally, in reference to Tyack's point that generalizing from Massachusetts and New York to the whole nation has produced a distorted perspective on the religion-and-education question, historians of Catholic education might well consider whether they have brought about a similar distortion by confining themselves so largely to the school struggle of Archbishop John Hughes of New York in the mid-nineteenth century and those of Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul fifty years later.

JOHN TRACY ELLIS
University of San Francisco

MANCHILD REVISITED

To the Editors:

I should like to compliment and thank Florence Shelton for her review of *Manchild in the Promised Land* (HER, Spring, 1966). She certainly pin-pointed the puzzling blank left by Claude Brown concerning his school experiences. Her explanation for this blank is undoubtedly accurate.

Having just finished the Malcolm X autobiography and having recently read *Manchild in the Promised Land*, I could not help being struck by the

fact that the significance and relevance lacking in school for both Malcolm X and Claude Brown was, in a sense, found in prison. Many students and adults, as they look back on school, view their school experiences as "doing time." Most of us couldn't wait to "bust out"—along the acceptable graduation route of course. Claude Brown, interestingly enough, wants at one point to bust into prison. He needs to go back, to get off the streets, but is told that he has to make it "out there."

An interesting question then is why does prison provide a setting that starts a Malcolm X and a Claude Brown on a new course? Is it only a matter of sympathetic personnel encountered? Does prison impose some sort of order on the chaos of their lives? But what is there about prison that might make them want to capitalize upon the imposition of such order? Or is there nothing else to do in prison?

Possibly the early activities of Malcolm X and Claude Brown really represent external endeavors to bust out of the prison of their lives; and it is only behind the impenetrable walls of a prison that such efforts can be internalized to a degree that compels their respective intelligences to move them away from the "old ways." Clearly, schools provide neither the order nor the challenge for students of the type exemplified by these two men.

STEPHEN J. FISCHER
Harvard University

Book Reviews

THE TEACHING HOSPITAL: EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES.

edited by John H. Knowles, M.D.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. 152 pp. \$4.50.

At first glance this little collection of the four 1965 Lowell Lectures on medical education may seem to be of only peripheral concern to the readers of a scholarly journal of education. Closer analysis, however, reveals the book to be significant on two accounts. First, since it is based upon data drawn from the experiences of the Massachusetts General Hospital, one of the outstanding university-affiliated teaching hospitals in the nation, and since each of the lecturers has held an important appointment in the Massachusetts General-Harvard Medical School complex, the book turns out to be the most sophisticated and authoritative comment that has yet appeared on the historical development of the teaching hospital and on its current problems. But what makes this little volume of particular interest to professional education is the fact that, for over ten years

now, those responsible for the graduate education of teachers have been casting self-conscious glances at the training of medical doctors as the best available model after which to pattern their clinical programs. For those of us trying to implement teaching internships, resident supervisorships, and most recently clinical professorships of education, therefore, *The Teaching Hospital*, since it is so authoritative, presents a fascinating opportunity to compare our own practices to the models from which they were borrowed. In the process, we should get some hints about whether we should revise our procedures, stick with them, or possibly abandon them and try a new tack. It is with this purpose in mind that I should like to review the book.

Let me approach this task by summarizing what appear to me to be the basic ingredients of the scheme for the clinical training of physicians and surgeons within the teaching hospital. The program is based on the assumption that medicine is an applied field, that is, an endeavor whose primary goal

is to use knowledge for the prevention and curing of disease. To achieve this goal, the medical profession must be organized to serve three functions: it must provide for patient care, that is, keep people from getting sick and cure those who are ill; it must seek to find and apply new knowledge about human health, the research and development component; and it must train personnel for a number of professional roles. Since the creation of new knowledge and its transmission are in this culture a primary task of universities, but since knowledge can only be applied in the community outside the school, what seems to be required if medicine is to achieve its goal is an institutional mechanism in which the university and the community can co-operate in implementing the tripartite functions of the profession. The teaching hospital is designed to be such an institution. Within its walls, patients are treated, experimentation is carried on to find new methods of treatment, and both researchers and clinicians are trained. This co-existence of patient-care, research and development, and training is critical to the induction of doctors into their professional roles, for since throughout his training the young physician is in systematic contact both with a wide variety of clinical practitioners and with a large number of persons engaged in different kinds of medical research and development, he not only gets a vision of "the profession as a whole," but he also is exposed to a wide variety of role models from which he may choose his own particular career.

Within the hospital the teaching ward is the central locus of the young doctor's clinical training. Though in the early part of this century undergraduate medical education was characterized by the personalized appren-

ticeship, in which a novice learned his calling largely from a single experienced master, that model has long since been abandoned in favor of a team approach to both patient-care and teaching. The system is carefully described by Dr. Paul Russell in his lecture on "Surgery in a Time of Change."

The ward includes a manageable number of patients placed under the care of a group of young physicians and surgeons of graded seniority. This group of doctors is a stable one with the same individuals working together as a team for at least some months at a time. They are closely supervised by senior men of much wider experience who are constantly available for consultation and who act as guarantors of the quality of the overall care of the patient. Consultants representing a wide range of special talents are freely available. (p. 58)

The typical membership of the team, whether in medical or surgical wards, in order of seniority, is: medical student (part time), intern, resident, and senior clinical professor. Two basic principles govern the activities of these individuals acting as a group: first, a very real delegation of responsibility, and second, a critical review or supervision of everything done by each junior member. Since it is assumed that clinical medicine can be learned only through active participation by the physician in training, no member is a mere observer. Each participant has his own different and carefully-graded responsibility. The medical student may be charged only with taking a history and doing a complete examination, for example, but this task is his personal responsibility and he carries it out always under the close supervision of an

intern or resident. The intern and resident, in turn, may be required to initiate or change therapy, but again only under the close scrutiny of the senior clinician who has the ultimate responsibility for all patients on the ward. Such a carefully integrated team approach apparently works very efficiently both to provide high quality patient care and to train new doctors. The careful review of each person's performance by his immediate superior apparently insures that mistakes are caught even though novices are directly involved in treatment.¹ The combination of constant supervision and carefully graded and assigned personal responsibility for tasks seems to be conducive to teaching and learning competence in the increasingly complex skills needed to practice medicine, and to the identification of particular competences, deficiencies, and interests.

These training outcomes seem so analogous to those to which we aspire in teacher education that it is no wonder that clinical personnel in graduate schools of education—in spite of lack of intimate knowledge of the operation of a teaching hospital—have seen the medical model as potentially applicable to their own programs. Indeed, as I read *The Teaching Hospital* I began underlining descriptions of the various schemes and writing marginal notations which said things like "Isn't there an analogue here?" or "Similar dilemma, why not similar approach?" Finally, having finished the book and, on reviewing it, finding a large number of such underscorings and comments, I found myself wondering what a clinical

training program in education would look like if instead of borrowing a few terms (like intern and clinical professor) and a fraction of a role model (releasing an experienced teacher from a couple of classes for purposes of supervision and calling him a resident supervisor, for example), we went whole-hog and tried to copy the training practices of the teaching hospital as closely as possible, given the different contexts of hospitals and schools. Would this likely provide more efficient clinical training? What obstacles might we face in implementing the model even if we did predict that its use ought to permit us to produce more highly skilled teachers?

Since the descriptions in *The Teaching Hospital* are so precise, reconstructing what this model would look like when applied to clinical training of educators in a secondary school is relatively simple. A small number of large comprehensive schools as close as possible geographically to a large school of education would take on an additional function as clinical training and research centers. Within each school, instead of the arrangements which now characterize our programs—the personalized apprenticeship (a part-time apprentice who teaches in the class of an experienced teacher) and the isolated internship (a full-time intern with his own classes under the more-or-less continual supervision of an experienced teacher)—we would have one or more teaching teams responsible for the instruction of the number of students presently taught in fifteen to twenty separate classes in a given subject area. The team would be made up of personnel varying in amounts and types of training experience. It would include apprentices (first-year teacher-trainees who are part-time in the school), interns (second-year graduate

¹Of ninety-seven deaths in a randomly selected recent year in one of the hospital's surgical services, only two were considered by a senior reviewing staff to have had any relation to the conduct of the operation itself (p. 59).

students full-time in the school), resident supervisors (full-time experienced teachers in the local schools), and a senior clinical professor who would have a joint appointment in the school and university. The team would be collectively responsible for designing curriculum materials and teaching them to the children assigned to its oversight. Various responsibilities for this overall task would be sub-delegated to members of the team on the basis of complexity. The administration of tests, the supervision of study, the conducting of small-group resource investigations, for example, might be the responsibility of apprentices. On the other hand, the giving of large lectures, the demonstration of complex discussion procedures, and the planning of major curriculum revisions would typically be initiated by resident teachers and the clinical professors. Careful supervision of junior members would be vital not only to promote quality of performance but equally important to facilitate learning the increasingly complex aspects of teaching. Although supervision would be a major responsibility of the resident teachers and the senior clinician, interns could also be assigned supervisory responsibility over some of the activities of apprentices. In any case, the main thrust of supervision would be the analysis of teaching, and there would be occasions where this analysis would be performed by all members of the group on the teaching of the residents and the clinical professor. Consultation services from the university would be available for any need, but presumably would be most useful in curriculum development and supervision problems. Doctoral and post-doctoral research internships would be useful vehicles for this purpose.

Utopian as such a scheme might

seem—and we shall have to examine in some detail just how unrealistic it is—one could claim it is likely to have a number of advantages over our current personalized apprenticeship or isolated internship models of clinical training. As in medicine, the team approach would seem to offer the opportunity for more efficient programming of the sophisticated skills involved in teaching, assuming that a way could be found to differentiate various teaching tasks on the basis of degrees of difficulty and complexity. The revised system would also both demand and facilitate more continuous and systematic supervision, and inadequate supervision is the most frequently cited weakness of our present training programs. Moreover, the team approach would seem to be more rational since it requires us to revise our present implicit conception of curriculum development and classroom teaching as separate activities to one which treats them as necessarily interrelated aspects of “teaching as a whole.” The student-teacher would be exposed to this more logical view throughout his training and quite likely much of the present disconnection between the theoretical curriculum courses and the practicum would be lessened. Indeed, it might be possible to arrange the topics in a methods course in such a way that they would integrate with the increasingly complex stages of the trainee’s clinical experience. Discussions of classroom management, awareness of pupil reactions, and questioning techniques might be appropriate topics for consideration during the apprenticeship, for example, whereas the analysis of classroom interaction, concept formation, and the selection and organization of content might be studied during or following the internship. Moreover, the continuous involvement of the young teacher

with scholars undertaking research and development would make him aware of a variety of possible role models.

One could also claim that the team arrangement would have distinct advantages for the secondary school in which it was instituted. By breaking down the isolation of the self-contained classroom, the team arrangement would place the participating teachers in continuous dialogue with fellow professionals discussing the wide range of teaching and learning problems in their subject field. Not only might this process provide an element of intellectual excitement now so frequently absent from the life of the five-classes-a-day career teacher, but it would constitute a mechanism whereby young teachers with unusual talents and competencies, particularly in curriculum development and supervision, could be identified and rewarded. By differentiating the many aspects of teaching, it might provide time and circumstances under which they could develop their special abilities more fully. If the system could be made to work efficiently it would produce for the school a model of excellent curriculum taught in superior fashion. In effect, in its curriculum-development function the team would seem to be a kind of in-school laboratory-center alternative to the schemes of external curriculum development currently being employed by several university projects and by private groups like Educational Services Incorporated. Finally, the model would inevitably require abandoning our present ridiculous assumption that teacher education and curriculum development are both terminable processes, the former ending with the granting of certification or tenure and the latter with the printing of a course of study. Instead, at least within the clinical school, we would be insuring

that both processes would be in fact as they are in theory, always developing in response to new knowledge.

But could a model borrowed this directly from medicine ever be made to work in education in spite of all the potential advantages one might be able to dream up for it? Do the faculty of teaching hospitals find inherent problems in trying to implement their ideas and would these inevitably carry over into a clinical school should we follow their lead? Are there other obvious and hidden obstacles peculiar to schools which would inevitably render the medical model inappropriate to teacher education?

The answers to these questions I submit are far from clear. It is apparent on reading *The Teaching Hospital* that there are difficulties inherent in this training model which would logically pertain to any context in which it was used. For one thing, it is understandably a very expensive scheme to operate, primarily because research, training, and patient care all must inevitably be planned and supervised by persons with relatively sophisticated degrees of training and competence, and procuring the services of such persons costs money. The numbers of professionals working at the Massachusetts General Hospital is positively astounding to the layman. If I read the figures correctly, the hospital in 1965 had approximately 1050 beds and employed 33 interns, 134 residents (a total of 167 house officers), and 260 research and clinical fellows (pp. 73 and 74). The ratio of M.D.'s to patients was in the order of 1 to 2½. To be sure, a considerable portion of the research and research-training salaries are paid by government and foundation grants. The research budget of the hospital is now approximately ten million dollars annually and in 1964 provided over

3½ million dollars in M.D. and research fellows salaries (pp. 27 and 131). But in that same year the hospital also paid 1½ million dollars, and the medical school an additional 374,000 dollars, in professional salaries exclusive of those paid to interns and residents, which required over ¾ million dollars more, this amount being met by charges to private patients (pp. 130-31). One could predict that the team approach would be more expensive in medicine than in education, since medical patients have to be treated individually whereas much teaching can be effectively done with groups of students. But there is no doubt that were we to adopt the medical model to teacher education, costs would rise markedly because members of local school staffs would have to be relieved of much of the time now spent directly instructing large groups of students in order to participate in supervision and research. Probably some of the additional expenses could be met by increased efficiency in the use of time which the team arrangement offers over the isolated teacher model. (It is surely economically inefficient to pay a \$9,000-per-year teacher to sit for one hour watching thirty students write an examination, for example.) It is also possible that public and foundation funds could be attracted to support curriculum and supervision research, but it is doubtful that these sources would compensate entirely for the increased expense. Thus one obstacle to adopting the medical training model would be that of finding financial means to support it.

A second, clearly, would be finding efficient and acceptable means of administering the new arrangement. Here again *The Teaching Hospital* is instructive. The most important difficulty in administering the medical model ap-

pears to be that of integrating the primary interests of the public community in having the hospital provide inexpensive and effective medical care with those of the university and the profession in having it offer optimal conditions for research and training. The two appear most obviously in conflict in making decisions about the allocation of resources. The increased emphasis on public welfare in the Great Society demands that more and more patients be treated better and better without significant increases in costs, while simultaneously the rapid advances in medical knowledge require the hospital to provide more sophisticated research and training. Thus on the one hand the political community may logically complain that many people are not getting adequate medical services *today* while at the same time doctors honestly contend that they are overburdened with demands for patient care and are unable to meet the great need both for new and better cures and for people capable of finding and applying them *tomorrow*. The administrative task of integrating university and community demands is exacerbated by the emotional predispositions of both the lay community and the doctors themselves. As Dr. John Knowles, Director of the Massachusetts General Hospital, notes, the American public tends to nourish a suspicion of intellectuals, to have a type of credit-minded satisfaction-guaranteed attitude, and to hold a belief that though social welfare should be publicly financed, local money-resources have now been pushed to their limits (p. 95). Moreover, the lay community tends to believe that high-quality medical care can be provided only under the direction of a single, widely experienced physician or surgeon. Despite fairly convincing evidence that the more flexible

and comprehensive resources available in the team model result in treatment superior to that given by private physicians, the "no-intern-is-going-to-deliver-my-baby" determination remains strongly intrenched (pp. 78-79). Consequently, with the ratio of ward to private patients decreasing steadily as a result of the spread of public and private health insurance, it is increasingly difficult for executives of the teaching hospital to find a sufficient number of "teaching patients" with whom to train the increasing number of doctors which the expanding population requires. For their part, the hospital's professional staff make the administrator's attempt to resolve his dilemmas more difficult by a naturally individualistic and anti-bureaucratic attitude. Doctors don't want to concern themselves with administrative problems and yet frequently resent the regulations promulgated by hospital administrators in an attempt to cope with such problems. Dr. Knowles quotes Everett Hughes' description of the medical profession with understandable sympathy: "The queen of the professions, medicine, is the avowed enemy of bureaucracy, at least a bureaucracy in medicine when other than physicians have a hand in it" (p. 89).

If one can generalize the experience at Massachusetts General, the problem of somehow reconciling the inherently conflicting interests of the university and the community will always be a paramount one as long as the teaching hospital attempts to serve both. But the tension which the persistence of the problem creates in the hospital is in some ways beneficial, particularly to doctors in training. For though neither the community nor the university is able to resolve the problems of the other, their need to find a *modus operandi* may occasion a dialogue from which

both may benefit. For the young doctor to train in an environment in which conflicts between community and profession are being worked out adds an element of realism which is presumably absent in the university-owned hospital.

A clinical school in a community near the university would likely have a similar advantage over a university-owned laboratory school. But like the teaching hospital, it would necessarily fall heir to the problems of integrating community and university demands and to the obstacles confronting administrators in so doing. Such difficulties are already obvious in our present relatively limited school-university co-operative ventures in teacher training and curriculum development. Similar to those in medicine, they center on the conflict between the university's logical need for optimal research and training conditions to provide for *tomorrow's* needs and the community's understandable desire for the best possible education for its children *today* at the lowest possible cost. They are evident in professional disputes about how much released time will be allowed for local supervisors and curriculum developers and who will pay for it, or in public complaints that this new curriculum will not prepare children adequately for college boards. As in medicine also, they are exacerbated by anti-intellectualism and the budget-consciousness of local communities as well as by public acceptance—at least in suburban communities—of the Mark-Hopkins-and-the-log image of good teaching. A number of highly vocal parents oppose having their youngsters taught experimental curricula or having them taught by interns, and many do not approve of team teaching. Since teaching, like medicine, is traditionally an individualistic profession, teachers, like doctors, have strong anti-bureau-

cratic feelings. Frequently, and understandably, they resist making agreements on what content is going to be taught how and resent the hours of committee meetings necessary to arrive at them. For their part, school principals sometimes contend that clinical professors and resident supervisors are too much concerned with research and development and not sufficiently occupied with the on-going instruction of children. Occasionally too, they express fear that any further extension of school-university cooperation will make the schools "prisoners of the university" and consequently, one suspects, reduce the power and status of the public school administrator. Given the evidence of these conflicts in our present highly limited school-university schemes, it seems only logical to predict that they would increase both in numbers and intensity were we to extend the teaching-hospital model to education.

Could we cope with these problems effectively enough to make the model work? *The Teaching Hospital* explains what would seem to be required. Professors of education would have to come out from behind the ivy-covered walls and agree to come to grips with the educational problems in the communities in which the clinical schools are located. This would mean taking time to find out about the problems, to engage in dialogue with school people, and if necessary with the public, about how better ways might be devised to cope with the problems. The school administrator would have to be willing to share decision-making with his teachers and they in turn must be willing to acquire sufficient knowledge of and sympathy with administrative problems so that they can and will share responsibility for policy-formation. The school administrator would also have

to be willing to work out careful yet not inflexible arrangements with the school of education governing the responsibility and support of *both* institutions for teaching, research, and training, and for the maintenance of the system of joint appointments which this kind of endeavor would require. Most important of all, both school and university personnel would have to have both the vision and the tolerance of frustration necessary to cope with the tensions that would inevitably accompany the attempt to apply the teaching-hospital model to education.

Securing adequate financial support and providing viable administration are problems inherent in the teaching-hospital model which would have to be faced no matter what the professional context to which it was applied. There is, however, an additional factor which must be considered in evaluating the feasibility of applying the medical scheme to the clinical training of teachers. It centers on the difference between education and medicine as applied fields of knowledge. Medical knowledge, and therefore medical technology, are inherently more exact than is knowledge in education. Physical disease is typically easier to diagnose than are learning difficulties. One can predict with more certainty the effects of treatment on a patient in a hospital than the results of teaching a child or group of children a certain curriculum according to a certain method. This critical difference between the two fields would inevitably complicate any effort to use the teaching hospital as a model for teacher training. Its principal effect, it seems to me, would be to make the link between research and training less natural and therefore more difficult to establish and maintain in a clinical school than in a teaching hospital. The specific resultant prob-

lems can be predicted. The relative looseness of educational knowledge makes it harder to differentiate the various tasks included in the act of teaching than is the case with those involved in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. Competence in teaching is thus harder to judge, and supervision more complex to apply. Consequently it is more difficult to make the team arrangement work to promote simultaneously more effective classroom learning (patient care) and more efficient professional training. Since it is less obvious that the pursuit of research is the *sine qua non* of excellence in education than in medicine, it is less possible to involve a school faculty in research than is the case with the staff of a teaching hospital. Similarly, the public in a local community, whose financial and policy views will necessarily circumscribe what can be done in the schools, has more faith in medical researchers than in "educationists." Most important of all, probably, school administrators are less apt than their counterparts in hospitals to believe that programatic research is essential to improvement in teaching, and thus they are more likely to see in-school research and training as running the danger of "sacrificing" the ongoing education of children, or at least they are inclined to favor only that research which has an immediate and obvious "payoff" which can be demonstrated to the public.

When one compounds these obstacles peculiar to education as a field with those which are apparently inherent in the teaching hospital as an institution, it would be easy to conclude that there is little hope of improving graduate teacher education by borrowing further from the seemingly more efficient clinical education of doctors. Such a hasty conclusion, however, would be far from

warranted for at least two reasons. The possible advantages in being able to improve the education of both children and teachers by integrating it closely with ongoing research seem far too great to be surrendered without ever really trying to attain them. Moreover, most of the obstacles which stand in the way of honestly exploring the utility of the medical model to education seem to be avoidable, or at least capable of being circumvented, if one could find money to try to establish the model and university and school people of sufficient good will and vision to attempt to implement it. Nor would such an exploration have to be conducted by attaching an entire school system to the research and training activities of a school of education. A relatively more modest pilot experiment could be attempted in a single school adapted for the purpose or, if one could provide physical accommodations with sufficient flexibility, within part of a department in an existing secondary school. If, compared to our present patterns of teacher education, the clinical training of doctors is as sound and dynamic as one would gather from reading *The Teaching Hospital*, such a project would be well worth undertaking. I, for one, would welcome participating in it.

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UNIVERSITIES: BRITISH, INDIAN, AFRICAN.
A STUDY IN THE ECOLOGY OF HIGHER
EDUCATION.

by Eric Ashby, in association with Mary
Anderson.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1966. xiii + 558 pp. \$12.95.

Sir Eric Ashby is probably better qualified than any other living person to

write on the subject he has chosen. His experience is unique: having taught for thirteen years first in Sydney, then in Manchester, he enjoyed, in a more literal sense than most people would, a successful tenure as Vice-Chancellor of Queen's University, Belfast—no bed of roses. He is now Master of Clare College, Cambridge, and a member of the University Grants Committee, the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas and the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy. From 1958 to 1960 he was chairman of the "Ashby Commission" which laid down the lines of future university development in Nigeria. More important than all this, he has an incisive mind, an intense concern for problems of higher education—especially in Africa—and he can write.

The present work—on which Sir Eric has been assisted by Dr. Mary Anderson, a historian and pupil of the late Dame Lillian Penson—will be indispensable for all concerned with higher education in Africa and other parts of the underdeveloped world, especially those parts in which English is the language of higher education. Africa, though this is not immediately apparent from the title, is the main theme. The first two parts—*Part One, The Setting*, dealing with the European background and some early transplantations, and *Part Two, India*—between them occupy less than two-fifths of the text (143 out of 375 pages). The remainder is devoted to *Part Three, Africa*. In addition, the 73-page *Documents* section—which is of great historical importance—consists entirely of documents bearing on the history of higher education in Africa; in the fourteen-page bibliography, nearly ten pages are concerned with Africa. "The core of the book," as the introduction states, "is a history and analysis of ideas

about university education in the English-speaking countries of tropical Africa" (p. x).

As this would suggest, the opening sections, though they do contain much of intrinsic interest, are intended mainly to contribute to a deeper understanding of the contemporary problem of adapting the "European-model" university so that it may function effectively in drastically different environments, especially those of Africa.

Part One consists of two chapters: a brief one on the historical background—the medieval university, its later national differentiations, and early transplantations in the Americas—and a longer one on the development of a "model for export" from Britain in the nineteenth century. Sir Eric here examines two nineteenth-century export models, concerning which he has some relevant experience—those of Ireland, the Queen's Colleges; and Australia, the Universities of Sydney and Melbourne. In this section Sir Eric gives an early demonstration of his remarkable capacity for inter-relating and using, with shrewd discrimination, his varied educational experience and wide-ranging sympathies. If his knowledge of the nineteenth-century background helps him—and through him the reader—to understand contemporary developments and controversies, conversely the part he has played in contemporary affairs gives him a keener hindsight into the nineteenth-century arguments and their outcome than an ordinary historian, lacking practical experience of what is in reality a continuing controversy, would be likely to achieve; it is a good example of practice enriching theory, and vice versa. The present reviewer was particularly struck by Sir Eric's capacity for inter-relating his Irish and his African experience and interests. Thus

he quotes the following statement of the mid-nineteenth-century Irish-Catholic educational reformer, Thomas Wyse:

The national intellect, waste but fertile, should be brought into cultivation, and another people, truly such and not as they hitherto have been, too frequently a populace, should be raised up, out of the wrecks and lees of the past. England owes us this atonement for her former misrule and spoliation; she it was who made us and kept us ignorant. (p. 29)

He relates this very appropriately (pp. 163 and 455) to the appeal made by the Negro educational reformer, Edward Blyden, to the administrator-in-chief of Sierra Leone:

Europeans owe us a great debt, not only for the unrequited physical labours we have performed in all parts of the world, but for the unnumbered miseries and untold demoralization they have brought upon Africa by the prosecution for centuries of the horrible traffic to promote their own selfish ends; and we feel that we do not simply ask it as a favour but claim it as a right when we entreat their aid as civilized and Christian Governments in the work of unfettering and enlightening the Negro mind, and placing him in a position to act well his part among the "productive agencies" of time. (p. 455)

Sir Eric notes the unusual sympathy with which the administrator-in-chief received and transmitted this appeal for an African university, but does not explicitly remark that the administrator in question, John Pope-Hennessy, came from the class for which Wyse spoke, so that Blyden's appeal happen-

ed also to be an *argumentum ad hominem*. The Anglican Bishop of Sierra Leone and his colleagues, who bitterly resented the Blyden-Hennessy combination and its effect in speeding up—a very relative term—the development of African higher education, saw clearly the relevance of Hennessy's antecedents, as documents quoted in this volume show. "I sincerely hope," wrote the Principal of Fourah Bay College in June, 1873, "that Mr. Gladstone will not send out any more red-hot Papists to this colony..." (p. 466). Thus the documents Sir Eric cites not merely validate the *theoretical* cross-relation which he makes, but demonstrate its *practical* significance at a critical moment in the history of the development of African higher education. This particular cross-relation—of which more, in an appropriate context, might be said—happens to be of particular interest to the present reviewer; I have no doubt that an Australian would find it equally rewarding to follow up and develop some of Sir Eric's Australian analogies.

Part Two, India tells the grim and pathetic story of the expansion and decline of higher education in the subcontinent. Sir Eric is especially interested in, and subtly analyzes, the debate between "anglicists" and "orientalists" in the early nineteenth century. To say that this debate is between those who stress the need for "European standards" and those who stress the need for "adaptation to environment" is to state it crudely, but does at least identify the enduring polarizing factors in a complex, shifting and still continuing debate. Among leading British educationalists in the mid-twentieth century, Sir Eric has been the most favourable to "adaptation"—without, however, going to extreme lengths in that direction—and in the

Indian debate his sympathies are clearly with the "orientalists" rather than with the "anglicists," with John Stuart Mill rather than with James Mill and Macaulay. He is, as always, wary—and sometimes astringent—about those who, like Macaulay, are absolutely sure that they know what is best for "the native," and he listens thoughtfully to what the natives themselves have to say. He quotes R. S. Trivedi: "Western education has given us much, we have been great gainers; but there has been a cost, a cost as regards culture, a cost as regards respect for self and reverence for others, a cost as regards the nobility and dignity of life" (p. 116).

What the Indian said in wistful and restrained language to the Calcutta University Commission in 1918, a Negro had written in Africa more than forty years before, in a language more often heard today:

All educated Negroes suffer from a kind of slavery in many ways far more subversive of the real welfare of the race than the ancient physical fetters. The slavery of the mind is far more destructive than that of the body. But such is the weakness and imperfection of human nature that many even of those who bravely fought to remove the shackles from the *body* of the Negro transfer them to his *mind* with as little compunction as ever Hawkins or Da Souza prosecuted the slave-trade; and do not feel themselves called upon to give the slightest attention to questions like these. (Blyden to Hennessy, December 11, 1872; pp. 454-55)

Although Sir Eric Ashby has shown himself distinctly more attentive to voices like those of Trivedi and Blyden than was the British colonial tradition, he also allows fair scope to the arguments of the anglicists. There was

some force in what they said—and they could certainly have said to Blyden that if he wanted an African university, and if he meant a real university with internationally recognizable standards, then he was asking for more "mental enslavement," not less. But whatever they might have said, it was what the administration did that mattered and what it did in India was, while continuing to talk about standards, to let them go catastrophically down and stay down. In school and university, the Indians got the worst of both worlds—an education "anglicized" in form and content but "Indianized" in standard—"Indianized," that is, not in the sense of what serious Indian thinkers asked, but in terms of the economic and political pressures of the sub-continent: poverty at the base of all, popular illusions about the power of a diploma, demagoguery and intrigue on one side, lethargy and cynicism on the other. The result would have appalled Macaulay even more than Trivedi. In language which is to mine as Trivedi's is to Blyden's, Sir Eric sums up:

Anyone who studies the story of the universities in India since 1857 cannot escape the conclusion that the system of higher education inherited at independence from the British raj was dangerously weak in three ways: (i) During British rule we failed to set and maintain the quality of teaching and the standards of achievement essential to a university if its degree is to be freely acceptable in universities overseas. (ii) We failed to devise, and to persuade Indians to accept, a content of higher education suited to India's social and economic needs. (iii) We failed to establish patterns of academic government and relations between

universities and the state, which would accord to universities that degree of autonomy without which they cannot serve society properly. (p.138)

As if feeling that, on the subject of the standards of Indian universities, the British technique of understatement is not adequate, he adds: "At independence the Indians inherited in their universities a massive invalid, unable to respond to any simple treatment" (p. 139).

"Out of our partial failure in India," writes Sir Eric, "grew our partial success in Africa." It was natural, and fortunate for Africans, that the dreadful example of the Indian universities stiffened the determination of those responsible for African university policy not to dilute the quality of education and not to lower standards. It was also natural, though less logical and beneficial, that this example should have led them to resist, or under-emphasize, the need for "adaptation." If "adaptation" meant what had happened in India, then it was something any serious educator would seek to avoid. The Asquith Commission (1945), with its high emphasis on "standards" and relatively low emphasis on "adaptation," seems to have had the Indian "warning" in mind. Yet of course what had happened in India was not at all what the "orientalists" had meant, or what serious Africanists sought: the intelligent adaptation of curricula and methods to meet the needs of the local environment. There were those who almost instinctively felt—it comes through in many a guarded phrase in reports, and less guarded phrases in letters—that the local environment was of its nature hostile to true education, that the fewer concessions made to it the better, and that the thing to do was to stand against it and beat it. There

might have been something to say for this philosophy, if it had animated a vigorous higher educational effort in Africa in the mid-nineteenth century, which it did not, because there was no such effort. Two reasons why higher education was deemed suitable at a much earlier stage for Indians than for Africans are indicated in a revealing letter of May 7, 1873, from the Principal of Fourah Bay College, commenting on the Blyden proposals:

The introduction of India and its universities into the letters in 'Negro' [sic] is neither here nor there . . . for they forget that the Hindoo has just as good claims to Caucasian origin as we have ourselves—and also that they have existing evidence of a civilization and literature many hundred years before the name of Anglo-Saxon even appeared in History . . . (p. 465)

The paradoxical effect of this concept was that Africa, getting its universities later than India, got them better-planned and established on more generous lines and that their "non-Caucasian" graduates are much better educated than most of their—vastly more numerous—nominal equivalents among the "Caucasians" of the sub-continent. Of the products of the African colleges, set up on lines recommended by the Asquith Commission, Sir Eric—otherwise highly critical both of the Commission and the College—has this to say: "Within ten years the colonial colleges [in Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda and what is now Ghana, and later in other areas] had earned their hallmarks of excellence. Their graduates carried away the modern equivalent of *ius ubique docendi*" (p. 235).

The period of the introduction of higher education to Africa, and the concomitant "anglicist" emphasis, was a period in which the imminent end of

the colonial system was clearly foreseen; indeed documents here published for the first time, and Sir Eric's own comments, make clear that it was this foresight which stimulated both the introduction of higher education and the "anglicist" emphasis thereon. As early as 1933 the Currie Report "saw," as Sir Eric surmises it, "serious political trouble and a very real danger of alienating enlightened African opinion unless adequate provision were promptly made for the growing demand for higher education in Africa." The Currie Report itself, first published here in the *Documents* section (pp. 476-81), makes clear that the long shadow of Uncle Sam was falling on the colonial scene even at this early date:

It seems indefensible, for example, that the Gordon College [Khartoum] should, at all events until very recently, have had to rely substantially upon the American University at Beirut for the advanced training of natives needed for its own staffing. From another, and slightly different point of view it appears equally indefensible that intelligent Africans from the Gold Coast should most easily obtain further training of a University type by taking advantage of American bounty and American institutions. On the political difficulties and the economic disabilities inherent in such a position continuing, it is not necessary to enlarge. (pp. 477-78)

Nothing, or almost nothing, came of the Currie Report, in itself; as Sir Eric points out, the Report "was not even before the Asquith Commission which largely reiterated Currie's findings twelve years later" (p. 197). But the factors faintly reflected in the Currie Report made themselves more forcefully felt as the years went by. The

Channon Report (1943), also first published here (*Documents*, pp. 492-524), explicitly connects the need to speed on higher education with the probability of approaching independence:

During the present war the British Government has emphasized that the guiding principle of the colonial policy is that the Colonies shall become increasingly self-governing as the degree of their development makes the carrying out of this policy possible. These public pronouncements of policy will lead the colonial peoples rightly to expect that active help in their own development will come from Great Britain after the war. There is no doubt that there will be a spontaneous and vigorous impulse for self-development among the colonial peoples in the immediate post-war period and preparations must be made to satisfy this impulse. Long-term plans must be made now so that the course of future events may as far as possible be pre-determined. Unless such plans are so prepared, pressure of events will later compel action to be taken, and action under pressure lacks the ordered sequence necessary to success. (p. 495)

The very success of our own propaganda leaves us with no option but to go forward; we must, however, go forward constructively and without hurry, giving the lead rather than being pressed into action. The psychological value of the present attitude of mind both at home and abroad is great; at home, there is a new consciousness of our obligations, and in the colonies pronouncements such as that of the Atlantic Charter, have led to expectations. Advantage

must be taken of the new outlook at home, and the expectations of the Colonies must be moulded to fruitful and constructive purpose. (p. 523-4)

(The apparent cynicism of some of these remarks—as for example that about “the success of our propaganda”—may to some extent be discounted. There is nothing that philanthropic men like better than to use fiendishly Machiavellian arguments to advance altruistic purposes. The remarks are significant, I think, for their bearing not so much on the intent of their authors as on the administrative climate in which they were expected, by people with experience of that climate, to be effective. This does not detract from, but adds to, their historic importance.)

For the relation of the foresight of independence to the “anglicist” emphasis the most explicit source is Sir Eric himself:

But it was not solely on grounds of expediency and suitability that the pattern adopted was British. There was a political motive too. Thirty years ago Sadler was astute enough to urge that Britain should retain an intellectual influence over universities in her dependencies; and as self-rule for the colonies drew in sight, the British government saw how universities in the British tradition would become valuable entry-points where British ideas could flow into the newly independent states. Adaptation, therefore, was not prominently in the minds of those who transplanted higher education overseas. (p. 225)

I am very glad that these words did not appear in print at the time when my colleagues and myself were doing

our best to defend the autonomy of the University of Ghana—a product of the Asquith Commission, and an anglicist, anglophile, and anglomaniac foundation—against the onslaughts of the Convention People's Party urging its own peculiar form of “adaptation.” I can hear, in my mind's ear, the shrieks of joy with which, in Nkrumah's time, the Accra “Press Club,” then dominated by the *Spark* group, would have greeted these avowals—final and irrefutable proof of the “neo-colonialist” intent of the African university system. There are other avowals to delight their hearts: for example, Lord Hardinge's breezy dictum (1846) that “the Government ought to have the power of direct control and interference in all the affairs of the University” (p. 55); the application of this principle in India by Curzon as a *reform measure* at the turn of the century (Chapter V); the Indian Government's proposal, at the same time, that the governor-general in council should have power to suspend the University constitution (p. 91); and finally, Sir Eric's comment on the last proposal: “Half a century later the British academic world was shocked when Dr. Nkrumah, as chancellor of the University of Ghana, assumed to himself powers more modest than these, though somewhat similar to them” (p. 140).

God's plenty, for amateurs of neo-colonialist hypocrisy.

Some general comments, inspired by Sir Eric's book, in its relation to my own experience, may be in order at this stage.

First, the proof is here that the neo-colonialist intent—to dominate through education after political domination was no longer feasible—was not just a paranoid myth of the colonized, as is often suggested, but was a reality in

the minds of colonial planners. What the point of it all was is another matter. The pat answer—"control of the resources of the continent"—doesn't really fit. You don't have to create an African Cambridge in order to control the price of cocoa; in fact you don't have to go near Africa at all. "Educational neo-colonialism" has, I believe, more to do with habit, sentiment, power, glory, self-importance, meddlesomeness, and even decency than it has with money. I cite "decency" as a motive of individuals: that it did not weigh very heavily in the making of the relevant government decisions is clear from the timing of the decision to set up universities in Africa, and its motivation as explained in the documents which Sir Eric cites.

The very fact that no British Government gave serious thought to higher education for the African colonies until it became clear that the period of British rule was nearing its end is hard to reconcile with the more benevolent interpretations of the colonial period. And the fact that the independence movement provided the stimulus for the provision of higher education is an answer to those who at the time used to counsel against "impatience" and in favour of "adequate preparation." Had it not been for "impatience," preparation would simply have started *later*, as in the Congo, with the results we know.

Second, Africans are wise to suspect neo-colonialist intent in any proposals made for their apparent benefit, and to satisfy themselves that they are really beneficial *to them* before accepting them.

Third, Africa needed, and still needs, universities, and these, if they are not to be merely wasteful prestige-items—of which Africa has more than enough—need to be real universities, provid-

ing the conditions that hold and attract teachers of high quality—many of whom must for some time come from outside Africa—and enable them to work effectively. This entails the defence of standards, freedom of teaching and research, and a reasonable measure of university autonomy. To break down these defences is not to "weaken neo-colonialism" (the price of cocoa will in no way be affected); it is to weaken Africa by a general deterioration of all education, of which the university sets the standard.

Fourth, the "neo-colonialist anglicists" provided these defences with a built-in weakness by linking standards, academic freedom, and university autonomy with British values and symbols. This made it an automatic reflex for many African nationalists to be against standards, etc., which they assumed to be a cover-up for something else. (Some of the most vocal "African nationalists" had, however, a curious taste for "anglicist" symbolism. Thus, Mr. Kwaku Boateng, Minister for Education in Ghana and Chairman of the University Council, who took the view that the constitution of the University was automatically amendable by Presidential Command, was at the same time as staunch a supporter of High Tables and academic gowns as the most archaic of "anglicists" could wish.) Sir Eric is absolutely right in insisting on the need for "adaptation." Only intelligent and thorough "adaptation" could have prevented what happened: the drive for crude, precipitate, and educationally ruinous "adaptation" in such forms as the attempt to put the University of Ghana under the tutelage of the Convention People's Party.

Fifth, since Africa's history was not such as to enable her to start her own universities, outside help was neces-

sary, and remains necessary, though perhaps in a diminishing degree. That this help was not entirely disinterested, Sir Eric's documents show. That help from any other outside quarter would be any more disinterested is doubtful. That it would be less effective I am inclined by experience to believe. With one or two brilliant exceptions—notably a Czech agronomist with a gift for relevant adaptation—the Eastern Europeans who taught in Ghana tended to be heavily handicapped by linguistic difficulty and also, even when in time they partly surmounted that difficulty, by a sort of ingrown discretion, giving a noncommittal turn to whatever it was they finally managed to utter. I cannot feel that this trait can have been helpful in the classroom. They also tended, with the same exceptions, to find the environment more improbable even than some of the Westerners did: to be more homesick, and to betray a kind of elementary provincial racism in ways which even Westerners of similar outlook took care to eschew (e.g., on hearing a statement by an African, to remark, "He's quite intelligent," in a tone of surprise and within the hearing of the object of the comment. This particular social feat was performed by an ambassador, not a teacher, but I knew teachers of the same nationality who would have had difficulty in understanding that the remark could have been found offensive.) Most of them found it hard to adapt and of those who did, some did so to excess, like that Hungarian teacher at the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Ideology at Winneba, who later wrote a preface to a book by Colonel Afrifah, one of the officers who ousted Nkrumah. As for the Chinese Communists, there were none teaching at the University of Ghana because, despite their supposedly boundless desire to

infiltrate, they showed no interest in sending anyone. When I asked a distinguished visitor, the Director of the Tientsin Opera, whether they could let us have an instructor for our Drama School, I received a traditionally haughty reply: "Chinese theatre very old. Many thousand years. Persons interested Chinese theatre—come China."

So it seems that African universities will have to continue to draw the help they need in the main from the universities of Britain, France, and the United States. They may suspect the motives—and will often be right to do so—but they need the help. For the English-speaking African countries, only Britain and America are in a position to make a significant contribution. Here, Sir Eric Ashby is in a pivotal position. Unlike many of his British colleagues, he neither underestimates American education nor at any time sought to exclude its influence from the African scene. On the contrary, he finds the "land-grant philosophy" more relevant to Africa's needs than either the Oxbridge or the Redbrick model. His criticisms of the Asquith Commission are in this sense, and the report of the Ashby Commission (on Nigerian university expansion) reflects in some degree his preoccupation with this and other forms of "adaptation." Sir Eric thus stands at the point where Britain, America, and Africa meet, educationally. It is a conjuncture at which all his remarkable qualities of mind and character are needed and are likely to be tested. For if the rise of American influence in African higher education is in many ways to be welcomed—Sir Eric is quite right about the relevance of the "land-grant philosophy" and the extension work connected with it—it also, like most other massive phenomena, brings with it certain dangers. British intellectual

neo-colonialism, after all, is now usually limited, in places like West Africa, to enrichment of the local store of fetishes in such shapes as academic gowns and pictures of the Dear Queen. American neo-colonialism, obviously, is more dynamic, and potentially more destructive. There is no doubt that American educators, having projects for African higher education to "sell" to decision-makers, find that their best "pitch" is to say that their project is a sovereign remedy against communism. Where the Englishman Currie presented the idea of an African university as a measure to keep out the Yanks, today American decision-makers are liable to see aid to universities as a way to keep out the Russians or the Chinese or—more plausibly—their local emulators. The trouble is that anti-communist zeal is quite as capable of destroying an African university as is African nationalist zeal. To take a concrete example, if that American university which recently confessed to having provided an academic cloak for C.I.A. activity in another country had been hindered in this exercise, it would no doubt have raised the cry of "academic freedom in danger." In doing so, it would of course have given the idea of academic freedom, in the whole of the under-developed world, a deadly blow. The danger of such academic perversions, usually in less glaring and provable forms, is real. Academic freedom in Africa will not be safe unless it is something which its most articulate foreign sponsors not merely commend to Africans but also respect themselves in practice, even where it hurts most, like allowing a card-carrying member of the Communist Party to continue to teach political science to African undergraduates in an American-aided university. Practice, inevitably, will be mixed. What the mixture

will be—how much real contribution to education, including the maintenance of standards, etc., and how much politics in the guise of education—will be determined to a considerable degree by the decisions and advice of individuals. No man is better qualified, better disposed or better placed to keep the genuine educational content at the maximum attainable than is Sir Eric Ashby. This book well reflects the nature and quality of his concern.

I have not judged it appropriate, in this review, to comment in any detail on that part of the book which deals with the period of my own tenure (1962-65) as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana. Here, the published sources on which Sir Eric necessarily relied are in a few respects misleading. Any reader who may be interested will find my comments in "Correspondence, Autonomy, and Academic Freedom in Britain and Africa."¹

As the defence of standards is a great part of the subject of Ashby's book, and of this review, it is the reviewer's concluding duty to point out that the standard of proofreading is worthy neither of the work itself nor of the distinguished imprint under which it appears.

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SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP
AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT
IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
WORLD.

by Barrington Moore, Jr.

Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. xx +
559 pp. \$10.00.

I am glad there are still people willing to spend ten years writing a book. Reviewing Moore's *magnum opus* over a

¹ *Minerva*, V, No. 1 (Autumn 1966), 89-92.

Christmas vacation is laying profane hands on it.

Moore's fundamental point is that all industrialization starts in agrarian societies, and agrarian societies differ a great deal among themselves. The political context of modernization is thus set by the relations of the developing industrial and commercial groups to the agrarian groups. At the same time, the varying rural social structures generate new political forces as commercialization hits them. This fundamental point is well taken, and it is too much ignored in current studies of modernization.

The book is an attempt at comparative agrarian political history during industrialization, with the object of explaining the origins of the main political forms of industrial society: capitalist democracy, fascism, and communism. He treats the capitalist democracies of England, France, and the United States; the communism of China; the fascism of Japan; and ends with an essay on the difficulties of democracy in India. These are supplemented by concluding theoretical essays. Throughout there are comparative references to German and Russian parallels and contrasts.

Very briefly and schematically, we can outline the argument as follows. For the capitalist democratic variant, the power of the landed upper classes over peasants must be broken. This may take place, as in the United States Civil War and the French Revolution, by a coalition of developing capitalist interests with an independent property-owning peasantry. Or it may take place as in England by the rural upper class becoming thoroughly capitalist and driving peasants off the land, removing the problem of controlling peasants from the worries of rural landowners. The fascist variant involves a coalition

between the capitalists and rural landowners, both oriented toward the maintenance of their authority and privileges against their respective lower classes. An authoritarian landlord bureaucracy impoverishes democratic political life, preparing the ground for fascist totalitarianism when the technical means are provided by growing industrial capacity. Communism arises when an agrarian bureaucratic state, having maintained a dependent bourgeoisie and having tried to manage modernization with corrupt and inefficient traditional officials, gives up the ghost. The agrarian bureaucracy declines when it cannot control peasants, who are set in motion by commercialization and the decay of the old order, and usually also by defeat in war.

This outline of the origins of varying political structures of industrial society seems to me to be broadly sound. American political sociology has overemphasized the mass petty bourgeois base of fascist movements and underemphasized the useful services to fascist governments provided by landed reactionaries. Moore follows the current overemphasis on the peasant character of communist revolutions. The significance of the peasants is mainly, I think, not in favoring a new government but in making it impossible for the old regime to govern. Communist armies and, secondarily, workers' movements have been more important in construction of communist governments; any positive popularity they may have had among peasants is a secondary, and in the long run dispensable, resource. They have depended on the peasants to cut the foundation out of the old regime.

Moore argues his thesis by a type of historical methodology which is relatively rare. It has been developing among the more historical sociologists,

such as Reinhard Bendix, and some of the more sociological historians, such as Crane Brinton, during the past two or three decades. It consists of studying from three to perhaps ten cases of historical development in which something like "the same process" is manifest. Each of these cases is studied in sufficient detail, usually on the basis of secondary sources rather than new analyses of original data, until the causes of similarities and variations in the process seem manifest to the author. The book then consists, in each of the cases, of an historical argument in which the thesis about the causes of its course of development is argued. Appended is a theoretical argument about the main sources of variation, derived from the arguments about the cases. This is a particularly difficult methodology to handle, but it does have the advantage of bringing out the author's presuppositions, because so much of the book is his judgments about causes rather than evidence on causes. Let me specify some of the presuppositions, which seem to me either false or dubious, that affect Moore's historical judgments.

First, Moore seems to think that a reactionary political stance among agrarians must stem from a group of rich oppressors. He also seems to think that without being oppressed by rural overlords, rural proprietors will not be radical. But in one of his societies, France, there are now both communist and right wing small holding areas, with few oppressing landlords in either. The national political complexion of peasant movements cannot be predicted very well from the concrete interests of peasants, because the connection in rural minds between national policy and agricultural interests is vague and precarious. The vote of rural areas can often be interpreted as

a vote against the national government's policy of not bringing rain. Both radical and conservative governments sometimes follow this policy.

A second presupposition is that a soldier in a communist army is primarily a member of his class, while a soldier in a warlord's or nation's army is primarily a soldier. I believe we have all been deceived by communist rhetoric on this point. The devices for controlling the actions of a soldier are not so different between Mao and Chiang as to make the problem of management radically distinct, or very "political," in either case. Once the problem is formulated in this way, and we ask why communists in China were better warlords than the warlords themselves, matters take on a different hue. I think the key to communist victory in China was the superior capacity of the communists to control both officers of physically dispersed units and bureaucrats collecting taxes in villages. Ideological unity and discipline of an officer corps was never really achieved by Chiang.

A third presupposition seems to be that feudalism and other landlord-dominated political systems can be changed significantly only by violence. Every reform within them is, for Moore, temporizing, a sign of weakness which will be repealed in time of strength. We note that in this book there are no weak democratic governments: just weak kings and weak landlords. I would urge that most feudal governments were as aware as most modern democratic governments that the coalition on which they were constructed was precarious. It is also interesting to note that Moore has weak kings causing the growth of the powers of parliament in England, but causing revolution in France and China. "Weak" must be much more concretely

described before it is an analytic category rather than a convenient label to pin on a government that later gets defeated.

A fourth presupposition, explicitly stated on page 469, is that peasants almost always live in reasonably large villages. The detailed studies of Folke Dövring for Europe, and the American experience, suggest wide variation in the size of agricultural settlements, hamlets, or villages. Moore's own treatment of the West of France shows this variation. It has been suggested (among others, by André Siegfried) that large agricultural villages respond most rapidly to democratic and revolutionary currents, while dispersed settlements or small hamlets permit landlord domination or influence of small-town commercial classes. The concentration of peasant anarchism in Spain, Southern Italy, the southern Balkans, and South Russia, exactly where peasant settlements are very large, suggests that this preconception may have deprived Moore of an important explanatory principle.

A fifth presupposition is that statistics cannot tell one much. It is clear from the errors in elementary arithmetic on pages 104 and 150 that statistics will not tell Moore much. A number of religions are based on reading human incompetence into the nature of the universe, but not many sciences advance by that strategy.

In sum, I think Moore's book is basically right, but wrong in several detailed, interpretive principles. It is a very good introduction to the politics of modernization, better than most books that claim that subject. And in fact, the individual chapters are good introductions to the political history of the countries treated.

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THE HISTORIAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO
ANGLO-AMERICAN MISUNDERSTANDING:
REPORT OF A COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
BIAS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HISTORY
TEXTBOOKS.

by Ray Allen Billington, with the
collaboration of C. P. Hill, Angus J.
Johnstone II, C. L. Mowat, and
Charles F. Mullett.

*New York: Hobbs, Dorman &
Company, Inc., 1966. 118 pp. \$3.50.*

Textbooks ought to be the finest books written. The older generation owes this to their progeny. Knowledge and understanding can be developed only from the firmest of foundations, and the textbook in most subjects is the staple diet from which all else follows. The teacher's actions and words may well be activated by pressures of the moment, formulated by disciplinary demands, or inhibited by personal weaknesses. But each child has a textbook; it is to be referred to, read and re-read and thought about. Because it is in print it receives the accolade of truth. What a responsibility to be a textbook writer!

All too often the texts fall short. At one time this was attributable to a failure in presentation—pages crammed with small print which made Sir Walter Scott unpalatable for life. Madison Avenue techniques have helped there. For the history teacher few textbooks approach a topic as he, or she, would wish; they are too dry, too simple, too political, or what you will. It is not so apparent that the book is biased, especially if one's own bias is that of the author. We expect newspapers to be slanted, but not "factual" textbooks. We forget that the very titles often pre-judge the issue—*Land of the Free, History of a Free People, Our Free Nation*. No historian in selecting and commenting on his data can hope to achieve objectivity. E. H. Carr says that

even "the facts of history cannot be purely objective, since they become facts of history only in virtue of the significance attached to them by the historian,"¹ and he is a shaped product of his own times who cannot erase his current prejudices entirely when writing about the past.

One of the most insidious expressions of bias is that of nationalism. Professor Billington and his committee have investigated the presentation of three events common to the history of Great Britain and the United States: the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and World War I. The inquiry was made under the auspices of the British Association for American Studies and the Historical Associations of both America and England and Wales. Fourteen American and twenty-eight British secondary school texts were selected and five forms of bias, based on definitions in E. H. Dance's *History the Betrayer: A Study of Bias*,² were studied.

These were: the bias of inertia, or the failure of textbook writers to keep abreast of modern scholarship and their willingness to perpetuate myth; unconscious falsification, the inability to view events from other than a local or national viewpoint, a failure which leads to silly generalisations about amorous Frenchmen or inscrutable Chinese; bias by omission, whereby, for example, a recital of battles won and silence on those lost can lead to false conclusions; bias in use of language, witness the distinction between a *crowd* and a *mob*, a *patriot* and a *rebel*; and finally, bias by cumulative implication, whereby a sense of national superiority is fostered which

denies due recognition of international forces.

An impressive array of evidence is produced to cause alarm and despondency among historians and educators alike. The findings are telling:

Several [texts] commonly used in Junior High schools of the United States are so blatantly nationalistic that they seem designed to propagandize rather than instruct. (p. 30)

[N]ot a single textbook among those most widely used in American high schools is free of mis-statement, questionable word choice, nuances of language, the cumulative presentation of evidence in a manner favouring one side or another, and the selection of facts that glorify America at the expense of Britain. (p. 44)

We will dispose of the British textbooks first. Only twelve of the twenty-eight texts were editions published in the 1960's—all the American texts were of that era. This is indicative of the traditional British attitude toward texts. History books are dowdy, colorless, and ill thought out compared with the American product. Visual attractions are too often despised as unintellectual. Teachers use texts sparingly, substituting lectures which may or may not be better informed. Despite the excuses offered in this report, inspired textbook material is needed in Britain—as well as other audio-visual aids.

British authors are indicted for the bias of omission. The War of 1812, if mentioned at all, is dismissed in a few sentences. The American contribution to World War I is similarly, and less excusably, ignored by writers who rush to heap glory on the victorious Tommies. (American writers take revenge

¹ E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 159.

² (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

by failing to recognize British and Commonwealth activity in the Pacific War, 1942-45.) The classroom perpetuates British ignorance of American history. Fortunately, interest in American studies is growing; university departments are developing and more American history is being taught in the schools.

The American history textbook is a different species. It is a manual of citizenship; and in addition to history, it embodies moral and political truths deemed essential. Britain, an old nation with a comparatively homogeneous population, does not require such an obvious device; the inherent conservatism of her teachers is enough. American authors are under pressure—from state adoption boards, from religious or ethnic groups, and even politicians—to produce history which will instill a patriotic view of the United States.

In viewing the committee's findings, I wonder whether they over-insist on the need for texts to reflect recent scholarship. Not only is the bulk indigestible, but the findings are often contrary. The views on Burgoyne, Howe and Germain, distributing blame equally for the defeat at Saratoga (pp. 42, 54), do not square with those of Piers Mackesy in *The War for America*.³ Their defence, by implication, of Charles Townshend is hardly sustained by John Brooke and Sir Lewis Namier in *Charles Townshend*.⁴

Again, have scholars finally decided how beneficial the Navigation Acts were to the colonists? Of course, the Namier findings of 1930 ought to be incorporated into a view of George III, but revisionism is a galloping business, and the textbook writer is hard

pressed to keep up. Bias of inertia is more complex than the committee implies.

Further, there is a possible conflict between a school and a college view of history, summed up conveniently by the use of sayings such as "George, be King!" (p. 32), advice from a fond mother, or Ethan Allen's demand that Ticonderoga surrender "in the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress" (p. 40). Such phrases are memorable; there is evidence, even if it is not impeccable, that the words were used, and in the context, I do not see how they contribute to national bias. The advice to George III is sound, and a soldier believes in his special relationship with the Almighty in time of war. What evidence the committee has for saying that Allen probably shouted, "Come out you damned rats and surrender" (p. 102), is not clear. I wonder what Marie Antoinette really said about the cake—the game has possibilities.

Although the committee is sure that exhilarating school history can be written without recourse to unproven *obiter dicta*, it might produce some dry stuff if it took up all the issues raised here. Given the problem of teaching citizenship as well as history, and a different age range, a gap is bound to develop between school and college history. Ideally a pupil progresses from one to the other; difficulties occur when the transition fails. Then it is distressing to find intelligent chemists, for example, who see not a trace of imperialism in American history, nor a hint of corruption in the political scene after the Civil War.

I found the tone of the report faintly patronizing to both writers and teachers. Little praise is given to work well done; instead writers are "misguided" (p. 82) and "unbelievably careless" (p. 52), "display woeful igno-

³(London: Longmans, 1964).

⁴(New York: St. Martin's, 1964).

rance" (p. 95), and "distort history and obstruct internationalism" (p. 85). Theological overtones creep in when the "guilty" (p. 68) writers believe that "their judgments comprise the untainted gospel" (p. 93). "One text commits the unpardonable sin of failing to mention that the [Tea Act] lowered rather than raised the price of tea" (p. 49). The committee, however, knows that "[e]ternal vigilance is the price of history" (p. 96). Amen. This might be difficult for scholar-authors like John Alden, Arthur Link, and Merle Curti to accept. Suggestions made to improve texts are admirable, but surely already known to these professionals.

The teacher from a teacher's college is hardly expected to think, and "while competent to handle and even inspire a class, would not be equipped to select a proper textbook in history, or to challenge that textbook when it was wrong" (p. 21). The accusation is blunt enough, but teachers must elaborate on texts; they comment on nationalism, although a few possibly bemoan the absence of a John Birch Society script.

It is a pity, also, that the committee could not have examined one topic unrelated to war. An investigation of imperialism, industry, or Communism might have produced some subtleties even more fruitful. Both countries regard themselves as havens for the persecuted—Marx wrote in London, Einstein fled to New York—but their attitudes toward the indigenous poor leave much to be desired. The Cold War is hot for comparative treatment. In selecting the Revolution for comment, the committee took a blatant example. Here was both a war and the birth pangs of a nation. Englishmen look at 1485 in a semi-mystical way, too. They discredit the Yorkists,

Richard III in particular, partly because of the myth that modern Britain began with the Tudor dynasty.

However, the report is an important contribution to historical studies. It makes the error of national bias plain for all to see. The documentation is impressive. If the relationship between two such similar powers is tainted, one shudders to think of the bias which might be revealed against Frenchmen, Russians, or those with other than lily-white skins. Objectivity is a quality which, however unattainable, is eminently desirable. To question this report on smaller issues is not to deny the strength of its basic premise.

Secondly, it should shake the complacency of textbook writers and encourage a less simplistic approach to hallowed topics. An advertisement for a junior high school text recently proclaimed that the book refused "to deal with the history of the United States as one continuous episode of progress, free from mistakes and social injustice" and attempted "to educate the student instead of indoctrinating him." That is a start, anyway.

At a session on national bias in textbooks, held at the American Historical Association annual conference in New York in December, 1966, some writers gave the impression that all was well in this field. They defended their own products vehemently, refuted the charge of bias and were unwilling to discuss the general issue. This stand was not particularly helpful; every conscience ought to have been pricked.

Finally, it is right that the Historical Associations, as professional bodies, promote discussion of historical standards and comment on what passes for history. If history is to be taught in schools as history, rather than as literature or civics, then reports like this are needed and stimulating. History is not

a tale of good guys versus bad guys, nor is the United States the sole depository of democratic truth. History ought not to prop up national myths; not only is this intellectually debasing but it can also lead to international misunderstanding which is to be deplored in a contracting world. Washington is no less a man for being lower than the angels. Anglo-American relations could benefit from a franker recognition of the merits and weaknesses on both sides. An assumed superiority was not the most enviable characteristic of imperial Britain; it would be sad if the champion of western democracy were to inherit that particular vice.

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POLITICS, SOCIETY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION IN ENGLAND.

by Andreas M. Kazamias.

Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1966. 381 pp.
\$8.50.

The time has come for drastic action. Someone must act boldly and lock all copies of reports by Royal Commissions and Consultative Committees in a vault and horde the key for at least two or three decades. If the larger and stronger guild of political historians will only let us, it would be well to do the same with *Hansard*. The reports and debates are wonderful sources; they are chock-full of readily available data begging to be sifted, analyzed, interpreted, then resifted, reanalyzed, reinterpreted, again and again. As a temptation to historians, they are overwhelming; and we all (the present reviewer included) succumb. Take away the reports and we shall cry out in agony; but once we master our withdrawal symptoms, we may be able to

get down to writing some significant history and to answering the questions that have been for so long ignored or skimpily treated. In his lucid and intelligent book, *Politics, Society and Secondary Education in England*, Andreas Kazamias provides support for my heretical strategy. For he has carried history by commission about as far as it can go; and the weaknesses of his book, with some exceptions, reflect the deficiencies of his approach; and his approach, with modifications, is the traditional one of historians of British education.

Kazamias' intent is to record and explain the changing "official" conception of secondary education between 1895 and 1926, with a brief glance at the years between the latter date and the late 1940's. His questions are: "What were the ideological changes in English secondary education, especially from the Bryce Commission to the Hadow Report, and how can they be explained?" (p. 25) Kazamias' answers to these questions, which form the themes of his book, are not uncommon or especially arresting. One motif pervading the book is the transition from voluntarism to state responsibility in the provision of secondary education. The other is the accompanying shift in the view of secondary education from a mode of schooling distinctly different from elementary and serving a small, socially select segment of the population to the modern concept of a "secondary education for all," following elementary schooling as the second stage in a unitary system. Two traditions, the older secondary one represented by endowed grammar schools and the new one represented by the brash products of the upthrusting of elementary education, united eventually in a somewhat uneasy intellectual alliance that found expression in

the Hadow report, a document radically different from the Bryce report of three decades before. Kazamias is concerned not only with describing these changing conceptions but also with explaining them, primarily by reference to their historical, especially political, context. He stresses the congruence between educational views and political persuasions shifting from end of century Toryism (educational equivalent—Act of 1902) to incipient Liberal welfare-statism (educational equivalent —“free place” system) to right-wing socialism (educational equivalent—Hadow report).

The picture Kazamias draws does not, in its outline, surprise. Free secondary education for all is the outcome of a teleological historical process; the history of education is the tale of the steps on the march towards its attainment. This is, as I have pointed out in an earlier issue of this journal, a familiar story,¹ and Kazamias neither startles nor outrages us as does Brian Simon in his less balanced and responsible but more daring and provoking book on roughly the same period.² This is not to say that Kazamias adds nothing new; however, his revisionism is of the sort that alters the shade in a corner of the picture, reworks the angle of a few lines and changes the expression of some characters just a bit. But the whole remains distinctly recognizable. Simon, on the other hand, burned the old canvas and started anew with, unfortunately, pigment rather too much coloured by his ideological penchant for using history to advance present partisan policy.

Kazamias revises the historical record

¹ Review of Brian Simon, *Education and the Labour Movement 1870-1918*, *Harvard Educational Review*, XXXVI, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), 197-202.

² Simon, *op. cit.*

on a number of specific points which would be tedious to detail in a review. However, he does make one major revision that brings him squarely opposite Simon and at a considerable angle to commonly-accepted interpretation. Usually, the Labour Party is considered to have championed an egalitarian ideal of secondary education for all since early in the twentieth century. Simon, in fact, casts Labour in the mantle of the protagonist in the struggle for the democratization of education. Kazamias takes a very different position. He asserts in a number of places that Labour, for most of the first half of the twentieth century, sought no revolutionary changes in the educational system and accepted the then current, limited conception of secondary schooling, seeking merely to see that the brightest poor boys could get boosted up the educational ladder. Writes Kazamias:

Labour groups called for the widening of the rungs of the educational ladder so that through scholarships and bursaries more working-class children could gain access into the existing type of secondary schools. Thus, in this respect they operated *within* the existing ideological and institutional framework rather than *without*. Indeed the radical Labour view of equalitarianism in education outside the existing system is a post World War II phenomenon and in no way can it be traced to the beginning of the Labour Party. (p. 325)

Kazamias also provides some evidence to counter Simon's rather hard-to-believe assertions about the education-hunger of the working class. Sir Philip Magnus, speaking of an education bill in Parliament in 1907, "cautioned against an oversupply of secondary

education in excess of demand for it. For it was his experience (and there was agreement on this point by Labour members) that there was 'lack of interest and desire among the working classes for the facilities which already existed' " (p. 174). On the first point—official Labour policy toward secondary education—Kazamias' lucid presentation of documentary evidence is convincing. But on the more interesting and probably more significant point—actual working-class attitude toward schooling—neither he nor Simon have marshalled anything like the sort of evidence necessary to make a convincing case.

To note where Kazamias is convincing brings us closer to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of both his book and his style of historical analysis. On one level, Kazamias is quite good. This level is the expounding of texts; the exposition of the nature, meaning and significance of the arguments, propositions, recommendations and requirements in reports, speeches, and legislation. We know extremely well just what, for instance, the point of view in the Bryce report was and exactly how that in Hadow was different; we can appreciate the precise significance of the "free-place" regulations in development of policy. In a few places, Kazamias is strong even when he leaves the official documents. His presentation of the sides in the liberal-technical debate is very clear; his observations of the longer persistence of faculty psychology in England than in America are fresh, and his explanation of the difference is quite convincing. But at a level deeper than the official documents themselves, he is, for the most part, not too satisfying, both in what he has done and in what he apparently has not considered.

Let us start with something Kazamias treats at a number of points: verbal reaction to reports and legislation. When he writes of political partisans, the motivation of reaction is usually clear enough. But when he broadens his terms and looks to schoolmen and the public in general, his approach is too often a seemingly random throwing in of examples of reaction pro and con rather than a carefully argued analysis of just which groups were in favor and which opposed, and why. This is particularly apparent in the chapter on "practical" education. Similar instances occur when Kazamias talks of actions taken (in contrast to words spoken or written) in response to legislation. For instance, he presents a quotation (p. 176) revealing that response to the "free-place" system varied enormously from community to community, but that is as far as he goes. No attempt is made to suggest why some communities responded by making more secondary-school places free than did others, or whether there was an association between the type of community and the proportion of free places available. It could be argued that this analysis was outside the scope of Kazamias' intent, and the point would be well taken. But it is precisely the narrowness of the intent that makes the book a good deal less than very satisfying. For it is the sort of question raised by a differential response to innovation that needs answering by historians of education if they are ever to say something concrete about *how* and *why* educational change took place.

A similar criticism applies to Kazamias' description early in his book of late nineteenth-century provisions for secondary education. This is drawn almost wholly from statistics and responses of witnesses, which are contained in the Bryce report and its massive appen-

dices. From these, one is able to say not too much more than that the nature and extent of provision varied greatly as did the proportion of the population attending secondary schools. But to stop there is to leave begging the question that has been unanswered since the Commission gathered its evidence in the 1890's: How is this variation to be explained? Was it random or were there identifiable patterns of association between community type, school attendance, and educational provisions? These associations might well tell us far more about the relation of school and community than the pages of official reports.

To answer these sorts of questions one must depart from the convenient reports, debates, and periodicals. One must combine some sort of quantitative analysis of the problem with detailed digging into the process of educational change within differing communities. The same is true for American education. One can read even the most recent literature on the history of secondary education in America and still know little about its nature or dynamics. To study the reports, for instance, of NEA committees, as has been done quite thoroughly, is not to know how, why, or even if schooling actually changed.² The actual pressures that force institutional and curricular change within communities may be (and I suspect are) quite different from committee reports. Indeed, the exact function of educational reports and legislation is a question left largely un-

analyzed, even by the authors who have carefully examined the documents themselves. To imply (and at times I sense a suggestion of this in Kazamias) that national committees write reports, or even that parliaments make laws, and that these provide the dynamic force in educational change is, I submit, a very dubious position. It may even be that the principal function of committees and even laws in England and America has been to ratify aspects of current practice by giving them the official stamp of approval.

A similar sort of analytical gap is present in another aspect of Kazamias' book. We are treated to examinations of changes in proposed and formulated policy. As reasons for these policy alterations we are given accounts of gross changes in forces that impinge on education: the intellectual climate, social and economic change, war, foreign competition, and political realignment. But the actual relationship between any one of these forces and either the concrete hammering out of policy or the changing of doctrine is not analyzed. We are not told, for instance, what precisely was the relation between the thought of T. H. Greene (who is discussed) and changes in official educational policy; we are not even quite sure why Greene is chosen for examination or why reference is made to the growth of limited liability, but none to birth rate and other demographic factors. Rather, we are left with somewhat vague and loose associations instead of precisely-defined explanatory relationships (pp. 102-14 are especially notable for this).

Now, for the historian whose interests lie with central government and who is uninterested in doing local history, the study of policy-making offers an opportunity to treat a critical and neglected area of educational develop-

² Two recent books on American secondary education that stress national committees and are roughly analogous to Kazamias in approach are: Edward A. Krug, *The Shaping of the American High School* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), and Theodore R.Sizer, *Secondary Schools at the Turn of the Century* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).

ment. But it is not one on which Kazamias sheds much illumination, despite his intention of explaining changes in official conceptions of secondary education. As anyone who has read David Roberts' superlative work, *Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State*, cannot help but realize, the formulation of policy within governmental departments was a complicated process.⁴ Among the people whom Roberts treats for an earlier period, for instance, are inspectors. He shows how their actual experience in the field modified their preconceptions and stirred them to bring pressure to alter departmental policy upon higher officials, who were usually trapped in complex webs of bureaucracy and politics. We sense none of this complexity of policy-making in Kazamias' book. How, we wonder, was governmental educational policy actually hammered out? What influence did inspectors and other civil servants (excluding the familiar Sadler and Morant) exercise on changing official doctrine? To what extent was the experience gained by the working of policy effective in modifying policy? Were (as Roberts would suggest) the staggering problems of tackling increasingly complex administrative tasks more important in altering opinion on the nature and organization of secondary education than political doctrine?

These are important questions; they are questions historians should tackle. To do so, historians will have to use more extensive sources than did Kazamias, whose book is based entirely on published material. Unpublished correspondence, published and unpublished census material and school registers, the variegated documents of local history—these are the kinds of sources

historians of education must use to answer the sorts of questions that this review has suggested are important.

Kazamias is well aware of one of the critical questions historians of education must try to answer: What was the social function of education? But when he writes of the social function of secondary education, his emphasis is almost exclusively on the role of the schools' social and intellectual selectivity in promoting or retarding upward mobility. The selective question surely is a hot one in Britain right now, but, I wonder, were there other social functions that innovators of the time expected schools to perform? In the United States, for example, secondary education was promoted in terms of its potential contributions to communal integration, moral regeneration, and cultural uplift as well as to mobility. Were these some of the proposed social functions of secondary education during the period of which Kazamias writes?

To ask the last question is to pose another, and the hardest, analytical problem for the historian. What was the effect of secondary education? What was its impact upon individuals, upon social classes, upon the community? Did the democratization of secondary education accelerate the rate of social mobility? Did its continuing selective nature (although selective in a different sense) harden and reinforce cultural divisions? What has been the effect of education on the quality of intellectual life? On the shape of the economy? On popular attitudes? It is this question, the results of education, it seems to me, that must be the one of ultimate concern to the historian of education who wishes to speak something relevant to the educational perplexity of his time. It is a question, unfortunately, that Kazamias did not ask.

⁴ (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960).

Within a narrow frame of reference Kazamias has written a lucid (though stylistically very flat), useful, and intelligent book. He has succeeded in answering his first question regarding the changing official conceptions of secondary education, but he has not handled his second one regarding the explanation of these changes, with anything like equal success. He has stretched reports about as far as they will go. But history by commission, committee, and legislative action has had its day. It is time for historians of education to stop writing variations on a theme. It is time they ask the fresh questions and search out the answers necessary to write that which expresses the process, the dynamics and the results of the educational development about which they are supposed to be concerned.

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A SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE.*

by Joyce O. Hertzler.

New York: Random House, Inc.,
1965. xiii + 559 pp. \$8.95.

In their 1940 classic, *Contemporary Social Theory*,¹ Harry E. Barnes and Howard and Frances Becker wrote of the prospects of a sociology of language as follows:

Out of many diverse sources and interests, sociology of language is emerging as a specialty with a high

*I have consulted with colleagues to a substantially greater degree than is usually the case in the preparation of a review article. I thank them, but will not try to share responsibility for what I have written by identifying them.

¹ (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940).

potential of generalizability. Because of its many angles and because it seems to be involved in all human actions, it promises to become a center of fructifying observation and analysis. Its frontiers are uneven and wide and largely unexplored.²

In 1952, taking up this challenge, Joyce O. Hertzler presented a pioneering paper on the sociology of language at the annual meetings of the Midwest Sociological Society.³ Now, following a decade of continued interest, Hertzler has published the volume here under review.

Unfortunately, Hertzler is no longer a pioneer, and his book will do little to illuminate the developing interests in the interplay between social structure and the structure and usage of language (an activity now more frequently labelled as sociolinguistics rather than as the sociology of language). This is all the more unfortunate since sociologists have, finally, begun to attend to sociolinguistic issues and many of them will seize upon Hertzler both as an introduction to the field and as a standard reference. The book is neither, and the appearance in a major sociological journal of a laudatory review⁴ suggesting that it is the former will further exacerbate the difficulties of those sociologists and linguists, such as the scholars now serving on the Social Science Research Council Committee on Sociolinguistics, who are trying to establish some common ground for cooperative work. It is fortunate that

² *Ibid.*, p. 895, as cited in J. O. Hertzler, "Toward a Sociology of Language," *Social Forces*, XXXII, No. 2 (Dec. 1953), 109-19.

³ Subsequently published in Hertzler, *op. cit.*

⁴ By Frank Koen, *American Sociological Review*, XXXI, No. 5 (Oct. 1966), 734-35. Readers of this review will want to look at Koen's assessment, which emphasizes some of the positive aspects of Hertzler's contribution not discussed in the pages following.

other more sophisticated and useful publications are now appearing which will be substantially more fruitful in directing the attention of interested sociologists to those intersections of language and social structures which are of particular concern to the student of society.⁵ Regretfully, these other sources are much less likely to be seen by the average sociologist or by the educationist interested in applications of new theoretical formulations and empirical insights to his own problems.⁶

Early in his book Hertzler identifies his main objective as "conducting a study of language in its multiple social contexts, more particularly a study of language structure, functions, and process in relation to societal structure, function, and process" (p. 7). This statement, while vague, is unobjection-

able. Unfortunately, on the same page he provides a clue to his orientation to the linguistic contribution to the sociology of language when he writes, "Unavoidably . . . the sociology of language must pay considerable attention to linguistics." After noting the concerns of linguists with essential accuracy, he proceeds, in the remainder of the book, largely to ignore the currently relevant literature produced by linguists and to rely largely on anecdotes,⁷ extremely gross statistical summaries, and on a literature which has been substantially superseded.⁸

Hertzler initiates his discussion with a review of some basic concepts and an introductory chapter on the functions

⁵ See, e.g., William Bright (ed.), *Sociolinguistics: Proceedings of the UCLA Sociolinguistics Conference, 1964* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966); John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.), "The Ethnography of Communication," *American Anthropologist*, LXVI, No. 6, Part 2 (Dec. 1964); Dell Hymes (ed.), *Language in Culture and Society: A Reader in Linguistics and Anthropology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Stanley Lieberman (ed.), "Explorations in Sociolinguistics," *Sociological Inquiry*, XXXVI, No. 2 (Spring 1966). Two other suggestive volumes are A. Kimball Romney and Roy G. D'Andrade (eds.), "Transcultural Studies in Cognition," *American Anthropologist*, LXVI, No. 3, Part 2 (June 1964) and E. A. Hammel (ed.), "Formal Semantic Analysis," *American Anthropologist*, LXVII, No. 5, Part 2 (Oct. 1965). Roger Brown, *Words and Things* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), a volume on social psychology built around linguistic data, is among the best examples of how the two fields can be integrated.

⁶ Readers of this journal will find that books such as Roger W. Shuy (ed.), *Social Dialect and Language Learning* (Champaign, Illinois: National Council of Teachers of English, 1965), are of particular interest. They will also want to carefully examine the work of William Labov, cited *infra*.

⁷ Hertzler has obviously done a tremendous amount of research, and his presentation generally evinces a high level of scholarship. It was difficult, however, in reading this book, to avoid the conclusion that over the years Hertzler has kept a large file filled with 3 x 5 cards to which he added, under topical headings, interesting examples which he ran across in reading and in conversations. This is a good idea, and such examples can be used in an extremely illuminating manner where there is a substantial base of research literature serving as an underpinning to the anecdotes. Too often it seemed, however, that Hertzler had written whole sections of chapters simply by opening his "file" and, *seriatim*, listing examples.

⁸ There is some substantiation for the claim that Hertzler has not kept up with the relevant literature. Of approximately 375 titles (ignoring multiple listings and including edited volumes only once rather than each time a contributor is listed), slightly over 150 were published prior to 1950. If this were an accurate reflection of the literature after 1950 there would be no room for complaint; however, one looks in vain for references to such distinguished contributors as: Chomsky, Diebold, Fishman, Ferguson, Friedrich, Fischer, Garvin, Geertz (to select a few from the beginning of the alphabet) and there is no reference anywhere in the book to Osgood, on whose work social psychologists have drawn widely in recent years.

of language. These sections are quite clear. In his brief discussion of theoretical and methodological emphases and trends in recent American linguistics, there is no mention either of transformational grammar or of componential analysis. However, while there is an identifiable static bias and while the writing occasionally verges on hyperbole:

Man lives in the universe. He has contacts with this universe in the form of two major sets of environments. First, there is the *physical environment*, reaching out into the infinities of space. This affects him through its *cosmic features*. . . (pp. 23-4)

the first six chapters will serve as a useful introduction for many readers.

In the remaining twelve chapters Hertzler discusses language and social change, the differentiation and homogenization of language, language as a unifying and divisive characteristic within and across societies, the reciprocal relationship between language and social control, language and the individual (more with reference to *idiolect*, constraint, and perception than to socialization), multilingualism, writing, and mass communication. The treatment is repetitive (e.g., the discussion of shifting ethnic names to "Americanized" versions [pp. 116, 233, 382] or of the standardization of metropolitan dialects [pp. 185-86, 191]); quite frequently in factual error (e.g., "the rigid maintenance of the Dutch language by the successive generations of Dutch Afrikaners of Southern Africa, in order to preserve themselves in the ocean of Bantus" [p. 173], the confusion over Sanskrit and Pali [p. 175], the location of Ceylon in Southeast Asia [p. 180]); larded with highly questionable empirical generalizations

(e.g., "the tendency for regional and class distinctions of speech to become fewer and less sharp" [p. 196], dialects are mainly a function of lower social strata [p. 310]); replete with value judgments (a questionable practice however much others may agree with him); and frequently written on the level of an introductory sociology text (see especially the discussion of institutions and the final chapter on mass communication). Somewhat more serious, in a purportedly encyclopedic volume such as this, is the presentation of "data" on contemporary speech communities (pp. 210-12) where statements are made such as that English is "quite readily understood by approximately 250,000,000 . . . in India, Africa and elsewhere" (*viz.*, in addition to 285,000,000 for whom it is the mother tongue) and where the languages of India are characterized as a "speech community." Less serious, perhaps, is the statement that the word *whore* is tabooed when used to indicate a human being (p. 275).

The fundamental defect of this book lies in Hertzler's failure to redeem the promise (on the bookjacket) of a comprehensive analysis of the reciprocal relationship between language and human society. William Bright has characterized the sociolinguist's task as "to show the systematic covariance of linguistic structure and social structure—and perhaps even to show a causal relationship in one direction or the other."⁹ Bright suggests seven dimensions of sociolinguistics—"separate lines of interest which run through the field"—and suggests that wherever two or more of the dimensions intersect, a subject of sociolinguistic study will be found.¹⁰ A major concern of the

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-14. The seven dimensions, in crass oversimplification, include:

sociolinguist is to show that linguistic diversity is not random but rather is systematically related to social variations.¹¹ Hertzler has listed many variations in language use (more specifically, in speech use and more particularly still in lexical as contrasted to syntactic differentiation). While he may draw together "previously unrelated historical, sociological, anthropological, and psychological data in a new theoretical synthesis" (book-jacket), he does not illuminate the interaction of social structural characteristics and language use—whatever the causal direction.

A few examples may serve to illustrate the kinds of questions which *can* be raised with reference to the interaction of language and social structures and to indicate the increasing sophistication of the research upon which answers have been based. The selection is not totally fair to Hertzler since the studies discussed have been published primarily in the last five years. However, equally relevant examples published at earlier dates can be found in Hymes.

Fischer, in his cross-societal study of Truk and Ponape, has attempted to demonstrate the manner in which variations in social structure are linked to varying patterns of syntactic differentiation.¹² Fischer's primary attention is

focused on the differentiation of noun modifiers by position within the sentence; Trukese and Ponapean are closely related languages but differ in this particular, Ponapean noun phrases being "constructed more tightly" than those of Trukese. Fischer believes that as a consequence of this difference there is a greater chance in Trukese "for the listener to decide that the speaker has come to a point at which he may be interrupted, when actually the speaker intends to say more."¹³ This difference in syntax, with its accompanying consequences for speech behavior and closure in intellectual discourse, Fischer attributes to differences in the social structure of the two societies which have developed in the years (approximately eight centuries) of geographical isolation of the two languages and cultures. Fischer characterizes Ponapean social structure as being more differentiated than Trukese, in that there is a greater variety of significantly different social roles on Ponape (this is particularly true of kinship and political roles). Not only are Ponapean roles more varied, they are also subject to change due to individual initiative and, hence, Ponapean social structure is also more flexible. Fischer concludes that this requires (among other things) that the word meanings be more independent of context and less concrete:

the social identity of sender or speaker; the social identity of receiver or person spoken to; setting and context; whether the research is synchronic or diachronic; differentiation between how people use languages and what they believe about their own linguistic behavior and that of others; the extent of linguistic diversity; and application. None of these dimensions is totally ignored in Hertzler's treatment; nor, however, are interrelationships systematically examined.

¹¹ Bright, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹² John L. Fischer, "Syntax and Social Structure: Truk and Ponape," in Bright,

op. cit., pp. 168-87. In a more recent article, "The Stylistic Significance of Consonantal Sandhi in Trukese and Ponapean," *American Anthropologist*, LXVII, No. 6, Part 1 (Dec. 1965), 1495-502, Fischer has used phonological analysis of the same two languages to illustrate somewhat more elegantly differences in social structure associated with linguistic variation and has suggested the possibility of a universal expressive value of different varieties of consonant clusters.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

As societies become more complex and social roles become more differentiated, the realized meaning of words in particular contexts becomes less important than the common or basic meaning. Speakers are forced to assume a greater cognitive gap between themselves and their listeners. At the same time, the basic meaning of the items of the lexicon tends to become more abstract and attenuated, since speakers have less need for words which can express much meaning in compact form to listeners who are conceived of as being much like the self; they have more need, instead, for words which can be used in many different contexts with many different listeners who are conceived of as being very different from the self and from each other. Of course, it is still necessary to speak precisely about detailed matters much of the time, but this kind of concreteness can be achieved through the combination of several words which in themselves are relatively abstract.¹⁴

This example shows, first, how detailed linguistic analysis can be combined with ethnographic information actually to demonstrate the "reciprocal relationship between language and human society." Secondly, it shows how sociolinguistic research can lead to statements of relationships which are generalizable beyond the confines of single social structures and which at the same time have implications both methodologically (syntax as an indicator of social structural complexity) and pragmatically (isolation of issues relevant, e.g., to the teaching of "culturally deprived" children).

A study by Gumperz introduced the concept of the linguistic repertoire—de-

fined as the totality of styles, dialects, and languages used within a socially defined community—as a unit of analysis for the cross-cultural comparison of language behavior.¹⁵ He suggests that social structure affects the relative degrees of linguistic distinctness among such speech varieties rather than the grammatical make-up of a single language or dialect. In two widely separated communities (one in Norway, the other in India), he shows that while the choice between dialect use or the use of the standard language in each case is conditioned by such factors as the social occasion, the setting, the formal or informal roles of participants, their audiences, and the topic of conversation, in the Indian case the existence of sharply defined social barriers of caste and status has the effect of separating the repertoire into highly discrete, nonoverlapping varieties. In Norway, on the other hand, where social barriers are more fluid, the standard and the dialect are more like poles defining the end points of a continuum of linguistic variants. He concludes:

Social restraints on language choice ... are also a part of social structure. They are thus susceptible to analysis in terms of generalized relational variables which apply to interaction in all human groups. The study of particular sets of grammatical systems and cultural norms in terms of these variables enables us to treat linguistic behavior as a form of social behavior, and linguistic change as a special case of social change.¹⁶

Since individuals need not be aware of their own switching from one reper-

¹⁵ John J. Gumperz, "Linguistic and Social Interaction in Two Communities," in Gumperz and Hymes, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-53.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

toire to another, the rules of language usage, like the rules of grammar, are part of subconscious automatic behavior. They are thus subject to study by indirect method independent of speakers' attitudes. Thus, they may serve as an independent check on data obtained by sociological methods of enquiry. In addition, some individuals will be more skilled in language switching than others. It might well be possible, therefore, that some problems in the field of education are a consequence of mutual ignorance of repertoires and of usage rules by teachers and their students (and the parents of those students).

Limitations of space preclude discussion of other examples in even the sketchy manner in which the Fischer and Gumperz studies have been presented. Readers of this review, however, will want to examine such studies as Friedrich's two excellent articles, the first on changes in Russian kinship terminology under the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes, the second on Russian pronominal usages.¹⁷ In the first of these, Friedrich links very marked structural realignments and reductions in the number of kin terms used over the brief span of a single century, demonstrating the causal role of such social variables as the breakup of the extended family and the massive legal and ideological changes which have occurred. In the second, using Russian novels as sociological source materials,

¹⁷ Paul Friedrich, "Linguistic Reflex of Kinship Change in Russia," in Lieberman, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-85, and "Structural Implications of Russian Pronominal Usage," in Bright, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-59. Another interesting treatment of variation in address is Samuel E. Martin, "Speech Levels in Japan and Korea," in Hymes, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-15. A more extensive analysis of related variation in Japanese is being prepared by Bernice Goldstein of Purdue University.

he has shown the ways in which use of *ty* and *vy* (roughly equivalent to *tu* and *vous*) can serve as indicators of status differentials, of shifting patterns of interpersonal relationships, and of subjective personal response.

Hertzler does give some attention to the work of Basil Bernstein, a sociolinguist whose work has a variety of implications, particularly for the sociologies of education and child development.¹⁸ He does not, however, discuss the pedagogical (or personality development) consequences of "elaborated" and "restricted" code use, a central aspect of Bernstein's work. Bernstein uses these polar concepts in the elucidation of a wide range of situations and uses of language but attends particularly to problems of learning and processes of social control. With reference to educability, Bernstein suggests that users of elaborated codes are enabled to think in terms of the abstract, and hence in terms of relationships, while restricted code users are able only to engage in the exchange of what are essentially solidarity clichés. Consequently, restricted code users are able to handle schoolwork during those years in which there is emphasis on rote learning, but they cannot keep up with their middle-class age peers when materials are introduced which require understanding and articulation of relational abstract concepts. But the elaborated code user does not come off scot-free. Social control in the restricted mode relies on status and authority but provides the child with security. The elaborated mode, with its emphasis on personal characteristics

¹⁸ Extensive reference to Bernstein's developing work in this area can be found in Allen D. Grimshaw, "Directions for Research in Sociolinguistics: Suggestions of a Nonlinguist Sociologist," in Lieberman, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-32.

and specific situations, may confuse the child while contributing to the long-range development of greater flexibility and individuality.

The pioneering and convincing research of William Labov may be that most relevant for readers of this journal, as it promises to be for sociologists with a variety of interests in social differentiation. Labov's basic theme, elaborated in his book, *The Social Stratification of English in New York City*,¹⁹ is that the most coherent unit of analysis is the speech community, defined as a group of people with the same set of evaluative norms with respect to language. This community has a complex of stylistic and social stratification in which systematic deviation from the common norms must be attributed to an underlying, covert and competitive set of normative values. Observing language behaviors from this perspective, Labov has discerned, with great clarity, pattern and consistency rather than randomness or willful ignorance. In one series of articles, Labov has ingeniously demonstrated how phonic differentiation is linked to actual social mobility and to aspirations for mobility.²⁰ In research on lexical and syntactic shifts in urban dialects among the very poor (largely Negroes and Puerto Ricans) in New York City, he is isolating the social structural supports for deviations from

standard English which are a major obstacle to successful application of traditional pedagogical practices among these populations.²¹ These researches are oriented to an understanding of fundamental principles of human behavior and provide convincing evidence that there can be a valuable and viable sociolinguistics!

Hertzler has worked long and hard; he has brought to the attention of the sociological community a body of literature and research which has been woefully and surprisingly neglected; his is the first book (in English) in the field. The negativism of the treatment of the Hertzler volume in this review stems from a fear that the trivial nature of much of its content, its repetitiveness, and its failure meaningfully to link social structure with the structure of language may retard, rather than encourage, social scientists' incorporating sociolinguistic notions into their own work. The reference to the work of Fischer, Gumperz, Friedrich, Bernstein, and Labov is offered as a sample of that activity. The Bright, Gumperz, Gumperz and Hymes, and Lieberman volumes abound with other suggestive examples. While Hertzler may not convey the vitality of this new enterprise, hopefully he may stimulate readers to demand and seek out more sophisticated work in a sociology of language.

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¹⁹ Washington, D. C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1966.

²⁰ See, e.g., "The Social Motivation of a Sound Change," *Word*, XIX, No. 3 (Dec. 1963), 273-309; "Phonological Correlates of Social Stratification," in Gumperz and Hymes, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-76; "The Effect of Social Mobility on Linguistic Behavior," in Lieberman, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-208; "Hypercorrection by the Lower Middle Class as a Factor in Linguistic Change," in Bright, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-113.

²¹ See, e.g., "Stages in the Acquisition of Standard English," in Shuy, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-104; "Some Sources of Reading Problems for Negro Speakers of Non-Standard English," in Alexander Frazier (ed.), *Proceedings of the 1966 N.C.T.E. Spring Institute on New Directions in Elementary English* (Champaign, Illinois: National Council of Teachers of English, forthcoming).

THEORY AND RESEARCH IN
ADMINISTRATION.

by Andrew W. Halpin.

New York: The Macmillan Company,
1966. 352 pp. \$6.95.

The work under consideration here is not a monograph. It treats no single theme, subject, or problem area. (It might more appropriately have been entitled, *The Collected Works of Andrew Halpin*.) This book may be conceived as the contributions of Andrew Halpin in the several roles of philosopher and methodologist of science, scientist, social critic, and educator. Since an adequate review of the contributions of all four Halpins calls for time, space, and scholarly resources well beyond those available to me, and since the philosopher and methodologist Halpin seems to provide the logical grounding for the other three, I shall focus attention on this aspect of his work.

In following this procedure, I shall deliberately ignore Halpin's contributions as a researcher, as a social critic, and as an educator. By ignoring these contributions, I do not intend to convey either a positive or negative evaluation of them. Moreover, by commenting on the one type of contribution, I do not wish to convey the impression that one can generalize the comments made in that context to the context of other types of contributions. I make these points explicit because Halpin has become a famous, or infamous, figure in the field of educational administration, depending on the side of the fence on which one stands. There is a marked tendency to treat his work as an undifferentiated whole which is either categorically accepted and praised or categorically rejected and damned. Halpin's work is sufficiently varied as to make global assessment impossible. The several parts require

scrutiny on the basis of independent criteria.

Two of the four sections of the book are represented by the author as dealing with the topics, "The nature of theory and how it should be applied to research on administration," and "Reflections on the nature of scientific inquiry and the pertinence of these ideas for the training of research workers in education and the behavioral sciences" (p. 8). Nowhere in the book, however, does one find a systematic treatment of these topics, and a view of Halpin's position with respect to them can be obtained only by supplementing evidence presented directly in his discussions of the nature of scientific inquiry, theories, and taxonomies with evidence presented indirectly in his discussions of his own research, the state of the art in administrative research, and the training of researchers.

There is a sense in which the procedure that I have adopted is unfair. Statements concerning various aspects of the scientific enterprise which I take to represent implicit or explicit philosophical and methodological positions have been abstracted from the context in which they appear. Some distortion of Halpin's view is probably inevitable, but the convenience this procedure affords in raising significant issues has been given precedence over the possibility of doing an injustice to the author.

On first examination, Halpin's conception of the nature of theory and its application to research seems reasonably clear. He cites Feigl's characterization of theory as "a set of assumptions from which can be derived by purely logico-mathematical procedures, a larger set of empirical laws [thereby furnishing] an explanation of these empirical laws and unifying the originally heterogeneous areas of subject matter

characterized by those empirical laws" (p. 8). Despite the relative clarity of Feigl's characterization there remains some uncertainty with respect to what would or would not be considered a theory. The uncertainty arises in connection with the distinction between two kinds of deductively formulated theories: (1) those in which the postulates are directly verifiable propositions about empirical entities and their relations, and; (2) those in which the postulates are propositions about unobservable entities and their relations, which can be verified only by giving a semantic interpretation to some of the primitive terms and by deducing empirically testable theorems from the interpreted postulates. Northrop terms the former "abstractive, deductively formulated theory," and the latter, "hypothetically inferred, deductively formulated theory." Northrop,¹ Margeneau,² Hempel,³ Rudner,⁴ and Pap⁵ agree in emphasizing the necessity of supplementing the syntactical, or logico-mathematical, procedures with semantic meanings, epistemic correlations, coordinating definitions, or rules of correspondence where the latter type of theory is concerned. If it is to the "abstractive" type of deductive theory⁶

that Halpin refers, then the appropriateness of a number of my comments is questionable. However, Halpin's reliance on the physical sciences for illustrations seems to indicate that this is not the case, and I shall assume that he refers to "hypothetically inferred, deductively formulated" theory.

The early appearance of conceptual clarity is soon dispelled. We find Halpin saying that a theory of administration "can permit us to declare that if you do x , consequence a will result; if you do y , consequence b will result" (p. 10). Given the hypothetically inferred, deductively formulated interpretation of theory, the only sense in which one might say that theories permit us to predict particular consequences of particular effects is through the mediation of empirical laws. From the theory one may deduce (predict) laws, and from the laws one may deduce (predict) particular events. The insistence on pointing out the mediating role of laws may seem trivial in some contexts, but it is far from trivial when the problem under consideration is theory construction, for it implies that it is meaningless to undertake the task of theory construction before there is at least one law to be accounted for. Halpin's lack of clarity on this point is evident on page 11, where he states that the development of theory in educational administration depends on our knowing the domain of the theory we are trying to construct. One who is aware of the superordinate relation of theories to laws, and of the conditional relation of laws to theories, would not concern himself with the problem of

tively formulated theories. His example of the "abstractive" type is Herbert Simon's formalization of the generalizations from Homans' *Human Groups*. See Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), 99 ff.

¹ F. S. C. Northrop, *Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), chap. vi.

² Henry Margeneau, *The Nature of Physical Reality* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950).

³ Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

⁴ Richard S. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

⁵ Arthur Pap, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

⁶ Roger Brown, in *Explanation in Social Science* (Chicago: Aldine, 1963), makes the same distinction between types of deduc-

specifying the domain of the theory. The domain is automatically specified by the laws for which the theory provides an account.

Further ambiguities arise in the context of Halpin's discussion of the nature, limitations, and relation of taxonomies to theories. A taxonomy is a classificatory scheme which, according to Halpin, suffers from three inherent weaknesses: (1) the number of classifications is limited only by the size of our vocabulary; (2) there is no way to be certain that we do not mix oranges and battleships; and (3) there is no way in which the juxtaposition of two or more taxonomic schemata can be made to yield a theory (p. 9). Halpin is entirely justified in criticizing the manner in which some persons have constructed and utilized taxonomies, but in the process of doing so, he seems to have presented a distorted picture of the place of taxonomic efforts in scientific inquiry. To speak of taxonomies as inherently limited only by the breadth of one's vocabulary, and to speak of constructing theory through the juxtaposition of two or more taxonomies, seem to reflect a fundamental lack of understanding of the place of taxonomic studies in scientific investigation.

Perhaps the classic illustration of a taxonomy is the periodic table of chemistry. The manner in which this device contributed to the development of the atomic theory of matter is well known. Dalton's original theory of the atomic constitution of matter, based on the law of fixed proportions, the law of multiple proportions, and the law of reciprocal proportions led to the assignment of relative atomic weights to known elements. The taxonomy of elements thus constructed led to Newland's law of octaves, and ultimately to Mendeleef's systematic classification of

elements into families showing periodicity of chemical and physical properties.

Mendeleef ascribed certain gaps in his classification to the existence of undiscovered elements, and soon afterward some of these were discovered and found to have the very properties predicted by Mendeleef. Such *relationships*, [italics mine] when well established, gave rise to much speculation concerning their fundamental cause, and attention became increasingly focused on the nature of the atom.⁷

These developments, in turn, paved the way for the development of the theory of the electronic constitution of the atom, and hence of matter, as spelled out by Rutherford.

In the context of the present discussion, there are two points to be noted about the events described above. First, there was a close tie between the construction of the taxonomy and empirical observation. The inclusion of categories describing the chemical and physical properties of elements was a matter of observation, not of "arm-chair speculation." Second, it was the *lawful relations among the categories* that gave rise to further theoretical developments, not the juxtaposition of this and some other taxonomy.

A more adequate view of the place of classificatory schemes in science is provided by Northrop, who points out that these are necessary prerequisites for the development of deductively formulated theories. As a matter of fact, says Northrop, "...Aristotelian physics was the second stage in the physical inquiry of Western science, for

⁷ John Read, "Chemistry," in James R. Newman (ed.), *What is Science?* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1961), p. 180 (paper).

which the deductively formulated physics of Galilei and Newton is the third stage."⁸

Halpin's characterization of taxonomic efforts as Aristotelian, as opposed to Galilean, while correct in a narrow sense, reflects the incompleteness of his view of the full spectrum of scientific inquiry. As Northrop has pointed out:

Nothing is more important therefore for a clarification of scientific method, empirical logic and philosophy than a clear recognition of the different stages of inquiry. Once this is appreciated the natural history type of scientific knowledge of the Aristotelian kind gains the importance which is its due.⁹

Earlier in the same discussion, Northrop noted:

Again we see the importance in science of emphasizing the different stages of scientific inquiry. We note also the importance of not supposing there is but one scientific method for all subject matters or for all the stages of inquiry of a single subject matter. Scientific methods, like space and time, are relative. A scientific method is relative to the type of problem. The scientific method appropriate for the second stage of inquiry [the natural history, classificatory stage] is different from the scientific method appropriate for its third stage [the stage of deductively formulated theory]. Moreover, the method of a later stage, to be effective, presupposes the method of the earlier stage.¹⁰

Northrop could hardly be more emphatic in stressing the importance of

⁸ Northrop, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

distinctions and of recognizing the place of each type of method in the process of inquiry. He argues, for example, that

if one proceeds immediately to the deductively formulated type of scientific theory which is appropriate to the third stage of inquiry, before one has passed through the natural history type of science . . . the result inevitably is immature, half-baked, dogmatic and for the most part worthless theory. As the expertly trained psychologist and psychiatrist Warren McCulloch has said, this has been the fatal weakness of much of modern psychological theory. It moved too quickly to deductively formulated theory without having gone through the lengthy, laborious, inductive Baconian description of different observable personality traits and types, after the manner of the natural history biologists who are only now . . . near the completion of the natural history description of their subject matter.¹¹

Halpin's lack of understanding of both the nature of natural history research and its relation to theory development is apparent in his discussion of ways of tackling the domain of organizational climate. One unsophisticated way of approaching the problem, according to Halpin, is by proceeding to

generate elaborate lists of adjectives which presumably describe a host of possible aspects of organizational climates. (These adjectives can then, for example, be arranged in the form of a checklist.) Obviously, these adjectives do describe the climate, but since they have been generated

¹¹ *Ibid.*

ad hoc, without an organizing principle, the investigator can group the behaviors to which the adjectives refer only on an arbitrary basis. . . . Precisely why does this tactic lead to a dead end? Because the aspects of organizational climate chosen for study, and the adjectives chosen to define these aspects, are determined not empirically and not by means of a strict theoretical formulation of the nature of organizations, but are determined solely by means of arm-chair speculation. (p. 142)

Again, Halpin appears to miss the whole point of taxonomizing. Taxonomies can, and do, emerge out of systematic descriptions of empirically observable variations among objects and events. One needs no theory to construct a taxonomy of organizations, or of anything else, for that matter. All that is required is a frame of reference of some sort. The more explicit the frame of reference, the better, but even an implicit one will do. One might construct a taxonomy of organizations, for example, according to: (1) what they produce; (2) how they acquire their resources; (3) how they make their products available to recipients; and (4) the basis of their interest in the organizations and individuals with whom they interact. Each of these "dimensions" might contain several alternatives (or they might be continuous variables). Having identified empirically meaningful variables, or dimensions, in terms of which organizations may be differentiated from one another, one is in a position to assess the extent to which given values on a given dimension are functionally related to the values of the other variables. What one seeks to determine is whether or not there is a determinate connection between: (1) what an organiza-

tion produces and (2) how the organization acquires its resources, etc. To the extent that such relations can be detected, we can speak of empirical laws. Moreover, to the extent that such laws can be identified, we can concern ourselves with the theoretical issue. The theoretical issue, of course, is, "What kind of an explanation must we postulate in order that these laws may be deduced from it?"

Some confusion in Halpin's treatment of these matters is evident in his discussion of the "Organizational Climate Studies" (p. 225). It is certainly the case that one test of a taxonomy is the extent to which it suggests hypotheses. Given a number of variable dimensions, there may be a vast number of possible combinations of the values of these variables, and a great number of hypotheses may be stated simply by taking particular combinations of values and hypothesizing the existence of the organizations that they describe. An equally important test, however, would seem to be determining whether there are lawful relations among the variables such that given the value of one or more variables, the others may be specified, i.e., computed. Given this conception of the nature of scientific inquiry, the question of a criterion variable against which to check the climate taxonomy (which Halpin raises on p. 195) simply does not arise. What are taken as dependent and independent, or experimental and criterion, variables is an arbitrary matter.

I must confess a considerable amount of confusion concerning the place of factor analytic procedures in relation to the conception outlined above. Since the factors, which seem to correspond to the variable dimensions of a taxonomy, are independent, it makes no sense to speak of examining

the relations among them. One possible interpretation would be that which treats the factors as pattern alternatives on a single dimension of a more encompassing taxonomy. For example, one might identify orthogonal factors concerning the manner in which organizations acquire their resources, then relate these to similarly (or otherwise) derived factors concerning organizational products. If this is a meaningful interpretation, then my criticism of Halpin's comment concerning the juxtaposition of two or more taxonomies must be withdrawn, if by juxtaposition he meant the attempt to identify lawful relations among the variables of the several taxonomies.

A more interesting, and perhaps fruitful, interpretation is that (alluded to by Boring)¹² in which factor analysis is conceived as analogous to the resolution of a physical force into independent components by the use of the parallelogram laws. Here the velocity of any particle within a specified frame of reference is seen as the resultant vector of two or more independent vectors. From this perspective, initiating structure and consideration, for example, could be seen as independent components entering into change in the behavior of leaders within an as yet unspecified frame of reference.

A further aspect of Halpin's philosophical position may, following Rudner,¹³ be characterized under the heading of "separatism." Halpin expresses serious doubts concerning the appropriateness of physical and biological science methodology for education and the behavioral sciences. Our failure to train good observers, says Halpin, is due to "a misguided effort in

education to mimic the more prestigious physical and biological sciences" (p. 302). Later in the same discussion of the problem of training researchers, Halpin asks:

How long, I wonder, will it take us to learn that the model of the physical and biological sciences may be the wrong one for us in education to ape? Since the events with which educators deal are human events, they have closest affinity to the spheres of the philosopher, the poet and the novelist. (p. 310)

This is a strange statement indeed. Were it pushed to its conclusion, one would have to acknowledge that the events with which physicians must deal are also human events, and therefore, that medicine is the proper province of the philosopher, poet, and novelist.

Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what is to be understood by the phrase, "the model of the physical and biological sciences." If it means techniques of observation, experimentation, and control, then the point is trivial. What could be more obvious, as Rudner puts it, than the simple-minded assertion that "sociologists cannot accelerate Cambridge dons in Cyclotrons."¹⁴ On the other hand,

[t]o claim that there is a difference in *methodology* between two disciplines . . . is to make a very radical claim. For the methodology of a scientific discipline is not a matter of its transient techniques, but of its *logic of justification*. The method of a science is, indeed, the rationale on which it bases its acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories. Accordingly, to hold that the social sciences are methodologically distinct

¹² Edwin G. Boring, "Psychology," in Newman (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 311-32.

¹³ Rudner, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

from the non-social sciences is not to hold merely (or perhaps not at all) the banal view that the social sciences employ different techniques of inquiry, but rather the startling view that the social sciences require a different logic of inquiry. To hold such a view, moreover, is to deny that all of science is characterized by a common logic of justification in its acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories.¹⁵

As Rudner's analysis demonstrates, such a position is untenable.

Finally, although Halpin professes to recognize the importance of theory, he appears to be overwhelmingly empiricist in orientation. This aspect of his position is reflected in such statements as "... the foundation of creative inquiry lies in observation, in identifying what is 'out there'" (p. 302), and "The heart of the [scientific] method is ... freshness of observation, irrespective of whatever ritual is subsequently performed on these observations" (p. 288). For a science in its natural history stage, the emphasis on "what's out there" is appropriate, but even then, as Halpin notes in a different context (p. 287), it is essential to know what things out there are worth counting. Halpin maintains that the acquisition of such knowledge depends on the development of "... the capacity to view with unfettered perception the world around us" (p. 208). It is not at all clear how "unfettered perception" leads to the identification of relevant observations, i.e., observations worth counting. To speak of "worth" implies an evaluative standard, and the least fettered perception may not involve such a standard. Hempel seems to provide a more accurate statement in pointing out that the worth of observations can

be assessed only in terms of its relevance to a given hypothesis.¹⁶

Close on the heels of the "heart of the scientific method" quotation cited above, Halpin quotes with approval J. Z. Young's statement, "Science consists in exact description of one's observations to other people" (p. 302). If the point is that that is all, or even primarily, what science consists in, then both Young and Halpin have a terribly limited view of science. A more complete view would seem to be that of Albert Einstein: "Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense-experience correspond to a logically uniform system of thought."¹⁷ To be sure, without sense-experience (observation) there can be no empirical science. But one is equally justified in asserting that there can be no fully developed empirical science without description, classification, analysis, and deductive reasoning. All these, as well as observation, are elements of scientific inquiry, and to see one as the heart of the matter is to be fettered indeed, for it is a primary condition of the advancement of scientific inquiry that higher-order elements can develop only on the basis of lower-order elements. Although one with a partial view of inquiry is not necessarily thereby handicapped in doing adequate, or even excellent, work at a given level (as Halpin's work demonstrates), he would seem to be handicapped in seeing how work at that level contributes to higher levels. One would hope that research training would provide not only the observational and technical skills required for sound research, but also the breadth of philosophical and methodological knowledge required to know what one is doing (in the sense

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Hempel, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁷ Cited in Northrop, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

of where in the structure of science one is working) when he applies those skills. The issue at stake in the preceding discussion, therefore, is not "What is, or is not, really a theory, a law, or a taxonomy?" but, to paraphrase Einstein, "How can we make the chaotic diversity that is science correspond to a uniform system of thought?" The point is not "What is the correct meaning of theory?" but "How can we conceive the structure of science, i.e., its component parts and their relationships, in order that the parts build cumulatively toward a more or less unified whole?"

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EDUCATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS.

by Robert J. Havighurst.

Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966.
260 pp. \$3.50 (paper).

This is a textbook which utilizes an urban sociology approach to the problems of metropolitan schools. The author, a distinguished authority, brings a wealth of both practical and academic experience to his task. His aim is to deal not with one aspect of the subject, such as the suburban school, but with metropolitan education as a unit. He pays particular attention to the economic and racial stratification of the metropolis, to the impact of the Negro revolution, to the prospects for metropolitan integration, and to ideal-types of different schools, superintendents, teachers, and parents. The book is obviously intended for the young teacher who may find himself or herself in a metropolitan school.

The book is disappointing for many reasons. It is an anemic work. One somehow gets the feeling that Havighurst is constrained by the conven-

tional wisdom of the educator or by the format of a text. It might have been more satisfactory if he had been clearly homiletic and written an impassioned tract. But instead of a tract or urban sociology, he gives us bits of social science and an ideology, which, as I shall argue, has some disquieting implications. His presentation is often embarrassing, and sometimes descends into bathos. He talks about people ("People fall into groups"), the sweep of urban history ("Jerusalem was rebuilt by Nehemiah, Athens by Pericles, Rome by Augustus, Paris by Napoleon III, and Chicago by Mayor Daley"), and why we are here ("The purpose of the human enterprise as a social venture is to make life more satisfying for all of those who live brief lives on the face of this ancient earth"). Sociological theories of the city and of stratification detain the reader for only a page or two, as if they had attained the status of Newtonian laws. There is no hint of the controversies surrounding them. Often the ideal-types, which are very important to Havighurst's theme, are fictionalized accounts. There are too many tables, many of which are unnecessary since the information they contain is easily accessible in census publications and elsewhere. Tabulation is meant to be a form of shorthand. Unnecessary tables do not make a manuscript more "sociological"; they merely increase the price of the book. The writing is irritatingly harsh and uneven. It cannot be taken for granted, like clear scientific prose, but jars the attention by occasional violations of syntax and language. Like the metropolitan area, this book is a bit chaotic. Reading it is like perusing *Tristram Shandy* and expecting the unexpected. Is the next page going to be a table, a new chapter, a fireside story, or a short sermon on democracy?

The ideology that Havighurst presents deserves close attention, especially if his opinions are widely shared by professors of education and educational decision-makers. That his views can be buttressed by a brand of sociology greatly concerns me. Havighurst states that the promise of American life is threatened by the lack of planning of its increasingly metropolitan framework. People in cities and suburbs have not adopted a metropolitan perspective and have not cooperated to solve their common problems. For the schools this means that:

metropolitan development as it has taken place in America during the present century has made it more difficult for boys and girls to get a good education, both in and out of school. The schools have been handicapped by the growing economic and racial stratification of the metropolitan area. (p. 83)

Furthermore, Havighurst maintains that the ideal school is the socially and racially mixed school. The purpose of the school is to re-stratify the population as far as possible on the basis of ability. By doing this, the schools ensure opportunity, which is crucial to an open-class stratification system and to democracy. If children go to mixed schools, the less privileged will learn the arts of upward mobility from their social betters. This is not possible in a school which is socially or racially homogeneous. The function of children with privileged backgrounds is to act as role-models for their social inferiors. Though he claims to utilize sociology, Havighurst is basically social psychological in orientation. He admits there is not much evidence of metropolitan integration, which would result in mixed schools, but he remains

hopeful as well as vague about the future.

Havighurst is, however, not an optimist but, as I shall attempt to show, quite the opposite. First of all, his view of metropolitan development suggests that he regards urbanization as pathological. This view reflects an ideological stance assumed by many earlier sociologists who were either from a rural background or thought unconsciously of the good society as a modern folk society. It is surely time that educators stopped being so unsympathetic to the development of the school in urban America, and recognized its extraordinary achievement in assimilating generations of immigrant children and children of rural backgrounds to a new world.

Havighurst's uncritical belief in the mixed school reveals a democratic bias. A school does not function well because it has good teachers or excellent educational programs but because it has the right kind of student body. The effects of student upon student are what matter, for the privileged student functions as a role-model for the underprivileged student. In sociological terms, the informal organization of the student body is fundamental. The mixed school is desirable not only because it is sanctioned by law but also because it institutionalizes a social-psychological mechanism for ensuring upward mobility.

The democratic bias toward estimating the effect of the school by examining the informal organization of its student body may also be seen in the work of James Coleman.¹ In his analysis, the educational content of school programs and the educational leadership of teachers made little headway

¹ James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (New York: Free Press, 1961).

against the powerful cliques and peer groups whose interests lay elsewhere. His practical suggestion was that the informal organization of student bodies be administratively recognized and, indeed, harnessed to the educational aims of schools.

Although Havighurst holds a similar bias and pessimism about the formal structure and requirements of the school, he certainly does not recognize the existence of peer groups among students. He seems to define the educational potentialities of schools not by the relationships between authority and informal groups but only by the social background of the students. If a school is composed of "culturally deprived" students, then it has little educational potential. Only by breaking down the concentration of the "culturally deprived" and by offering such students superior role-models can such schools be improved. He writes to warn teachers of the kinds of inferior schools they may expect in the metropolitan area by categorizing schools in terms of students' socio-economic backgrounds.

Surely this kind of conventional wisdom needs to be challenged. Many distinguished Americans did not need to rub shoulders with privileged children functioning as role-models to become upwardly mobile. Even in a mixed school there is no guarantee, from what we know of peer group formation, that privileged children will function as role-models. Reference groups may be oriented to behavior which may have an effect opposite to creating upward mobility, if it is emulated. But the central point on which Havighurst's arguments need countering is his assumption that it is possible to estimate the educational potential of schools by categorizing them according to social background. This view is ex-

tremely pessimistic because it discounts the positive effects of teachers and educational programs and avoids real questions about what is wrong with schools by focusing on the effects of students' backgrounds. One of the crucial reasons why minority group parents want their children in mixed schools is they think these schools will have better teachers and superior educational programs. Students who perform well need to mix not only with good students but also with superior teachers, who may function as role-models. Sociologists have been trying to get away from the democratic bias of Coleman and to suggest that the school—its formal structure of authority and the curriculum—has an extremely important effect which is quite independent of the socio-economic backgrounds of students.

Finally, one finds no reason for accepting the validity of Havighurst's ideal-types of schools, which were formulated on the basis of his views of social and racial structure. He tells the story of the incident at the Samuel Slater School in New York City where parents demanded the resignation of the principal because of a letter he had written to new teachers analyzing the cultural deprivation of their future students. Parents rejected the principal's views of their condition, culled, as Estelle Fuchs points out, from fashionable sociological investigations taken out of context.² This book is reminiscent of the principal's letter, and the ideal-types may be just as false. It could prejudice teachers against their students. It could convince them and others not that teachers and schools need improvement but only that the family backgrounds of students need amelioration. As so-

² Estelle Fuchs, *Pickets at the Gates* (New York: Free Press, 1966).

ciology, it is weak; as ideology, it is pessimistic and even anti-educational. It displaces the discredited psychological notion of the genetic inferiority of the poor with the quasi-sociological idea of the insurmountable barriers to achievement in the home and family dynamics of the poor.

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TEACHING DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN
IN THE PRESCHOOL.

by Carl Bereiter and Siegfried
Engelmann.

*Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1966. 312 pp. \$7.95.*

Bereiter and Engelmann have performed a valuable service for the field of child development, particularly for early-childhood educators concerned with young children from poor families, called "disadvantaged" or "deprived" these days. Because of its extreme position and claims of quick success, this book is bound to bring controversial issues in education into sharper focus. Hopefully, this will lead to new approaches more palatable than the rigid training procedures propounded by its authors.

Based on a preschool program run by the authors at the Institute for Research on Exceptional Children of the University of Illinois, the book is basically a manual for the instruction in language skills, reading, and arithmetic of four-year-old, disadvantaged children. On the basis of a success, measured by superior performance on standard achievement tests after nine months, with the fifteen children who composed the first experimental class, the authors offer a thoroughly worked-out, step-by-step set of "deliberately planned lessons involving demonstra-

tions, drill, exercises, problems, and the like" (p. 63). Each two-hour school day is divided into twenty-minute study periods for each subject, with the remaining time scheduled for un- or semi-structured activities such as music or snack. The form of each session as well as its content is specified; it proceeds by a fixed route. For example, when the task involves classification and concept building of "weapons" (see pp. 105-10), the teacher starts with "This is a gun" ("Let's all say it: This is a gun. This is a gun. Again. This is a gun."), proceeds to "A gun is a weapon, a knife is a weapon" ("Here's the rule: If you use it to hurt somebody, then it's a weapon. Again. If you use it to hurt somebody, then it's a weapon. One more time..."), etc. All along she raises questions that will elicit the desired answers.

Starting from the premise that disadvantaged children have educational requirements quite different from those of middle-class children, the authors reject developmentally-oriented nursery school education in favor of a concentration on highly controlled rote learning. The spirit of this program is aptly expressed by a song which, after its introduction "early in the year," is "to be used once a week" to acquaint children "with statements about what is expected of them in the preschool":

I'm going to sing when the teacher
says "Sing."

I'm going to sing when the teacher
says "Sing."

I'm going to sing when the teacher
says "Sing."

And think when the teacher says
"Think." (p. 214)

The teacher demonstrates, touching forehead at "think"; the children are to do the same. Verses are added, and "as the children become familiar with

the rules of the school," they too may volunteer additions. The teacher is to "ask questions, such as 'What are you going to do when the teacher says "Sing"?... Are you going to jump when the teacher says "Sing"?'" (*Ibid.*).

To be sure, you are *not* going to jump when the teacher says "Sing." Nor will you jump when the teacher says "Sit" ("Children should sit in assigned seats. They should leave their places only with the teacher's consent." [p. 80]) nor go to the toilet except at specified times (p. 79). Four-year-olds! You will not express affect—even enthusiasm—in a child-like manner, just because you feel it ("Except when children are instructed to yell or sing loudly during the instructional periods or the music periods, they should be quiet and restrained." [p. 78]) nor talk about anything of importance to you, particularly not when you are in group three and it is your fourth activity period: twenty minutes of "language" (Children "should be discouraged from relating personal experiences or interjecting ideas that are irrelevant to the teacher's presentations." The teacher "may occasionally allow a minute or two for the children to speak their minds, but this should be at the teacher's discretion, not the children's" [p. 80]). And you will neither sing except when told to, nor not sing if you would rather listen (p. 212).

Participation is enforced and reinforced by a reward/punishment system which is as prescribed as the "lessons." If you have the stomach for it, read the section entitled "Establishing Appropriate Schoolroom Behavior" (pp. 78-91), particularly the last five pages which deal with punishment. The recipes here range from "a slap or a good shaking" for "unthinking or automatic behavior" (p. 87) to sticking the child

into "a small, poorly-lighted closet with a simple chair" for "behavior that is more calculated," such as "clowning during a study period or the music period or when they refuse to respond" (*Ibid.*). Hardly novel "methods," these responses to the children's behavior are consistent with Bereiter's and Engelmann's inability or unwillingness to understand it. "Preschool disadvantaged children," they say, "are likely to show distressing tendencies to hit, bite, kick, scream, run wildly about, cling, climb into laps, steal, lie, hide, ignore directions, and defy authority" (p. 41). That they lump all these together as "inappropriate classroom behavior" reveals the authors' real attitude toward these children as one toward dreadfully ignorant creatures with the desire to be held on a lap or so great a fear as to cling to a teacher who likes him only for his accomplishments! The ideal of unquestioned obedience may appeal to those favoring coercive methods of manipulation. It seems to me to be in conflict with the aim of helping children to develop self-control and to learn to modulate their behavior in accordance with a growing understanding of themselves and their environment. The children under study do tend to show behavioral characteristics that are divergent to varying degrees from those of some middle-class children. But these must be understood in terms of the children's life-experiences and not dismissed as "inappropriate social learning," swiftly replaceable by toughly-enforced "proper rules."

The four-year-olds "taught" in the authors' school were selected from a specific population group on the basis of their siblings' having encountered school problems and because they came "from homes which, in the judgment of teachers visiting them, were especially unfavorable educationally"

(p. 52). From this group they generalize what is to be appropriate for all disadvantaged children. Although they occasionally differentiate between "deprived" and "severely deprived" children and between four-year-olds and children of other ages, they proceed on the whole as though no substantial differences exist within this "lower-class disadvantaged" group and as though three-, four-, and five-year-olds all face identical developmental tasks. All the book's teaching strategies are selected with one goal in mind: to ready the "culturally-deprived" child to meet the academic requirements of a traditional first grade. Bereiter and Engelmann use "culturally-deprived" to describe children who have been "deprived of opportunities for cultural learning to which everyone in our society is entitled" (p. 25), and who therefore fall short of the "standards of knowledge and ability which are constantly held to be valuable in the schools" (p. 24). "Cultural deprivation," finally, is identified with "language deprivation," as distinguished from, e.g., "social or emotional deprivations" which, we are assured, are of minor importance insofar as they exist at all (pp. 40-43).

Basing their analysis on test results, the authors characterize disadvantaged threes-to-fives as *retarded* in reasoning ability and language development. They are said to be functioning at levels of children at least a year younger, thus being seriously behind in their ability to manipulate symbols. As such children tend to fall farther and farther behind in school, the authors reason that it is imperative that they be taught quickly and systematically what they do not know. Bereiter and Engelmann grant that the quality of the primary grades may contribute to learning failures, but they do not consider this possibility in depth or de-

tail, refusing seriously to question the appropriateness of traditional first-grade standards for "disadvantaged" or any other children.

In fact, the authors are possessed with the idea of "catching up"; they stress that there is "no conceivable way to contradict" their notion that it is a "simple logical necessity that these children *must progress at a faster than usual rate* if they are to catch up" (p. 7, their emphasis). It follows that the children cannot afford to waste time with the variety of learning experiences, geared to optimally furthering each child's development, usually provided in nursery schools, but that their education must be narrowly focused to ensure success in first grade. "Normally, the young child has a lot of time; but the disadvantaged child who enters a preschool at the age of four-and-a-half has already used most of his up" (p. 9).

It must be mentioned that the aims and procedures ascribed by Bereiter and Engelmann to the "traditional nursery school" bear little resemblance to the reality aimed at by early-childhood educators. To clear up these misconceptions alone would require more space than is here available. Unguided play outside of school, for instance, is equated with free-choice activity periods in the nursery school; explication of what is thus distorted would involve delineating the educational functions of the latter and discussing the methods by which a teacher seeks to maximize cognitive growth through this channel of guided symbolic representation, among others.¹ It is true that a child-

¹ Cf. Barbara Biber, "Integration of Mental Health Principles in the School Setting," in G. Caplan (ed.), *Prevention of Mental Disorders in Children* (New York: Basic Books, 1961); Barbara Biber, "Preschool Education," in R. Ulich (ed.), *Educa-*

development-oriented nursery school could not accommodate a conditioning program; respect for the child and his need to organize his thinking and to manage tasks in his own four-year-old way preclude pushing and rushing. This means not that early-childhood educators are complacent about cognitive deficiencies, but that the approach is sharply divergent from that urged in the book under review.

While its authors magnanimously concede that a concern "with the child's over-all development as a human being is thoroughly commendable" (p. 11), they do not deem it practical to consider the "development" of deprived children when planning their education, since it is "a process that must go on at its own rate" (p. 8) while a narrow focus "on specific learning goals makes high rates of progress possible" (p. 10). Thus they attempt to justify depriving the already disadvantaged child of developmentally appropriate preschool experiences.

There is nothing particularly new about this segmentation of the learning child, nor in the authors' use of a methodology of rigidly-structured teaching with emphasis on conventional measures of achievement and unquestioning conformity, except that this lack of concern with personality development has now been extended downward in age and that a disregard of developmentally appropriate modes of learning is consciously sought. This

is a real regression, I feel, considering that educators and research psychologists are now working on extending child-development principles in education from the nursery school to the grades. Thus, integration of cognitive and affective experiences must be facilitated by educational strategies, and for optimal effectiveness any curriculum needs to be geared to perceptual and learning styles as well as to rates of progress specific to various age groups and the individuals comprising each class.²

It seems odd that Bereiter and Engelmann should tie their efforts to standards of achievement that are being questioned today even for intellectually "advantaged" children. Does the traditional first-grade program really provide the learning opportunities that will lead children increasingly to comprehend and cope successfully with the complexity of the worlds of nature and ideas? The better we understand the integrative processes involved in the young child's acquisition of knowledge, the less sense can be found in purely didactic and premature teaching of skills. "Learning," as Piaget points out, "is always relative to the developmental period during which it takes place."³ A recent study of language development by the psychologist and linguist

²R. Cartwright and B. Biber, "The Teacher's Role in a Comprehensive Program for Mental Health," in R. Ojemann (ed.), *The School and the Community Treatment Facility in Preventive Psychiatry*. Proceedings of the 5th Institute on Preventive Psychiatry, 1965 (Ames, Iowa: State University of Iowa, 1966). This is a particularly lucid and insightful exposition of the issues involved in this effort. See also C. Calitri, "A Structure for Teaching the Language Arts," *Harvard Educational Review*, 35 (Fall 1965).

³Foreword to M. Almy, *Young Children's Thinking* (New York: Teacher's College, Columbia Univ., 1966), p. v.

tion and the Idea of Mankind (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964); E. B. Omwake, "The Child's Estate," in A. J. Solnit and S. A. Provence (eds.), *Modern Perspectives in Child Development* (New York: International Univ. Press, 1963); and K. D. Wann, M. S. Dorn, & E. A. Liddle, *Fostering Intellectual Development in Young Children* (New York: Teacher's College, Columbia Univ., 1962).

Hermine Sinclair⁴ shows that while it is possible to refine the linguistic ability of young children and produce changes in their use of language, this does not bring with it an advance in "operational" (i.e., reasoning) ability.

Related to their dependence on academic success in traditionally-programmed schools as a criterion of "educative" success is the authors' over-reliance on test results. Although they are aware that tests alone do not give an accurate picture of a child's linguistic competence, much less of the child, and recognize the need for multifaceted research that includes observations in a variety of settings, they nonetheless proceed on the basis of distortions inevitably resulting from their narrow point of departure. While observations easily bear out test findings that disadvantaged children tend to have considerable difficulty with language and that cognitive functioning for many of them has been delayed or seriously impaired, they will not support any notion of simple retardation in language and thinking processes. A four-year-old whose tests show a year's retardation in linguistic competence may not *be* or *act* or *think* or *speak* like an "average three-year-old" at all. In fact, the authors' analysis of relevant language features, as derived from Engelmann's Cognitive Maturity Tests and from observations of their group of children, reveals cognitive deviancies that can hardly be understood merely in terms of "retardation." To say that "the speech of the severely deprived children seems to consist not of distinct

words, as does the speech of middle-class children of the same age, but rather of whole phrases or sentences that function like giant words" and that "these 'giant word' units cannot be taken apart by the child and re-combined" (p. 34) is to state a characteristic of the speech patterns of certain—by no means all—severely disadvantaged children and not something to be described as a four-year-old functioning on the level of a middle-class three-year-old.⁵

The authors' *descriptions* of discrete linguistic features of their group provide additions to, verifications of, and deviations from the findings of other recent investigators, such as Bailey, Bernstein, Cazden, Hess, John, Stewart, etc. These data are useful for the light they shed on both shared characteristics of the language patterns of many deprived children and important differences among them.⁶ This should not, however, lead us to view and treat children as disembodied intellects. Such compartmentalization is possible only theoretically, not in the actual education of human beings, whose development is a unitary process. For the child, far more is involved here than inexperience with properly structured sentences, classifications, or questions. When communication in the home has been restricted chiefly to those items that serve expediency, then mutually gratifying relationship—including the early and continued responsiveness of a parent to a child's exploration and discoveries and parental recognition of

⁴ H. Sinclair (de Zwart), *Apprentissage Linguistique et Développement de la Pensée* (Paris: Dunod, 1967), referred to by J. Piaget in his lecture, "Memoire et Operations," at the Heinz Werner Institute of Developmental Psychology, Clark University, January 19, 1967.

⁵ Cf., for instance, P. Menyuk, "Syntactic Rules Used by Children from Preschool through First Grade," *Child Development*, XXXV (1964), 533-46.

⁶ W. Fowler, "Concept Learning in Early Childhood," in *Teaching the Disadvantaged Child* (New York: Nat. Assoc. for the Ed. of Young Children, 1966), p. 96, mentions these decided differences.

the child's intentions—quite often tend to be insufficient for the emergence of self-awareness and autonomous functioning. When the mechanics of day-by-day existence leave scarce time or energy for shared pleasurable experiences between parents and children, the impetus and guidance for the child's learning about himself and the world may be diminished. Life for children in the slums tends to be far less predictable than for most others. Even if the home itself is stable, he must cope with many unexpected and—to a child—incomprehensible occurrences. This imposes a burden, and it tends to obscure cause-and-effect relationships and a sequential ordering of events. If, in addition, a child experiences unpredictability in his immediate interpersonal relationships—as some of these children do—we see evidence of bewilderment, suspicion, severe difficulties in tolerating delay or other frustration and in the child's expectation to achieve. For such children action is largely restricted to imitations and response to the intent of others, with the virtual absence of self-initiated involvement in learning activities.

The authors mention repeatedly that their children did not use, nor understand the meaning of, the word "or." To view this only in terms of linguistic retardation is to focus remedial strategies on a symptom, not its complex cause. The missing concept tells us a great deal about the children's inability to consider and make choices, giving evidence of their adaptations to interrelated depriving aspects of their lives. Every child needs to experience himself as a worthwhile person whose feelings, concerns and ideas are attended to and valued. To make this possible, a teacher has to listen and look, not just talk and control. Unless preschool programs provide

the child with the experience of considering alternatives and making decisions, the acquired word "or"—even when used correctly in sentences—may well exist only as a part of a pseudo-vocabulary with a synthetic content. To enable the child to take responsibility for thinking is to preclude conditioning him to "think when the teacher says: 'Think'."

Bereiter and Engelmann are not apologetic for their haste in assembling their volume before long-range effects of their methods could be examined and before they have attempted to evaluate their approach in the light of the existing body of theories relating to cognitive development. This tendency to rush into action on the basis of bits of knowledge and evidence must be considered dangerous, in spite of the authors' enthusiasm and unquestionable interest in helping these children. The "success" of such a program needs to be understood in terms of this. No doubt, the combination of an innovative spirit, sincerity, and a high teacher-child ratio (at least 3 per 15 children) with its emphasis on concentrated attention on each child's performance would entice such children to perform as expected of them. Since a development towards autonomy—in the sense that Erikson speaks of it—has not usually been supported in many of these children, the absence of this as an educative goal would be far less bewildering to them than to other children whose rights to make choices and to express their interests have been respected. Similarly, the tendency of many of these children to orient themselves to externals rather than being experienced in initiating activities would make it far easier for them, particularly under pressure, to abrogate their own intentions and fulfill the teacher's demands. Thus, the already far too

pronounced tendency of children such as these to accommodate to the environment is cleverly utilized, instead of enabling them to assimilate knowledge through the self-regulatory process of coordinating activity. The function of education is not to teach children to take tests but to facilitate this assimilation. Our best efforts must be directed to this task, particularly for disadvantaged children.

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THE DISADVANTAGED LEARNER:
KNOWING, UNDERSTANDING, EDUCATING.
edited by Staten W. Webster.
San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.,
1966. 644 pp. \$7.50.

THE DISADVANTAGED CHILD: ISSUES
AND INNOVATIONS
edited by Joe L. Frost and
Glenn R. Hawkes.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1966. 445 pp. \$4.95.

The collection of materials for inclusion in a good book of readings in any field requires judgment and selectivity on the part of the editor. An even more important requirement is that the field of study be developed to a level which is productive of substantive work. We are indebted to Staten Webster and to Joe Frost and Glenn Hawkes for the two collections of readings published under the titles *The Disadvantaged Learner* and *The Disadvantaged Child*, respectively. Despite the thought and care which have gone into the selection of articles to be included in these two volumes, the editors have done little to compensate for the fact that, as a field of study, education of the disadvantaged has not yet emerged as an area characterized by a substantive theoretical and research literature. The litera-

ture is heavily descriptive of programs, illustrative of problems, and speculative with respect to where work in this field should go. Nonetheless, both volumes contain useful information and provocative ideas.

Webster's *The Disadvantaged Learner* is organized into three parts. Part One includes articles by such writers as Coles, Harrington, Havighurst, Henry, Kardiner and Ovesey, and others which identify and describe several categories of disadvantaged persons and the conditions under which they live. Special populations discussed include the American Indian, Japanese Americans, the American Negro, several Spanish-speaking populations, migrant farm-children, Appalachian children, youth-gang societies, and teenage culture. What is missing in this section is an effort at placing these several observations into a context that is meaningful for educational planning. The characteristics of a variety of subgroups are described, but an interpretation of these characteristics and conditions is not provided.

Part Two is directed at the educational problems of the disadvantaged learner. The logic of this division from Part One is not readily apparent, since the alleged characteristics of this population are discussed further. There is, however, a sharper focus on those characteristics which function primarily as educational disabilities. The Ausubel discussion of the effects of cultural deprivation on learning patterns is much too brief. Riessman's¹ excerption of a chapter "The Slow Gifted Child" from his book was a useful introduction to the problem in 1962, when the book was first published. Today it seems somewhat superficial. The Hess and Ship-

¹ Frank Riessman, *The Culturally Deprived Child* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

man discussion of "Early Blocks to Children's Learning" provides a helpful overview of some issues that may not be otherwise adequately considered. Pasa-manick and Knobloch call attention to a problem with which school people have been too little concerned in their discussion of some possible relations between school retardation and organic abnormality. Other problems treated with varying degrees of adequacy are creativity, success strivings, male identification, language development, anti-social behavior, and special problems related to arithmetic, social studies, and verbal comprehension. This section on pupil's problems is interesting, but is primarily an accumulation of individuals' observations or experiences with small groups. We do not see in this section an overview or an integrated summary of the educational problems of the disadvantaged. The reader will have to draw conclusions for himself relative to the overall picture.

The last section of this compilation is the richest collection I have seen of published descriptive experiences and programs directed at "Educating the Disadvantaged." A wide variety of ideas, practices, strategies, and plans are advanced. They cover teaching, guidance, administration, curriculum development, parent involvement, reading, specific subject-areas, and omnibus approaches. Readers will find a more complete survey of programs in the directory section of *Compensatory Education*,² but the anthology of recorded experiences and programs presented here provides a useful overview of some of the things being tried in work with disadvantaged children. Webster makes no attempt at evaluating or rating these

models. His contribution rests in the collecting of the papers into an interesting and reasonably well-balanced group.

The Frost and Hawkes collection and the Webster book are very similar, though the organization of the two books differs somewhat. Frost and Hawkes have used more sections and thus are able to make the section titles more specific. Both books include some of the same authors and sometimes, where different authors are used, the basic message communicated is similar. After identifying the disadvantaged and their characteristics in Parts One and Two, Part Three consists of six papers relating to "Intelligence Testing and the I.Q." These are important works. Hunt provides a theoretical discussion of how intelligence develops, and he makes a strong case for the plasticity of intellect during the early years. His position is more fully developed in his book *Intelligence and Experience*.³ Even though he may have overstated the case for malleability, it is a refreshing antedote for the hopelessness with which much work with disadvantaged children has been approached. The article by Pettigrew (also an abbreviated presentation of work more fully developed elsewhere⁴) places in context much of the work and speculation concerning Negro intelligence. Pettigrew reviews the research evidence and concludes that the case has *not* been made for significant inherent distinctions in quality of intellect related to race. Like Hunt, he pleads the case for the plasticity of intellectual development. Skeels and Kirk in separate articles deal with

² Edmund W. Gordon and Doxey A. Wilkerson, *Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1966).

³ Joseph McV. Hunt, *Intelligence and Experience* (New York: Ronald Press, 1961).

⁴ Thomas F. Pettigrew, *A Profile of the Negro American* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1964).

the effects of improved patterns of stimulation through adoption and education. Their evidence and positions strongly support those of Hunt and Pettigrew. Valuable as these four papers are, they should have been balanced by an article in which a more conservative or cautious position is advanced. The plasticity of intellectual development is not a closed issue.⁵ Some investigators take a far more pessimistic position and among them are at least a few who are not racists or political conservatives. They argue that in the presence of carefully assessed intellectual function, significant upward shifts in I.Q. are infrequently achieved and sustained. They also suggest that to take too optimistic a view is to lead to expectations which cannot be met with our present level of pedagogical skill. The issues here may be incorrectly drawn. For the educator, the genetic basis of intellectual function and the plasticity of intellectual development may be of ultimate importance. However, within the limits of existing knowledge, it is obvious that individuals, if not groups, differ with respect to the quality and patterning of intellectual function. It is also obvious that the course of intellectual development has been observed to shift in some individuals. The important issue may well be the *nature* of intellectual function in the individual learner, or the group of learners for whom one is responsible, and the *implications for the design of learning experiences* once that nature has been identified and understood.

Frost and Hawkes have included two articles on intelligence testing in which positions for and against the use of

group intelligence testing with disadvantaged children are presented. These authors make their points well but, again, the point being debated may miss the mark. The problem of psycho-educational appraisal for disadvantaged children is not one of finding a way to measure adequately quantity or level of intelligence. The problem is one of qualitative analysis of intellectual function, from which analysis appropriate learning experiences and educational programs can be prescribed, designed, and executed. It helps the teacher little to know that the score she has is a valid measure of intellectual function in her pupil. What she very much needs to know are the patterns of affective and cognitive function in this child which have meaning or implications for what she must do to enhance his chances for the development of intellectual and social competence.

Interesting and provocative articles are included in the sections on "Education and the Young Child," "Education and the Older Child," "Teaching Communicative and Problem-Solving Skills," and "Training Teachers of the Disadvantaged." These several discussions tend to be programmatic and polemical, but contain many ideas and strategies which deserve systematic consideration and exploration. The final section of the book consists of articles which give a philosophical treatment of the "Individual, Family, and Community."

One leaves these two collections with a feeling of thankfulness that good people are thinking about many aspects of this important problem area. Some will find in at least some of the articles sufficient substance to mount several programs. Others will take new pride in their own efforts as they discover that they are on the "right" track or at least that "no one else is doing more than my

⁵ These issues have been extensively examined by Harold E. Jones, "The Environment and Mental Development," in Leonard Carmichael (ed.), *Manual of Child Psychology* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

program does." If, however, the best of our thinking and efforts are represented in the articles which appear in these two books, both might well be retitled:

THE DISADVANTAGED LEARNER:

THE DISADVANTAGED CHILD:

*And the Disadvantaged Professions
which serve him.*

We have only begun a long and a hard struggle. The battle and the victory lie still ahead.

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CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN ACTION.

edited by Reginald A. Neuwien.

Notre Dame, Ind.: University of

Notre Dame Press, 1966. 328 pp. \$10.50.

The sub-title of *Catholic Schools in Action* is *The Notre Dame Study of Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools in the United States*. This sub-title calls for a brief historical note about the origins of the book itself.

Back in the early 1960's, David Willis, then Chairman of the Education Department at Marquette University, submitted a proposal to the Carnegie Corporation calling for a study of Catholic elementary and secondary schools. The proposal emphasized the need for comprehensive factual studies of Catholic education, and the value such studies might have in resolving controversies over Catholic schools and their relationships to public schools. Subsequently, Willis was informed by the Carnegie Corporation that his proposal was being considered; as I recall, the *Chicago Sun-Times* even carried a story to this effect.

The Carnegie Corporation ultimately funded a study of Catholic education. The grant was made, however, to the University of Notre Dame, not to Marquette University. Among some in-

formed Catholics, there was shock that Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, the President of Notre Dame who was also a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation at the time, would accept the grant under these circumstances, especially since his own institution had not initiated any such proposal. In any case, the astonished Willis, left like a bride at the altar, must have received another shock recently when he read, in the preface of this book, that the study was "the fruit of the passionate interest of John Gardner, then President of the Corporation." Even in enterprises as addicted to sycophancy and back-scratching as foundations and higher education, this is rubbing it in.

Subsequently, Notre Dame employed Reginald A. Neuwien as the Director of the Study. Neuwien, who also served as editor of this report, is a devout Catholic, a person of integrity, and a competent school administrator. Needless to say, whatever may have been questionable about the origins of the study, it deserves to be considered on its merits.

The work itself is divided into eight chapters, plus an appendix which lists all the instruments used in the study. The eight chapters discuss the current goals of Catholic education; the enrollment of Catholic schools, the staff of Catholic schools, the preparation of religious for teaching; inventories of Catholic school outcomes relating to religious understanding, student attitudes, and other school outcomes; and a concluding chapter on what Catholic parents think of Catholic schools. In making the study, the staff had the assistance of an advisory committee consisting of Catholic religious and educational leaders, as well as a few non-Catholic members.

The delicate nature of the study is reflected in the guide-lines established

by its advisory committee. Emphasis was to be placed on reliable statistical data concerning Catholic schools. In addition to national statistics, thirteen dioceses were to be studied in depth. Evaluation was to be avoided, as were comparisons with the public schools. Emphasis was to be placed upon ethical and religious aspects of Catholic schools.

At the outset, I would say that *Catholic Schools in Action* does include a great deal of valuable data on Catholic schools. The very rationale for the study was the need for reliable information about Catholic schools. Non-Catholics are apt to exaggerate the extent to which Catholic educators or the hierarchy have such information. In fact, reliable data is frequently lacking, even at the diocesan level, on some of the most important aspects of Catholic school operations. This fact is recognized in the study, which cannot reasonably be expected to compensate for decades of failure to develop reliable data about Catholic schools.

Indeed, the attitude many readers may take toward this book will depend on whether they evaluate it on the basis of the data that existed before the study, or on what they wish to know about Catholic schools. Of course, the book should be evaluated from both perspectives, but it seems to me to be an important effort to enlarge our knowledge of Catholic schools.

The chapters in this book vary a great deal in quality. I found the most useful chapters to be those analyzing the enrollments and staff of Catholic schools. These chapters include much basic data that one needs in order to understand what is happening in Catholic education. Data on enrollments, admission policies, school plant, coeducation, lay and religious teachers, administrative personnel, teacher prep-

aration, and other matters are included in usable, if not ideal, form. The avoidance of evaluation is understandable but unfortunate, since it is difficult to assimilate such a large mass of data, unrelieved by the kind of evaluation needed to place it in perspective.

Back in 1960, when I was a guest at the convention of the National Catholic Education Association, a diocesan superintendent commented that diocesan autonomy is the Catholic equivalent of state's rights. The resultant wide variation in Catholic schools is an important fact which is amply documented in the study. To the outsider, "Catholic schools" suggests a monolithic enterprise which is assumed to be the same everywhere. In fact, there is some similarity and uniformity, especially on doctrinal matters; on the other hand, Catholic schools vary widely on such matters as costs, class size, administrative structure, personnel policies, and so on. For example, there are Catholic schools staffed entirely by religious, and there are Catholic schools staffed entirely by lay persons.

The chapter on the preparation of religious for teaching also includes valuable data, especially on the difficulties involved in providing adequate training for religious in secular subjects. The chapter is marred, however, by an irritating tendency to regard the intended outcomes of Catholic teacher education as accomplished facts.

In my opinion, the least successful chapters are those dealing with the Inventory of Catholic School Outcomes. The book is not explicit on the basic dilemma confronting Catholic schools. Salvation is the chief objective of Catholic schools, but there is no direct way to evaluate the success of Catholic schools in this regard. For this reason, Catholic educators are forced to resort

to other criteria to evaluate Catholic schools. One way is to measure the degree to which Catholics believe and behave according to doctrinal prescriptions for achieving salvation. On this score, one of the most astonishing aspects of the study is the fact that the staff had to develop a test of religious knowledge; one might have thought Catholic educators would have all sorts of these tests available.

Another approach is to evaluate Catholic schools on what are essentially secular criteria, e.g., how many students go on to college?, or how well do they score on standardized tests? Given the fact that Catholic schools are competing with public schools for students, staff, and funds, the avoidance of comparisons to the public schools is interesting. As a public school educator, I welcome any and all careful comparisons of this kind. My objective would not be to prove Catholic schools to be inferior; rather, if Catholic schools are doing better, I want to know why and how, so that the benefits can be incorporated into the public schools.

Although the study was supposed to avoid evaluation, it did not—and could not. Unfortunately, its tendencies are to narrow the basis for evaluation of Catholic schools to comparisons of student performance. This is an important point which calls for brief elaboration. Theoretically, Catholic schools would be justified, even if clearly inferior to public schools on all secular criteria, as long as there was a logical basis for ascribing supernatural benefits to Catholic education. As a practical matter, however, Catholic schools cannot survive this way. Whatever may be the schools' ostensible or formal purpose, Catholic parents would be reluctant to send their children to schools which were recognized or thought to be inferior on the basis of important secular

criteria. Now the non-Catholic frequently (and I think justifiably) represents comparisons of public to Catholic schools which ignore the selective admissions policies of Catholic schools. The Notre Dame Study does suggest the importance of selective admissions in Catholic schools. In fact, although it specifically mentions the selectivity of Catholic schools and denies any Catholic intentions to establish a system of schools for the upper classes, it seems clear that this will be the outcome of present tendencies, regardless of the intent.

One should not evaluate the secular benefits of Catholic schools without taking into account their over-all impact on the public schools. The public schools of Rhode Island, the state with the highest proportion of students in non-public schools, are in disgraceful condition. The difficulty of generating public understanding and support for public schools, when a substantial proportion of the population regards the public schools as an undeserving competitor, must be considered in evaluating the secular outcomes of Catholic schools. To cite another example, the tendency of Catholic schools to enroll disproportionate numbers of white students, and thereby to intensify the problems of racial segregation in the public schools, must be considered in any comprehensive evaluation of Catholic schools' outcomes. I do not criticize the Notre Dame Study for failure to discuss these institutional outcomes, but the book does have a regrettable tendency to ignore them in discussing the impact of Catholic schools.

Finally, I would suggest the title is somewhat misleading. A reader might get a better insight into Catholic schools in action from reading Father Joseph Fichter's *Parochial School* than from this book. *Catholic Schools in Ac-*

tion provides a great deal of valuable data on Catholic schools, but really to get at the dynamics of Catholic schools, one has to come to grips in more detail with particular schools in operation.

The most important fact about this book is not what it covers or what it omits. Rather, it is the fact that the book reflects a systematic effort to secure basic data about Catholic schools. It is easy to think of issues which the study ignored; the crucial issue is whether the study represents a real, if modest, beginning of critical self-study by Catholic schools, or whether Catholics and non-Catholics alike will tolerate the "Iron Curtain" that has hitherto shielded Catholic schools from critical analysis and evaluation. Catholic schools enroll almost 15 per cent of our total school enrollments. They are, therefore, too important to be granted any immunity from critical evaluation, whether by Catholics or non-Catholics. If *Catholic Schools in Action* provides any momentum to the objective study and evaluation of Catholic schools, and I think it has, it will be an important contribution to American education.

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AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM IN EDUCATION.

by Paul Nash.

New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1966. 342 pp. \$3.95.

This book is sub-titled "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education"—and it is therefore relevant to begin a review by considering how Professor Nash conceives the philosophy of education. He believes that it involves what he terms both "analysis" and "commitment." He welcomes what the modern analytical philosopher can contribute

to the clarification of educational concepts and to the validation of educational arguments. But, at the same time, he finds these procedures in themselves insufficient; he thinks it necessary to commit himself to a moral standpoint vis-à-vis current educational problems. To justify this reading of the philosopher's task, he cites the example of G. E. Moore, who laid the "groundwork for a systematic clarification of ethical statements and questions," but who then "went on to commit himself to a substantive ethical position" (p. 2). This is a dual undertaking with which I happen to have some sympathy, as I have long regarded the work of the analytical philosopher as essentially a propaedeutic to the important task of prescription. Whether one attributes this further job to the philosopher as such is bound up with conventions relating to the use of the word "philosopher," and can be settled by appeal to ordinary usage or stipulation. One can also point to the fact that some analyses of educational concepts smuggle in prescriptions under the guise of clarification—I suspect that Professor Peters' analysis of the concept of "education" itself, in his inaugural lecture, "Education as Initiation," does precisely this.

But, of course, the analytical philosophers have done a great service to educational philosophy by insisting on clarity of conceptual usage and rigour of argument. They have helped to lay to rest the gentlemanly purveyors of ripe wisdom, the banal proclaimers of high-sounding platitudes who have too long passed for educational philosophers and who, in England at least, had brought the subject into such contempt.

Professor Nash's book is devoted to an examination of the dialectic which exists between the concepts of freedom

and authority. He examines their application in a variety of social and educational spheres—"The authority of institutions/The freedom to think, learn, and teach," "The authority of the group/The freedom to become oneself," "The authority of excellence/The freedom to enjoy equal opportunities," and so on. The notion of a dialectic is, in this context, a good one, because of the rather odd behaviour of the concept of "freedom"; it operates with the implication of "freedom from" restraints, but also in the positive sense of "freedom to" behave in a variety of ways and, in this latter context, may well imply initial restraints which seem at odds with its more normal sense of emancipation. One might well have expected Professor Nash to begin by a careful and extended sorting out of this paradox, involving an elucidation of the behaviour of the concept of "freedom" analogous to that provided by Mr. Maurice Cranston, in his study published some twelve years ago, *Freedom: A New Analysis*.¹ This sort of exercise would have been well within the scope of even beginners of the subject, and would not have militated against Nash's attempts to provide an introductory book. Indeed, Mr. Cranston's book is itself one of the best introductions to the ways in which a modern philosopher teases out the implications of a concept, so that something on this line would certainly have been well within the understanding of students.

My feeling, however, is that Professor Nash is more interested in his commitments than he is in the work of an "under-labourer," concerned to provide the conditions in which commitment can be profitably discussed. But, alas! what he has to offer in the way of positive advice, within the general frame-

work of the paradox of freedom and authority, is all too often banal and even naïve. It is, in any case, usually far too loosely expressed for someone who is presuming to write an introductory book on the philosophy of education.

I can perhaps illustrate my strictures by taking a sentence of Professor Nash and showing how loosely framed it is and how, in any case, it is contradicted by other elements in the book. If it is urged that it is unfair to condemn a book on the basis of a single loose proposition, I can only urge that the book is full of such looseness, and that I could have chosen many more out of the ones that I noted during the course of my reading; in other words, the sentence is quite representative of a pervasive flabbiness.

"The full flowering of the human mind requires intellectual freedom in the most comprehensive sense" (p. 71) is the sentence I have in mind. It clearly raises doubts about what is meant by "full flowering" and "in the most comprehensive sense." But is it intended as prescription or statement of fact? As a statement of fact it is a dubious starter: some of the most culturally creative periods—such as those of Elizabethan England, nineteenth-century Russia, or the medieval Italian state—were, in fact, times when there were a variety of quite severe restrictions on intellectual freedom. Indeed, I would contend that the human mind "flowers" (if I understand what that means) best when it meets just the right amount of restraint—not too severe, as in the totalitarian state, which is too efficient in repression, and not too "open" as in our disintegrating culture with its fear of even a responsible authority. Now there is, of course, a sense in which Professor Nash realizes this because, as I have explained, his book is about the

¹ (London: Longmans, 1953).

interaction of freedom and authority. But the fact that he could perpetrate such a sentence—and so many like them (the chapter on creativity, for instance, is full of them)—is illustrative of a tendency found throughout the book. The prose is far too full of uplift, reminiscent of the old bad tradition of educational philosophy—or of government report prose, as it is written in England. It is far too full of quotation from second- and third-rate writers. And this is a pity, because if Professor Nash had cut his book by at least half and tightened up the remainder, he might have had something quite interesting to say.

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J. A. COMENIUS AND THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL EDUCATION.

by John E. Sadler.

New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1966.
318 pp. \$6.50.

John Amos Comenius is best remembered as the prolific seventeenth-century Czech author of children's texts. This is ironic. Not only did Comenius detest the tedious task of writing texts, but recalling only this one aspect of his many-sided career overlooks his most grandiose aim—namely, the creation of a society populated by men "made in the image of God." To accomplish this end, Comenius felt that nothing less than universal education would be required. The dimensions of Comenius's concept of universal education constitute the theme of Professor Sadler's book.

Universal education, to Comenius, meant that *all* men were to be taught "about all things, and in all ways." These three aspects of universal education also provide a convenient framework for characterizing Comenius's life

work. His concern for educating all people is epitomized by *The School of Infancy*, in which Comenius admonishes his readers that all children, "boys and girls, both noble and ignoble, in all cities and towns, villages and hamlets should be sent to school." Impressed by the notion of pansophy and encyclopedic knowledge, Comenius devoted a greater portion of his life to the compilation of his own encyclopedia. So involved was he in expediting the educative process, Comenius prepared his own didactical works, for example, the *Great Didactic* and the *Analytic Didactic*, portions of which are remarkably relevant today.

Comenius was more than an educator. He was a theologian, a social reformer, a linguist, a psychologist (before the science was created), a composer of religious music, an indefatigable traveler, and an internationally known pacifist and arbiter of nations. His interest in pansophy brought him in contact with the leading intellects of his day. He was known to The Royal Society, he was an acquaintance of Descartes, he prepared textbooks for Swedish schools, and he established a model school in Hungary. Even in his day, his language textbooks were translated into a dozen different languages.

But aside from the professional renown of Comenius, there was a personal and tragic side. Half of his life spanned the Thirty Years' War. The more fruitful, creative period of his life was spent seeking asylum. Three of his wives preceded him to the grave. The major portion of his pansophic studies was destroyed when Polish forces burned the city of Leszno. His beloved church, the *Unitas Fratrum*, was banned in Moravia and was close to extinction. And Comenius was exiled from his homeland to die in relative obscurity in Amsterdam. Perhaps most

shattering to Comenius was his belated awareness that most of his ambitions and hopes would never be realized in his life. Pansophy was dead, and the millennium was as distant as ever. Educational and societal reforms would have to wait for later generations.

It is not hard to write about Comenius. A prolific author, Comenius wrote at least 200 books, many of which are still extant. Furthermore, much has been written about Comenius. By 1911, over 13,000 articles and books had been written about him. In fact, so much has been written about Comenius that a special research group was created in Prague to bring order out of this vast body of literature.

Nor is it hard to find some appealing aspect of Comenius to write about. Comenius was so active in so many different enterprises from pacificism to pedagogy that any researcher can find something of value somewhere in the life and work of Comenius. The problem of writing about Comenius is not one of paucity of material; it is one of isolation, delineation, and selectivity.

Professor Sadler has exercised this selectivity well without doing injustice to the breadth and scope of Comenius's work. By concentrating on the theme of universal education, he places Comenius's pansophic, pedagogic, and social reform efforts in their proper perspectives. As such, schools, didactic processes, textbooks, and schoolmasters are interpreted properly as instrumentalities for bringing about a new and better world, not as ends in themselves.

Like Comenius's efforts, Sadler's work is an ambitious one. At times it appears almost too ambitious. To encompass the theme of universal education within 300 pages requires considerable "distillation." Unfortunately, one effect of this distillation is a seemingly endless recitation of pithy

excerpts from Comenius's works, interwoven with only enough "connective tissue" to provide continuity. The result is not unlike a Bach fugue in which many voices are introduced, embroidered, interwoven, and then finally resolved at the end. Considering the topic and the number of works consulted and cited, it is surprising that the book comes off at all. One is reminded of Dr. Johnson's comment regarding a woman's preaching: "It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."

But Sadler's book is done well. The book has been thoroughly researched. Using primary source material (some of which was just recently discovered by the Comenius Research Group) and personally visiting places in Moravia associated with Comenius, Sadler has produced a most authoritative work. Not only is he thoroughly familiar with the works of Comenius, but he is equally familiar with the works of Comenius's contemporaries and followers, e.g., Francke, who perhaps more than anyone else was responsible for applying and preserving the works of Comenius. Above all, the author's assessment of Comenius is a balanced one. This is unusual because students of Comenius are rarely impartial.

Two features of *J. A. Comenius and the Concept of Universal Education* are especially noteworthy: the first is a biographical and historical treatment of Comenius and his times; the other is an appendix which contains biographic sketches of contemporaries of Comenius. (Searchers of thesis topics will find a gold mine in both places.)

Although the book is complete in so many respects, one particular omission is surprising. No mention is made of Comenius's inability to elicit information from Wolfgang Ratke concerning the latter's didactic methods. Pre-

sumably Ratke ignored all similar requests from educators, preferring instead to sell his methods to various princes in Germany.

Professor Sadler's book is not likely to appeal to the general reader. Neither Comenius nor the concept of universal education are provocative issues today. However, to the educational historian, and to the student of Comenius, this scholarly work is indispensable.

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ABSTRACTION AND CONCEPT FORMATION.
by Anatol Pikas.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. 303 pp. \$7.00.

This kind of book is an important attempt and it is with respect and regret that I must report that it creates much confusion while dispelling only a little. The book attempts to organize the heterogeneous definitions and assumptions of several kinds of psychological studies directed at human thinking, concept formation, abstraction, and symbolism. It seeks to reconcile these approaches through analysis to arrive at a sound view of the nature of abstraction and concept formation.

A good sample of literature is considered. For example, one vein of literature has been concerned with object-sorting tasks assigned to schizophrenic or brain-damaged patients to investigate their tendency to categorize the world in relatively concrete or abstract terms. A second has been concerned with experiments in which subjects try to find common elements among heterogeneous stimulus materials; these are the studies of concept-formation, concept-attainment, or concept-identification. A third line of research has asked subjects to indicate by gestures, drawings,

or associations the connotative symbolisms conveyed to them in words or sentences. These and other groups of experiments have in common an attempt to study the processes by which people attach meaning to experience. Yet these different lines of experimentation, so interesting separately, do not add together. Differences in terminology, procedure, and type of subject make them ostensibly not alike. Previous reviews have not tried to integrate the information these studies offer, but have rather passively pigeon-holed the studies under routine procedural categories.

To his credit, Pikas sees that what one author calls an "abstraction" another author may call "stimulus generalization," and that what one author calls a concept may not be what another author calls a concept. He takes on the heroic task of trying to analyze these approaches to find the similarities and differences among their underlying premises. There is no attempt at exhaustive bibliography or review; each approach is exemplified by one or two papers. Not all the groups of literature are perfectly represented by one exemplar, but certainly extreme selectivity is essential for an effort of this sort.

The book fails, I think. It fails largely because of ordinary, uninstructional shortcomings in presentation. Terminology swims into view and is used repeatedly when no definition has yet been offered. Distinctions between terms and equations of terms are not discussed sufficiently to make them clear. Allusions to studies are incomplete and choppy so that the reader who has not recently read a study cannot follow the author's analysis of it. This failure to keep the reader in touch with the argument—augmented, no doubt, by the minor blurs that translation inevitably produces—makes the

book vague and incoherent. I could not keep the line of discussion clearly in mind and often just trailed along with the text. Here and there a point would come up which seemed interesting, but the point would not form fully, and a semi-comprehension of the author's argument would recede once again under blurred text.

Part of the failure, however, may be due to a more central problem which is worth some discussion. Writing faults apart, no one has ever done much better than Pikas in integrating this kind of literature. Thus, one might conclude that these failures may, in part, be attributed to the very nature of the topic. To think about thinking is in some senses to try to lift oneself by the bootstraps.

Psychology is haunted by the problem of epistemology. We trace the recent origins of the discipline to British and French philosophers who, beginning with an argument about the problem of knowledge, gradually developed psychological arguments until they became functionally autonomous. The epistemological problems of the field persisted to the beginning of this century, when psychology as a discipline attempted to buy peace for a while by deciding that it would deal with the real world of the physicist and by further deciding that that world could be completely and unambiguously characterized in terms of stimuli and responses. Of course, that decided nothing—the more sophisticated behaviorists have ever since been saying that the fundamental problem of psychology is the problem of defining what a stimulus is. But psychologists, most of them, could live in peace with a world of stimulus and response so long as they did not try to define too sharply a concept, an abstraction, or a symbol.

To define these things adequately,

one must necessarily make decisions about what is "out there" and what is a mental construction. Naïve realism about the physical world will not avail; the experienced real world is not so naïvely real. If there is processing of experience on its way to our awareness of it—and we now believe there must be filtering, selection, and organization at the level of sensory end organs—then we are aware only of what is effectively a conceptualized world. In fact, what we usually call a stimulus (a black triangle, a left runway, a nonsense shape) is conceptualized experience—imagine, for instance, the task of programing a computer so that it would call a stimulus what the psychologist calls a stimulus. If our awareness of the world comes already organized, then the boundary between raw *vs.* interpreted experience cannot be decided by intuition or introspection, but rather must be derived by laborious and imaginative reconstructions using data from sensory and brain physiology, inference from analysis of the ontogenesis of meaning in children, and extremely careful interpretation of normal and pathological information-processing in adults. We are beginning to try such reconstruction now, and it is a formidable and complicated task. To define the stimulus and the concept will demand a sophisticated, inferential realism.

One might question whether there is the possibility of clarification in the collective wisdom of the literatures which Pikas has examined. These literatures typically began with casual and intuitive definitions of concepts, symbols, and abstractions. Perhaps those definitions must be the end points, not the beginnings, of research into thinking.

Pikas has directly confronted an important problem as few other psychol-

ogists have. Ultimately, of course, some unconfused way must be found to define the boundaries of cognitive functioning or we will not attain what we are all today so enthusiastic about—a cognitive psychology.

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A THEORY OF ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION.

edited by John W. Atkinson and
Norman T. Feather.

New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1966. 392 pp. \$11.50.

A Theory of Achievement Motivation is the latest major contribution to the empirical study of motivation. Atkinson and Feather's book presents mathematical formulations and supporting research data which integrate and extend existing knowledge of achievement motivation. This is a considerable feat, given the wealth of data which has accumulated on achievement motivation in the past twenty years. At latest count there were well over 1000 published journal articles. In the past ten years research on achievement motivation has progressed in two directions. David McClelland and co-workers have studied the social origins and molar social consequences of achievement motivation. This research is summarized by McClelland in *The Achieving Society*.¹ Atkinson and Feather, on the other hand, have continued to study the nature and effects of achievement motivation at a molecular level through systematic laboratory research.

The basic concepts and equations

¹David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1961).

presented by Atkinson and Feather are as follows:

1. A person's response Tendency in Achievement-oriented situations (T_A) is the sum of the Tendency to strive for Success (T_S) and the Tendency to Avoid Failure (T_{AF}).

$$T_A = T_S - T_{AF}$$

T_{AF} always inhibits responses to achievement-oriented situations. Thus T_{AF} always is subtractive in its effect on T_A .

2. T_S is a multiplicative function of the operant level of an individual's Motive to strive for Success (M_S), the subjective Probability of Success (P_S), and the Incentive value of Success (I_S).

$$T_S = M_S \times P_S \times I_S$$

Similarly, T_{AF} is a multiplicative function of the operant level of an individual's Motive to Avoid Failure (M_{AF}), the subjective Probability of Failure (P_F), and the Incentive value of Failure (I_F).

$$T_{AF} = M_{AF} \times P_F \times I_F$$

3. The Incentive values of success and failure are inverse linear functions of the subjective probabilities of success and failure, respectively.

$$I_S = 1 - P_S \qquad I_F = 1 - P_F$$

4. By making appropriate substitutions and algebraic simplifications, the editors present the following equation for determining the resultant Tendency (T_A) in achievement-oriented situations (p. 333).

$$T_A = (M_S - M_{AF}) \times [P_S \times (1 - P_S)]$$

Thus, achievement-oriented tendencies are determined by the stable

levels of motivation in the individual ($M_B - M_{AF}$) and by a function of the subjective probability of success in a given situation [$P_B \times (1 - P_B)$]. The editors comment on this equation as follows:

This simplification shows quite clearly that the theory of achievement motivation represents a specification of the personality and environmental determinants as well as the nature of the interaction summarized programmatically in Lewin's equation $B = f(P, E)$. (p. 333)

The increased specificity which the editors have given to Lewin's well-known equation—Behavior is a function of Personality and Environmental factors—clearly indicates the degree of scientific progress made since Lewin presented his formulation. Atkinson and Feather's summary equation has greatest significance as an integration of two traditions within scientific psychology. As Cronbach² has pointed out, concern with the description of individual differences has been kept separate from the study of basic behavioral processes. Atkinson and Feather have carefully combined the two traditions, thus providing a prototypical solution to the problems Cronbach presented.

These basic ideas are presented and elaborated in four major sections of Atkinson and Feather's book. The first section contains summaries of the research on subjective probability, risk-taking behavior, and persistence, research which supports the basic hypotheses and formulations. The second section is made up of six empirical studies which test deductions from the

model. The third section, which will be most interesting to educators, presents five studies of the social implications of the theory. These practical applications cover such highly relevant areas as vocational aspiration, occupational mobility in the United States, economic behavior, and ability grouping in schools. In the last section, the editors review and critically examine the present status of their theory. It is to their credit that they have devoted great attention to the limitations of the theory and to the future research which can build on, or qualify, their documented propositions. The editors' critical appraisal demonstrates again the degree of precision they have brought to the study of motivation.

Although most of the studies in the book have been published previously as separate journal articles, the book is fresh in several respects. The introductory and summary chapters are new and contain a cogent statement of the theory, which helps the reader grasp the whole as he digests the often intricate studies. Together, the research studies have an overall logic which is not obvious from reading the journal articles separately. What is most impressive, however, is the degree of scientific sophistication they have brought to the area of human motivation. Twenty years ago the scientific study of human motivation was regarded, justifiably, as the most neglected area in psychology. Today we can say with justification that motivation, and achievement motivation in particular, is one of the most thoroughly researched areas in psychology. Atkinson and Feather have conducted a significant portion of the research which has brought the study of motivation to its present status.

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² L. J. Cronbach, "The Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology," *American Psychologist*, XII (1957), 671-84.

GRAMMAR 1 AND GRAMMAR 2.

by Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum.

Boston: Ginn and Company, 1967.
60 pp. and 65 pp. \$1.32.

The volumes under review represent the first two books in a series of textbooks planned for grades 7 through 12. *Grammar 1* is intended for the seventh grade; *Grammar 2*, for the eighth. *Grammar 1* consists of twelve lessons, dealing with such topics as *Noun Phrases*, *Relative Clauses*, *Verb Phrases*, and the sub-classification of *Nouns*. *Grammar 2*, also twelve lessons, covers the material of *Grammar 1* in the first two lessons, and then moves into more complicated English constructions. Among these are *Noun Phrase Complements*, *Verb Phrase Complements*, *Case-Marking* and *Pronominalization*.

Both texts present in a simple and straightforward fashion some of the major results of linguistic research in the field of transformational grammar during the last ten years. Indeed, both texts are constructed around the central result of this period: namely, the introduction into a theory of syntax of the notion of deep structure. With this notion as a starting point and central focus, the authors discuss a selected set of grammatical rules, called transformations, which map abstract (deep) structures into actual (surface) structures of a language, i.e., the sentences. Among these transformations are the *negative*, *question*, *passive*, *relative clause*, and *complementizing* transformations.¹ The discussions of these and other rules provide a good intro-

duction to the rudiments of transformational grammar. Indeed, the presentation is so useful that, in a recent graduate class in English syntax at M.I.T., the books were recommended for those members of the class receiving their first exposure to syntax. Thus one can say, at the outset, that for English teachers (and graduate students) who are interested in a relatively painless introduction to the basic concepts in a rapidly growing field, these textbooks are quite well done.

However, the authors have not intended to put together a teacher's manual in transformational grammar, but rather a textbook on English grammar for use in the secondary schools. And, even from the brief summary above, it should be apparent that their textbooks differ radically from those which are currently in use. The fundamental departure from traditional texts is that the authors have written a set of elementary pamphlets in which a particular theory of grammar is presented for its own sake.

There has always been an assumption in secondary (and primary) education that the teaching of grammar is beneficial in improving one's ability to write and to think clearly. Indeed, Jacobs and Rosenbaum, ignoring it in practice, give a nod toward this belief when they observe in the first chapter of *Grammar 1*:

When you know exactly what these skills [the skills used in speaking, hearing, reading or writing] are and how they work, you can truly say that you have an understanding of English. You will understand more

¹ The complement constructions are based upon the analyses presented by Rosenbaum in *The Grammar of English Predicate Complement Constructions* (Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1965). Thus *Grammar 2* at least is a counterexample to the often lamented slowness with which

results in the universities filter down into the lower levels of education. Indeed, in this respect, *Grammar 2* probably represents something of a record.

than just how to use English. You will know more exactly what you are doing when you use English. (p. 4)

The point is that seventh and eighth graders do not know how to use English, and there is no more reason to believe that the study of grammar for its own sake will help them to improve their usage (for whatever purpose) than there is reason to suppose that the study of hydrodynamics will make its students better swimmers. Thus one must observe that even if one could relate the teaching of grammar to the use of English (a relationship well worth trying for), Jacobs and Rosenbaum have chosen not to do so. They have assumed that grammar is sufficient unto itself. This will be by no means self-evident to the more traditional teachers of rhetoric, composition, and grammar who will not share the authors' enthusiasm for the latter at the expense of the former. And such antipathy will be unfortunate since these textbooks provide an opportunity for an interesting experiment in introducing the scientific study of language into the lower grades. It may well turn out that, even if students learn nothing rhetorically useful, they are learning something interesting.

For example, the approach in these books to the parts of speech is much better motivated than more traditional approaches. The view that a noun phrase is whatever contains something which names a person, place, or thing is replaced by the view that a noun phrase is one of that class of syntactic objects which behave alike with respect to certain rules. In the chapter, "Discovering Noun Phrases," the authors show that *late* cannot be a noun phrase in the sentence *The little boy slept late* because it doesn't act like one; that is, it may not be interchanged with the sub-

ject, **Late was slept by the little boy*,² the way other syntactic objects do: *The apple was eaten by the little boy*.

Certainly this sort of discussion is more revealing about language than rubrics of the "person, place, or thing" variety. For one thing, such discussions teach, indirectly, that to call something a noun phrase is to make a theoretical claim about its syntactic behavior. In this respect, the authors are to be applauded for presenting for secondary school consumption a rational and consistent exposition of a particular theory of grammar.

Unfortunately, not all the lessons are so successful. For example, in Lesson 3, "Transformations," the authors observe:

One of the most important transformations in English is the *passive transformation*. The passive transformation changes (or *transforms*) a deep structure, such as the deep structure for the sentence *Joanna hit the ball* into the surface structure: *The ball was hit by Joanna*. (p. 11)

But why isn't it the other way around? Or why don't both sentences come directly from separate deep structures? What are the consequences of deriving one from the other? All of these questions should be asked (and answered) in a study of grammar for its own sake, for it is the answers to these questions which lead to the particular analyses presented.

Again, in the same lesson, the authors observe that *Will John eat a banana?* is a rearrangement of *John will eat a banana*. But again, why not the other way around? Indeed, the bare assertion that questions come from declaratives with a symbol "QUESTION"

² An asterisk (*) indicates the sentence is somehow strange.

in front is not especially enlightening until one observes that questions are requests, and discusses what they are requests for and why one wants to represent in a deep structure the fact that they are requests.

Consider another example, this from *Grammar 2* in a chapter entitled "Verb Phrases." The point of the chapter is to present certain linguistic arguments for treating adjectives and verbs as members of the same syntactic category. The argument is based on the assumption that the behavior of adjectives and verbs is such that they resemble one another much more than they differ from one another. The resemblances are three: (1) certain verbs and certain adjectives may not participate in imperative constructions; (2) nor may they participate in progressive constructions; (3) nor may they occur in the complement of sentences whose main verb is like *tell* or *persuade*. The following sentences are illustrative:

- 1a. * Resemble that man!
- 1b. * Be tall!

- 2a. * He is resembling that man.
- 2b. * He is being tall.

- 3a. * She told the boy to resemble his father.
- 3b. * She told the boy to be tall.

Pointing out these resemblances, Jacobs and Rosenbaum propose that a new constituent called a *verbal* be introduced and that the difference in *verbals* (those which are adjectives as opposed to those which are verbs) be described by means of features. Thus adjectives are distinguished from verbs by the feature [— verb] and [+ verb], respectively, while *resemble* and *tall* differ in terms of the feature [— action]

from such pairs as *eat* and *quiet* which are [+ action]. Now regardless of the soundness of this analysis, one feels that the authors lose a golden opportunity in not allowing the student to discover these distinctions on his own and, by doing so, to begin to care about a theory to account for them. Instead of merely asserting that adjectives and verbs are active and nonactive, one suspects that the inclusion of exercises which would lead to this distinction would have been more effective. Suppose, for example, the student were asked to list the kinds of adjectives people can be (good, kind, tall, nice) and then the kinds of adjectives one can tell people to be (good, kind, nice). The first list will contain both active and nonactive adjectives; the second will contain only active adjectives. If students study these lists and discover the differences themselves, they will perhaps learn more about why grammar is important than they will by being shown only the problem and a solution.

In summary, then, the value of a course in grammar for grammar's sake in secondary-school education is assumed by the authors. Given the validity of such an assumption, the authors have provided teachers with material for an interesting experiment in English studies at the secondary level. While the material is somewhat flawed by incomplete attention to questions of motivation, it does constitute a good introduction to the apparatus of transformational grammar and, in many instances, to its rationale. The students may respond to the rigor and consistency of the approach. And this, in turn, may serve to make them more rational creatures. It will be interesting to see.

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BUREAUCRACY IN HIGHER EDUCATION.

by Herbert Stroup.

New York: The Free Press, 1966. xi + 242 pp. \$5.95.

In his preface, Stroup states that his intention is to analyze institutions of higher education as bureaucracies. In actual fact, his objective is more limited and might better be described by a later statement:

The various chapters aim to do little more than to establish certain principles of bureaucracy as they pertain to the college and to make available certain illustrations not only from the experience of the colleges, but from other bureaucracies as well. (p. viii)

Stroup defines bureaucracy as:

a large-scale organization with a complex but definite social function. It consists, moreover, of a specialized personnel and is guided by a system of rules and procedures. In addition, a carefully contrived hierarchy of authority exists by which the social function of the bureaucracy is carried out impersonally. (p. 14)

The author writes that our time is characterized by organized hugeness in almost every aspect of life and indicates that higher education has its share of this organized hugeness. He then uses certain sociological and anthropological concepts to describe various parts of the collegiate bureaucracy.

Stroup observes that, in bureaucratic fashion, practically every member of the staff of a college holds an office. He then describes ten "qualifications" which comprise the major elements of the office which the worker in higher education holds. This description is followed by a chapter on the ways in which outwardly successful faculty run

the academic maze. The next section of the book is a discussion of the formal and informal organization of the college, followed by two chapters on the rational and irrational driving forces operating within a collegiate bureaucracy. The book concludes with an assortment of chapters on such varying subjects as rules, paper work, red tape, and communication; the disabilities of the college bureaucracy; and the relationship of the college to the outside community.

One of the merits of the book is the importance of its subject matter. Institutions of higher education do have many features of bureaucracies, as defined by the author. Consequently, there exists a great need to understand the nature of the bureaucracy so as to enable it to better perform its functions. Another merit of the book is the choice of a cross-disciplinary approach, with concepts and insights drawn from the behavioral sciences.

Despite so much potential for enlightening the reader, Stroup has written a disappointing book. For over two hundred pages he hovers on the periphery of the issue raised by A. Whitney Griswold—"How we can make all this organization serve us instead of our serving it: that is our problem"—yet never really comes to grips with it. It is almost as though, in an attempt to demonstrate the bureaucratic features of colleges and universities, the author has forgotten that this demonstration is a means, not an end. The reader is not informed, to any significant extent, how the bureaucratic structure might be manipulated to further educational objectives.

To elaborate the above point, it might be said that there exists a relationship between the present difficulties of general education and the bureaucratic structure of colleges and univer-

sities. To enhance the position of general education in the academic pecking order, one would need to be able not merely to describe the nature of the bureaucratic structure, but to understand the dynamics of bureaucracy in institutions of higher learning. Even then one might not be successful in improving the lot of general education, but at least the possibility of success would be greater than if one had merely stopped at the level of description. It is a major defect of *Bureaucracy in Higher Education* that it inadequately merges the historical approach with a "cross-disciplinary approach that encompasses the insights of anthropology,

sociology, political science, and education."

Another fault of the book is that it is badly organized. The reviewer found it hard to find any rhyme or reason in the sequence of chapters and, worse still, in the choice of some of the subject-matter. In sum, this is a weak book on an important topic. As an application of the insights of the behavioral sciences to the problems of higher education, it is not in the same class as Sanford's *The American College*.

RICHARD NELSON-JONES

*New England Board of Higher
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
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
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The author reflects on his experiences teaching in the ghetto schools of a large American city. Although the teachers, administrators, and students he describes are composite characters with no actual counterparts, their traits and attitudes are intended to be representative.

JONATHAN KOZOL

Newton Public Schools

Halls of Darkness: In the Ghetto Schools*

The school was built seventy years ago and rises along the side of an undistinguished hill. Fifty years ago, the neighborhood in which it stands was solidly white Protestant. Twenty years ago, it was Jewish. Today it is 80 per cent Negro and moving quickly toward 100 per cent. In a matter of years, five, six, or seven at most, there will not be ten white faces in a school which holds six hundred children.

From outside, the school seems morbid, desolate, crumbling. Inside, it overpowers one with a sense of heaviness and darkness. Gloom pervades the atmosphere. Children file in lines of silence. Teachers are present in the manner of overseers: watchful, stern-faced, guarded. They stand at corners, at the tops and bottoms of stairways. They laugh to each other sometimes or smile in whispered confidences, but they do not laugh or smile at the children. "Keep your mouth shut"—"Please walk more quietly"—"Get back in line where you belong" are the expressions of morning welcome most commonly heard.

Two years ago, I was a fourth-grade teacher in this school. My class was located on the second floor, on the street side, in the corner of an auditorium. Severe overcrowding and the school system's refusal either to bus or to redis-

* From *Death at an Early Age*, to be published this fall by Houghton Mifflin Co. Copyright © 1967, Jonathan Kozol.

trict had obliged the school for several years to pack two classes into the corners of this auditorium while still using the central portion for other activities. Singing, sewing, conferences, drama, and remedial work of various kinds all took place simultaneously on many mornings. Torn curtains, rotted window-sashes, broken blackboards, and a faded U.S. flag highlight my memories of that classroom: these, and the dirt on the panes, the cardboard covering over broken windows, desks without tops, walls of peeling paint and, over it all, above it all, looking down upon it all in dark and mocking daguerrotype, a portrait of Abe Lincoln.

The atmosphere within the cellar of the school had qualities belonging to a Dickens novel: rank smells, angry shouts, a long grim corridor leading out into the schoolyard. I remember one teacher who used to post himself down there next to the toilets and coal-furnace every morning during the beginning of recess. There, in the gloomy half-light, he would stand watching the lines of herded children, holding a long thin rattan ever at the ready in his hand. If a small boy walked too slowly, took too long peeing, laughed to another child, or did any other little thing that might be wrong, that bamboo rod began to threaten. I've seen him whip it at a boy on several occasions and I've also seen him do this: He would grab a child, one who was *really* little, maybe only three and a half or four feet tall, and, swinging him by the collar, actually bash him up against the wall. Whatever the pretext, the vehemence of the rebuke was always a hundred times too strong. One day I noticed him virtually hurling a first-grade pupil down the length of the long corridor in the general direction of the door.

There were also teachers who forgot themselves occasionally while we were sitting together in the downstairs teachers' smoke-room and let out the forbidden but, evidently, not yet forgotten terms that one might have believed by now to be banished from the doors of a schoolhouse, if not from the national memory altogether. Suddenly, as if in total oblivion of all around us, as if in a kind of unknowing and unaware reversion to the habits, vocabulary, and practices of another part of the country, or of a generation long past, the teachers would be speaking of the children in their classes in the language of casual hate and satire. The children, their parents, their people, their ministers, became the "jigs," the "niggers," the "bucks," the "black stuff." And, all at once, within the schoolhouse of an American city, the teachers were speaking with the same words, scorning with the same scorn, hating with the same hate, as those who wear the robes and burn the crosses and stand in angry crowds to shout at Negro children in Mississippi and Alabama whose families have somehow had the temerity to want to send them to an integrated school.

Of all the forms that injustice took within that schoolhouse, the most

enduring and enveloping seemed to stem from the cruelty and condescension that were engendered within the attitudes of many teachers. This was as true, I felt, for the quietly reserved and gentle older lady who patted the little children on their heads and then withdrew with immense relief to her home in a white suburb as it was for the outright redneck and head-slamming bigot who would not hesitate to call the kids within the classroom jigs and niggers. In a way, I think, those gently smiling older ladies were even more dangerous and more self-compromising, for it is they, after all, who make up the backbone of almost any urban system; and it is they, in the long run, who are most responsible for the perpetuation of its styles and attitudes.

No one teacher can stand for thousands, but sometimes one teacher can represent in her views and ways a great deal that is most familiar and most disturbing in many others. One such teacher, with whom I had a close involvement in my building, was a lady to whom I will refer here as the Reading Teacher. Unlike many others, this woman was seldom consciously malevolent to anyone. She worked hard, gave many signs of warmth to various children, and spoke often of her deep feelings for them. She was precisely the sort of person whom an outside observer would instantly have designated as a "dedicated teacher," if for no other reason than because she herself and dozens of others in the school would tell him that she was. There is no doubt that she was dedicated, if by dedication one means absorption in the job of teaching. She cared deeply about teaching, about the children, their progress, and the things that they were learning. She also cared, in a highly public and self-conscious manner, about the whole area of fair play and equal rights and racial justice. She would go on at great lengths describing and bemoaning the many forms of open or half-suppressed race prejudice which were, according to her confidences, very nearly universal in the building. It came, however, as a shock, or an insult, or perhaps even at moments as a marginal revelation for her to consider the possibility that she herself might share a few fragments of the same feelings.

One morning she came up to see me in my classroom during lunchtime. She was, as I remember, in one of her familiar moods—making fun of the bigotry of others while at the same time, and almost unknowingly, congratulating herself upon her freedom from such attitudes. "Others may be prejudiced," was the content of her message. "So and so downstairs uses the word 'nigger.' I know, I've heard him say it with my own ears. It makes me sick every time I hear him say that. If a person feels that way, I don't know what he's doing teaching at this school. You wouldn't imagine the kinds of things I used to hear. . . . Last year there was a teacher in this school who used to call them 'black stuff.' Can you imagine somebody even thinking up a phrase like that? If people are prejudiced, they should not be teaching here."

Another time, she spoke of the same matter in these words: "Others may be prejudiced. I know that I am not. There are hundreds like me. Thank God for that. Some teachers are prejudiced. The majority are not. We are living in a time when everything is changing. Things are going along, but they must not change too fast."

I felt astonished at her certainty. I told her, for my own part, that I would feel very uneasy in making that kind of absolute statement. I said that on many occasions I had become convinced that my thinking was prejudiced, sometimes in obvious ways and sometimes in ways that lay deeper and would not have been so easy for other people to observe. Furthermore, I said, I also was convinced that I was prejudiced in a manner hardened over so many years that some of that prejudice undoubtedly would always be within me.

"Well I'm not," she replied with much emotion.

I did not try to turn any accusation toward her. Everything I said was directed at "people in general," at "white society," and mainly at myself. I said to the Reading Teacher that, so far as my own feelings were concerned, I had little doubt of what I was saying. I had learned, in much of the work I'd done in ghetto neighborhoods, that more than once I must have hurt somebody's feelings badly by an undercurrent or an unconscious innuendo in my talk or else the people I was talking to just would not have winced the way they had. I said I was certain, from any number of moments like that, that there was plenty of regular old-time prejudice in me, just as in almost every other white man I ever saw.

To this, however, the Reading Teacher snapped back at me again, and now with an absolute self-confidence: "In me, there is none."

We stood together in the doorway. The children sat in their chairs. It was almost the end of lunchtime. Each child was having his milk except the ones who couldn't afford it. Sometimes white and Negro children chattered with each other, but there were not sufficient white children for this to happen freely enough. The Reading Teacher looked out at the children and said, "Roger over there, I think, is the most unhappy boy in this class." Roger was one of only three white boys in my class. He was sitting behind a boy named Stephen. Stephen, a Negro child who was regularly harassed and punished all year long, was a ward of the state, an orphan who had been placed in a dismal and unfriendly home and who had been having serious psychiatric problems for some time. The difference between his situation and that of the white child was so enormous that I could not imagine a teacher even balancing the difficulties of two such children within a single scale. Yet the Reading Teacher not only threw them both into the same scale, but judged Roger's case to be more serious. She said to me, "When I look at them, I do

not see white or black." But I felt really that she saw white much more clearly than she saw black. She saw the somewhat unhappy and rather quiet little white boy. She did not see Stephen in front of him, his hands welts from rattannings and his face scratched and scarred with scabs. "I see no color difference," she told me. "I see children in front of me, not children who are black. It has never made a difference to me. White skin or black skin, they are all made by God."

Another day she told me about a trip she had made to Europe during the summer before. She told me that one evening a man on the boat had come across the floor to dance with her. But the man's skin was black. "I knew it was wrong but I honestly could not make myself say yes to that man. It was because he was a Negro. I just could not see myself dancing with that man."

I didn't know if anyone could be condemned for being honest. "What if I fell in love with a Negro girl?" I asked her.

She told me the truth: "I would be shocked."

I said I didn't see why she couldn't dance with a Negro passenger.

"I could not do it."

She also said, "If you married a Negro girl, I have to admit that I would feel terribly sad."

I did not have that in my mind, but I found I was still puzzled about what she had been saying. "Would you have Negroes visit you or come and have dinner with you?"

To that, the answer was clear, elucidating, and exact: "They could come and visit if I invited them to come but not as you could come to see me. They could not feel free to just drop in on me. I would have to draw the line at that."

Hearing that, I asked myself what this kind of feeling meant in terms of one teacher and one child. This woman had drawn the line "at that" just as the city had drawn the line of the ghetto. A Negro was acceptable, even lovable, if he came out only when invited and at other times stayed back. What did it do to a Negro student when he recognized that his teacher felt that she had to "draw the line at that"? Did it make him feel grateful for the few scraps that he got, or did it make him feel embittered instead that there ought to be any line at all? The Reading Teacher apparently was confident that the line did not descend, in her feelings, to the level of the children—or that, if it did, it would not be detected by them. I gained the impression, on the contrary, that the line was very much in evidence in the classroom and that many of the children were aware of it.

There were two ways in which I thought the Reading Teacher unknowingly but consistently revealed the existence of that line. One of these ways, certainly the less important, was in the occasional favors that she showed and in the kinds of arrangements that she would make for various children. She

gave a really fine and expensive children's book to one of my pupils. I recall that she presented it to the child before the whole class and spoke of how much the little girl deserved it and of how warmly she admired her. For a poor boy from a large family, she tried to arrange a stay at summer camp. In the case of a third child, she made a friendly contact with his parents, invited them on a couple of occasions to come over and visit in her home, and in general took a warm and decent interest in his up-bringing. The point of this account is that all three of these children were white and, while all may well have deserved her help and fondness, nonetheless it is striking that there was a definite minority of whites within that class of thirty-five, and, during the course of the entire year in which I was teaching them, I did not once observe her having offered to do anything of that sort for any child who was black. When I took it on my own initiative to do something similar for a couple of the Negro children in my class, she heard about it immediately and came up to advise me that it was not at all a good idea.

In November, I began giving one of the children a lift home after class. In December, I also started to make occasional visits to see Stephen on the weekends, and one day I took him over to my old college to visit for an afternoon. On Christmas Eve, I brought him some crayons and some art paper and visited for a while in his home. From all of these trivial actions, but especially from the last, I was seriously discouraged. It was not good practice. It was not in accord with teaching standards. It could not but ruin discipline if a teacher got to know a pupil outside class. Yet the person who offered me this criticism had just done many things of a similar nature for a number of white children. It seemed evident to me, as it must by now be evident also to her, that the rule or the standard or the policy or the pattern that defines the distance between a teacher and his pupil was being understood at our school, and was being explicitly interpreted, in precisely such a way as to maintain a line of color. The rule was there. It was relaxed for white children. It was enforced rigorously for Negroes. In this way, the color line grew firm and strong.

There was another way in which the Reading Teacher showed her preference. It was in the matter of expectations—what you could even hope to look for "in these kinds of children," meaning children who were Negro. Directly hooked onto this, often expressed in the same sentence, was a long and hard-dying panegyric to the past. The last, the panegyric, was one of the most common themes and undercurrents in our conversations all year long. Even at moments when she knew it to be inappropriate almost to the point of cruelty, still she could not suppress it. Several of the other teachers in the school expressed the same idea frequently, but the most vivid conversations

of this sort that I remember from the first part of the year were those with the Reading Teacher.

In the early part of winter, I had to ask the Reading Teacher for permission to take my pupils on a trip to the Museum. I spoke to her of the fact that we would soon be studying Egypt and the desert and said I thought a morning's visit to the Museum of Fine Arts to see the Egyptian collection and also to wander around and look at some of the paintings would be a good idea. The Reading Teacher's manner of reacting to this request anticipated the way in which she and certain of the other teachers would respond to many other requests that I was to make later in the year. Her first reaction was to turn me down flatly. Then she paused for a moment—and, finally, feeling suddenly the need to justify her refusal, she added, "With another sort of child, perhaps. The kind of children that we used to have. . . ." The moment of panegyric: "Oh we used to do beautiful work here. Wonderful projects! So many wonderful ideas. . . ." The present tense again: "Not with these children. You'd take a chance with *him?* or *her?* You'd take a group like them to the museum?"

In a similar vein, I made a suggestion for another child—not for Stephen, because I knew in advance that it would have been doomed to her refusal—but for a little girl. "I thought about next summer. She's one of the best in drawing. I wanted to try to get her into an art class somewhere starting in June."

The Reading Teacher grilled me about it skeptically. "Where?"

I told her that I had two places in mind. One was the school attached to the Art Museum. A summer class for young children was conducted there. Another class that sounded more exciting was located near the university. The latter program, situated in a converted loft, was being spoken about with much excitement by many of the people interested in art education, and it had already won a lively reputation for its atmosphere of openness and freedom. The children of some friends of mine were taking classes there.

"How would she get there?"

I answered that I knew someone who would drive her.

"Who'd pay for it?"

I said the same person had offered to pay for the lessons.

The very idea of this little Negro girl bridging the gap between two worlds seemed inconceivable or mechanically unfeasible to the Reading Teacher. To hear her voice, you might well have thought that it was an arrogant proposal. It was as if I were suggesting a major defiance of nature and of all proper relations and proportions. A moment's pause for thinking and then this answer, finally: "I wouldn't do anything for Angelina because

I just don't like her. But if you're going to do anything, the Museum School's plenty good enough for a child like her."

Because she respected herself as highly as she did, I wonder if the Reading Teacher would have been astonished if somebody had told her that she sounded rather ungentle? Perhaps she would not have been astonished—because she probably would not have believed it. She was surely one of the most positive persons whom I have ever known, and she also had an amazing capacity to convince herself of the justice of her position on almost any issue at all. At any moment when she was reminded, by herself or someone else, that she was being less than Christian or less than charitable to kids who already did not have very much in life, she was apt to question whether there was really so much suffering here as people liked to say or whether things were really all that bad. With Stephen, for example, there were only rare moments when she would come face to face with his desperate position. Characteristic of her response to him was the attitude expressed the time she pointed to the white boy in the seat in back of him and called him the most unhappy child in the class. I remember that when I said to her, "What about Stephen? He doesn't even have parents!" the Reading Teacher became instantly defensive and irritated with me and replied, "He has a mother. What are you talking about? He has a foster mother and she is paid by the state to look after his care." But I said maybe it wasn't like having a real mother. And also, I said, the state didn't seem to have time to notice that he was being beaten up by his foster mother while being thoroughly pulverized and obliterated in one way or another almost every day at school. "He has plenty," was her answer. "There are many children who are a great deal worse off. Plenty of white people have had a much harder time than that." Harder than he had? How many? I didn't believe it. Besides, when it got to that point, did it very much matter who, out of many suffering people, was suffering a little bit less or a little bit more? But the Reading Teacher became impatient with the direction of my questioning and she ended it at this point by telling me with finality, "He's getting a whole lot more than he deserves."

It was this, her assumption that people don't deserve a great deal in life, and that a little—even a very, very little for a Negro child—is probably a great deal more than he has earned, which seemed the most disturbing thing about her. Yet, at the same time, she enjoyed delineating to me the bigotry of others, attacking certain of her associates ruthlessly when she was not chatting with them, and making hash out of the Principal when she was not making hash out of someone else. I came into that school as a provisional teacher in October, but it was four months before I had the courage to begin to speak to her with honesty.

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One of the other fourth grades within our school building was located in a room across the stairs from me. In this room, for almost an entire year, there was a gentle teacher on the apparent verge of mental breakdown. Instead of being retired or given the type of specialized work in which he might have been effective, the man had simply been shunted from one overcrowded ghetto school into another. His assignment in our school was unjust both to him and to the children. The classroom was filled with chaos, screams, and shouting all day long. The man gave his class mixed-up instructions. He was the sort of mild, nervous person who gives instructions in a tone that makes it clear in advance he does not really expect to be obeyed. He screamed often but his screams contained generally not force but fear. Bright children got confused; all children grew exhausted. There was little calm or order. Going in there on an errand during the middle of the morning, you were not always immediately able to find him. You could not see him in the midst of the shouting, jumping class. On rare occasions, the children, having no one else to blame for this except their teacher, would rise up in an angry instant and strike back. I remember one cold day in the middle of January, when the teacher went out onto the fire escape for a moment—perhaps just to regain his composure and try to calm himself down. One of the children jumped up and slammed the door. It locked behind him. "Let me in!" the man started screaming. It was unjust to him but he must have seemed like Rumpelstiltskin, and the children, not ever having had a chance at revenge before, must have been filled with sudden joy. "Let me in! How dare you?" At last they relented and someone opened the door.

After I went into his classroom the first time in November, I began to find my attention drawn repeatedly to two of the children. One of them was a bright, attractive, and impatient Negro girl who showed her hatred for school and teacher by sitting all day with a slow and smouldering look of cynical resentment in her eyes. Not only was she bright but she also worked extremely hard, and she seemed to me remarkably sophisticated, even though she was still very much a little child. I thought that she would easily have been a sure candidate for one of the local girls' schools of distinction had she not been Negro and a victim of this segregated school. For two years, she had had substitute teachers, and this year a permanent teacher in a state of perpetual breakdown. Her eyes, beautiful and sarcastic, told that she understood exactly what was going on. She possessed enough shrewdness and had a sufficient sense of dignity to know where to place the blame. She was one of thousands who gave the lie, merely by her silent eloquence, to all the utterances of those who have defined the limits and capabilities of Negro children. Five years from now, if my guess was correct, she would be out on the picket lines. She would stand there and protest because, after so much wasting of her

years, there alone would be the one place where her pride and hope would still have a chance.

The other child whom I noticed in that fourth-grade room was in an obvious way far less fortunate—he was retarded. For Edward there was no chance at all of surviving inwardly within this miserable classroom, still less of figuring out where the blame ought to be applied. The combination of low intelligence with a state of emotional confusion resulted in behavior which, though never violent, was unmistakably peculiar. No one could have missed it—unless he wanted to, or needed to. The boy walked upstairs backward, singing. Many teachers managed not to notice. He walked with his coat pulled up and zippered over his face; inside, he roared with laughter, until a teacher grabbed him and slammed him to the wall. Nobody said, "Something is wrong." He hopped like a frog and made frog-noises. Occasionally, a teacher would not be able to help himself and would come right out and say, "Jesus, that kid's odd." But I never did hear anyone say that maybe also, in regard to the disposition of this one child at least, something in the system of the school itself was wrong or odd.

Edward was designated a "special student," categorized in this way because of his I. Q. and hence, by the expectation of most teachers, not teachable within a normal, crowded room. On the other hand, because of the overcrowding of our school and the lack of special teachers, there was no room for him in our one special class. Because of the refusal of the city either to redistrict or to bus Negro children to white neighborhoods, he could not be sent to any other school which might have room. The consequence of all of this, as it came down through the chancery of the system, was that he was to remain a full year mostly unseen and virtually forgotten, with nothing to do except to vegetate, cause trouble, daydream, or just silently decay. He was unwell. His sickness was obvious, and it was impossible to miss it. He laughed to near crying over unimaginable details. If you didn't look closely, it seemed often that he was laughing over nothing at all. Sometimes he smiled wonderfully with a look of sheer ecstasy. Usually it was over something tiny: a little dot on his finger or an imaginary bug upon the floor. The boy had a large head and very glassy, rolling eyes. One day I brought him a book about a little French boy who was followed to school by a red balloon. He sat and swung his head back and forth over it and smiled. More often he was likely to sulk, or whimper, or cry. He cried in reading because he could not learn to read. He cried in writing because he could not be taught to write. He cried because he couldn't pronounce words of many syllables. He didn't know his tables. He didn't know how to subtract. He didn't know how to divide. He was in this fourth-grade class, it seemed to me, by an administrative error so huge that it appeared an administrative joke. The joke of HIM was so obvious it

was hard not to find it funny. The children in the class found it funny. They laughed at him all day. Sometimes he laughed with them since it's quite possible, when we have few choices, to look upon even our own misery as some kind of desperate joke. Or else he started to shout. His teacher once turned to me and said quite honestly and openly, "It's just impossible to teach him." And the truth, of course, in this case, is that the teacher *didn't* teach him; nor had he really been taught since the day he came into the school.

In November, I started doing special work in reading with a number of the slowest readers from all the fourth grades. It was not easy to pick them, for few children at our school read near grade-level. Only six or seven in my own class were fourth-grade readers. Many of them were at least a year, frequently two years, behind. Those who had had many substitutes in the previous two years tended to be in the worst shape. In selecting this special group of children, it seemed to me that Edward deserved the extra help as much as anyone. He wanted it too—he made that apparent. For he came along with excitement and with a great and optimistic smile. He began by being attentive to me and seemed very happy for a while. The smiling stopped soon, however, because he could not follow even the extremely moderate pace that we were keeping. The other children, backward as they had been, were too far ahead ahead of him. He soon began to cry. At this point, the Reading Teacher came rushing on the scene. Her reaction was predictable. Rather than getting angry at either the school or the city or the system for this one child's sake, her anger was all for him; and her outrage and her capacity for onslaught all came down upon his head. "I will not have it," she said of him and of his misery and then, virtually seething with her decision-making power, she instructed me that I was not to teach him any longer. Not taught by me and not by his regular teacher. I asked her, in that case, by whom he would be taught from now on, and the answer in effect was, "Nobody." The real decision, spoken or unspoken, was that he would not be taught at all. In this, as in so many of the other things that I have described, I was reluctant at that time to argue forcefully. Instead, I acquiesced to her authority; I quietly did as I was told. For the duration of the fall and for the major portion of the winter, the little boy with the olive smile would ask me, it seemed, almost every morning, "Mr. Kozol, can I come to reading with you?" And almost every morning, I pretended that his exclusion was only temporary; and I lied to him and told him, "I'm sorry, Edward. Just not for today."

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There is a tendency in a great many teachers in all kinds of schools to attribute lies to children who in fact did not lie and had not lied and about whom the teacher may know very little. In a ghetto neighborhood especially, the

assumption of prior guilt seems at times so overwhelming that even a new teacher with strong affiliations to the Negro community, and sometimes even a teacher who is Negro, will be surprised to discover the extent to which he shares it. It seems at moments to require an almost muscular effort of the imagination to consider the possibility in a particular case that a Negro child might actually *not* have done it, that he might *not* be telling any lie. I remember several incidents of this kind when a pupil whom I knew for certain to be innocent was actually brought around to the point of saying, "Yes, I did it" or, "Yes, I was lying," simply from the force of an adult's accusation.

One morning the Mathematics Teacher—another among the ranks of dedicated and high-powered older teachers—came rushing into the fourth-grade across the stairs from mine when the regular teacher was not present and when I was taking his class while somebody else was filling in with mine. The children had done an arithmetic assignment the day before. All but two had had it graded and passed back. The two who didn't get it back insisted to me that they had done it but that the substitute teacher who had been with them the day before must have thrown it aside or lost it. I had been in and out of that room long enough to know those two boys and to believe what they were saying. I also knew that in the chaos of substitute changes there was continual loss and mislaying of homework and of papers of all sorts. Despite this, the Math Teacher came sweeping into the room, delivered a withering denunciation to the whole class on their general performance, then addressed herself to the two boys whose papers had not been given back. She called them to the front and, without questioning or qualification, she *told* them that they were lying and that she knew they were lying, and furthermore, that she did not want contradictions from them because she knew them too well to be deceived. The truth is that she did not know them at all and probably did not even know their names. What she meant was that she knew "children who are like them"—in this case, "Negro nine-year-old boys who like to tell lies." Knowing them or not, however, she swept down upon them and she told them that they were liars and did it with so much vigor that she virtually compelled them to believe it must be so.

A somewhat different incident of this sort concerned another boy and involved one of the male teachers in our school. One day while I was working, I saw this teacher coming toward me and holding a boy named Anthony rather firmly by the arm. I asked the class to sit still a moment while I went out behind the portable blackboard to find out what was going on. The teacher continued to hold Anthony by the arm. He stood Anthony before me. Anthony looked down at the floor. I knew him only slightly. He was one of the slow readers who met with me for extra work from time to time.

"ANTHONY," said the teacher, "I WANT YOU TO TELL MR. KOZOL NOW THE SAME THING THAT YOU TOLD ME."

It was spaced out like that, exactly, with a caesura of intensity and measured judgment and of persuasive intelligence in between every parceled word: "I WANT YOU TO GO ON NOW AND SAY TO MR. KOZOL WHAT YOU WANT TO TELL HIM, AND I WANT YOU TO SAY IT IN A VOICE WHICH IS LOUD AND CLEAR, AND I WANT YOU TO LOOK UP AT MR. KOZOL."

When he spoke this way, it was as if every child, or every person, in the whole world might be an isolated idiot and that, if the words did not come out so slowly and carefully, nobody in the world might ever truly find out what any other person believed.

"ANTHONY," the teacher continued, "MR. KOZOL IS A VERY BUSY MAN. MR. KOZOL HAS A WHOLE CLASS OF CHILDREN WAITING. NOW WE DON'T WANT TO KEEP MR. KOZOL STANDING HERE AND WAITING FOR YOU, ANTHONY, DO WE? AND WE WOULDN'T WANT MR. KOZOL TO THINK THAT WE WERE AFRAID TO SPEAK UP AND APOLOGIZE TO HIM WHEN WE HAVE DONE SOMETHING WRONG. WOULD WE WANT MR. KOZOL TO THINK THAT, ANTHONY?"

Anthony kept his eyes on the floor. My students poked and peered and stared and craned their necks around from behind the broken blackboard. At last I could see that Anthony had decided to give in. With one of the most cynical yet thoroughly repentant looks of confession that I have ever seen in any person's eyes, he looked up first at the teacher, then at me, and said decently, "I'm sorry." And the teacher said to him, "I'm sorry—WHOO?" And Anthony said nicely, "I'm sorry, Mr. Kozol." And the teacher said, "Good boy, Anthony!" or something of that sort and he touched him in a nice way on the arm. Now the truth is he *had* been a good boy. He had been a very good boy indeed. He had been a good boy in exactly this regard: he had gone along with the assumption of one white man about one Negro; he had done nothing at all to contradict or to topple that conception; and he even had acted out and executed agreeably a quite skillful little confessional vignette to reinforce it. To this day, I haven't the slightest idea of what it was about.

When something as crazy as this happens, it seems important to try to find out how it could be possible. How can an adult so easily, so heedlessly, and so unhesitatingly attribute to a child the blame for a misdemeanor about which the child has so little information and about which, in fact, he may know nothing? I am sure the reasons are mainly the same as those

for the use of corporal punishment: haste and hurry, fear on the part of teachers, animosity and resentment, and the potentiality for some sort of sudden insurrection by certain children. The atmosphere at times gets to seem so threatening to many teachers that they dare not risk the outbreak of disorder which might occur if they should take time to ascertain gently, carefully, and moderately the nature of what is really going on. It always seems more practical and less risky to pretend to know more than you do and to insist on your omniscience. When you assume a child is lying and tell him so without reservations, he is almost inclined to agree with you, and furthermore it is often to his advantage to do so since, in this way, he is likely to minimize his punishment. A child, of course, who begins by pretending to accept blame may end up *really* accepting it. If one pretends something well, and if that pretense becomes a habit, and if that habit in time becomes the entire style and strategy with which one deals with the white world, then probably it is not surprising if at last it gets into the bloodstream too. Naturally all children don't react in the same way. Among the children at my school there were many different degrees of blame-acceptance or resignation or docility. There were also children who did not give in at all. It was not these—not the defiant ones—but the children who gave in to their teachers most easily and utterly who seemed the saddest.

One day I was out in the auditorium doing reading with some children. Classes were taking place on both sides of us. The glee club and sewing class were taking place at the same time in the middle. There was also a fifth-grade remedial math group, comprising six pupils, and there were several other children whom I did not know simply walking back and forth. Before me were six fourth-graders, most of them from the disorderly fourth grade and several of whom had had substitute teachers during much of the previous two years. It was not their fault; they had done nothing to deserve substitute teachers. And it was not their fault now if they could not hear my words clearly; I could barely hear theirs. Yet the way that they dealt with this dilemma, at least on the level at which I could observe it, was to blame, not the school but themselves. Not one of them would say, "Mr. Kozol, what's going on here? This is a crazy place to learn."

This instead is what I heard:

"Mr. Kozol, I'm trying as hard as I can, but I just can't even hear a word you say."

"Mr. Kozol, please don't be angry. It's so hard—I couldn't hear you."

"Mr. Kozol, please, would you read it to me one more time?"

You could not mistake the absolute assumption that this mess was not only their own fault but something to be ashamed of. It was a triumph of pedagogic brainwashing. The place was ugly, noisy, rotten. Yet the children be-

fore me found it natural and automatic to accept as normal the school's structural inadequacies and to incorporate them, as it were, right into themselves: as if the rotting timbers might not be objective calamities but self-condemning configurations of their own making and as if the frenzied noise and overcrowding were a condition and an indictment not of the school building itself but rather of their own inadequate mentalities or of their own incapacitated souls. Other children were defiant, but most of them were not. It was the tension between defiance and docility, and the need of a beleaguered teacher to justify something absolutely unjustifiable, which created the air of unreality, possible danger, intellectual hypocrisy, and fear. The result of this atmosphere was that too many children became believers in their own responsibility for being ruined; and they themselves, like the teachers, began somehow to believe that some human material is just biologically better and some of it worse. A former chairman of the school committee of this city, a man of extreme conservative leanings and well-known segregationist beliefs, has publicly given utterance to this idea in words he might regret by this time. "We have no inferior education in our schools," he has let himself be quoted. "What we have been getting is an inferior type of student." Is it any wonder, with the heads of a school system believing this, that after a while some of the children come to believe they are inferior too?

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The area in which I taught my regular class was, as I have said, no more than the corner of an auditorium. There were no partitions, but simply four portable blackboards which served to cut us off from the farther reaches of the hall. Two of the blackboards were broken; yet these four were all we had to separate us. One day I saw that one blackboard was wobbling badly—tottering—and it looked to me as if it could very easily tip over. Two days went by. On the third day, the Reading Teacher was getting ready to do a demonstration English lesson. She began to turn the blackboard, pushing it from one side with one hand. The entire unit tipped forward suddenly, then crashed downward toward the children sitting two yards off.

It slammed down with a violent impact upon a desk in the first row. A little girl named Charlene was sitting in that desk at that moment and she was not looking up because she had been busy at her work. The child at that desk missed getting her skull smashed in by about two and a half inches. The blackboard remained resting on her desk for a couple of seconds. The children seemed terrified by the noise and by the visible proof of how close it had come. You could see the little girl's head and you could see the

blackboard's edge. There it was. No doubt. No blur. There was the object. There, a few inches away, the vulnerable head. I looked. The Reading Teacher looked. Then there was a kind of "click" of cancellation and denial.

It was as if the film were run backward, as if the blackboard were lifted up by magic and straightened up nicely and put back to stand where it had been before. The point is that the anger and outrage inherent and inevitable in what had just happened were instantaneously by-passed and ignored. I realized, almost as it happened, how essential and automatic a process this had become within our school. It *had* to be ignored because, the next morning when the Reading Teacher swept into the room, beamed warmly, smiled lovingly, and said to the children, "Let's close our eyes and think of all the happy things that we have to be grateful for and all of the wonderful things that we have been given in our school," it would not do if, at that moment, a child should be wondering about a falling blackboard or a collapsing ceiling or maybe even opening up one eye ever so briefly to make sure that nothing sharp was flying at her head. So that click of denial. A moment later, all that I could see was that the children looked embarrassed. They were embarrassed for the sake of the teacher and for the sake of the school. Embarrassed for the teacher, for her awkwardness and momentary self-accusation. Embarrassed for the school, because this was the only school they had been given and so they had to try to believe with all their heart and soul that it was okay.

The girl whose desk was underneath the blackboard had the most curious expression on her face. I couldn't tell whether it was simply the look of being numb or whether she was, like so many other of the children in this building, getting herself set up for the ritual of blaming *herself*. Was she saying with those eyes which looked down so steadily, as if with apology, that she really felt very sorry and did not mean to have gotten her small head in the way of the board? There had been that other little girl, Myra Ann, who had raised her hand one morning, in the midst of reading class, and pleaded up at me from her tiny minnow's face, "Please, Mr. Kozol, I'm trying as hard as I can, but I just can't even hear a word you say." Why didn't this little girl get angry? Why couldn't she figure out who or what there was to blame? It is for the same reason that even the pupils of a teacher who visibly hated and vocally derided the grease of their hair and the color of their skin felt unendingly grateful for the few scraps of friendship that he managed to drop them on his way. Incorporating the school's structural inadequacies into their own consciousness and attributing to themselves the flaws which the building or the system contained seemed to be the conditioned reflex of far too many children: gratitude for small goodness, and

parental horror of Athenian dimensions at the thought of questioning the ways the gods have ordered things within the public schools.

About once a month, it seemed, one child would suddenly and miraculously burst free. It always astonished me. One boy, who had been called out of a fourth-grade classroom to be rebuked by the Principal, got mad at her and told her something she usually didn't hear.

"What can be the matter with you?" she was saying to him.

"Why aren't you grateful for what we have been doing?"

"How can you behave so badly when your teacher is trying so hard to help you and when you know that you have one of the most dedicated teachers in the school?"

And other questions of that sort.

The boy being reprimanded, according to a teacher who was present, suddenly began glaring at the Principal in her snug perch as if he had all at once gotten the idea to chop her up, and he yelled at her, "How in hell do you know anything about it when you weren't even there?" He added, with inspiration, "All that you do is sit here in the office on your fat ass all day long!"

Nobody told me exactly what the Principal said to the student after that, or whether she had him sent down for a whipping that would be equal to the one that she had just received. But I do know that it must have appealed to a common feeling of silent hatred and secret rebellion at the school, because the same story was passed along to me, variously altered and with considerable pleasure, by a number of teachers for several days after it happened. And I got the feeling that it was something that any number of people in the school would have liked a lot to say. It was repeated about as often by teachers as by children. Each person changed the words a little, but the heart of it remained the same: somebody had gotten good and mad for a change and, unbelievably, told somebody else what he actually thought about something.

The pupil in question was a boy of great humor and cynicism, as well as of considerable inner rage, who had asked me, not long before, how you went about making a dry martini. He also was a boy who had gotten slashed quite badly in the jaw by one of the older children. Both before and after that event, he was being given the rattan regularly by any number of the teachers, and he already had something like a slow and steadily searing revolution gradually burning in his eyes. The look—most hated at our school as well as in most black schoolbuildings, because it means that he is getting wised up and, as one school official has put it, is likely to become an "unmanageable" adult—was the look which is translated into words by the freedom song, "Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Round."

The boys who manifest this attitude most clearly in segregated classrooms are the ones of whom teachers say, "We haven't been able to quite reach that boy yet." You deeply pray that they won't. I have the feeling, dangerous as it may seem to many people, that it is within the defiant gaze of a boy like that, far sooner than in the down-regarding eyes of a hard-working and obedient student, that the surest help and soonest salvation of his people is going to lie.

The time that the blackboard broke and fell provided a clear example of the "obedient" reaction. After the moment of stun was over, the blackboard was righted. One of the custodians was sent for. He came up, inept and disliking the children, a sour mushroom person who told jokes in the cellar about "jigs" and "niggers" and who spoke to me endlessly about how all of these children wrote on the walls and broke windows and stole and broke in and jimmied doors. He came up now because he had to and he fiddled around with the blackboard for a minute or two, said that we shouldn't "turn it so much," and then went away. I thought maybe it was okay, even though he had spent so little time. But the next day it started to sway and topple just the same. We got him up again after a week and this time, with hammer and screws and scrap lumber, he made the thing stand straight. He didn't repair it properly, however, and he gave no promise that it was going to be replaced. He did what slum landlords do when pressed. He used scrap junk that he happened to have around to make a repair that wouldn't cost anything but would silence complaints for a while. A social worker who came to school to talk about a child took a look around our auditorium, I remember, at the scrap lumber bits, peeled paint, torn curtains, cardboard windows and said to me in disappointment, "It's exactly like the worst houses in which the poorest of them live."

So now the custodian did nothing except screw on an irregularly sawed-off piece of lumber. A month later I turned the board for a science lesson and it cracked suddenly and started to collapse again. The janitor appeared sourly an hour later and said that this time he didn't think he would bother to fix it because the thing was "no damn good anyway." After that, it was pushed into a corner and leaned against a wall where we no longer tried to use it. We had three blackboards then, instead of four.

The little girl who had had the near miss with the blackboard was the daughter of a minister. A few days after the accident, the minister and his wife came up to school. They did not speak of the accident. They came about another and, seemingly, far less important matter. My memory is that they were speaking about a torn briefcase and about another child's having teased their daughter. While they were talking, however, and for no apparent reason, the mother started weeping. The Reading Teacher, who

was present, seemed startled by this outburst and drew no association between this and the recent blackboard incident. I found it hard to believe they had not heard of it. When the mother stopped weeping, the point was made by the Reading Teacher that this little girl actually was not so much teased by other kids at she was something of a troublemaker herself. It happened that this was not the truth, but even if it had been, I did not think that it was very important in comparison with the blackboard, of which nothing was said at all. The Reading Teacher then delivered an elaborate description of the little girl's incorrect behavior, and she was so persuasive that the child ended up by apologizing to the Reading Teacher for all of the things that she had done wrong.

I think this must be a classic occurrence, for I have heard of it happening in so many other ghetto schools. The parents come up with a just and proper reason to place blame, and they *get* it instead. Up they come angry and with proper outrage. Off they go, humbled, sad, and silenced, having, as it were, apologized for the stupid thing they've tried to obtain. The look of embarrassed humility. The terrible parental horror that they might have made a bad mistake. Will their child now get punished? Will some kind of silent and unnoticeable retaliation now take place? What right had they to complain? Wasn't it stupid? Wasn't it unwise of them when they were being received with so much politeness by one of the most respected old-time teachers in the city? The Reading Teacher was brilliant at conveying to Negro parents an earnest kind of persuasive concern and sense of her own absolute moral superiority when it came to a matter of the welfare of their children. She did not display one ounce of meanness. She was solid, kindly, decent. Yet it still was they, not the school authorities but the parents, who in the end found themselves apologizing for what they had been persuaded to conceive of as their own child's mistake.

The first time we spoke of that child and of her father, the Reading Teacher assured me that the father was not a real minister anyway, but a fake. She said without hesitation that she could tell about this from having looked over the records carefully and also from quite a few years' experience in sizing up parents and in knowing what they were like. These statements of condescension were frequently hemmed around with exaggerated assurances about how many truly fine and truly cultured parents there were in the school neighborhood. "Mrs. Laramy, for example . . . and little Eleanor's mother . . . a wonderful person! One of the finest human beings that I have ever known." But here was this one case and here was this one assessment: the man in question was no minister, and she had proof of that and knew as a matter of fact that actually he worked on a boat, was a sailor or something ordinary like that. If this had been true, then what made me angry was that

she did not think what share she and I as white people had had in making such deceptions necessary. And again, if it had been true, the thing that was a hundred times more true was that she, as a white woman, needed somehow to think of him as a fake anyway and did not really like the idea of his possible distinction as a minister but took a vocal and somehow juicy kind of relish and satisfaction in getting across to me the idea that he was a pretender.

"He's no minister. I can tell you that for certain. I don't know where he got that piece of cloth, but he's an obvious fake. They can set up a pulpit in a store room, and he'll stand up in front of them and pray."

But, of course, the thing that is most important and most devastating in this case is that it was *not* true, for the man was very much a minister, and happened to be a quite distinguished one. It also happens that he held a salaried position in the U.S. Navy in order to earn some extra money; and it was upon this fact, I believe, that the Reading Teacher was basing her derogatory statement.

Minister or not, however, and whether he had been an ordinary deckhand or the captain of the ship, within two months of that conversation tragedy was to strike his family. The man's wife died in childbirth and the newborn child died as well. Charlene was now motherless. The Reading Teacher, with strong instincts of motherhood and kindness, instantly galvanized herself into action and did some traditional, benevolent good deeds. A visit to the home. Special attention to the child. Assurances to the father. And a number of similar actions, all kindly and apparently honest and worthwhile. She, the Math Teacher, and one other teacher went together to the funeral. I asked if I could go also but was not permitted to do so, for there would not have been anybody left to stay with the children. The delegation went and, when they returned, the Reading Teacher astonished me by being all in giggles. The change in her was remarkable. Whether it was due to the two hours' company of the two other teachers, or whether it was due to some real intrinsic shift in her feelings, I did not know. But her whole tone was very different. From an attitude of generosity, warm feeling, and motherly goodness, she had shifted into a mood of high hilarity. She had to confess to me, she said, all excited (and in a manner that she adopted very often, as if whoever she was talking to would inevitably agree) that "the whole thing was so embarrassing and so ridiculous" that she and the others with her had had all they could do "not to laugh right out loud right there in the place." I remembered plenty of occasions on which she had severely condemned other teachers, even ridiculed them, for that kind of condescension. Yet she did not realize in how many obvious ways she was exactly like them and she obviously had no idea at all of the extent to which she was adopting their condescending attitude herself.

"It wasn't even like a funeral. It was like a jazz program. They had a singer there who was just like Eartha Kitt. Children were screaming and running all around the place and they passed out fans and even printed up a program and had nurses all around in case anyone should faint."

I said, "You mean it was like a revival meeting?"

"It was so primitivel" was what the Reading Teacher said.

Then she said to me, once again with apparent kindness and reflection and with a sense of obligation which was no longer humorous or consciously derogatory in the least but absolutely serious and severe, "I see, after that, what we all have to work against in school and how far we have to go to reach those children."

She also said to me, "It's true, I suppose, that some of our funerals would seem offensive to other people too." But she added right after that, "I think that everyone who teaches Negro children in this kind of school ought to go to a Negro funeral at least once, just in order to know the kinds of things he has to work against."

Obviously, I have no idea at all what sort of funeral it was; actually for all that I know, it may have been the most conservative funeral on earth. But I cannot believe that any funeral, of whatever sort, could be of instructive use or edification to a teacher whose mind was so filled with senseless bigotry.

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Before I came to teach my fourth-grade pupils, I had been a substitute teacher in a number of other schools within the same system. During that period of about four or five weeks, I visited and worked in several classrooms at a number of levels; and I was able to form some opinions of what was going on in various parts of the city. Of all schools I saw, the most cheerful, hopeful, and best kept-up was an elementary school that had been partially integrated despite the fact that it was in a predominantly white area. According to the children in the class that I taught, of whom about one-fourth were Negro, they had very few substitute teachers. The faculty members to whom I talked confirmed this. The most miserable schools that I saw during this period—most poorly staffed, most grim, and most unhappy—were those that were most heavily imbalanced.

In one of these schools, a segregated elementary school in one of the most rundown Negro districts, I received confirmation of the belief that even a modern structure and new equipment could not do away with the problems inherent in a segregated building. The slave-master and black child feeling was prevalent there anyway, and discipline remained the over-riding problem. Still children seethed and classes were too crowded and the assignment of substitute teachers was quite common. In the class in which I was placed,

a sixth grade of almost all black children, I was told by the children that I was the fifth of five substitutes in five days. It may have been an exaggeration, but I don't see any reason to doubt it, for I saw exactly the same thing happen in my own school. Another school, not in the same neighborhood as the one described above, but very similar in its racial make-up as it was also in its faculty deficiencies, had twenty-five substitute teachers in one third-grade class during the three and a half months between September and Christmas. The children in that sixth grade also told me that their regular teacher was a very old lady who was supposed to have retired but for some reason had not done so and instead came to school somewhat sporadically, just about when she felt up to it. While at school, she repeatedly nodded off as she sat at her desk. I didn't absolutely believe this report until I asked the other teachers, but they assured me it was so.

The worst school of all schools in which I ever taught as a substitute was not an ordinary school at all but a "discipline school." I think this was the most depressing place for learning that I have ever seen. It was a place for difficult children, for kids who had been in trouble, who had fallen behind, who had been arrested, who were truant, who had bad problems, who were disturbed or despairing, or unwell. To this school I was sent as a new substitute teacher not only absolutely unprepared but also wholly untrained and unwarned. The most curious thing about it is that the school department, in asking me to go there, did not even tell me that it was a discipline school but specifically misinformed me when I asked, telling me that it was a regular junior high. It was not until I got there that I found out what it was. What it was, was not a school but a dumping ground. It was a dumping ground, I felt, both for undistinguished teachers and for students who had not been manageable or who had not been considered salvageable at more ordinary schools. At this place, education seemed to me to have been forgotten, and the twentieth century itself seemed to have been forgotten or perhaps never seriously encountered. I met a number of the teachers during the time that I was working there, and I remember at least a couple of them clearly.

One was a good-natured person with nothing in particular right or wrong about him except that he seemed to dislike education and had no apparent interest in kids. He assured me on one of my first days that all revolutions have been begun by intellectuals. I remember that we were out in the schoolyard when he said this and he shoved out his arm in a good imitation of the Hitler salute and incanted, "Mao Tse-tung! Stalin! Castro! They were all intellectuals. They are the type of people who threaten the free world."

I did not know what I had done to bring on that display since I did not walk into that school talking about Stalin or Castro, and the only thing I said that had anything to do with education was that I was thinking of try-

ing to teach some mathematics to my pupils. He also told me that if I was interested in teaching then I had better get out. "This place isn't a school. It's a zoo. And those are the animals."

When he said it was a zoo, he gestured out to the children in the schoolyard, and the sweep of his hand was terrifying because it seemed to shut out forever all chance of amelioration or education or treatment or any kind of hope. Yet he did not hesitate to talk to me in this way and he seemed assured, for a reason that I did not give to him, that his expressions of contempt for the children would somehow find a willing listener. The same thing has happened to me on a number of other occasions, and it happened in a more dramatic and more damaging way with one of the other teachers at that school.

This man, unlike the first, was not easy-going and affable at all, although he shared with the first one an apparent distaste both for the children and, I thought, for the school. The man was a professional "tough guy." He had been a Marine sergeant before taking the courses and getting the credits to become a teacher. He styled himself very much as a tough guy and seemed to like this designation and the boys accepted it. He told me several tales of his toughness and showed it off in the schoolyard by throwing a bullet football pass. (I remember that he took a certain amount of relish in trying to "nail" me with a hard one and that I earned the only grains of respect from him I ever had by catching it.) He, too, confused me by seeming to like me; and for a while, he made me feel tied down by his tendency to report to me things that I did not want to hear but which he seemed to feel sure I would enjoy or profit from. It was he, for example, who went out of his way to advise me to be very careful I wasn't observed if I should ever strike a child. He illustrated this warning by relating to me the story of a good friend of his, a teacher in another school, who had struck a boy so hard that the welt marks remained on the child's face for a week and the parents threatened to take the teacher into court. The teacher got out of it, he told me, by using some kind of political connection or some sort of affiliation with the judge. He also managed to get the parents off his back by threatening them with some kind of sordid revelation about their son which he said would have gotten the pupil sent away. So the parents dropped the charge. The point of the lesson, however, was that a teacher could not be too careful. Whack a kid, if you had to, when nobody was looking, but make sure you didn't leave any bruises. And then just deny it coldly if the case ever came to court. When I thought of his story later, I was surprised that he had told it to me—because it seemed so damning both to his friend and, in a sense, to him by his seeming to sanction it. Yet it also was a narration which, in a small way, indicated that he knew some people who knew other people

who had some connections in the world; and so it was a story of which, even in a small way, he could feel proud. I do not mean to make fun of him, because it was obvious that there just were not many other things in his life of which he *could* be proud, and I also have the impression that plenty of unlettered and uncultured tough guys like him have made good teachers. But I also think it's important to give a clear impression of the intellectual style and level present in such a school and of the over-all mood that such a teaching staff conveys. Certainly the children at that school were not getting much of what they needed, and they were not going to get much of it from people who considered them animals.

My first two or three days in the discipline school were anything but easy. Few students heard or obeyed me. They wandered in and out of the classroom pretty much at will. For a time, I did not know even how many were my students. Some of the boys were hostile when I arrived and hostile when I left and never softened for one minute in between. Nonetheless, I did become close to several of the boys, and liked many of them, and one day I found myself driving a group home. I did not know at the time that doing so was against the rules of the school. One boy, I remember, asked me to leave him at the end of his street. His friend said, "That's because he's embarrassed. He doesn't want you to see what an awful place he lives in."

Things in the classroom calmed down somewhat after a few days, but the set-up of the place remained miserable for teaching. Two or three of the boys were virtually adult. Others seemed much younger and were reading at the first- or second-grade level. I could find no easy books or basic primers in the room. If there were any, no one bothered to tell me where they were or which ones I should be using. Math, I was told, hadn't been taught for a long while, and I could believe this when I tried some easy subtraction and division. Few children could do either. Some of these boys were thirteen to fifteen. Almost all seemed disturbed. A large number were Negro. I couldn't single out one of them who might not, if he weren't poor or weren't colored, have been a candidate for some kind of intensive psychiatric aid. As it was, so far as I could find out, they got nothing.

Sometimes a child in a situation like this will recognize, even if only distantly, the grotesque nature of the trap around him, and he will even come out and ask you, pretty straightforwardly, if you will help him find an escape. I remember a boy like this at that school who asked me privately, and with much embarrassment, if I would get him a first-grade book at a library or bookstore since he couldn't find such a book at school and was embarrassed at his age to walk into a public place and ask for one. He wanted desperately to read. He knew for sure what he was in for if he could not catch up now. Yet the school offered him nothing and he had to

humble himself to plead with me. I think that one of the saddest things on earth is the sight of a young person, already becoming adolescent, who has lost about five years in the chaos and oblivion of a school system and who still not only wants but pleads to learn, as this boy did.

The summer before I entered the school system, I had been working as a volunteer tutor in a church. About a week after the tutorial started, and after I had been told to admit no more pupils, a boy appeared, about sixteen or seventeen already showing signs of growing a man's beard. He turned out to be the older brother of one of the fifth-grade pupils in the class. He could have been out playing, earning money, driving a car, doing anything he pleased. Instead he listened outside a volunteer tutor's makeshift class; and at the end of each week, he would ask me if there was any chance of someone's dropping out so that he could get in to take the empty place. He was in the eighth grade, but he had never learned to read. People who talk about these things often resort to the explanation that it "all starts in the home" or else that "these people just don't want to learn." Whenever I hear that, I wish that I could tell them about that boy who stood outside my classroom for an entire summer of long, hot mornings, waiting there to walk his sister home and hoping that he might somehow be admitted to the sessions, too. There was nothing wrong with his motivation and there was nothing wrong with his home or home-life either. It was the public schools, pure and simple, which had held him back and made the situation of his life pathetic. It is the same story for thousands of other children all over that city, and I believe it is the same for children in dozens of other cities in the United States.

For the slower pupils at the discipline school, because there were so few suitable materials, I found little work to assign other than drawing. I am sure this shows that I lacked much ingenuity, but at that point, having been a teacher for about three weeks, I did not have very many ideas about what you could do without materials. While I was working with the others, I would set up subjects for the slower kids to draw. They drew one picture after another. I used to pray that they would take a little longer so that I would have a chance to finish something with the other boys. When they tired of drawing, there were mimeographed maps and juvenile pictures to color. The pupils who could read were insulted and bored by the kinds of books that filled the cupboards. There was nothing special, nothing for them, nothing inspired, ingenious, advanced. The only geography book I saw in the classroom was a ten-year-old version of the same book that I had used as a seventh-grade pupil a decade and a half before. The principal of the school was an ageing kindly man with little idea of what was going on upstairs. He was frail, near retirement, and died of a heart attack that winter. He came up twice, told me where to park my car so I wouldn't get a ticket,

and that was as much help as I got. About a third of the school hours were spent doing "sports" (wandering in the schoolyard), working at shop in the cellar, cooking (making the lunch), or watching movies. School got out early. Boys wandered in and out of classrooms. One boy in my class howled and cried almost the whole of every day. When he was not howling, his favorite occupation was to lift the flaps of his ancient raincoat (which for some private reason he could never be persuaded to hang up) and run about the classroom, raincoat flying out behind him, only to come to a sudden frozen stop. If I scolded him, he would let out a hideous sad groan. Out in the schoolyard, another boy spent most of the mornings posturing as a Hollywood producer, with a "cigarette" (pencil) delicately dangling from his lips.

By the end of a week, I recognized that, no matter how hard I tried and no matter how much the children in my class might go along with me, there still was not going to be a real opportunity for me to teach there or for the children to learn. It was not a school. And it wasn't a center for disturbed children. And it wasn't an institution dedicated to salvage. It was a place in which the school system kept its unteachables out of sight and left them to grow older. I felt that, in almost any other school in the city, I would at least have a chance to teach children a few things I knew or could learn. Nonetheless, I often felt guilty after I left there, and I thought that I had ditched the pupils in my room just at the moment when they were beginning to feel involved with me. I still don't know whether I should or shouldn't have stayed there or whether, even while I was there, I really was doing as useful a job as I believed. But I know anyway that my own crisis of conscience in the matter isn't the present problem for those boys, nor for anybody else. The problem is the waste of years, the loss of chances, the death of childhood, the closing of avenues, the end of hopes which that kind of institution represents. Even if that school should be completely revamped, rebuilt, redesigned, reconceived, and rearranged, the guilty burden of the past and of what has already been done to the boys there will remain and it will have been very great.

* * *

Sometimes it is the children themselves, and not the press or any other outside agency, who wake us up most suddenly and startlingly to the outrages and injustices and educational absurdities that have been tolerated or else winked at and quietly evaded for so long. When this awakening occurs, needless to say, it is not likely to bring either pride or pleasure to the teachers but, as may be imagined, a mixture of fear and consternation, anxiety and scorn. I had an opportunity to see this happening at my school when a class of children passed in some papers of extremely honest and graphic writing that had to do with their own neighborhood and, in some cases, with the

school. The class was the fourth grade across the stairs from mine, and the papers were written at a moment when the children had been going through a very wild and desperate time.

The Principal somehow, after five months of general agony for everyone, had been able to have the unhappy and unhealthy man who had been teaching them removed; but in his place, she was not able to assign a permanent or appropriate teacher. Instead, the children received what was virtually an unbroken string of hapless substitutes. The line of substitutes grew longer and longer and, at last, in obvious bewilderment and having no better option, the Principal sent me in to try to work with the children, who were now very nearly at the point of knocking down the walls. Since that time I have taught all kinds of writing classes, but I don't think that I will ever again receive such a wide-open response.

In my school [began one paper] I see dirty boards and I see papers on the floor. I see an old browken window with a sign on it saying, "Do not unlock this window are browken." And I see cracks in the walls and I see old books with ink poured all over them and I see old painting hanging on the walls. I see old alfurbet letter hanging on one nail on the wall. I see a dirty fire exit I see a old closet with supplys for the class. I see pigons flying all over the school. I see old freght trains throgh the fence of the school yard. I see pictures of contryies hanging on the wall and I see desks with wrighting all over the top of the desks and insited of the desk.

Another paper said this:

There is a torn up house I live near and the stairs are broken down. The windows are boarded up too. One day I saw a little boy and his dog on the third floor. I don't know how they got up there but they were. The doors are pushed in and there is trash in the house dirt for it hasn't been clean for a long time. Everything is boarded up. The railing on the porch looks like it is going to fall off. One of the steps are about to fall off. Some children even go into the yard and on the porch of the house. The yard has glass, paper, rocks, broken pens and pencils, a torn dress, some pants, in it. It is the junkiest yard Ive ever seen. There is always a black cat in the yard too. I never go near it though. I don't go into the yard but I look over my fence and I look into the house and yard.

Another child told me this:

I see lots of thinings in this room. I see new teachers omots every day. I can see flowers and children books and other things. I like the 100 papers I like allso cabnets. I don't like the drity windows. And the dusty window shallvalls...

A little girl wrote,

I can see old cars with gas in it and there is always people lighting fires old refrigartor an wood glass that comes from the old cars old trees and trash old weeds and people put there old chairs in there an flat tires and one thing there is up there is

wood that you can make dog houses and there are beautiful flowers and there are dead dogs and cats. . . . On some of the cars the wheel is off and wisey bottles beer cans car seats are all out cars are all tip over and just the other day there was a fire and it was just blasting and whew in the back there is a big open space where Girl Scouts could mabe cook. . . . This feild was a gas staition and the light pole is still up.

This was one more:

I see pictures in my school. I see pictures of Spain and a pictures of Portofino and a pictures of Chicago. I see arithmetic paper a spellings paper. I see a star chart. I see the flag of our Amerrica. The room is dirty. . . . The auditorium dirty the seats are dusty. The light in the auditorium is brok. The curtains in the auditorium are ragged they took the curtains down because they was so ragged. The bathroom is dirty sometime the toilet is very hard. The cellar is dirty the hold school is dirty sometime. . . . The flowers are dry every thing in my school is so so dirty.

When these essays were passed in, I showed one of them to the Reading Teacher. She was not happy with it. Her first reaction was to accuse me of having somehow concocted or coaxed this writing out of the child, whoever it was, who had composed it. "You must have induced it," she said, or "suggested it" or "invited it" or something like that, which was a way of totally disqualifying the independent intelligence and perception of the child who did the writing, at the same time that it discredited the impartiality and honesty of the teacher who could have allowed such thoughts to find their way to paper. What she said to me, essentially, was that I must have planted these gloomy word-pictures in the minds of the children or else they could not conceivably have written such things down. I was, on the contrary, very pleased with the children's essays because they were so direct and open and also so filled with details. It was, I suppose, quite correct that in a sense I *had* induced this writing by telling the class to go out and really look at things and not write about their neighborhood or their school or about anything as if it were identical with the ingredients of the world or neighborhood that was often depicted in the pictures of their books. The Reading Teacher also was probably correct in saying that the children wouldn't have written those essays if I hadn't said what I did because, as I have already shown, the great majority had been thoroughly disciplined into the same kind of pretense which the teachers themselves had adopted for self-comfort; and this pretense did not allow for broken cars and boarded windows. Another of the children's essays just started off by announcing that in September they had begun with such and such a teacher and then had had so and so, and then so and so, and then so and so, and right on through a list of about eight or nine teachers ending up finally with me. It was cold-blooded, factual, showed a good memory and was shatteringly effective simply by rattling off almost the entire list without making any pointed comments. This, she may or may not

have done if she hadn't been told she *could* do it, because the general atmosphere at school militated against a photographic frankness of that sort.

The crux of the matter, I suppose, is that the Reading Teacher, like many other teachers, had worked hard to develop and to solidify her own optimistic values. To perpetrate the same views upon her pupils therefore was not to lie to them (for her), at least not consciously, but to extend to them, to attempt really to "sell" to them, her own hard-earned hopes about the world. During a long career she had had a great deal of apparent success in inducing the children she taught to write cheery and pastel little letters and stories and book reports to correspond to her own views. The essays written by my pupils were disturbing to her partly, undoubtedly, because she was afraid that they were true. Evasive herself, she could not accept such clarity from the children; and, frightened herself, she could not endure such directness and forthrightness in people who were so many years her juniors. They wrote out of their hearts. This, in her dreadful self-defense and self-compromise, was the one thing she could not do.

In the long run, it is probably not astonishing that the teachers should have had so much more trouble with the problem of honesty than their pupils had. The teachers, after all, are in many cases the only ones who have a real stake in lying. The children have none. The teachers alone must pretend to themselves that they believe in an equality of races which they do not in fact either believe in or practice, but to which they feel obliged to pay an arid lip-service. The teachers alone must take seriously the rituals of patriotism, and it is they who must persuade a class of sleepy children every morning to place their hands across their hearts and recite in unison a pledge of allegiance to a flag of an incomplete democracy which they, as well as the children, know to have excluded millions of poor people and almost all black people in America. It is they above all who, when faced with a sudden exposure of their own beliefs and practices, must close ranks compulsively, as with a single flanking motion, silencing their tongues and suppressing their common knowledge—only to open their mouths, if at all, in order to deny what both they and the children know to be so.

The dedicated senior teachers are a sacrosanct entity in American opinion. Few people in a nation which likes to think of itself as kind and decent are eager to criticize those who appear to be both so genteel and so well-meaning, and nobody of course ever feels very safe in saying anything unkind about old people. Yet it is they above all who serve to perpetuate as well as to profit from the nature of the system in its present operation, and it is they who provide the apologists for the status quo with their most disarming argument. Sooner or later, we are going to have to come to terms with the problem that is posed by the veteran defenders of these systems. Sentimental and self-aggrandizing dedication is one thing. Education is another.

In this article the author discusses possible relationships between urban political systems and the schools. In suggesting that education would benefit from closer ties to the political structure, he questions the traditional arguments for the "professional independence" of the schools.

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Schools and Politics in The Big City*

After decades of silence, both social scientists and educators are at last explicitly examining and re-examining all the options regarding the relationship between the political system and the schools. Descriptive analysis has greatly enriched our understanding of how alternative structures operate. A full menu of recipes for changing the structures has been developed and here and there implemented. And while we are far from realizing closure on our uncertainties, the art of social engineering with respect to school-community relations is finally getting an underpinning of evidence and systematic analysis.¹

Broadly, there seem to be three themes running through this new wave of literature. One is primarily descriptive: How are educational decisions made, and what variables are relevant for explaining alternative outcomes? A second theme merges this descriptive task with a special concern: What accounts for variations in the money available to the schools, and implicitly,

* The original version of this paper was delivered as the Alfred Dexter Simpson Memorial Lecture at Harvard University, November 12, 1965. I am grateful to the Harvard Graduate School of Education and the New England School Development Council, under whose auspices the lecture was presented, for extending to me the opportunity to formulate the arguments presented in the paper.

¹ I have chosen not to try to provide a full array of bibliographical citation to the relevant literature. Partly, this decision is based on my desire to present an argument which raises questions for public examination and debate rather than to assert that some things are so and others not. Partly, however, this particular body of literature is growing so rapidly that reference footnotes would be incomplete virtually as soon as they were written.

how might more money be made available? The third theme is a bit different. It raises a more complex question, and answers depend not only upon careful descriptive analysis but also upon performance criteria that are very difficult to work out: How may the school system do a more effective job in the total context of community life?

It is apparent that the "context of community life" is a concept fraught with snares and difficulties. I propose to look at it mainly with reference to the problems of the core city; there, it encompasses major facets of the problems of race, of poverty, of physical decay and renewal, of perennial fiscal trauma, indeed most of those troubles we label "urban problems" in contemporary American society. The issue I wish to ruminate about here is whether one type of political system-school system relationship might be more effective than another in attacking these dilemmas of urban life. Specifically, I propose to consider the thesis that direct political-system control of the schools (historically anathema to educators) might have significant virtues in making the schools more effective instruments of social change and development.²

We know that many big-city school systems operate with substantial formal autonomy. They are not run by the political or administrative leaders of the city, but are insulated from those leaders and the interests they represent. In part this autonomy is a consequence of various formal features of local government which give to the schools the authority to run their affairs with little or no reference to the demands of other city officials. Perhaps in larger part, however, the insulation of the schools may be a function of the ideology, propagated by schoolmen but widely shared by the larger public, that schools should be free from "politics," i.e., the influence of non-school officials. Insofar as this view is shared, it has made formal independence a less relevant variable, and most of what evidence we have suggests that the formal structure of school-city relations does not matter very much: the schools are largely autonomous anyway.

It has been argued that autonomy for the schools means that professional educators would be free to carry out educational policies which they, as professionals, deem most effective without the intrusion of conflicting and educationally deleterious demands from nonprofessionals. But autonomy and insulation may also result in other things. Autonomous schools may be unresponsive to important groups in the community whose interests are not effectively served by the dominant values of professional schoolmen. Autonomy may mean a fragmenting of efforts aimed at solving community prob-

² I have explored some facets of this question in briefer compass in my essay, "Urban Politics and Education," in Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *Planning for a Nation of Cities* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 268-84.

lems because of inadequate coordination and planning. And autonomy may also bring vulnerability as well as insulation. If the schools are separated from the rest of the community's political system, they may be more easily exposed to the protests or demands of groups which are disaffected from that system, unable to work their will within its often labyrinthine structures, but able to organize direct popular support. And if they attempt direct protest action, they can make life most difficult for schoolmen who are unable to retreat into positions of mutual support among city officials with many programs and agencies and client groups. Unable to trade off one group against another, the schools may be and often are the targets of protest which may well have its roots in other facets of the city's life, but are directed against the schools precisely because they are autonomous and vulnerable.

The argument that the costs of "political control" far exceed the costs of autonomy needs re-examination. I have been struck by the frequent reference in that argument to the allegedly baleful effects of Big Bill Thompson's 1927 campaign for election as mayor of Chicago in which he concentrated much of his flamboyant oratory on the issue of control of the public schools. Big Bill promised to sack the superintendent who was, said Thompson, a lackey of King George and the British. Educators have ever since been agreed that a mayoral campaign subjecting the schools to this kind of educationally irrelevant attack was ample evidence of the need for protection from big city politics. Thompson's rhetoric was, of course, so blatantly demagogic that he makes an easy object lesson, but behind the rhetoric the issue has other features which make its moral much less clear.

In a most interesting book, called *School and Society in Chicago*,³ George S. Counts examined the 1927 election soon after it happened. Counts' assessment is one of considerable ambivalence. On the one hand, he has no sympathy for Thompson's tactics of catering to his anti-British constituents by threatening to "punch King George in the snoot." Yet Thompson, in denouncing Superintendent McAndrew, was exploiting a very real conflict within the schools which had already engaged major socio-economic sectors in the community.

William McAndrew had come to Chicago in 1924 in the wake of a series of political scandals and convictions affecting members of the school board. McAndrew was looked to as a reformer who would use his office more vigorously than had his predecessors. Particularly, he was expected, apparently by all the most interested parties, to establish the superintendency as the center from which the schools would thereafter be run. Professional educational criteria were to prevail. No more politics!

³ New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928.

McAndrew interpreted this mandate to mean that *he* would select the criteria; the classroom teachers would not. He believed that *professional* educators should embrace teachers and administrators in the same organizational units, so he effectively discouraged the previously vigorous teachers councils in the Chicago schools. Chicago had a strong and long-standing set of teacher organizations including units of the American Federation of Teachers, and McAndrew's unsympathetic view of their status led to abiding tension. Counts reports that the teachers' groups provided effective support for Thompson's election.

In addition, McAndrew had alienated organized labor in general. Not only had he rejected the propriety of the teachers' unions. He had introduced the junior high school. Chicago labor spokesmen construed this to be a step toward separate vocational training for working-class children. They viewed the junior high as an early breakaway from an equalitarian curriculum and this, they feared, was aimed at producing a docile, cheap labor force. Finally, McAndrew was a champion of the platoon system, or, as it was generally referred to, the Gary Plan. He favored the alleged efficiencies of the Plan and justified them quite frankly in a business-oriented way. Moreover, he actively and often consulted with representatives of the Chicago Association of Commerce; never with spokesmen of labor.

The result was a fairly considerable class conflict over McAndrew and his policies, both inside the school system and in the community. William Hale Thompson exploited these tensions and, in a way, helped resolve them. At least, after Thompson won, McAndrew was fired.

The important morals of this story seem to me to be the following: First, McAndrew provoked a severe conflict among the schoolmen themselves. The alleged intrusion of "politics" into the schools was really more the widening of a breach that already existed. Breaches among the schoolmen have been rather exceptional, from McAndrew's time until very nearly the present. Educators have proclaimed their fundamental unity of purpose and interest; and to a remarkable degree, they have lived up to it. But as teachers' unions grow strong and make demands and, occasionally, strike, and as community-wide controversies develop over the location, programs, and financing of the schools, the myths and practices which lead educators to maintain a united front in facing the outside, nonprofessional, world cannot survive. And, if there are conflicts, they will be exploited. The only question is, "By whom?"

The second lesson of the Chicago case of 1927 relates to the ultimate problem-solving machinery. McAndrew and the schools became a central issue in a partisan political race. Was this an appropriate mechanism for resolving a virtual class conflict involving the largest category of public expendi-

ture? If it was not, then what is the regular political process for? Why are educational issues not properly determined in this arena? Why not indeed, except, perhaps, that Big Bill made the final determination. This dramatic fact has been enough to cinch the argument whenever some hardy soul could be found to play devil's advocate.

Later in this paper I shall explore further the two features I have drawn from the Chicago case; the political significance of unity among the schoolmen, and the possible consequences of determining school questions within the regular political processes of the community. Before I do, however, I would like to consider further what seems to me an important element of the context of school politics, in Chicago and every other city, then and now. This is what I shall call *the myth of the unitary community*.

George Counts concludes his analysis of the McAndrew affair by calling for "the frank recognition of the pluralistic quality of the modern city. Such recognition would involve the extension of a direct voice in the control of education to the more powerful interests and the more significant points of view."⁴ The recommendation troubled Counts. He believed that it would really only "regularize practices already in existence," since these groups were already actively engaged in the struggle for influence over the schools. Still Counts recognized that he was making a "radical" proposal. It went directly counter to an historic perspective which has long pervaded the thinking of educators: namely, that the city is a unity for purposes of the school program. That is, regardless of ethnic, racial, religious, economic, or political differences and group conflicts in other arenas of urban life, education need not, and should not if it could, recognize or legitimize those differences. Education is a process that must not be differentiated according to section or class. Learning is the same phenomenon, or should be, in every neighborhood. Physical facilities and personnel should be allocated without regard to whatever group conflicts might exist in the community.

Schools have not always been run this way in reality. In the nineteenth century, some concessions were made to such prominent ethnic groups as the Germans by providing special classes in the German language; but in St. Louis, these were discontinued in 1888, or just about the time that ethnic heterogeneity really blossomed in the city. In recent years, a good many departures from the norm can be observed. In many cities, ethnic representation on the school board has been accepted as a hostage to the times, though the tendency is generally to deplore the necessity of special group recognition. Representatives of labor, of Negroes, and of Catholics hold big-city board memberships today and their constituents would complain if they did not. But the prevailing doctrines have not altered as much as the prac-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

tice, I suspect, and the perspective which denies the legitimacy of group conflicts over school policy is certainly still widely held.

Surely an important element of this view of the city was the egalitarian democracy espoused by a large portion of professional education's intellectuals. The common school, later the high school, and now the community college have been urged and supported as mechanisms for equalizing the life chances of everyone in the community. To introduce programs for one group that were not available to another, or to build different kinds of school buildings for different neighborhoods, would cultivate group and class differences in the twig-bending stage which would lead to deeper socio-economic cleavages in the adult community. Most people, it seemed, never considered the possibility that the have-not groups might receive *more* and *better* education than the middle class.

It looked like the poor could only get short-changed in a system of differentiated education and a caste system would result. This was the position not only of educators but probably of most actively concerned lay citizens too. It was an operative theory to guide education policy, and it was linked to a view of the community beyond the school system. For a consensual, integrated, organic community was and is an abiding standard for many American intellectuals. A proper city should manifest no deep-seated social or economic cleavages. Groups and classes with opposing interests are considered dangerous to the continued tranquillity of the polity. When they exist, as they increasingly did in the industrial city of turn-of-the-century America, it becomes necessary to adopt programs, such as universal education, and institutions, such as nonpartisan local government or at-large elections, that overcome the threatening heterogeneity.

But burgeoning immigration, the rise of the urban political machine, the emergence of corporate economic interests, and the enormous increases in scale of the urban community were parallel and closely connected phenomena of the 1880-1910 era. The metropolis which emerged threatened to erupt in group conflicts that would engulf the schools unless defenses could be found. The unitary-community perspective, more or less accurate as description a generation before and still serviceable for many smaller communities outside the metropolis, from that time on has been primarily a myth for the big city.

Still, it is a useful myth, and its uses were and are many. First, it served as a sharp contrast to the "political" world. Urban politics in the muckraker era was plainly a politics of group conflict and accommodation. The boss was a broker of social and economic tensions, and part of his brokerage fee to the community was the heightening of group consciousness. Ethnic iden-

tity for many Europeans was first achieved through the processes of American ward politics. Irish, Italian, or Czech nationalisms, for example, were much promoted in the cities of this era, as candidates and parties sought ways to secure the loyalties of the urban electorate.

With the political arena patently corrupt and marked by the conflicts of a myriad of "special" interests, the unitary-community perspective of education could justify the institutional separation of the schools from the rest of the political community. Independence from "politics" would keep out the selfish aims and corrupt tactics of the politician.

Independent school systems were not new of course. Institutional separation had always been a prevailing pattern. But in the larger cities, until the end of the nineteenth century, the structure of the independent school systems had been highly political.⁵ Many school boards were chosen by wards. Some were selected by the city council, some by direct and frequent election. Ward representation was not originally viewed as a way of representing diverse group interests in the city as much as it was a means of keeping the board in close touch with the electorate. It resulted, however, in highly "politicized" school boards, sensitive to neighborhood pressures, particularly in the area of school-building. The ward system promoted log-rolling among sections of the city over many components of the school program. Neighborhoods sometimes traded off advantages, thereby probably facilitating rapid construction in many cities. Wards might also block one another, however, and thus retard the whole system.

The development of the professional educator to fill the newly created position of superintendent of schools inaugurated a different approach to education in which lay control would operate in increasing tension with the professional expert. With ward representation, this tension might well have been unbearable, at least to the professional educator. But parallel to the rise of the superintendency came the elimination of the ward system, and at-large election systems were rapidly adopted for the selection of school-board members.

The unitary myth was and is of great use in justifying an at-large school board. If the community is an organic whole with a single public interest in education, the board member should be protected against local, "selfish," interests by giving him a city-wide constituency. Moreover, since there are no legitimate "special" group interests in education, any responsible citizen can serve on the board, and there is no reason to give particular groups in the community a seat. To give a seat to labor, for example, would be wrong because it would constitute recognition of a special-group perspective on

⁵See the discussion in Thomas McDowell Gilland, *The Origin and Development of the Power and Duties of the City School Superintendent* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), esp. Ch. vi.

educational policy. Indeed, in a unitary community, there is really no such thing as representation on the school board, since there are no interests to represent. If, as George Counts and others found, urban school-board members were drawn predominantly from middle class, WASP, business-oriented strata of the community, it was a fact without significance in a unitary community.⁶ In a recent study of school desegregation in eight northern cities, Robert Crain found that business and professional persons who serve on the school board, do so as individuals, not as class or elite spokesmen, and that such "nonrepresentative" individuals have been more acquiescent to integration than Board members elected by party or ethnic constituencies.⁷

The myth has thus been important in underwriting equalitarian educational programs, in separating the school systems from the main political process of the city, and in validating middle-class control of the schools. In addition, it was a useful adjunct to the emergence of professional expertise in education and school administration. Expertise rested on the assumption that valid ways and means to run the schools existed and were independent of the particular interests and values of particular groups. A good school system is good for everyone, not just a portion of the community. Experts, those people with professional training in the field, are qualified by their specialized training to tell good from bad, and laymen, if they are sensible, should defer to this expertise. If the unitary assumption is undermined, however, then no one, however well trained, can identify or administer a "good" school system. One may then ask only, "Good for whom? For which groups?"

Apart from a social scientist's perverse interest in exploring the myths we live by, is there any point to this discussion of the unitary-community myth? I believe the answer is "Emphatically, yes!" When educators treat the community as a unitary phenomenon, they are less able to offer programs and facilities which are differentiated to serve the diverse needs and values of particular subgroups in the city. It is an indictment of educational political theory that head-start projects for the urban poor only began on a large scale in 1965. Not that schoolmen did not often recognize the differential needs of slum children and sometimes tailor programs to fit those special

⁶ George S. Counts, "The Social Composition of Boards of Education: A Study in the Social Control of Public Education," *Supplementary Educational Monographs*, Vol. XXX, July 1927, p. 83. See also the more recent findings of Roy Coughran, "The School Board Member Today," *The American School Board Journal*, No. 6 (December, 1956), pp. 25-6, reprinted in August Kerber and Wilfred R. Smith, eds., *Educational Issues in a Changing Society*, rev. ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), pp. 284-7. W. W. Charters argues cogently that whatever the political significance of middle-class membership on school boards may have been, there is little empirical basis for concluding that membership really has meant policy control anyway. See his "Social Class Analysis and the Control of Public Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. XXIII (Fall, 1953), pp. 268-83.

⁷ Reported in "Educational Decision-Making and the Distribution of Influence in Cities," (paper presented to the American Political Science Association, September 7, 1966).

needs. Rather, they had to do it in an inarticulate, often *sub rosa*, fashion since such programs went counter to the main stream of schoolmen's thinking. And so the programs were generally ineffective in meeting a problem of such magnitude.

The unitary-community idea was not simply for the guidance of educators. As we have seen, it helped protect the independence of the schools from the community's political processes. Or did it? Raymond E. Callahan has argued that the independent urban schoolmen were, in the period from about 1910 to 1930, extremely vulnerable; not, perhaps, to partisan political pressure, but to the dominant socio-economic interests of the community.⁸ In this period, business was pretty generally dominant, and Callahan attributes the rise of the "cult of efficiency" in educational administration to the desire of vulnerable schoolmen to please the influential businessmen. In a way, Counts's story of Chicago confirms this point; during the relatively "nonpolitical" period when McAndrew was exercising full authority, the Association of Commerce occupied a very influential place while labor was excluded from school affairs. The "intrusion of politics" under Thompson meant the return of the teachers and other nonbusiness interests to active and influential positions.

Independent schools, operating according to the myth of the unitary community, were and are rather feeble instruments for seeking public support, and this weakness is one key to the business domination Callahan has described. School-tax rates and bond issues and, in some states, the annual school budget, may require specific voter approval in a referendum. How are the schoolmen to persuade the electorate to say yes? They have relatively little of what in urban politics is sometimes called "clout." They have no network of support from groups and interests for whom the educators have done favors in the past and who now can be asked to reciprocate. They may sometimes get the teachers and the parents and the children to ring doorbells, but such efforts are often ineffectual compared to the canvassing a strong party organization might do. Since approval of a school referendum invariably costs the taxpayers money immediately—there is no intervening lapse of time as there is between the election of a candidate to a city office and the possible future increase in taxes—a sizable negative vote may normally be assumed. Where is the positive vote coming from? Educators have gone on the assumption, quite probably correct, that the benevolent patronage of the business leadership was necessary if they were to have a chance of referendum success.

Today, in the big city, the structure of the situation has not changed. Only the interests which effectively make demands upon the schools have

⁸ *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

changed. Negroes, the poor, middle-class intellectuals, and teachers have partially, perhaps largely, displaced the businessmen. The unitary-community myth is still used as a defense of the schools. In order to persuade predominantly Catholic, lower-middle-class voters of Irish or Polish descent to support higher taxes for public schools, it is very important to emphasize the undivided benefits which all residents receive from an undifferentiated educational program. The difficulty is that today the pitch is no longer believed. It is evident, for example, that Negroes do not buy the myth that the community is unitary. They know better. Moreover, even though a school board with a unitary-community perspective may permit integration, Negroes demand a differentiated school program with compensatory facilities to help them fight prejudice and poverty, to help them reach a high enough level so that equal educational programs will no longer leave them behind. Meanwhile, those ethnic groups whom Wilson and Banfield have shown to be comparatively unwilling to vote for public expenditures for *any* purpose are especially unenthusiastic about putting high-cost programs into Negro slum schools.⁹ Unions are anxious about job competition from the products of improved vocational programs. And although property taxes for schools may be only a minor problem for large corporate business, they are often severe in their effect on smaller business and on small householders. The latter groups, especially, are potential city dropouts; that is, they may move to suburbia if taxes go up, and the result may be to depreciate further the city's tax base while its educational needs increase. The unitary-community myth no longer serves to quiet the demonstrations or to pass the tax increase. It has largely outlived its usefulness. Yet it is still frequently articulated by schoolmen and lay supporters of the schools, perhaps because, as the inveterate gambler said in explaining his continued patronage of the crooked card game, "It's the only one in town."

There is another dimension in which unity has been emphasized with respect to schools. Educators have tried very hard to achieve and maintain consensus among all those engaged in the educational enterprise. Unity is a prerequisite to a reputation for expertise, and it thus adds to the bargaining power of schoolmen as they seek public support. Unity inside the school helps justify independence from "politics." In the Chicago case of 1927 and again today, in Chicago and elsewhere, the vulnerability of the schools to group pressures from the community depends heavily on the extent to which the board, the superintendent and his administrative associates, and the

⁹ James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVIII (December, 1964), pp. 876-88.

teaching staff remain as professional allies rather than splitting into conflicting camps.

The consensus among school interests is equally sought after at the state level, and as my colleagues and I have suggested in our study of state politics and the schools,¹⁰ a number of devices have been developed to help achieve and preserve unity, even at some cost in terms of goal achievements—dollar volume of state aid, or teacher tenure law protection, for example. The point I wish to make here, however, is that unity among schoolmen is frequently a considerable handicap for big-city school interests, particularly in their efforts to get increased state aid.

Let me illustrate my point with a discussion that leans heavily on experience in Missouri. There, a moderately malapportioned legislature for many years exhibited great fiscal prudence. They spend more than they used to, but the state still ranks much lower in comparison to other states in expenditures than in income. Education is no exception, but, thanks largely to the skillful efforts of the Missouri State Teachers Association, both district consolidation and equalization grants under a foundation program have steadily improved the financial condition of most *rural* schools. But these programs are of much less benefit to schools in the large cities.

St. Louis and Kansas City schools receive state aid, to be sure, but on a somewhat different basis from other districts. State aid is legally less assured in the large cities, and it gets a smaller portion of the job done. The city of today has high-cost educational needs as compared to noncity areas. The core-city wealth, which is effectively taxable by local action, is comparatively less great than it used to be. State-aid programs which aim at providing minimum per-pupil expenditure do not solve big-city needs, and the states have not been receptive to extra demands of urban educators any more than they have responded to other urban interests.

When the city-school interests go to the state capital to press their special claims, they carry with them the norms of their professional colleagues everywhere, the norms of unity. All educators are united in favor of education, one and indivisible, to be provided equally for all. Yet this same delegation comes to ask special treatment from the state, either in the form of additional state money or additional authority to act for themselves. Moreover, the statewide education interests normally take no stand on the requests of the city-school interests. The statewide groups are interested in equalization, not special programs for the cities. They might even oppose urban-oriented school legislation since it would either compete for monies desired for equalization or, at the least, serve the needs of "the city," a symbol which noncity

¹⁰ Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot, *State Politics and the Public Schools* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1964).

school leaders look on with suspicion. And these school leaders occupy the state department of education and dominate the state teachers association. From the point of view of the city schools, the best thing, and the usual thing, is to have the state groups stay out.

The urban school forces, assuming they have at least the neutrality of the state educational groups, confront another unity norm when they arrive at the state capital. This is the unwritten rule of the state legislature for dealing with all "local" issues, and the school needs of a city like St. Louis are treated within the same system of legislative practice as a proposed salary increase for the sheriff. They are all local issues. The rule provides that the legislators will approve a request from a local community provided that the state representatives from that community are substantially united in their support of the request.

One might suppose that, since the school groups all strive for internal unity, the legislators' prerequisite would be easy to fulfill. Such is not the case, and much of the reason lies in the separation of the schools from the political system of the city. The problem lies in the relationship, or rather the lack thereof, between the spokesmen for the schools and the city delegation in the legislature. City legislators are not interested in the schools. They avoid service on education committees, take little part in debate on school issues, and generally are thought by other legislators who are concerned about state school policy to contribute very little. Urban legislators are likely indeed to be profoundly uninterested in the concerns of *any* groups which successfully keep themselves apart from the political system of the city. They, after all, are products of that system and their points of reference are mainly contained within it. The school representatives cannot eschew politics and still make meaningful contact with the legislature.

Although most state legislators would be merely indifferent to the schools' plea for state help, some may actively, though covertly, oppose the requests. In the St. Louis case, a number of influential city legislators identify themselves with the "state" as a fiscal entity apart from the "city," and resist increased state expenditures of any kind for the city. Others may reflect a Catholic constituency and say, for instance, that unless money is provided for transportation to parochial schools they will oppose extra funds for public education in the city. Still others have been known to be engaged in various kinds of alliances, for instance with school-building and maintenance crews, and hope to gain benefits for their allies by helping to block the school board's requests in the legislature. Most of the city-based legislative opposition will be behind the scenes. In a roll call vote it would seldom show up. Nevertheless it may effectively block passage of the program.

The key to the problem is in the fact that the schoolmen have no way to reach the pivotal legislators where it counts. There is no network of mutual obligation and support connecting the two groupings. The school board can cash no influence checks in payment for past or future favors done for legislators. There are a few favors the school can do for a highly political legislator, but every element in professional education training and ideology contributes to the refusal to think in these terms. Parenthetically, it might be noted here that lay board members seem to get more righteously indignant than professional superintendents at the suggestion that they do a little trading if they want their program passed. Political naiveté, especially at the level of articulated ideology, helps reinforce the incapacity of urban school interests (though not necessarily in rural areas where schoolmen are often highly skilled in the arts of "forks of the creek" politics) to get what they want from the state. Not only the congenital opposition of educators to these elemental political tactics, but the widespread misconception of the source of their opposition further confounds them. Newspapers and other "spectator elites" such as academics have assumed that it was the rural interests that were doing in the urban claims. The inability to understand that urban legislators were often unresponsive, not only regarding school problems but on many other desires of some city-based interests, has led to invalid inferences about what to do next. One of these has been simply to reassert the evils of politics and the importance of insulating the schools against their bitter breath. The second is to await with confidence the coming of reapportionment. "Give us an urban majority and our urban programs will pass," is the assumption underlying this optimism. But an urban state legislative majority may still not care much about the schools; and, without more political savvy than they have displayed in the past, the spokesmen for city school interests will continue to get unsatisfactory treatment.

There is, obviously, the now genuinely optimistic prospect of federal funding, especially rich for urban schools serving slum populations. I shall not explore this dimension in detail, but I want to note an important point: urban interests have for years done much better at the federal level than in the state capitol. The reasons are complex and not very well understood, but among them is the strong, warm, and skillfully administered relationship between city political leaders and federal officials. Federal officials in all the relevant branches and agencies have come to be responsive to political leaders and politically skillful administrators in the cities. Mayors, urban-renewal directors, and local poverty-program administrators are especially skilled, individually and through their national associations, at bringing their points of view to the sympathetic attention of Washington. The newspaper accounts of the federal treatment of the Chicago schools in 1965 sug-

gest to me that, as Mayor Daley salvaged Superintendent Willis's federal school money from the fire, so the help of political leaders in other cities may be necessary to maintain satisfactory relationships with this newly opened source of major financial assistance to big-city schools. Indeed, the requirement, which Washington officials seem to be taking seriously, that poverty programs and the new educational programs be closely coordinated may, in turn, force the schools into closer relationship with many other agencies of city government and thus, inevitably, into the mainstream of urban politics.

Earlier I raised the question of the significance of deciding the McAndrew affair within a partisan electoral process. Let us return to that dimension of our general problem. I have suggested that autonomy and isolation have serious disadvantages for urban schools. What is to be said on the other side? What would it be like if the schools were a more integral part of the urban political system; if, for example, they were made a regular line department of the city government with a director appointed by the mayor to serve at his pleasure? How would such a process work? What would be the substantive effects on educational policy and on the city generally?

To examine this issue directly, we need to be clear about how city political systems actually function. No single formulation will do justice to the complexities of the question but at least three points seem especially pertinent. First, political scientists generally have found that in large cities, and some of the smaller ones too, influence is rather widely dispersed, specialized, and exercised in a discontinuous fashion. That is, one person or group will be active and influential on one set of issues while quite a different array dominates the next set. This tendency is perhaps accentuated when a specialized set of issues, such as education, is determined within a specialized institutional framework. But the institutional framework is primarily reinforcing, not by itself determining. A second, related, finding of political scientists' examinations of the urban community is that great pressure is generally exercised in questions of substantive policy program (though not so much on elections or top level personnel appointments or tax rates) by the program's professional and administrative experts. In urban renewal or public health and hospitals, to take two examples from regular city government, the professional personnel run the programs about as completely as schoolmen run the schools; perhaps, more so.

A third finding is rather different from the first two, however. In many cities, though by no means in all of them, a critical and continuing role of substantial import is played by the mayor. He is the chief organizer of the dominant coalition of interests and the chief broker among them. He is the chief negotiator in balancing not only the disparate and often conflicting

groups in the city but also in representing city needs to state and especially to federal agencies. More than that the mayor is the single most important problem-solver. He is committed, out of sheer re-election necessity if for no other reason, to rebuilding the slums, attracting new business, renovating downtown, implementing equal rights and opportunity and, as federal money is at last making it possible, improving the life chances of the urban poor. Not all mayors face the same circumstances, of course. Some are weak in formal authority to control even their governmental environment; many are lacking in the fiscal and human resources to get the necessary leverage on the social and economic environment. Nevertheless, there is a substantial similarity in the orientation and role of big-city mayors, and this convergence has been especially pronounced during the past decade. In style or substance, mayors of today have little in common with Big Bill Thompson. Actually, mayors might not relish taking more direct responsibility for the schools. Why should they take on another large problem area when they too can fall back on the argument that the schools should be nonpolitical? If they were to accept a more active role, it might be because they really want to resolve the complicated difficulties of urban life, and solutions *must* include effective use of the schools.

These three generalizations are all relevant to my question but in somewhat different ways. They suggest that if the schools were integrated with the urban governmental system, the educators would continue to make most of the technical and administrative decisions but the mayor and his coalition of community support would play a major role in giving over-all program and fiscal direction. The schools would compete more directly than now with other city programs for available money. Their programs might be more differentiated among different segments of the community, as the mayor tried at once to solve problems and ease tensions and to please the major elements of the coalition that elected him. Their top administrative personnel might be more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of electoral fortune, though mayors might be only slightly more effective in breaking through the defenses of the educators' bureaucracy to choose (or fire) their own men than are independent school boards now. Educators might find themselves and their programs more often subordinated to other agencies and programs than is presently the case, but this subordination might be more a difference in perception than reality; an independent school system already must compete for money and support, but in an indirect and segmented manner. It is not clear that mayor-directed schools would be more generously financed from the local community but neither is it inevitable that they would be poorer.

In my judgement, the principal difference between the existing arrangements for the government of urban public education and this hypothetical

control by the mayor would be in the schools' relationship with the increasingly pluralistic and tension-filled community. An independent school system asks for community support directly, unprotected by any of the confusions of mandate that attend the election of political officials. The schools are naked against community pressures except as their unitary-community ideology and whatever rational citizen demand there may be for their services may shield them. I have argued, and so do the protest demonstrations and the negative votes in referenda, that these are not sufficient protection if the urban schools are to perform the extraordinarily difficult, high cost, tasks of educating the urban poor. It is not coincidence, I think, that recently the schools have been so often the target of the alienated and disaffected elements of society. Whether protesting against *de facto* segregation, double taxation of Catholics, or alleged Communist infiltration, the pickets know that the schools are vulnerable to direct assault. No other programs or interests get in the way. No other issues or loyalties intrude.

But the processes involved in electing a mayor and a council, especially on a partisan ticket, but also in a large, heterogeneous city with nonpartisan government, do mute these kinds of pressures. Mandates *are* vague; constraints on the specific policy choices which the officials will subsequently make are loose. And the protection afforded to the professionals is considerable. They may administer their programs while someone else takes the heat, and diffuses it.

There is evidence that in the controversies over fluoridation those communities in which the voters decided the question in a referendum were often in the process racked by deep social conflict. In those cities where a mayor played a strong role, on the other hand, fluoridating the city water supply by administrative order, there was little untoward excitement.¹¹ The schools have far more substantive impact on urban life than fluoridation, of course; the latter seems to be mainly symbolic. But educational issues are laden with affect, and they may come more and more to resemble fluoridation as a focus for the manifold discontents of the city. The broader political process might help to protect the schools against becoming the urban community's battlefield.

In all that I have said thus far, my principal points appear to be as follows: (1) more direct and effective political (mayoral) control of the schools will be difficult to engineer because of the resistance of schoolmen, regardless of formal governmental structure, to "nonprofessional" direc-

¹¹ See Elihu Katz, Robert Crain, Donald Rosenthal, and Aaron J. Spector, *The Fluoridation Decision: Community Structure and Innovation* (Mss, March, 1965). The processes by which an affect-laden issue like education may ignite previously latent community tensions have been inadequately explored. James S. Coleman's highly suggestive synthesis of the then existing materials, *Community Conflict* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), has not been followed by much further empirical work.

tion; and (2) big-city school interests might get a more receptive hearing in state and national capitals and be partially screened from local direct action protests if they merge their interests more fully with the over-all city administration. But would this type of result lead to more effective education? This, in my judgement, is precisely the *wrong* question. In the urban center, there is no education which is separate from the issues of race, poverty, housing, crime, and the other human problems of the metropolis. The issue we need to face is whether greater mayoral control would lead to changes in school policy (e.g., better coordination and cooperation with urban renewal, recreation, and poverty programs) which would make the educational program more effective in solving the larger complex of community problems. In a simpler era, one could argue that Big Bill Thompson may well have done just this in Chicago. And, forty years later, one might well feel that, in the same city, Mayor Daley might have achieved more effective integration than Superintendent Willis seemed disposed to provide had the mayor chosen to violate the educators' code of independence and exert more direct control of the situation.

At the same time, there should be no mistake about the fact that greater administrative integration of schools with city would, in many cases, mean subordination of the schools to the city government. Moreover, such subordination might often mean that the schools were being used as instruments to achieve policy goals which extended well beyond more narrowly defined educational objectives. To some extent, of course, this is happening anyway, and indeed it has always been so. But the issue of political control forces us to be explicit about the question of how the many goals we wish to achieve in the city can best be approached. If it turned out that education was not at the head of the list, educators would be compelled to acknowledge that fact in a situation where they had to bargain for their share of the local resources against the direct competition of other programs as well as against the fiscal prudence of the electorate.

Direct competition for local money; subordination of educators to other public officials with other interests and programs; the self-conscious use of the schools as instruments to fight poverty, improve housing conditions, or fight city-suburb separation: these have been virtually unthinkable heresies to devoted schoolmen. Yet, are they much more than an explicit statement of steps and tendencies already being taken or implicit in present practices? I think not; we are already moving this way, to some extent we always have been doing so, and the real question to be faced is: How might we do these things better? A greater measure of local political leadership in education and coordination of the schools with other portions of the community might well contribute to this end.

The author discusses an interdisciplinary social science course which dealt with poverty in America and emphasized the relation between social science generalizations and the students' own experience. Samples from the students' oral and written work illustrate the effects of the course on the middle-class and the poor students.

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The Cornell Introductory Course in the Social Sciences

A PSYCHOLOGIST'S REPORT

In the summer of 1966 an economist, a political scientist, a sociologist, and a psychologist joined in giving an experimental introductory course in the social sciences to fifty-three pre-freshmen at Cornell.¹ Its title, "Why are there poor people in a rich society like the United States?" reflected the wish to introduce the social sciences as relevant to social issues and to involve the student in the process of inquiry. In order to evaluate the course and its influence on the students, I shall start out by describing its aims and how it came to be given.

The planning for the course began at Rutgers in January of 1966 at a meeting of university and college teachers, organized by Douglas F. Dowd under the auspices of the Office of Education, Educational Services, Inc., and the National Science Foundation, to plan new ways of introducing college students to the social sciences. Many of the participants had also attended an earlier conference at Tufts on Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching. In

¹ We are grateful to Mr. Charles Foster of the U. S. Office of Education for his work in making the Cornell course possible. I also would like to thank Professor David Riesman for his helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this report.

part, student protest about undergraduate teaching in the social sciences was responsible for the meeting, and those of us who came were sympathetic to the students' complaints. What brought us together was the shared conviction that present methods of teaching social sciences bury the undergraduate's interest in understanding man and society beneath a mass of description cloaked in jargon, or force the student to concern himself with the specialized interests of his professors. Furthermore, introducing the social sciences through one of its branches alone fosters the illusion that social problems have an economic or psychological solution, rather than leading the student to interrelationships between the various social forces.

Some of us were especially struck by the contrast between the tendency in the social sciences to deaden and mechanize the study of man while in a modern natural science like physics, deeper theoretical understanding makes the inanimate subject matter seem increasingly more alive. Our long-range concern was not only to enrich the minds of undergraduates, but also to interest some of the best students in the study of man, since many potentially first-rate social scientists are repelled by mechanistic models and a lack of concern with the deepest human problems.

The participants in the Rutgers conference agreed that the students deserved more and better teaching in the universities, but not everyone interpreted the problem in the same way. Some who were critical of teaching procedures were satisfied with the social sciences. We split into groups of the like-minded, one of which became the nucleus for the Cornell course, including the four of us who shared a radical critique of the social sciences not only as they are taught but also as they are usually practiced. Before discussing our point of view, I shall present the participants.

The economist is Douglas F. Dowd, who sparked the series of meetings and became director of the course and the prime mover in its organization. Dowd is a professor at Cornell, an economist who, although familiar with the current mainstream of micro-economics, identifies with the tradition of Thorstein Veblen, who was also at war with his own discipline and concerned with making economic theory relevant to understanding man and society, and not merely business cycles and fiscal policy. The sociologist is Sister Marie Augusta Neal, S.N.D., the chairman of the Sociology Department at Emmanuel College in Boston, a graceful woman who directs her sociological analysis to questions of social change both within and outside of the Catholic Church. Although something of a feminist, Sister Marie's ecumenical spirit seeks community, in the social sciences, in religion, and among all men and women of good will. The political scientist, John Rensenbrink, teaches at Bowdoin College and before going to Maine, spent three years with AID in East Africa. Rensenbrink's main interest is analyzing

the political forces of the past and the present that block or allow men to experience freedom within the structure of society. I am a social psychologist, like Sister Marie graduated from Harvard's Department of Social Relations, but also trained as a psychoanalyst by Erich Fromm in Mexico, where I have spent six years studying Mexican peasants and where I now teach and practice psychoanalysis. My central interest is studying the relationship between the human motivation and the social and economic forces that mold character. As a psychoanalyst interested in education, I am particularly concerned with the problem of stimulating students to become aware of the difference between intellectualized, alienated knowledge and the understanding that comes from experience, systematic investigation, and authentic interest. The others shared this concern, which became the heart of our collaboration.

AIMS OF THE COURSE

The first aim of the course, then, was that the students feel related to what they study. Second, we sought to encourage and demonstrate a critical attitude. We considered this attitude absolutely essential for a scientist. Without a critical attitude toward appearances, "common sense," "facts," and authority, the student cannot battle against cultural stereotypes and categories of consciousness. Nor can he begin to discover truths which conflict with the conventional way of seeing things. He will learn, if at all, passively.

Our aim was to demonstrate that science, like art, can sensitize the observer to perceive reality more profoundly than he ordinarily does, with the difference that the scientist must produce systematic interpretations which stand the test of generalized criteria. An example of such sensitization that became important during the course relates to the apathetic behavior that characterizes many poor people. The students' first reaction was to label this behavior as laziness, to see it in conventional terms as the wish to get something for nothing, to avoid hard work, to take the easy way out. A sensitive artist or film-maker might go deeper and show the despair, the lack of hope that *motivates* the laziness. The social scientist should go further to try and understand in the light of a theory of motivation, the general conditions which kill hope and defeat the human spirit.

Thus, our next aim was to introduce the social sciences in terms of theory. Without theory, the social sciences remain descriptive and more easily influenced by conventional ways of seeing. Furthermore, there is no systematic way of determining what is important and what is trivial. The investigator is left to explain what he sees in an *ad hoc* manner, depending on pure speculation or on conventional wisdom. Furthermore, without a powerful theory,

the social sciences become dependent on their methodology. The results conform to the latest methods, instead of theory pressuring the development of better methods.

Many social scientists who might agree so far that a critical attitude and a powerful theory are essential for deepening knowledge would not make a further distinction between mechanistic and humanistic theories. We felt that theory in the social sciences becomes both more powerful for understanding and more inherently interesting to the students the more it treats people as uniquely people rather than as machines. Theories cannot help being abstract, but they can be rooted in the nature of man rather than starting from a mechanical model such as economic man, sexual man, role-playing man, etc.

What does it imply for theory that human beings, unlike machines, are alive? People have histories; they are constantly changing, in transition from the past to the future. This process is acted upon by economic, political, social, as well as psychological forces. Where humans are concerned, the static appearances at any moment may be misleading (like "laziness"), since they can be fully understood only when the dynamics of change and the forces at work are taken into account. People are often unconscious of the forces influencing them, but man is *unique* in nature in the sense that he can become conscious of the forces that act on him. By becoming conscious of these forces, he can influence them. Once he can influence them, he becomes morally responsible for them and for their result which includes himself.

We rejected the idea of a "value-free" social science. Rather, we considered that both scientist and student can learn to seek out the implicit values often hidden in scientific work, and analyze their implications. They can learn to separate science from ideology.

Although the four of us did not share identical values nor the same theoretical language, our common aims and assumptions allowed us to learn from each other.

METHODS OF TEACHING

To emphasize the interrelationship between science and decision, we focussed the course, or "introductory inquiry," on poverty in America. Other equally relevant areas of inquiry might have been chosen—war, freedom in a highly industrialized society, lying in America (the credibility gap), and so on. Such an inquiry demands examining the relevance of theory to a question that concerns us all. It demands critical examination of stereotypes and prejudices. It confronts opinions with systematic study.

As Dowd put it, our approach was not a "problems" approach, nor the

usual "interdisciplinary" approach. We wished to have the students and staff examine *one* question in depth. Normally, what is suggested by that question is given a week, at most, in a course in economics or sociology, and is not taken up at all in psychology or political science. When it is taken up, it is taken as "the problem of poverty." We took it up as a question, and one that in fact no single member of the teaching staff could answer adequately.

I might note here that at Rutgers, some participants favored an experimental introductory course stressing community action on a question of social importance, training students to change society. While the four of us believed that a deeper understanding of society is essential to its betterment, we were suspicious of such an approach. First of all, it is hard to imagine such training without indoctrination. But even if students were encouraged to change society any way they wished, their attempts would likely be distorted by naïve illusions or rebelliousness. It seemed to me that those teachers who wished to use the classroom to encourage political action secretly lacked faith in the power of the social sciences to deepen understanding so that political decisions eventually might be based on greater awareness.

The aims for the course implied that our methods of teaching allow for dialogue between scholars of the different disciplines, and between teacher and student. We wished to encourage the student to criticize us, to demand evidence and clear reasoning from us. And we planned to confront the student's stereotypes and biases, his unrelatedness to the subject matter, his tendency to make statements not based on study, nor even rooted in real interest.

The beginning student in the social sciences will be able to take knowledge more seriously, if he can use his own experience as data and relate himself to the subject matter studied. While we felt it important that we encourage students to use their own experiences, however, we felt this must be done with great care, to avoid intrusiveness.

FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE

The course began on July 5th and ended on August 12th, with classes from nine to twelve, Monday through Friday. There were fifty-three students enrolled in this course only. With the exception of two upperclassmen who asked permission to attend, the students were pre-freshmen either at Cornell or Emmanuel College. All the pre-freshmen from the two institutions were invited in late April and told they could expect an inter-disciplinary social science course with six hours credit and a tuition scholarship from the Office of Education which supported the experiment. Among the group were twelve Negroes from the Cornell Disadvantaged Students Program (boys and

girls from Harlem; Bedford-Stuyvesant; Washington, D.C.; and Birmingham, Alabama, whose low College Board scores would not ordinarily gain them entrance to Cornell). These students had been sent a special letter of invitation by Gloria Joseph, the teaching assistant in psychology, who directs, indeed mothers, the program. This group proved to be especially important to the course, not only because of their intimate knowledge of poverty in large city ghettos, but also because they forced the white middle-class students to confront glibness about poverty and the unexamined prejudices that hide behind an indifferent liberalism. For me personally, the Negro students were a revelation. I had not taught American undergraduates in six years and had never had the privilege of teaching the new generation of Negro youth who, without any servility or fear and with some defiance, demonstrate the possibility of different forms of intellectual excellence, other than the abstract, verbal fluency which we usually reward in universities and colleges. More will be said about these students in discussing the results of the course.

The pedagogical technique of the course stimulated constant reformulation. The day began at nine with an hour lecture, followed by a half-hour discussion of the lecture. While open to student questions, the discussion primarily was meant to bring out disagreements, if any, among the four professors and discover how each separate discipline in its form of analysis excluded or oversimplified factors central to another discipline. The lectures themselves were planned at a weekly meeting where each of us would try to explain what he or she could offer to the ongoing inquiry. Our colleagues' lectures forced us to reorganize our own presentations to take into account fresh insights and ideas.

To give an example, Rensenbrink, the political scientist, in discussing political power, pointed out that the white-collar class votes with the upper-middle class, even though its economic interest lies with the working class. Sister Marie, the sociologist, then called attention in her lecture to the aspirations of the white-collar class, to its reference group, to studies showing that the white-collar group seeks to be accepted by the upper classes and tries to copy its behavior. She considered how this behavior reflected general principles of inter-class behavior which could be understood theoretically. She raised the question of whether these principles would be applicable in other cultures or societies. This discussion paved the way for my own lecture on child socialization and the formation of character or motivational structure in the child that best guarantees him success within an economic system.

After the lecture and discussion, there was a half-hour break, followed four days a week by an hour section led by graduate teaching assistants. Often, discussions continued at lunch. The students ate together, and

we made a point of joining them once a week. The three sections, composed of eighteen or nineteen students, were led by Cornell graduate students in economics, political science, and psychology who, in their own doctoral research, had developed an interest in questions relating to poverty. The sections were to discuss the lectures and readings and, after the midpoint in the course, the individual research papers, which were required from each student in place of a final examination. Although attendance at lectures and sections was taken only unofficially, it is worth noting that the sessions averaged about 90 per cent attending.

The decision to require papers instead of an examination grew from the aim of stimulating self-directed interest, and of counteracting the tendency to learn only what is necessary to pass tests. The students were told that grading would be either pass or fail, and a grade of pass depended mainly on the seriousness of the student, as evidenced from his attendance, participation, and attempt to explore in his paper a question that interested him; he was to take into account his teachers' suggestions and the lectures in writing his paper. He should feel no compulsion to agree with his professors, but he should feel obliged to be aware of what they had said.

Besides the lectures and sections, the schedule varied on Wednesday mornings and Thursday evenings. On Wednesday, the group broke into smaller sections of eight, led by a professor or teaching assistant, to discuss in detail one of the ten books required in the course. On Thursday evenings, movies, both documentaries and feature films on aspects of poverty, were shown. Discussions followed, led by Eugene Lichtenstein, who served as evaluator of the course from the Office of Education and who is a documentary filmmaker in his own right.

Of the movies shown, five were noteworthy in adding depth to the subjects treated in the course, and in demonstrating that a sensitive eye and scientific analysis can combine to illuminate underlying truth. The documentaries included two C.B.S. reports, "Harvest of Shame" about poverty among migrant workers, and "Sixteen in Webster Groves" which studied affluent high school students. The latter film conveys the human costs of affluence in our society. The high-school students, outwardly satisfied, reveal their acute anxieties about failing to make college, to get a good job, to stay in Webster Groves. Their fear leads to cheating on examinations which increases the tension, since exposure means expulsion. The contrast between the Webster Groves students' lack of concern for others, for the poor or the Negroes, and their own anxiety about being excluded from the affluent society helped to make the students in the poverty course aware that when we were talking about American society, they were included. Much that they were seeing in Webster Groves allowed them to glimpse themselves. Another documentary,

"Football" produced by Time Inc. followed the progress of two high-school teams to the big game of the season and illustrated dramatically the clash in our society between humane values and the urge to win at any cost, even if this means brutalizing ourselves. These films were important to the consideration in the course of the relation of poverty to the character traits and motives formed in the society, and functional for material success.

The two feature films were Luis Bunuel's *Los Olvidados* (*The Young and the Damned*) about delinquent boys in Mexico and *The Cool World* with a similar theme, shot in Harlem. The two films illustrated cross-cultural similarities between the urban poor and the culturally rooted differences.

The most important readings of the course reflect the emphases of the instructors. Some of the books originally assigned turned out not to fit in with the inquiry as it developed, and others were brought in to take their place. (Ten copies of each book were put on reserve, and students could sign them out for overnight.) The first reading was Michael Harrington's *The Other America*, a book which stated the problem of the course and suggested or sketched some answers. It served the course well, since it spoke directly to middle-class stereotypes and prejudices. The readings in economics included Herman Miller's *Rich Man, Poor Man*, a presentation and discussion of income distribution in the United States, *Modern Capitalism* by A. Schonfeld, and Dowd's *Modern Economic Problems*, books that introduced the student to the workings, needs, and goals of the economic system. The readings in political science were chosen to give the student a fundamental picture of how people of different types and classes can make their wishes felt politically. The readings also served as a background for discussing the role of government in social change. Included were *Presidential Power* by R. Neustadt, *A Bill Becomes A Law* by D. Berman, and Anthony Lewis' *Gideon's Trumpet*, a book with a particular relationship to poverty since it describes how a poor man gained a hearing before the Supreme Court with the result that the poor in general can claim the right of counsel before any court in the United States.

My primary aim in assigning the readings in psychology was to construct the basis for an understanding of the relationship between the economy, social forces, and the individual motivation that determines success or failure. I assigned Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* and Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, two books which share the assumptions of dynamic motivation and unconscious processes but which differ radically in their view of what fundamentally motivates man. Some of the students also read B. F. Skinner's *Walden Two* which gives another, very different view of man, more representative of experimental psychology. Other students became especially interested in Fromm's humanistic view, and read his *Man for Himself* and *The*

Heart of Man. For readings on socialization of the child, I assigned some studies in the collection *Readings in Social Psychology*, edited by Maccoby, Newcomb, and Hartley, part of Piaget's *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, and Erikson's *Childhood and Society*, which also includes some interesting speculation on the psychological problems of Negroes and Indians in America.

Sister Marie, the sociologist, was able to use some of my readings as a background to her own lectures on social class, social perception, social aspirations, and the factors determining how people learn the rules of their reference groups and insure conformity. Another reading illustrating these points was W. F. Whyte's *Street Corner Society*. She also assigned A. Hollingshead's *Elmtown's Youth*, a book that, while dated, still touches on the recent experiences of the students in its analysis of social class and its effect on the high school—on aspirations, popularity, and teachers' judgments in a mid-western town. Indeed, the book stimulated comparisons with the students' own high-school life. Sister Marie also emphasized a comparative, cross-cultural view of the causes of poverty and to this end assigned some articles, including one by Alex Inkeles on traits common to industrialized societies, and sections from Oscar Lewis' *Five Families* and William McCord's *Springtime of Freedom*.

This meant a great deal of reading for newly graduated high-school seniors. When individual reading for their papers added to the burden late in the course, many gave up trying to follow the assignments. The books that made the most impact were among those assigned in the first weeks, especially *The Other America* and *Escape from Freedom*, two books which deeply challenged their ways of seeing their society and themselves.

RESULTS OF THE COURSE

What did the students, given their different backgrounds, varied education and abilities, learn from the course? One way of finding out is by examining their answers to the question of the course. On the second day of classes, students were handed blue books and asked to give their own idea of "Why are there poor people in a rich society like the United States?" On the last day, without warning, they were asked to answer the same question (neither answer was graded), and the difference in answers provided a good indication of the course's effect on the students' thinking. Another measure is the quality of the individual papers, and a third is the way in which they began to discuss with their teachers and among themselves (sometimes far into the night) what they had learned about poverty in America, about the social sciences, and about themselves.

Most of the students felt the course was a challenge and a demand to wake up to aspects of their society and their own lives that they had seen but never before noticed. Once they woke up to their experience, it was possible to relate poverty to the economic system and to facts of income distribution, to unconscious motivation and character, to questions of political power, and to childhood socialization practices and the social-class attitudes and definitions of reality that mold behavior. Waking-up demanded a critical view of what they had taken for granted, such as their own desires for the latest model car, or their excitement about buying new gadgets and clothes they did not need. Do all people share these desires? Are such desires necessary for a consuming society to operate? What attitudes would such desires, produced by advertising and social consensus, cause in the poor? And what about the students' own motives to gain success in school and work? Are these the same drives that motivate a peasant or a migratory worker? If not, what is it about the economic reality of a society which produces different motives in different societies? What is the result of the desire to do well, to achieve in our society? Does it lead to deep interest in knowing, to profound interpersonal relationships?

The students had never before considered how they had been formed by their society, nor the human cost of their formation. If they had not seen *themselves*, the majority of white middle-class adolescents had much less idea of the *poor*. One girl's experience with Negroes was limited to driving through the ghetto of her city "with the windows rolled up, so as to be safe." A Midwestern boy refused to believe there were poor people or social classes in his home town. He left infuriated from Sister Marie's lecture on social class and wrote home to his mother asking her to tell the professor that he lived in a classless town. The mother wrote back to tell her son what had never been discussed at home, and she reminded him that he did not invite some boys to his parties and others did not invite him. Many of the middle-class students, like many Americans, confidently wrote in their first answer that there were poor people because the poor were unintelligent, lazy or uneducated, victims of heredity or of parents who did not care or who were from foreign cultures that do not value education as highly as do Americans,

Here are some excerpts from the first answers. Julie and Ann Marie represent a large percentage of the students who answer the problem in purely "psychological" terms and imply that people generally get what they deserve. Julie writes:

The basic reason that there are poor people in a rich society, I think, is that ever since the beginning of time, there have been men who lead and men who will follow. Men who are mentally superior to their neighbors naturally will gain some

measure of their respect provided that they use what abilities they have. In early times an intelligent caveman undoubtedly thought first of fashioning weapons out of metal instead of stones. In those days, of course, on the small-scale level of primitive society (I don't even know if one may call it a society), man probably did not use this knowledge and superiority to the disadvantage or exploitation of his neighbors, but rather shared it with him. But in our society which is so materialistic and complex, the natural leaders and men of superior ability who wish to attain wealth can do it without too much difficulty, leaving the great masses who do not have their exceptional character, far behind.

Ann Marie states similar thoughts in other words:

Man was not created equal. Individualism is the key to most social problems, poverty outstanding. If our most benevolent government starting from scratch were to allot the same amount of money to each citizen to take care of his personal needs, inside of a month we would be on our way back to financial inequality. A new economic strata would be formed. Those who had shrewdly invested or saved miserly would have more than those who had been robbed or who had gambled or indulged themselves.

As though the well-off in this consumption society did not indulge themselves! Diana states it more baldly:

There exist poor people in the rich society of the United States because of their own laziness. Some believe they should receive benefits handed to them on a silver platter. The world owes them a living so why should they try to better themselves and do something with their lives. They are given a chance to help themselves but they don't.

Only a few of the students took into account factors of environment or society, and none of them attempted to analyze our society more critically than did Julie, while most implied criticism of the poor. Ellie and Ron were perhaps the two students with the best academic abilities. Ellie's first answer reads:

Differences in man's mental and physical capabilities, caused in turn by hereditary and environmental factors, are one reason for the disparities in man's wealth. Even with sufficient ability, however, some people lack the initiative or the opportunity to make use of them. And, by contrast, some seemingly incapable people manage to be rich just through chance or luck. Influences other than just the potential in a man, therefore, determine his material wealth. His place in society, his society, his place in history, his personal life, and many other involved facets of his life are important.

Even considering all these complexities, we still have not determined why the forces of poverty have not been broken by the incredible wealth of the United States. First we must ascertain that they have not, in fact, been broken. After all, few people are starving, obviously, standards have changed.

She ends up doubting whether poverty indeed exists in the United States. Ron, on the other hand, does not doubt poverty, but sees it as a trap or vicious circle for segments of the society who have been left out of either the nation's industrial advance or the government's attempt to "redistribute the nation's wealth." He writes:

The twentieth century saw attempts on the part of the federal government to redistribute the nation's wealth. Examples include the graduated income tax, minimum wage legislation, and social security benefits. In this way, the government sought to extend the nation's wealth to all its citizens.

However, inevitably some people were passed by in this redistribution and remain today as the poor. They had the misfortune to become engaged in an industry which became obsolete, or they were never trained in any industrial skills at all. Since the poor are engaged in a constant struggle to stay fed and clothed, they and their children have no opportunity to get the training necessary to benefit from the wealth of the society they live in. Trapped in this vicious circle, the poor can find no way out and remain as they are, passing their poverty on to their children. They do not participate in the affluent society and therefore cannot derive any benefits from that affluence.

Ron's analysis was atypical. The answers of almost all the students at the beginning of the course were glib and self-confident, often reflecting the impatience of some Americans with the poverty program and with high taxation to benefit poor people who they felt in great part were responsible for their poverty. In the first discussions, many students felt that the solution to poverty in America is obvious. All that is needed is better schools and teaching plus an injection into the poor of middle-class virtues and aspirations. Although we had been prepared for the students' lack of knowledge, we were shocked by their lack of compassion and their disidentification with the poor.

With few exceptions, the course did give students the sense that poverty concerned them also. Witness Julie's final answer to the question of the course:

There are poor people in a rich society like the U. S. A. because for seventeen years, seven months, two weeks, and six days it never occurred to me to wonder why there *are* poor people in a rich society like ours. I had experienced *relative* poverty, but I never let myself wonder about *absolute* poverty and the poor people. This is why, as Michael Harrington says, the poor are *hidden*. We don't want to let ourselves think about them—we're too busy relating *our* status to that of the rest of our community.

Juvenal said that "the tragedy of poverty is that it makes men utterly ridiculous." This is true, but he was not living in our society. Besides the fact that it makes men ridiculous, in our society poverty is a tragedy because it is *so unnecessary*. We are living in such an affluent society that no one should be denied the minimum standards

of housing, food, etc. But they are denied them; 50,000,000 people are denied them because people just don't care. They regard the poor as lazy and themselves as having achieved whatever they have by dint of their hard work. They don't know about the poor—they never see them. This is directly a result of the economic system which places such a high premium on achievement, pecuniary and material achievement. "Since money is the highest divinity around us, even though we have not yet put up an altar to cash, there will soon be a temple to money." Success, at any cost to anyone else, must be assured, but it is only those people who already have *middle-class values* that are going to achieve or at least have a chance of achieving success as we see it.

And the poor are not equal to the other people in our country. Equality should not be measured in I.Q. (middle-class culture tests) tests—no men have the same abilities. Equality should not be measured by where one lives or what color he is—but it is. There is no equality of *opportunity* in our country.

There is poverty then because everyone who has any money at all cares only about making more; because those who have the *power* (financial and political) to alleviate the lot of the poor do not care about the poor, only about themselves; because we hide the poor so we don't have to think about them, rather than *do* anything to help them.

There are poor people in our society because in a week I'll probably have forgotten all about poverty and poor people. There is nothing I alone can do, anyway, to change their lot, and I'll be going back to where money and material success are all that count.

Ann Marie's final answer is similar. After trying to summarize what she has learned in the course, she writes:

The government is apathetic—catering to the powerful. The middle class is busy getting ahead.

Perhaps the reason is me. People who haven't the guts to sacrifice themselves to this purging of their society so long as it treats them well. Now I am aware—intellectually I know what I should, what I must do. But next month I'll be buying new clothes for school, and next summer I'll be sailing and soon I'll be married, and I'll tell my children what they must do—especially since I didn't make the time to do it. And maybe along the way I'll talk to friends and spread the Gospel, but this is America, land of opportunity, upward mobility in a "no-class" system, and anyway who'll listen?

During the course, the students had become aware of who the poor are, and had learned that the poor fall outside of the heart of our economic system. They became more aware of the powerlessness of the poor, politically as well as economically, and they began to recognize their own contempt for those who are weak and powerless. Indeed, they began to confront the fact that our own society, based on consumption and efficiency, turns human

suffering into abstract problems, causing indifference to one's own feelings and to the reality of others.

It is important to keep in mind that most of the students were not brilliant. They did not suddenly become profound and highly analytical, although as both the answers and the individual papers demonstrate, some students had learned some theory and had become much more critical of their own conventional interpretations. Like Julie and Ann Marie, they had come to see that society is the responsibility of all its members, even if they were pessimistic about their own willingness to accept that responsibility. A new consciousness of society had confronted many with new moral decisions. Sometimes it just produced a feeling of confusion. Larry, in his final answer, writes:

Six weeks ago I came to this course convinced that there was one, and only one main reason for the existence of poverty. I thought that poor people existed because they were too lazy to work, to raise themselves from their plight. It would be the highest hypocrisy for me to say that I now know the answer to this problem. From this course I have found out that there is no one set answer. There is an incredibly complex set of answers.

Some attempted to synthesize the facts and theory they learned; Ron tried to find his own words, rather than those of his professors.

The result of this course on me has been somewhat paradoxical. I've learned very many factors relating to poverty that I had no previous knowledge of. However, the little bit of knowledge I have gotten has showed me how much I don't know, so I feel a little strange trying to answer the question.

The economic factors have to do with the capitalistic ethic, which encourages competition for "the other guy" and security through monopoly for one's self. Thus those who have nothing to start out with are ignored by the system, which is geared to production at the expense of human values.

The poor people can't change the system because they have no political power. This is so in part because they have no economic influence in the first place, so the situation becomes a vicious circle.

In addition, the middle classes, who have the numbers to help the poor, have been tacitly taught by our society to ignore them. We build beltways to avoid driving through slums; we live in suburbs to avoid seeing them; and we keep them ringed in ghettos through discrimination. Having no contact with the poor, it is easy for us to believe alienated knowledge of them, for instance that they are happy or just lazy. In other words, the middle class is kept from contact with poverty and then told that the poor like their condition. Under these conditions middle class apathy is inevitable

Of course this explanation has done far less than scratch the surface of the problem. The answer lies somewhere in dozens of complex factors which perhaps I am still not aware of. At least I now really know that there are poor people, which is a

start. I think it is important to recognize that poverty is not an anomaly but an entirely predictable result of a system which encourages people to concentrate on production and accumulation rather than on expanding their consciousness to be more aware of people. As long as we are economic men rather than just men in the best sense of the word, we will always have poverty.

Ellie, too, attempts to bring a theoretical analysis to bear on the question of why Americans are not more concerned about poverty. In her final answer, she first describes the aims of our economic system, stating that "it does not need the poor to operate, and if people really cared about the poor, the economy could not function as it does." She discusses how the educational system and the mass media support the status quo, stimulating values of material achievement and of continued consumption. She continues:

The conformity of the classes is similar to the uniformity of the mass society we are approaching. Automation, bureaucracy, and standardization turn people into things and statistics. We lose the sense of being human, lose our individuality, and lose our awareness. We are no longer free to be ourselves or free to know what is really happening in this country. The necrophilous tendencies caused by industrialization and automation makes us more concerned with death than with life and living people, such as the poor.

Even if, through some flaw in the system, we should become aware of and concerned with the problem of poverty, several things prevent our doing anything significant to help. The U. S. government is controlled by different interest groups, all of which lobby for their own benefits. Congress is not representative of the country because of unequal districting and lack of suffrage, for example, for the Negroes in the South. Congress is, therefore, conservative and stagnant, unwilling and unable to effect real reform.

What is more, we tend to look for simplified solutions to the problem when we approach it. Give them education, or give them jobs, or give them money, we say. But we don't stop to consider that many interacting factors influence the poor's position and must all be considered. Perhaps the lack of development of social sciences is one of the causes of this naïveté.

Ellie, together with Fred, another above-average student, based their independent papers on a field study in Ithaca, relating social class to measures of character and attitudes toward the poor. When Ellie mentions "necrophilous tendencies," she is referring to Fromm's use of this concept in *The Heart of Man*. By means of a questionnaire which I worked out with her, Ellie demonstrated statistically a relationship between contempt for the poor on the one hand and on the other, the affinity to death and dead things.

FACTORS IN CHANGE: THE NEGRO STUDENTS

What, other than books and teaching, produced the sense of relatedness that began to develop in the students? By the end of the course, practically all of

the students became aware of how difficult the question is and that any answer will implicitly assume both a theoretical and a moral viewpoint. Some students learned more than others, but all lost some of their detachment and glibness. As the examples of answers have shown, not all the students were alike in their pre-course attitudes, either toward the question or the poor. The majority had never thought seriously about the question, and their feelings were like those of Julie and Ann Marie. A closer look at their point of view in discussions revealed a tendency to agree with the consensus, to base their opinions on those of parents, the press, national magazines, and television. A smaller percentage of the students were more self-consciously conservative or right wing. These students felt more concerned about the question than the majority, but their tendency was to blame the poor for a lack of initiative or to blame poverty on foreign, non-American influences. An example of this type of student was Georgine, whose answers will be quoted in another context. Another group of students, larger than the right wing, considered themselves liberals. More than the others, the liberals claimed to care deeply about poverty in America, but as we shall see, these students perhaps found the course even more difficult than did the others.

From the start, the liberals, the conservatives, and the consensus-thinking shared underlying assumptions. They viewed poverty in America as a problem in psychology and morals. Whether or not they favored government programs to "help them," it angered them to think the poor might not be grateful to receive, and they worried that the poor be given so much help that they would lose interest in helping themselves. They did not consider that the same economic and social forces which had made them rich had made others poor. They did not see that eliminating poverty meant improving their society, that it was not a matter of being a "good guy" but one of being a responsible citizen whose own self-interest in the deepest sense required concern with his environment. Instead, they believed that all are benefitted when each member of society pursues his individual idol of material gain, and their obligation to those who fall by the wayside is charity wrapped in a sermon.

The unplanned factor in the course which proved as important as lectures and reading in challenging conventional attitudes to poverty was the presence of the twelve students from Negro ghettos. They had seen poverty and prejudice destroy hope for neighbors and relatives who tried desperately to find work, without success or only at subsistence wages. They had no illusions that education by itself would solve the problem of poverty, and it was no surprise for them to learn that a Negro with a college education can expect to make on the average as much as a white man graduated from the eighth grade. But it took a while before the Negro students began partici-

pating in the course. While the white middle-class students resisted the questioning of their conventionalism and virtuousness, the resistance of the Negroes lay in their suspiciousness of the professors as representatives of the white world. They feared that taking the course meant opening themselves to more of Whitey's brainwashing or to his ridicule of their intellectual abilities. It was better to stay unnoticed. Some were willing to learn the skills for making it in the Ivy League, but they were troubled about betraying their origins and their friends. They resented it when white students carefully excepted them when making prejudiced generalizations about Negro laziness or violence. Unlike Negroes of another generation, these did not find pride in being different. They *forced* the white students to confront stereotypes.

One of the most rewarding results of the course for the professors was the eventual engagement of many of the Negro students who became slowly convinced that knowledge and systematic analysis were relevant to better understanding their private experiences and to seeking a strategy to change the ghettos. A few discovered that their very lack of abstract intellectual ability saved them from the tendency to intellectualize, to compartmentalize knowledge into formal and dead categories closed to experience. Much of their resistance to learning and their impotence in the face of multiple-choice tests of the College Board variety were rooted in their bewilderment with knowledge that had no relation to their experience, that seemed purposeless and meaningless. Once they could respond to an intellectual question as an opportunity to transcend conventional wisdom, they were not only able but eager to learn. One Negro boy in his term paper describes a moment in the course when suddenly economics seemed to explain his own fears about the type of work he could look forward to and the kind of menial work that his brother was forced to accept. At that moment, he became interested and wanted to read more about capitalism and its alternatives.

For Pat, an attractive and quiet girl from Washington, the stimulation was a lecture on the causes and effects of matriarchal families, drawing from both studies in the United States and my own work with Mexican peasants. The lecture was concerned first with the economic factors that allow women to work while men are deprived the opportunity to maintain their sense of dignity and the patriarchal role demanded by their culture. I spoke of the universal conflict between the sexes and the way in which women attack men with ridicule and men fight back with either physical force, economic power, or finally, when they feel defeated and impotent, by abandonment. Pat and others were, for the first time, able to see Negro men as victims, not only of economics and prejudice but also of women who were not as victimized as they believed. Another Negro girl refers to this in her final answer:

Also, some psychological factors on the issue can be discussed. For example, the people who are already poor blame themselves for their condition. Thus they consider themselves failures and bums. Yet, they are not the primary reasons for their condition. It is, in fact, the system in which they live. In addition, a poor family can create unnecessary barriers in itself which hinder the making of a solution to the problem. A mother's insistence that her son is "no-good" makes him feel inferior. If he marries and has any marital discord, he rather than being ridiculed, deserts. Now, the family is fatherless, the mother starts the same routine on her son, and the cycle repeats itself.

Pat studied the works of E. Franklin Frazier on the Negro family in the United States, the Moynihan report on the Negro family, and twelve other books and articles. In her paper, she considers both the causes of Negro families' being without fathers or with weak fathers and the possible government policies that might help change this condition, ranging from government jobs for Negro men to the encouragement of male Negro school-teachers in the primary grades. It is a paper that would satisfy the requirements of a freshman course anywhere, but it would never have been written if the course had not spoken to Pat's own experiences.

A more dramatic educational experience was the awakening of Theo, a very quiet and reserved football star from Bedford-Stuyvesant, to his own intellectual insight and understanding. We had just finished the showing of *Los Olvidados* and begun discussion of the film. One sequence in the picture is a dream. The dreamer is a boy of twelve or thirteen who lives with his mother and younger brothers and sisters. The mother resents the boy, blaming him for the father's betrayal and abandonment of her. She demands that the boy earn his own living and refuses to give him either the food or affection he craves. Despite his wish to be warm and loving, the boy is drawn into a delinquent gang. One night he dreams that his mother finally listens to his plea to give him something to eat. In the dream, she gets up from bed and with a half-seductive, half-sardonic expression walks over to his bed, saying that she has some meat for him. To his horror, she hands him a slab of raw meat which is grabbed from his hands by the leader of the gang before he can touch it.

Although the class had no training in the interpretation of dreams, they had read Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* and Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents*, and I had lectured on unconscious processes and symbolic language. I asked the group if anyone felt like trying to interpret the dream. The first attempt was made by Fred, a bright and sophisticated boy from one of the better private schools in New York City. His interpretation was that the boy in the film was still fixated on the oral cannibalistic stage of development, as described by Freud, and therefore wanted raw meat. The

interpretation might have been made by a graduate student in clinical psychology or by a first year psychiatric resident, a seemingly well-founded but mechanistic and abstract interpretation which ignored the character of the dreamer as it had been developed within the film. I did not comment, but asked whether there were any other interpretations. Theo raised his hand hesitantly. He ignored Fred's commentary and began to describe the symbolism of the dream. The boy is experiencing what his mother is really like. She cannot even give him cooked meat; the meat she gives him is raw food that he cannot eat. She lacks the warmth to cook the meat, but the boy cannot receive even this primitive nourishment, for it will be grabbed away from him. He lives in a jungle.

Theo's interpretation was much closer to what would be given by an experienced psychoanalyst than Fred's, yet Fred's would more likely appear as evidence of understanding psychoanalytic theory in the typical academic setting, while Theo's interpretation might be considered unscientific or too poetic. Yet, it was easier for Theo to develop a serious interest in deepening his psychological understanding than it was for Fred. Theo was interested and his interest was related to real life. He lacked training in systematically investigating a problem, and he had not yet learned to combine information from different sources. He needed to be educated in theoretical understanding and in facts, and he needed someone to tell him that his insights and emotional responses were true. Only if his interest and insights were taken seriously and developed, would Theo be able to take a teacher seriously and feel any value in learning from him. Otherwise, the social sciences would remain a game that Theo played badly and intellectual work would be a task to be done as painlessly as possible. But when Theo discovered that his experience was relevant and his perceptions were not only accurate but also profound, he blossomed as a student.

At the end of the course, when I asked a number of students whether the course had stimulated them to want to study a problem in greater depth, even if such investigation had nothing to do with any formal coursework, most of the students who answered affirmatively defined the problem in terms of one or another branch of the social sciences. One student wanted to study how the poor could have more political power. Another wanted to study the psychology of political leaders, whether their decisions were determined by rational or irrational motives. Theo, in his answer, grasped more exactly the aim of the course. He was concerned with the meaning of riots in the ghettos. He felt they were related to the dying off of gangs and in some way a substitute for gang warfare, but he felt he did not know what caused riots, and he would need to understand a great deal about the political and economic as well as the social and psychological causes.

Theo represents a different style of intellectual excellence. He lacked abstract verbal skills and his College Board scores were below the median. Yet as the summer continued, he demonstrated: (a) an understanding of symbolic language; (b) an ability to listen closely, to concentrate on another person and perceive him accurately; (c) a critical attitude toward appearances, a lack of illusion, which might have become merely a cynical attitude. The best Negro students improved in their ability to relate knowledge to profound human concerns, and I am convinced this would also be the case in a course which did not deal with poverty or civil rights. But if the abilities of students like Theo are to blossom, academic study must be related to human concerns—to love and hate, loyalty and betrayal, dignity and humiliation. Theo and others have learned both to trust their senses and to distrust official explanations. The Negro's upbringing favors such a development; but, in order to succeed in the majority society, he must either turn against what he knows or play a double game. What I am suggesting is that the abilities favored by his background are not those generally rewarded in universities nor those which are tested on intelligence tests. If they are encouraged with care and respect, however, they can be the basis for intellectual growth.

RESISTANCES TO LEARNING

The majority of the white students were more alienated from their own perceptions and emotions, as well as from the subject matter of the course. It was easier to stimulate and direct students like Theo who had no illusions about the extent of their knowledge than to confront those students who thought they knew a great deal, but who in reality had been stuffed with clichés and were less interested in learning than in impressing their professors. When such students began to discover that the teachers were impressed only by their lack of real interest and not by well-meaning but superficial generalizations or by a regurgitation of lectures and reading, they felt deceived and sometimes angry. Up until this point, teachers had led them to believe that it did not matter whether or not they were interested as long as they complied. They complained it was unjust and unfriendly for anyone to question their motives or to call their opinions glib. They had as much right to an opinion as anyone, and if they did not really care whether these opinions were true or false, based on experience or hearsay, that was their business.

But a main object of the course was to confront the student with his alienation, not merely from society and from responsibility as a citizen, but from his own experience. The goal was educational rather than therapeutic.

tic, to make the student aware of how many of his statements were intellectualized and rootless, for unless the student is concerned with knowing the truth and aware of his own glibness and pre-judgments, he cannot learn anything worth knowing, and the educational process becomes a dull game, interesting only to the grade hungry and the students who, for one reason or another, wish to imitate their professors.

The goal of confronting the student with his intellectual alienation might be called the psychoanalytic dimension of the course, although its roots lie in the humanistic tradition of Western thought. The aim was greater awareness, and this process was painful and difficult. Often it triggered anger and hostility from the student who felt he was being exposed as a fraud or being put down by superior professorial gamesmanship. More deeply, students began to feel the fear and anxiety that nothing was certain, that all they had learned in the past had to be re-examined and might turn out to be illusion—brain-washing from parents, teachers, and the mass media. At the same time that they confronted their alienation, it was necessary to show them the possibility of finding out answers for themselves, of trusting in their own experience, of accepting the fact that scientific investigation demands hard work, dedication, and honesty.

I think it is useful to examine the specific forms of resistance we encountered in the students, since if the course or one like it is repeated, the same resistances are bound to occur. First, some students felt hurt that they were being judged unfairly. They felt that if they were in fact unconcerned about the poor, this meant they were terrible people.

The students' defense of their right to be superficial masked the more deeply felt fear of being harshly judged and found worthless. They were also defending lack of seriousness resulting from years of passive learning. The students were not conscious that their statements of the poor implied much harsher condemnations than our accusations of glibness. Like many students today, they maintained a nonjudging ideology and avoided seeing their tendency to categorize others according to secret perfectionistic standards. Naturally, they were fearful that they would be judged in exactly this way. They were extremely vulnerable. We had to make it clear that they were not being condemned, before they could listen to our criticisms. Rather, we were taking them seriously by not treating them condescendingly, but as people who meant what they said. We appreciated the fact that students valued honesty, understanding, seriousness, and compassion, but they were not conscious that their statements often conflicted with these values. By listening to themselves, they could become aware of the cultural tendency to make superficial judgments, to call people "nice" or "aggressive," "lazy," "rebellious," or "creative" on the basis of flimsy evidence or con-

ventional categories. To become aware and critical of this glibness or to be exposed in one's unconscious harshness was painful; but in this case it meant the opportunity for growth rather than rejection or an irrevocable sentence of failure.

The second resistance focused on the accusation by students that we were trying to indoctrinate them. This resistance served two purposes. The first was to avoid seeing how much their opinions and attitudes toward the poor and toward Negroes were based on previous indoctrination, how much they repeated what they had been told without the awareness that these judgments were not supported by their own experience. An illustration was a section discussion on *Gideon's Trumpet*, where we were discussing Gideon's character, his independence and rebelliousness, which had positive as well as anti-social qualities. The conversation led to the question of whether an independent man could be successful in the corporate society. Many of the students had doubts and reflected that even in their schooling, the pressures to conform were hard to overcome. One boy objected, saying that his father was a business executive who had firmly told him that he did not like yes-men and that this showed that independent men are likely to be more successful than conformists. The boy was unaware that he was trying to avoid thinking for himself by opposing his father against his professors; and when he became conscious of this tactic, his first response was anger and sullen withdrawal.

The second function of accusing the professors of trying to indoctrinate was that the students could then avoid doing the work. Instead, they could maintain that one opinion or ideology was no better than any other. They could point to the obvious fact that the professors expressed political positions that were liberal or democratic socialist and maintain that the purpose of the course was to make them think in the same way. In fact, we were explicitly not presenting solutions or political panaceas, but rather analyzing a problem and showing that moral choices are demanded. It was necessary to make it clear to the students that they could be liberals, conservatives, socialists, or reactionaries, but we demanded analysis and knowledge. Concern over a political position in fact proved to be a smoke-screen for a lack of interest in learning, a lack of seriousness about investigating the causes of poverty. This resistance yielded to direct confrontation, by showing the students in practice how they would turn the discussion to ideological issues when they did not know the answers or when the professors challenged an opinion. At the end of the course, one student who had been particularly suspicious and critical handed out a private questionnaire to his companions, asking them if they felt the professors were trying to indoctrinate the students. Less than 10 per cent answered yes. Indeed some of the

students managed to learn without losing their conservative, and in one case even reactionary, ideologies. An example of a conservative was Don who at the end of the course commented that he had come to see, at the cost of great resistance, the evils of our economic system, but he still felt that no other system was better and that the best we can do is try to make it more humane, try to bring the poor into the system.

Georgine was an example of a student with right-wing views. Her first answer discusses the lack of initiative in the poor and goes on to say that:

Society nowadays seems even to have itself to encourage the poor and jobless to remain so. Workmen's compensation is higher than the minimum wage; is it any wonder these people prefer to stay on relief? Besides, the mother who is separated from her husband gets money to bring up the children fatherless, a condition that leads the children to even more lawlessness and disrespect for hard work. The poor, in their own ways, are opportunists. The young men would rather work in a garage and get more pay now than join the Job Corps with a promise of higher pay later. They do not plan ahead but only care for the pleasures of the moment. All through the South can be seen wooden shacks with shining television aerials. Perhaps they have a lack of faith in tomorrow.

Certainly those who work hard to become rich have faith that they will be around to spend their money; otherwise they wouldn't work so hard. In the past, the poor have had good reason to have no faith. In Europe wars regularly ravaged wealth for over a thousand years. But in this country, now, is the atomic bomb such a threat? Besides, this country has not been overrun. Perhaps this lack of faith is a hangover from Europe, passes on from generation to generation in the family culture causing poverty even now.

Many of Georgine's beliefs did not change, but her final answer shows a sense of awareness that the poor and the rich live in the same society and are subject to some of the same forces. Here is her final answer:

The problem of causes of poverty in the U. S. is much harder than I thought it was when I started this course. I still think that a defeatist attitude brought over by peasants from Europe and transmitted to people who became poor while here is one of the causes of poverty. Because, due to war, unscrupulous nobles, or depressions, there was little point in planning far ahead or saving money for most of the peasants in Europe, they squandered what money they had on things that would give them immediate pleasure. Today, in this country, although planning ahead and saving money are possible and profitable, there are powerful commercial interests ordering people through the mass media to indulge themselves to buy all the wonderful things that are on the market.

Well, a person who comes from a poor home in a poor neighborhood with an inferior educational system who is bombarded by demands to splurge his money on material goods and not encouraged to want to be more educated is not going to make

a big squawk and try to get local educational facilities improved so his children will get on better. I think if you look at the beginnings of the movements for bussing children and so on you'll find they were started by higher class people, although once the poor have heard the whole spiel they can parrot it. Uneducated people have, and I can say this from my own experience, far less resistance to sales talk and advertising propaganda.

Thus poverty becomes a vicious cycle, with susceptibility to propaganda and poor education leading to susceptibility and poor education. The rest of the nation, unaware of this cycle, think of the poor as confirmed in their poverty—they don't want to get out because they're too lazy, therefore they don't deserve to get out.

However, the people who are better off are risking a downwards spiral. They, too, are susceptible to advertising and may in a generation or two, join the poor of the nation. This is especially so because automation will cut down on the number of jobs. For further thoughts along this line, see my term paper.

The course may have been hardest for some of the more liberal students, who expected to find themselves rewarded for progressive sentiments. I think of Martin, who, before the course began, was sure that education and enlightenment would solve the problems of poverty, who had never considered the importance of economic interests or the deep-rooted resistances to knowledge. In his first answer, he writes:

I believe much of the problem centers around education. By education, I mean not only booklearning, but also enlightenment. To the indigent Negro, for example, what help in escaping poverty would an education be if his prospective employer is an unenlightened person who does not believe that any Negro, no matter how educated, is capable of doing responsible work.

Martin was all too satisfied with his self-image as a crusader. His first shock was to see that the Negro students did not consider him concerned and altruistic, but found him prejudiced and condescending. Martin, a very sensitive and intelligent boy, could begin to confront his prejudice, but he was terrified by his own tendencies to criticize the economic system. At one of the weekly faculty-student lunches, he stated that he had been bothered by a dream the night before. In the dream, he was working in a supermarket, but he began to criticize the proprietor who immediately told him he was fired. Martin protested that he was a good worker, that there was no cause to throw him out, but to no avail. He found himself out in the cold. He put on a heavy coat, but he was still freezing. He looked for his father to help him, but his father was powerless. A dog bites him and he wakes up frightened.

I asked Pat, the Negro girl from Washington, whether she would interpret the dream. She first refused, saying she couldn't interpret dreams. "Come on," I insisted, "what is the supermarket?" "That," she said, "is the society Martin lives in. We Negroes don't live in the supermarket, but he does. And

if he criticises the people who run it, he is frightened that he will be left out in the cold." Martin felt a shock of understanding. It became clear to him that he was also beginning to see his father in a new light, less powerful and unable to help him if he were to oppose real power. The dog in the dream reflected the dog at the end of the movie *Los Olvidados*, a symbol of loneliness, poverty, and death. The main resistance for Martin and some others was the feeling that becoming less alienated from their deep feelings and perceptions entailed a more difficult breaking away from their backgrounds, and they were not willing to pay this price.

CONCLUSIONS

What then were the results of the course in terms of its aims? For practically all of the students, it was a deeper relatedness, a growing awareness of society and a new interest in understanding. For many of the disadvantaged students, this meant a new confidence in their abilities and an awakened desire to learn. Among the class in general, some were eager to go on and learn the methods of the social sciences, while others felt that advanced courses would be too mechanical, that they would be better off studying history or the humanities. This view resulted from their reactions to reading conventional studies and the college catalogue. In some cases, it may have been reinforced by their professors' criticisms of their own fields. However, since the students did not plan to become social scientists before the course, it is impossible to judge whether those who were discouraged would ever have preferred the social sciences to other areas.

Did the students develop a more critical attitude? It is hard to tell, since they had so far to go. Many learned to be critical of what their professors criticized, but the question can be answered only in the future. Will those students who go on to more specialized training in the social sciences have learned to examine theories and methods critically? Will they be alert to the implicit ideological assumptions hidden behind scientific rhetoric? We feel the chances are greater than if they had never taken the course.

Did the students learn theory? Only two or three students explicitly considered theoretical questions in their papers, and it is not possible to say how aware the rest were of the theoretical assumptions behind their final answers. I would say rather, that many learned something of their professors' theoretical viewpoints, but for the majority, most of their energies were used for learning about themselves and about poverty. The four of us felt at the end of the six weeks that we could just begin to try and teach theory in a more systematic manner.

The individual papers and the comparison of before and after answers

to the question "Why are there poor people in a rich society like the United States?" show that most of the students learned something about analyzing a social problem or at least had become aware of how much their old opinions reflected neither knowledge nor conviction. It was inevitable that some of the students tried to take over the professors' attitudes as the easiest way out despite our attempt to avoid this. Rather than becoming analytic, some of the students turned indignant about those who lacked their new-found concern with poverty. The aim of the course was not to change the students' values, and in fact students did become more aware and analytical exactly because they came to see that superficial opinions conflicted with their deeply-held values and that illusions protected them from having to resolve this conflict. For example, as long as the student could believe the poor were responsible for their condition, he did not have to feel involved. Once he perceived new facts, he had to change his attitude or give up his values.

Some students refused to give up illusions or to face such conflicts. Like the students of Morris Raphael Cohen, the philosopher who taught at CCNY, they might have complained: "Professor, you have destroyed our illusions, but what have you put in their place?" Professor Cohen, according to the story, replied, "And what did Hercules put in its place when he cleaned out the Augean stables?"

Finally, what produced the changes in the students? What was most important to their learning? We cannot discount the importance of the intensive experience. The students lived the course, talked about it at meals and in the evenings. The presence of the Negro students also helped make the question of poverty more real. But neither of these factors would have been effective without the fundamental aims and methods of introducing the social sciences. The theoretical basis of the course made it possible to make sense of the students' new insights and experiences. Because of our approach, these experiences became relevant to intellectual understanding. It was essential that the teachers demonstrated authentic interest in the students, that they could create trust while they hammered away at resistances. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the course is unrepeatable. There are sensitive teachers who can be trained in the methods we used. Such methods might seem out of place in the traditional introductory social science course, but they fit more naturally with an approach that affirms the relevance of the student's deepest insights and experiences to the understanding of social questions.

"The American Negro College," by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman (HER, Winter, 1967) has been the subject of widespread discussion and some misleading publicity. We are pleased to print the following four responses to the article, each written by a leader in Negro education, together with a reply by the authors. We urge interested readers to refer once again to the original article, as well as to the additional responses to it published in the "To the Editors" section of this issue.

"The American Negro College"

Four Responses and a Reply

STEPHEN J. WRIGHT

The United Negro College Fund

The Jencks-Riesman article, "The American Negro College," has had such a shattering effect upon Negro educators and those who support the colleges that it needs to be put in perspective. This need stems from the fact that the institutions involved serve the undergraduate needs of more than 50 per cent of the Negro youth enrolled in higher education and will, in my judgment, continue to serve approximately this proportion for the foreseeable future, and also from the fact that the institutions enrolling the great majority of these students do not deserve the description set forth in this article.

Anyone who knows anything about these institutions, should know at least four significant facts about them:

1. That they are, with very few exceptions, overwhelmingly *undergraduate* institutions and therefore cannot be seriously compared with universities;
2. That as a group, they have served and continue to serve, with some exceptions, the most culturally deprived college students in the nation, which means that their students, in the main, do not enter with "Ivy League" preparation;

3. That with very minor exceptions, they have been, and still are, the *underfinanced* colleges of the nation, with all that this implies;
4. That despite these all but insurmountable handicaps, they have managed, somehow, to develop a very substantial number of Negroes who qualify to teach in the public schools across the nation, who qualify for admission to medical colleges and eventually pass state and national medical examinations, and who qualify for admission to graduate schools of the arts and sciences and earn doctoral degrees and even teach, in modest numbers, in the predominantly white universities—not to mention the Negro colleges.

The article is not a report of a thorough-going scientific investigation. It is rather a reportorial essay, replete with unsupported generalizations, judgments, speculations, impressions, and a good many errors, stated or implied, and written in unscholarly language, i.e., language that makes extensive use of loaded words and phrases which are not adequately defined: "Uncle Tom," "academic disaster areas," "Who the hell do you think you are? attitude," etc. And had it not been written by men of considerable reputation and published in a respectable journal, it would have, in my judgment, attracted little attention. Nevertheless, the fact that the article was written by men of considerable reputation and published in a respectable journal adds nothing to its validity. What it does, is raise a serious question as to their motives. In other words, the validity of this article—in contradistinction to its effect—must rest upon the soundness and wisdom of its judgments, the basis for the speculations, the soundness of its generalizations—all of which are influenced by the accuracy and the relevance of the facts upon which they are based.

As a reportorial essay, it reports impressions of what others are alleged to have said, and draws sweeping "conclusions"—not reasoned judgments based on actual findings—from impressions and anecdotes. In a sense, it is not even good reporting because the authors fail to distinguish in importance between what they themselves have seen, experienced, or researched and what they were told.

The following examples will illustrate, in part, my characterization of this article:

1. "So far as we know, there is now no college founded for Negroes which has had only white presidents" (p. 15n).

The authors, with little effort, could have ascertained that Paine College in Augusta, Georgia and Xavier University in New Orleans, Louisiana (a Catholic institution founded for Negroes) have had only white

presidents. Moreover, when the article was written, the first Negro president of Stillman College had not taken office.

2. "The only additions to the Negro public sector [colleges and universities] since World War I have been a handful of marginal, two-year colleges, almost all in Florida" (pp. 19-20).

Since World War I, as a little checking would have indicated, the following additions have been made to the public sector:

North Carolina College at Durham
Morgan State College (Maryland)
Jackson State College (Mississippi)
Fort Valley State College (Georgia)
Mississippi Valley State College
Grambling College (Louisiana)
Texas Southern University

These are all four-year institutions enrolling in 1965-66 some 18,660 students.

3. "By the turn of the century seventeen states had separate land-grant colleges for Negroes" (p. 19).

What actually happened was that several of the Southern states designated existing private Negro colleges to carry the land-grant function. Hampton Institute, for example, carried the "land-grant" function for Virginia until 1920. As another example, Tennessee A & I State University, the Negro land-grant college for Tennessee, was not even chartered until 1909 and did not offer college level instruction until 1922.

4. "Clifton Johnson has directed our attention to one small but significant indication of this [racial pride], namely the gradual darkening skin color of girls chosen as beauty queens on Negro campuses" (p. 27n).

Clifton Johnson taught at LeMoyne College for a number of years and is now at Fisk. He is white and, as far as I know, well-meaning, but he is simply not correct. Having crowned any number of such queens and having seen them over a period of thirty years in more than a dozen institutions, I can state, as a fact, that those I have seen and crowned have run the gamut of colors through the years.

5. "The better faculty members are *dimly aware* that their students cannot master the kinds of materials they themselves studied during their graduate years at Michigan, Ohio State, Howard, NYU, or Teachers College. But like Nigerians wedded to a University of London syllabus, they *cling* to a *pallid* version of the academic tradition, itself in need of revival. *Anxious* about their authority, remembering how hard they worked for

their degrees, and *worried* by how much they have forgotten or not kept up with, they require their students to memorize *scraps of wisdom* in much the same fashion as a *bad high school*, an *old-fashioned Catholic college*, or a *provincial teachers' college* does" (p. 26; emphasis supplied).

I submit that such a generalization, even if it were true, would require very considerable, objective investigation. Without such investigation, no responsible scholar would claim or assert that a group of *better* faculty members of the Negro colleges are "dimly aware" that they are like Nigerians, "wedded to a University of London syllabus"; that they "cling to a pallid version . . .," that they are "anxious," "worried," or that they require their students to memorize "scraps of wisdom." Having seen and experienced teaching in a number of these colleges as well as in white colleges, I find such a statement, concerning the better faculty members, not only false but vicious.

6. "Then, too, Negro counsellors are as prone as white ones to feel that what was good enough for them ought to be good enough for the young. Many have a 'Who the hell do you think you are?' attitude toward students who want to go to a white college" (p. 37).

No evidence is presented to support this generalization. Had Jencks and Riesman intended to be honest and fair, they could have ascertained that many Negro counsellors take pride in the fact that their schools produce students good enough to qualify for admission to white colleges. Not only that, but many work hard to help see that those who wish to go and who qualify get the chance to enroll.

7. "Dishonesty is not, of course, unique to Negro colleges, but *anecdotal evidence* suggests that it is more common, especially at the poorer ones. Both Negroes and whites from these colleges report in conversation instances of petty blackmail and fraud . . . profiteering on textbooks . . . Such incidents are not, of course, unknown at white colleges, and invidious comparisons are obviously both risky and inflammatory. This is especially true when *no objective indices are available against which to check our impressions* . . . We are often asked, for example, whether Southern Negro colleges are any more benighted or corrupt than the typical mediocre Southern white colleges. There are no objective answers to such questions and so we must report our *impression* that Southern Negro colleges are, with a handful of hopeful exceptions, in something of a class by themselves" (p. 23; emphasis supplied).

It is difficult for me to understand, without serious question of racist motives on the part of the authors, how responsible scholars could put

such damaging *impressions* in print without evidence, which they freely admit they do not have. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence for so serious a charge is almost a contradiction of terms. Of whom, for example, did they ask the question as to whether Southern Negro colleges were more corrupt? Were those persons equally informed about both groups of colleges? In any case, asked as indicated, the question resembles a have-you-stopped-beating-your-wife-yet question! Some years ago, serious incidents occurred in two *white* land-grant colleges. A Louisiana State University president was convicted and served a term in the penitentiary for mis-handling State funds. In Ohio, an Ohio State University professor was electrocuted for the murder of a woman student. One should not therefore conclude that white land-grant colleges are citadels of major crimes!

This article would have the nation believe that Negro colleges are "academic disaster areas" and that they have no future of significance. The evidence gathered in more carefully done studies disputes such conclusions. Such irresponsible "scholarship" could do serious, if not mortal damage to some heroic institutions—many of which have been and are being served by some of the most able and heroic teachers and administrators ever to grace the profession. At the same time, no one would deny the fact that these institutions have their share of the inept, the unscrupulous, and the dishonest, any more than Jencks and Riesman can deny the same among the predominantly white institutions of higher learning.

BENJAMIN E. MAYS

Morehouse College

The Jencks-Riesman article on the American Negro College leads to no constructive end. After reading the article twice, I fail to find the purpose for which it was written. The authors give a tiny bit of hope to nine or ten Negro colleges; but all the rest, possibly 114, they describe as incurably inferior. The article is not the result of thorough research. The authors developed no research design that would be impressive to scholars in their field.

I would have more respect for the article if the authors had written a thesis resulting from a thorough investigation of fifty accredited Negro colleges and fifty accredited white colleges in approximately similar circumstances: similar in size, faculty strength, physical plant, quality of students, and endowment, and in the record their graduates make in graduate and professional schools and the contributions their alumni are making in the

world. On the basis of these findings, the authors would have a sound basis upon which to make comparisons. It should not be taken lightly that in comparing Negro institutions with white institutions, they tend to compare Negro colleges with the most prestigious white institutions.

When they say, "In part, the problem is that no Negro college's B.A. carries the same weight as one from Harvard, Oberlin, or Berkeley" (p. 47), they talk like uninformed men. Do they not know that possibly 90 per cent of all white colleges are not in a league with Harvard, Oberlin, and Berkeley? Harvard College is part of a university which, I hear, has an endowment of one billion dollars, and Oberlin is one of the best endowed colleges in the nation. The College of the University of California at Berkeley is part of one of the great universities. This kind of comparison is ridiculous and unfair. And yet graduates from other colleges do as well as graduates from these three. In fact, the vast majority of Negroes teaching in outstanding white colleges earned their B.A. degrees from Negro colleges. Of the 2000 Negro Ph.D.'s, 1477 or 70.4 per cent took their undergraduate degrees in Negro colleges.

Two years ago, there were 401 predominantly white colleges in the country too feeble in academic performance to be rated by any one of the six regional accrediting agencies, which places them below the weakest of the accredited Negro colleges. It is strange indeed that no article has been written describing these colleges as areas of "academic disaster."

Throughout the article, there are generalizations which cannot be substantiated. The Negro colleges are allegedly tyrannical and paternalistic. On page 46, where the authors speak of the few white students who may go to Negro colleges, they say that the white students who do go to Negro colleges are likely to find the "puritanical (if often ineffective) paternalism of these Negro colleges hard to accept." The implication is that all Negro colleges are paternalistic. Do the authors know this to be true? And how many white students will attend predominantly Negro colleges in the years ahead cannot be known. West Virginia State College and Lincoln University in Missouri have Negro presidents. Despite alleged "paternalism," 60 per cent of the students at West Virginia State College are white, and more than 40 per cent at Lincoln University in Missouri are white.

The authors give three possible solutions to the "Non-Elite Private Colleges for Negroes" (pp. 52-4). They may become community colleges, built on Negro culture; they may develop a distinctively "black" curriculum; or they may become residential secondary schools. When the authors themselves get through analyzing these alternatives, it is clear they are dealing in absurdities. The "black" curriculum phrase is unfortunate. If they mean that Negro colleges should emphasize Negro history more and do more to help

Negroes in the communities where the colleges exist, no one would or could disagree. But when they assume that the Negro has a distinct, unmixed culture of his own, they are not convincing.

It is a ludicrous comparison when they say: "But just as the American university curriculum in part reflects the particular situation, past and present, of Americans, and differs from the curriculum in a Japanese or Polish university, so the Negro college curriculum might take as its starting point the culture from which its students come and for which they are headed" (p. 53). Are Negroes not Americans? What is this culture from which Negro students come and for which they are headed?

Many Negro colleges, in addition to Howard University Law School, have devoted time to the Negro problem. More should be done; but the social revolution that has swept America in recent years did not begin at Berkeley, the University of Chicago, Oberlin, or Harvard, but in Negro institutions. The problem of the Negro is not the exclusive responsibility of Negro colleges. It is America's problem.

Jencks and Riesman are really saying that despite the need, the distinguished leaders these colleges have produced, the increasing enrollments, and the fact that many new colleges are being built every year, the various state and federal governments, foundations, and corporations will not give adequate support to Negro colleges. Are they spokesmen for these agencies, telling Negroes what has already been decided? If this is so, since these colleges by design have been kept on "short grass," some for a hundred years, such a decision would represent a kind of racism which the United States should not want to live with. All schools should be made adequate for the education of all students irrespective of race.

Yes, able white teachers have helped their Negro students to know that there is a "larger and more cosmopolitan world which they might, with effort, join." But I must remind Jencks and Riesman that long before they came on the scene Negro professors were expanding the horizons of Negro students, and they still are.

Speaking of the conditions under which the majority of Negroes live, and some whites, they conclude: "As for the life of the mind, we doubt that any program can make it attractive or accessible to many students who have been intellectually starved for their first seventeen years" (p. 60). The factor of motivation does wonders for students who have been intellectually starved. If this were not true, most Negroes and many whites would not have made their mark.

It has been said that the main contribution of Negro Americans to white Americans is a lower socio-economic status that allows the latter group to have smug feelings of racial superiority. Although Jencks and Riesman are knowledgeable enough to understand that Negro disadvantage is a product of white prejudice, they also reveal symptoms of racial complacency. For example, although they do not tell a single success story concerning a Negro student or professional person in a sixty-page article, they do amusingly describe an unidentified Negro dean whose "head often itched when he talked to white men, because as a child he had habitually assumed the 'darky' pose of scratching his head and saying 'Yassir' to white men" (p. 7). Moreover, there are indications of racial vanity in the following quotations:

1. "... the great majority of Negroes today have only limited interest in social integration, since they feel slightly (or at times acutely) uncomfortable or defensive around whites" (p. 7).

What is the source of this information about the racial feelings of "the great majority of Negroes"?

2. "If whites assume that Negroes are forever different, whether for genetic or other reasons, most Negroes will come to half believe it. If they believe it, it will tend to remain so. And if Negroes remain 'different,' both Negroes and whites will probably tend to assume that, at least in the American context, they are 'inferior'" (p. 12).

This unsupported assertion indicates that most Negroes will believe that they are inferior if whites so assume. Jencks and Riesman evidently do not know the racial thoughts and attitudes of Negroes today.

Although Jencks and Riesman are reputedly scholars, certain assertions in "The American Negro College" are quite unscholarly. The article contains a large number of sweeping generalizations and undocumented statements about the precarious present and hopeless future of the Negro college. Here are a few of these pontifical but unsupported comments:

1. Most Negro colleges are "likely to remain academically inferior institutions" (p. 4).

Social change and government aid might cause the upgrading of these schools.

2. "We know of no Southern white college, for example, which could match the atmosphere of Ralph Ellison's Negro college in *Invisible*

Man. We have known Negro colleges of which this fictional image was a not entirely inaccurate reflection" (p. 23).

Evidently Jencks and Riesman have not carefully studied certain white colleges in Mississippi, Alabama, and other Southern states. The setting, plot, and characters are different; but the dishonesty, the pretense, and the oppressiveness are just as obvious.

3. "Similarly, the grading system . . . is sometimes reported to be used at some of these colleges to blackmail students into mowing lawns, sweeping offices, or even providing sexual favors" (p. 23).

Such unethical practices are rare in Negro colleges and occasionally prevail at white colleges as well.

4. "We have the impression, however, supported by fragmentary statistics, that these colleges do even less than comparable white colleges to remedy their students' academic inadequacies" (p. 25).

I doubt that there is a single predominantly white college in the United States that can match the programs of Hampton Institute in this field. Many other predominantly Negro colleges also have effective remedial programs.

5. "The two Negro medical schools (Meharry and Howard) are said to rank among the worst in the nation, and would probably have been closed long ago had they not been a main source of doctors willing to tend Negro patients" (pp. 29-30).

What unnamed medical authorities gave Meharry and Howard this low rating? Who made the comment about the closing of these schools? Did Jencks and Riesman get their wires crossed when later in the article they said that Howard's "professional schools are often the cheapest and sometimes the best in the Washington area" (p. 47)?

6. "... we do not think there will be a significant number of Negroes in any income or ability group for whom an all-Negro college will represent the best available academic or occupational choice" (p. 42).

This supposition, which is preposterous, indicates that the Negro college will generally be the worst possible choice for a Negro student. In reaching this conclusion, have Jencks and Riesman compared the strongest Negro colleges with the weakest white colleges?

7. "... what is to become of the 123 institutions founded for Negroes which are still extant in 1966? . . . Their traditional, first-generation, lower-income constituency will increasingly turn to unselective, publicly-subsidized commuter colleges, while their prospective second-generation, middle-income constituency will often see no reason to choose

their parents' alma mater over a hospitable integrated institution" (p. 43).

Since most Negro colleges are steadily raising their academic standards, they will increasingly be able to compete effectively with other institutions for Negro as well as white students. Moreover, not all white students attend predominantly Negro colleges for what Jencks and Riesman call a mixture of "idealistic, exploratory, and neurotic reasons" (p. 42). For example, a recent survey of white students at Hampton Institute revealed that these students had entered Hampton because it is a good college—the best in the Hampton-Newport News area—and affords a good education at low cost.

8. "...we expect that only a small handful of the colleges founded for Negroes will attract substantial white enrollments in our time" (p. 44).

Have Jencks and Riesman checked any of the latest figures on rising white enrollments in predominantly Negro colleges? At Hampton Institute the number has risen in five years from fewer than ten to around one hundred.

9. "...no Negro college's B.A. carries the same weight as one from Harvard, Oberlin, or Berkeley" (p. 47).

How many white colleges offer a B.A. with such weight? Furthermore, what do Jencks and Riesman expect from institutions handicapped by a background of three and a half centuries of slavery and a century of segregation?

10. "...with the possible exception of Tuskegee, these ['leading private Negro'] colleges already aspire to do more than just serve poor local boys" (p. 45).

If Jencks and Riesman will note the origins of Tuskegee students, they will find that only a small percentage of these young men and women are from the town of Tuskegee and that the overwhelming majority of them come from other communities in the United States and foreign countries.

When Jencks and Riesman turn from the Negro colleges to the major universities, they paint a surprisingly attractive picture of the latter group of institutions. At a time when serious commentators are deeply concerned because many university professors are more involved with research and money than with instruction and students, because many university graduate students are entrusted with college teaching when their main emphasis is study toward advanced degrees, and because many university undergraduate students are more interested in LSD, residential intervisitation, and birth

control pills than they are in education, careers, and human welfare, Jencks and Riesman applaud summer programs which bring students from Negro "colleges to major university campuses, help them explore ideas in a new way, develop their confidence that they might survive or even flourish in such an environment, and try to give them a realistic sense of the possibilities open to them at the graduate level" (p. 59). It might interest Jencks and Riesman to know that some Negro students—after observing nonteaching professors, diverted graduate students, and stimulant-obsessed undergraduate students—feel that the large universities are also "academic disaster areas."

As a matter of fact, American sociological scholarship is likewise an "academic disaster area" if "The American Negro College" is an example of meritorious work in this field. In this article, we have an example of a study classified as research but prepared like a debater's argument and filled with racial assumptions, unsupported allegations, and sweeping generalizations.

But, most discouraging of all, Jencks and Riesman, in their pessimistic preoccupation with the problems of the present, kill the faith of the people in a better future for their educational institutions. If these prophets of gloom had seen the Negro colleges struggling to make a beginning during the years just after the Civil War, it is doubtful that these gentlemen would have predicted the progress of these schools to their present position.

Jencks and Riesman say that the "well-intentioned clerics who founded most of the private Negro colleges often had more courage and ambition than judgment or resources" (p. 15). In this connection, it might be observed that America would probably be a better country today if it had more humanitarians motivated by such "courage and ambition" and fewer bright minds guided by smug assumptions and engaged in one-sided research.

ALBERT W. DENT

Dillard University

The resurrection of ancient, moribund stereotypes by the Jencks and Riesman report, applying to the Negro college characteristics once used for the race, is most unfortunate at this stage in our history. The over-all stereotyping of Negro colleges is based on "impressions," hearsay, and "anecdotes," an all too familiar method and one we would not anticipate from these authors. Much evidence regarding the success of Negro colleges—evidence that would contradict the writers' conclusions—is overlooked or carelessly dismissed.

The real good that can possibly come from this article will derive from the fact that it does call dramatic attention to a group of colleges that have too long struggled against almost impossible odds to provide an adequate education for several generations of Negroes who were denied education in other colleges. Thus it is hoped that instead of arousing damaging public condemnation of these institutions because they do not measure up to Harvard (which seems to be the unstated norm according to which the authors judge Negro colleges), the article will stir fair-minded individuals, philanthropic agencies, and government on all levels to see an opportunity to make a needed, lasting contribution to American higher education. If the condemnation by the authors serves to remind Americans that these colleges are, and always have been, in the forefront of discovering and developing otherwise wasted potential talents among disadvantaged youth, it may after all serve a worthwhile end.

Looked at from a clearer point of view, the future of this group of colleges is indeed bright:

1. Some of these institutions are continuing to make efforts to raise academic standards and provide a high quality of education. Some are beginning to implement *scientifically-oriented* self-studies. Important changes in curricula, speech laboratories, new teaching aids, and promising teaching methods have been adopted. Furthermore, now that racial segregation is no longer the severely limiting barrier it once was, a number of colleges have established sustained relationships with predominantly white colleges, and are exposing their students to wider and richer cultural experiences. While most of these relationships are with large northern universities, at least one is local—Dillard University and Tulane University in New Orleans.
2. In the past, Negro colleges had no choice but to select practically all of their students from among graduates of the most inadequate high schools in the nation. These high schools were judged inferior by all who were concerned with them. Even school boards themselves acknowledged that Negro high schools were notoriously inferior to white high schools in the same system. Textbooks were often discarded from white schools, laboratories and libraries were poor or totally lacking, classes were overcrowded, and many teachers had little or no college training. Yet despite the shamefully inadequate preparation which these students brought to the freshman class, surprisingly large numbers were able to graduate with honors and to qualify for and succeed in top graduate and professional schools.

Today Negro colleges have a more capable group of high-school graduates

from which to select. Almost all of the high schools for Negroes are much better than in previous years. Their graduates are not only better educated but a large number of them are more ambitious to succeed in broader vocational areas than heretofore. They have more constructive concern about their academic and professional future than was true in previous years. They are demanding that these colleges continue to improve and provide them with the same level of academic experiences and outlets provided other college students. They can be relied upon to prod these colleges to continue to improve academic standards.

3. Not only are high schools providing better students, but the colleges are doing more to compensate for cultural lack. In 1959, Dillard, Morehouse, and Spelman began an experimental Pre-freshman Program that received national attention. This program is designed to bridge some serious academic gaps between an inadequate high-school education and the freshman college program. Since then, many such programs have been instituted by both private and governmental agencies. The most extensive of these is the "Upward Bound" program sponsored by the federal government. In one sense or another, all of these programs reflect the influence of the Pre-freshman Program experiment instituted by these three Negro colleges. If these pre-college programs meet with the expected degree of success, the Negro college of the future can expect to recruit a much larger proportion of adequately prepared students than ever before. The Negro college has admitted students who would not have been accepted in Ivy League colleges and who were barred because of race from entering white colleges in the South; nevertheless, the Negro college has produced a substantial number of graduates who have done extremely well in the most prestigious graduate and professional schools in this nation and abroad. As a result of better high schools and these special efforts, the future for Negro college graduates seems brighter than ever before.
4. Contrary to the authors' opinion that "the better faculty members are dimly aware" of the essential problem involved in teaching disadvantaged students, the truth is, practically all of the teachers in these colleges whom I have known directly or indirectly are *acutely* aware of this challenge. It is true that there was a time when missionary zeal rather than teaching skill motivated many. This day has, however, gone. The teacher in such a college is faced by a questioning, ambitious student. Helping this student to compensate for previous social and educational deprivation, while preparing for graduate examinations and competition in an integrated society, demands teaching skill of a high order. The

teacher who faces these problems can hardly remain unprepared or futile or complacent. He is, on the contrary, likely to be interested, inventive, and hard-working. There are, certainly, exceptions; no faculty regardless of the color of its students, has uniformly excellent quality. Negro college presidents are constantly seeking means by which to improve the effectiveness of their faculties. The federal government has already provided limited funds to stimulate faculty research and study that will lead to more effective teaching.

5. As is true of all American colleges, a most difficult problem remains the recruitment of a larger proportion of top-flight faculty. If Negro colleges could get the financial support they deserve, they could design the kinds of promising academic programs needed to achieve greater success in the discovery and development of talent among the masses of Negro students, an area in which they have a hundred years of experience.

If the American public would respond positively to the Jencks-Riesman article, these colleges would begin to receive the financial help and social support for which they have begged and which they have received only in token amounts. Until today, Negro colleges have dedicated themselves to the most difficult task in higher education—providing a high quality of education to the economically and socially disadvantaged—while receiving woefully inadequate support. With deserved support, these colleges could become the primary centers from which might flow the new and valuable academic discoveries and practices which are so desperately needed.

Unquestionably, the Negro colleges were founded on high idealistic bases, but in a very different social climate from that which prevails today. They were established primarily to train Negroes to serve "their people." This concept is no longer acceptable as national policy. The Negro colleges, probably more than the dominant educational establishment of the country and its supporters, realize the urgency of the transition they face. I would expect a more factual and positive approach to the problems of the Negro college than that of scholars like Jencks and Riesman. But it may be that what they have written will underscore what Negro college administrators have insisted upon over the years—namely, that with the proper understanding and support of the American people, these colleges can make a distinct contribution toward establishing and maintaining the democratic society to which our nation is committed.

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS and DAVID RIESMAN *reply*:

Our *Harvard Educational Review* article on Negro colleges was not the result of a major research project aimed specifically at Negro colleges. It was a single chapter in a much larger study which attempts to describe many different sorts of colleges and universities as products of history and current social forces. It is evidence of the long-standing neglect of which Dr. Wright speaks that our decision to include a chapter on Negro colleges came only after the civil rights movement had thrust them into prominence. When we wrote our first joint article five years ago attempting to describe the American academic enterprise,¹ we devoted only two sentences to Negro colleges, and our twenty co-authors in that 1,000-page volume never mentioned these colleges by name at all. Nonetheless, as our work developed, we became increasingly interested in how these colleges fitted into the larger academic system we were investigating, and in how their situation both resembled and differed from that of other special-purpose institutions serving particular religious groups, localities, occupational groups, men only or women only, and so forth.

We anticipated that this effort was likely to seem invidious to those about whom we wrote. When we published a vignette of the Jesuits' Boston College in *The American College*, for example, it aroused outrage. Indeed, one Boston College official described our article as resembling "an account of Tuskegee written by a white supremacist." Nor was this feeling of being aggressively misunderstood simply a result of resistance to the application of presumptively Ivy League standards to non-Ivy League colleges. When we wrote about the Harvard house system in *The American College*, some of the Masters of these Houses reacted with even more fury than some Boston College Jesuits. (In all these cases, we also had letters and comments accusing us of pulling our punches, and claiming that the institutions were far worse than we had said.) The mere universality of such objections does not, of course, justify what we wrote, which must be judged on its merits. The character of these reactions does, however, make clear that many men who devote their lives to academic institutions are far from fatalistic and resigned, and react with understandable passion when their life and work are categorized and criticized by skeptical outsiders with a very different perspective from their own.

Some anthropologists have known how to write about native cultures, almost as if from within, in such a way as to eschew invidious comparisons while making plain to outsiders the coherence and meaningfulness of "their"

¹ "The Viability of the American College," in Nevitt Sanford (ed.), *The American College* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

tribes. But as nonliterate cultures are caught up in an international economic and social system whose basic standards and aspirations (e.g., industrialization) they neither can nor care to resist, cultural relativism of this kind has become less illuminating and helpful than it once was. Similarly, American colleges are in greater or lesser measure caught up in a national society where, in spite of immense diversity, Berkeley, Harvard, Oberlin, Rice, *et al.*, provide benchmarks against which others are measured and, what is perhaps more important, measure themselves. The extent of this phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that a good many readers of our article heard our assertion that most Negro colleges were academically third-rate as an assertion that most Negro colleges should be closed down. On the contrary, we have maintained in the face of many who feel this way that the Negro colleges are essential, and that the effort should be to strengthen them in non-imitative ways. As the whole body of our work should make clear, we are not uncritical admirers of the academic elite, and we find it sad, if comprehensible, that many in the Negro colleges assume that the only viable academic standards are extrinsic, and that if they do not measure up to these traditional criteria, their *raison d'être* is gone. We do not maintain that the traditional criteria are irrelevant and should be ignored, but rather that they should be examined in a more eclectic and experimental fashion.

Fortunately, many who work in and on behalf of Negro colleges do have this exploratory sense and are not passively acquiescent in the fates we have predicted for them. President Dent describes some of the ways in which these institutions are endeavoring to rewrite the script white men originally prepared. Yet the fact remains that virtually all of America's nonprofit institutions—schools, hospitals, colleges, social agencies, government services of all sorts—suffer from undernourishment of men, motivation, and resources. Even if much greater concern and much more money became available for the Negro colleges in the near future, these colleges would still be caught in a competition for talent whose rules make it easy for the rich to get richer and hard for the poor even to stay put. In this, of course, they are no different from most third- and fourth-rank white colleges, but that is no consolation to anyone concerned.

Even if we are right about these general points, however, specific errors, of either fact or interpretation, cannot be excused. Dr. Wright is correct, for example, in pointing out that neither Paine nor Xavier College has yet had a Negro president. He is also correct that the seven colleges he mentions were added to the public sector after World War I, although at least five of these seven were *founded* before World War I as private institutions. With regard to Tuskegee, we must apologize for phraseology which conveyed a different impression from the one intended. We certainly did not mean to imply that

most Tuskegee students came from Black Belt Alabama, but only that Tuskegee was more interested in such students than most comparably affluent and well-known Negro (or white) colleges. On the color of Negro college beauty queens, we defer to Dr. Wright's judgment. We note, however, that when a girl with a "natural" hairdo was crowned this year at Howard University, the event was described there as unprecedented.

A more fundamental question of fact is how the Negro colleges compare to white ones in terms of "value added." Consumer research on nonprofit institutions is relatively scarce. But if, for example, one looks at the proportion of students who failed the national medical boards last year,² one finds only two medical schools (Chicago Medical School and Stritch School of Medicine) with poorer records than Howard and Meharry. No other medical school comes even close. Yet if one then looks at Dietrich Reitzes's book, *Negroes in Medicine*, one finds that the medical aptitude scores of students entering Howard and Meharry are also much lower than at most white medical schools. The high failure rates on medical boards may then be almost inevitable. Indeed, *given the raw material they get, these two medical schools may do a better job than most white schools*. Data which would test this hypothesis are not, however, available to us.

Any Negro college anxious to investigate the question of academic "value added" can, however, do so rather easily, in a way no outsider can. Although there are many problems in determining academic competence, especially for individuals who have suffered from poor secondary education, the best single measure over-all appears to be the so-called verbal aptitude test. Students' scores on these tests change during college. A college can therefore assess its relative effectiveness by looking at its seniors' verbal scores on the Graduate Record Examinations and then by looking back to see how these same students scored on the Scholastic Aptitude Test they took when applying. (The two tests are not normalized in the same way, but formulae for comparing the two sets of scores are available.) It is inherent in such a comparison that half the students in the country would do better relative to a national norm after four years of college than before, while the other half would do better before than after. A college can therefore judge its impact relative to other colleges by seeing whether the majority of its students improve their percentile rank or reduce it. (We know of no college, Negro or white, which has made such a comparison and published the results. The Coleman Report³ contains some crude and discouraging evidence that Negro college students planning to become teachers fall even further behind

² *Journal of the American Medical Association*, June 6, 1966, pp. 882-5.

³ *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1966), Ch. iv.

their Southern white counterparts during the college years, but this should not be taken too seriously.) If Negro colleges were to investigate this question systematically, they could not only perhaps find evidence to silence critics such as ourselves but show white colleges the way toward candor. Consumer research of this kind, while depressingly rare, is nonetheless the only way to rescue students, faculty, administrators, and outsiders from continuous vacillation between total despair and unjustifiable euphoria. We are not, however, optimistic about what it will show.

The Editorial Board welcomes comments on articles, reviews, and letters that have appeared in the REVIEW. Communications should be addressed to: HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 13 Appian Way, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. Letters from readers will be published at the Editors' discretion.

To the Editors

THE AMERICAN NEGRO COLLEGE

To the Editors:

Christopher Jencks and David Riesman (HER, Winter, 1967) have provided us with a trenchant analysis of the tragic past of the American Negro college. There is indeed a "burden of history" that blights the present and threatens the future of Negro institutions. Attitudes and techniques, once necessary to insure the very survival of the Negro college, linger on to retard further development. The public is indebted to the authors for their vigorous and scholarly indictment of the aspects of the past that must be overcome.

I fear, however, that the kind of public discussion and debate likely to be engendered by this article may not serve to clarify the issues or lead to the necessary reforms. As one of the "carpetbagger" faculty at a large public institution in the deep South, I have had the opportunity to solicit reactions to this article from many faculty members and students, and to observe the reactions of many more to its vulgarization in *Time* (March 31). The more alienated students naturally seize

its ideas for their propaganda value. (One student wanted to post excerpts on every bulletin board on campus!) A more typical reaction among all groups on campus is dismay and/or anger. Calm discussion and constructive debate seem unlikely in this highly charged atmosphere. It would be a tragedy if, in the emotional debate certain to be provoked by this article, the thoughtful and constructive suggestions for change offered by Riesman and Jencks were ignored. And yet, by failing to distinguish clearly between the past and present state of the Negro college, the authors may have unwittingly closed some minds to their vital message.

One basic criticism of the article, voiced by everyone regardless of his degree of alienation from or commitment to the existing state of the institution, appears to me justifiable. There is far more life, far more hope, and far more dynamism in the Negro college of 1967 than the authors indicate. The administrator or department head is probably thinking in terms of unspectacular but genuine progress in recruiting a sounder faculty and improving the academic qual-

ifications of graduates. The more radical faculty member or student may point to concessions painfully wrested from the administration in the direction of more personal and academic freedom. From whatever perspective, one might legitimately argue that the authors have slighted the hopeful, if tenuous, gains of the last few years. There does seem to be an implication by the authors, intentional or not, that there is little difference between the Negro college of today and that of the 1950's. It is always extremely difficult to pin down the fleeting present by means of any methods of sociological analysis, and I suspect that this difficulty has been compounded by the fragmentary and subjective nature of the data upon which the authors have had to rely. It is also possible that the larger picture is indeed far more bleak than it appears from my worm's eye view of the situation. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that justice is not done to the present condition of the Negro college if we identify it totally with the benighted institution of the 1950's so vividly and accurately dissected in this article.

I'd like to illustrate this contention with a few impressionistic comments on the institution in which I teach. I would contend that, although the student body, faculty, and administration still resemble to some extent the stereotype postulated for the 1950's, there have been significant signs of improvement and perhaps even evidence of a slow and painful learning process in all three groups. The students, for example, are learning to organize themselves to remove the more obnoxious restrictions upon their personal freedom, and their growing self-confidence is bound to be encouraged by the wave of student militancy currently invigorating other campuses. The faculty

is losing its dominant tone of complacency and homogeneity as its ranks are joined by more assertive Africans, whites, and Southern Negroes who have rejected the monolithic ethos of the "Southern way of life." Administrative policy is clearly more flexible and restrained in its treatment of dissident students and faculty members, despite some recent outrages such as the arbitrary dismissal of a faculty member without any semblance of "academic due process." Despite much mutual incomprehension and distrust among the various elements of the university, a growing number of confrontations between the administration and students or faculty members indicates that a healthy struggle has replaced the stunned silence resulting from the internecine purges of 1960-1962.

Many of the tensions seem to be connected with the slow transition from the "paternal" or "personal" authoritarianism of the past to the "bureaucratic" authoritarianism more favored in other institutions of learning in this country. A student body numbering in the thousands and a faculty numbering in the hundreds can no longer be effectively controlled as if they still constituted the cohesive "family" the Negro college allegedly used to be. Even if the administration were as paternal and compassionate as it claims, the more sophisticated students and faculty members would no longer be content to be treated as wards. Many students perceive the supposedly paternal concern of the deans who govern some of the most minute aspects of their conduct as a species of capricious and petty tyranny. The lack of orderly disciplinary procedures specified in writing and the absence of clear channels of recourse of grievances subject the student to an unhealthy degree

of manipulation and control. *Mutatis mutandis*, the faculty is equally subject to manipulation from above. There is no corporate faculty body or grievance committee, except perhaps the tiny local chapter of the A.A.U.P., to provide recourse for any faculty member being coerced into submission by administrative threats (denial of summer employment or of an earned sabbatical leave being unusually potent ones). Increasingly, however, the sphere of arbitrary administrative competence is being reduced by concessions to the desire for explicit, rational regulations and safeguards, if only because the alternative might be genuine participation in decision-making by students and faculty members, a more radical departure from traditional practice.

Thus far, I have been discussing the "political" aspects of the contemporary situation. Academically, there is an analogous combination of desperate problems inherited from the past with some indicators pointing upward. Some departments are strong and vital, and most provide decent instruction in their advanced courses for departmental majors in liberal arts and sciences. At the lower levels, there is much neglect of students and sheer incompetence from some faculty members who are hired simply because no one else is available; but most departments have capable chairmen working with the administration to alleviate this problem.

The students may be divided into two groups: a small minority struggling with some success to overcome the crippling handicaps of their previous mis-education, and a larger group who do indeed seem to find the life of the mind inaccessible. Once the superior student survives the first year or two, he is likely to find a hospitable depart-

ment that will give him a decent preparation for further study, and there is an honors program that keeps hope alive in the meantime. They are often uncomfortable and dissatisfied in an over-all environment hardly conducive to learning or cultural growth, but a mass exodus of the better students is not yet imminent. These students do provide much of the vitality and hope now present on this campus, and the future does look bleak for the Negro college if the most ambitious and promising students choose predominantly white institutions. The less fortunate students badly need the leaven of their presence, and their potential flight is the most unfavorable omen for the future of the Negro institutions.

But, as the authors point out, the real issue for the public Negro institutions is how well or badly they will deal in the future with their natural constituency, the desperately unprepared and intellectually starved Negroes from the miserable, segregated schools of the small towns and rural areas of the South. They make up the majority of students here today, and most of them do seem to find serious academic work difficult and unattractive. We must not judge their academic "potential" too hastily or discount the possibility of reaching some of them. Some are being salvaged by dedicated teachers even now. How many more could profit by the massive remedial effort so badly needed?

When *Time* stated that Riesman and Jencks "urge most Negro colleges to lower their sights," it did the authors and the public a disservice. What the authors did suggest was that Negro colleges stop aping Harvard and Yale and begin to experiment with alternative ways of serving their constituencies. The immense and noble task of the public Negro college is to give

the oppressed and swindled Negro youth of the South one real chance to break through to wider intellectual and cultural horizons. How well it performs this task is the concern of all of us.

The authors fear, with much justification, that most Negro institutions lack the internal freedom, the self-confidence, and the will to face the massive job ahead. Perhaps the public discussion of this article will help the administrations and faculties of the Negro colleges to face these tasks squarely and realistically.

The Negro colleges will not be able adequately to meet the tremendous needs of their constituency without a considerable influx of human and financial resources from more favored institutions across the land. This support must be given generously and tactfully. The foundations and some universities are already helping, but much more needs to be done if the gallant and attractive young people who now attend the Negro schools and will do so in the future are to be afforded their fair share of opportunity. How long can this nation be indifferent to the plight of Southern Negro youth who have been systematically robbed of their right to a decent education in their pitiful elementary and secondary schools and who so often lack the most basic skills to undertake higher education? For most of them the Negro college is, and will continue to be, the only resort.

PAUL GARVER

To the Editors:

Since Messrs. Jencks and Riesman list my name as one of those to whom they are indebted, I would like, if I could, to diminish that debt by making here the major criticisms of the article I

made when it was in manuscript form and which in essence were ignored or brushed aside as the authors pursued their conclusions. The criticisms were summarized as follows:

The chapter as now written is a dangerous document and a misleading one. Certainly, it is not based on enough reading in the field. Since it takes Negro education and educators to task so hard and implies that they were plagued as much by their own incompetence as by social conditions, the exposition should be closely documented.

That criticism for my part is still justified.

The article is dangerous because it was written by authors who in their manuscript had classified Shaw and St. Augustine Colleges in North Carolina as being among the top Negro colleges. The least one could say is that, at the time the authors' research was completed and they sat down to write their manuscript, their knowledge of Negro colleges was superficial. The worst one could say is that their sources of data were leading them into inaccurate judgments. Evidently, from the published version, the authors did not see fit to increase their grasp of their subject.

The article is dangerous also because it makes sharply attacking statements about Negro colleges and in some instances Negroes, e.g., "Negro colleges serve as a living reminder of how bad most white colleges... had been" or anecdotal evidence suggests "[dishonesty] is more common at the poorer ones [Negro colleges]" or "professors... blackmail students into providing sexual favors" or that as to being benighted and corrupted "Southern Negro colleges are in a class by themselves." These statements sound more

like charges which a prosecuting attorney makes about a defendant he is out to convict than a dispassionate analysis of relevant issues based on sound evidence.

On the other hand, the article is strangely clinical and optimistic when it describes the segregated system and the economic and educational plight of Negro youngsters who want higher education. In fact, the article uses the poor education of Negroes coming out of criminally neglected schools as another indictment of Negro colleges. Nowhere in the article does the attacking tone of the previous paragraph appear when discussing the racist system which created Negro colleges and which neglects Negro children and their education. At least one wonders if their fascination with their subject, the Negro college, gave them myopia about the "benighted and corrupt" system which characterizes the education of Negroes. Until the authors attack with equal venom the racist society which produced Negro colleges and which continues to make them indispensable to Negro survival, the article remains irresponsible and one sided and does lend ammunition to racism (to which none of the authors' demeaning adjectives or phrases were applied).

When the "friends" of Negroes attack their institutions for the afflictions they endure in a still racist society and do not mount equally venomous attacks on racism itself but rather blandly describe its results, those "friends" are like the father (paternalistic symbol intended) who beats his son to death for only surviving but not winning a fist fight with two boys twice as big.

ELIAS BLAKE, JR.
Educational Projects, Inc.

To the Editors:

The evaluations of Riesman and Jencks regarding Negro colleges do not square with those of Earl McGrath in his book: *The Predominantly Negro Colleges and Universities in Transition*, Teachers College Press, 1965. Dr. McGrath made a comprehensive study of these schools and concluded that some of the better colleges in the country are included in their ranks. Dr. McGrath is director of a center for the study of higher education, president-elect of a college, and a former U.S. Commissioner of Education.

I got the feeling that David Riesman and Christopher Jencks while attempting to "bring the light" to some of the little church-related colleges, were rebuffed by their faculties and their administrations. Riesman and Jencks' treatment of the American Negro college seems tinged with disappointment and a touch of bitterness.

If this is the case, they should not feel badly about the situation. Innovation is very difficult to promote in any school situation. Witness the rigidity and lack of amenability to change in our public schools. Also, Negroes are Southern Protestants and, in the true spirit of this group, cling to tradition with admirable tenacity even though the wisdom of such a course is debatable. Therefore, the authors should not be dismayed.

The Negro college will come along, and, as they noted, the little group of institutions of poor quality among them will both survive and persist. As the authors pointed out, these colleges enroll only a small portion of the Negro college students, while they serve a social function of a sort for their communities and, in some cases, the denomination with which they are associated. Their teacher-training function might be improved or some-

what curtailed; otherwise, they will be valuable in offering the higher education that it seems will be needed by the used-car and shoe salesmen of the future. I once taught a course for a Caucasian college of this calibre which was so poor it didn't even *have* a regular faculty. It is still going. One of my best friends teaches at a Caucasian Bible Belt institution where all science must be based on the New Testament. The president, faculty, trustees, alumni, and 3000 students are all certain that they are engaged in a great work. It will thrive.

Riesman and Jencks and other interested individuals and institutions must fasten upon the *real* problem in this area, i.e., the elimination of the Negro-Caucasian gap in college enrollment and graduation. We are going to need far more than rhetoric to get these youngsters into higher education. College enrollment of Negroes needs to be more than doubled to eliminate this gap, resulting in a total enrollment of about 600,000 instead of the 250,000 or so now enrolled.

Instead of fussing and fidgeting about quality in a few institutions, we must concentrate on stimulating the enrollment of 300,000 or so additional *mediocre* students. This is not academic heresy. Of the twenty-three Caucasian state-supported institutions in Virginia, for example, only three enrolled freshman classes last fall with SAT-V medians over 500. The rest had medians under 430 and none of the seven community colleges had more than twenty per cent of the freshmen with SAT-V scores over 500. In the great rush toward the baccalaureate, Negro students have a right to be at least as mediocre as these Caucasians. If such a state decides to improve education, and this state has, Negro competencies will shift upward with the

rest. The colleges will require higher Board scores, the school systems higher NTE scores, and the teachers and kids will adjust. It will be a gradual process. School integration and compensatory programs will help.

It is in these public colleges that most of the expansion in higher education has taken place, and it is in such colleges that the enrollment gap will be eliminated. We need to urge the administrations of this sort of institution, in all sections of the country, to develop programs for recruiting Negro students and lending them financial assistance if it is needed. An addition of 300 Negroes to the student population of each of the 800 or so public colleges in this country would almost eliminate the enrollment gap.

We also need to locate some of the new community colleges in Negro communities. I would suggest Roxbury, Harlem, Hough, and Watts as starters. These colleges should have well-integrated faculties and offer technical and liberal arts courses of study and a wide range of evening-college, adult-education, and community-improvement programs. Hopefully, some Caucasian students would elect to enroll. In our efforts to bring "the colleges to the people," we should try to bring some to the Negro people. I can see no reason at all for *always* locating these institutions in Caucasian communities.

As noted above, this is not a job that can be handled by rhetoric. But rhetoric must be used to try to convince the decision-makers in this area. The time for this seems to be now.

WILLIAM F. BRAZZIEL
Virginia State College

To the Editors:

The long article by Jencks and Riesman on "The American Negro College" (HER, Winter, 1967) seems to me a balanced portrayal of issues concerning this important class of institutions. Probably for expository reasons, its authors were wise to avoid most statistical comparisons of Negro and white students and thus to make their essay more interesting. Nevertheless, by not indicating the exact extent to which students in predominantly Negro colleges overlap in tested ability those in predominantly non-Negro colleges, they may have conveyed to some readers the impression that students in the typical colleges enrolling Negroes predominantly are as able psychometrically, on the average, as are students in the least distinguished colleges enrolling few Negroes.

Evidence from several Southern states, especially Georgia and North Carolina, indicates that the overlap on the Scholastic Aptitude Test between entering freshmen in the unselective Negro colleges and the unselective non-Negro colleges is not great. The most complete and readily available data from which such comparisons can be made were assembled by John R. Hills and others in Georgia for each of eight consecutive freshman years, 1957-58 through 1964-65. A comparison of the most recent Scholastic Aptitude Test Verbal (SAT-V) scores for entering freshmen at all three Georgia state colleges enrolling few whites (coeducational, four-year institutions, the only state colleges for Negroes in Georgia) and the SAT-V scores of the entering freshmen in the three four-year, coeducational, predominantly non-Negro state colleges of Georgia that in 1964-65 had the lowest SAT-V means gives the following results:¹

The median SAT-V scores were 399.9 for white males, 254.0 for Negro males, 419.3 for white females, and 258.0 for Negro females. Only 3.2 per cent of the Negro males exceeded the median of the white males and just 1.4 per cent of the Negro females exceeded the median of the white females.

The median for Negro males was at the 1.1th percentile of the white-male distribution, indicating that 98.9 per cent of the white males exceeded the median of the Negro males. The median of the Negro females was at the 1.0th percentile of the white-female distribution; 99 per cent of the white females exceeded the median of the Negro females.

None of the 1184 entering freshmen in the predominantly non-Negro colleges scored below 220 on SAT-V, whereas 19.7 per cent of the 437 Negro males and 18.9 per cent of the 660 Negro females did. (A scaled score of about 220 corresponds to a corrected-for-chance raw score of 0.) The percentages of SAT-V scores below 300 were 4.5 per cent for white males versus 79.2 per cent for Negro males, and 4.3 per cent for white females versus 77 per cent for Negro females.

At the higher part of the scale, 50.2 per cent of the white males scored 400 or more, versus 3.2 per cent of the Negro males, and 60.3 per cent of the white females scored 400 or more, versus 2.1 per cent of the Negro females.

The SAT-V items measure reading ability, vocabulary knowledge, and verbal reasoning. Thus SAT-V scores of entering college freshmen indicate

¹ John R. Hills, Joseph A. Klock, and Marilyn L. Bush, *Freshman Norms for the University System of Georgia, 1964-65* (Atlanta, Ga.: Office of Testing and Guidance, Regents of the University System of Georgia), especially pp. 7, 18, 36, 63.

their developed verbal ability. This development has taken place over the individual's entire lifetime thus far. Poor pre-college educational opportunities and verbally unstimulating home and community backgrounds such as those most Negroes in the Southeast have had, at least until very recently, make acquiring SAT-V ability difficult. SAT-V scores predict freshman-year grades of Negro men, Negro women, and non-Negro men about equally well in these six colleges;² therefore, they cannot be ignored. The grades of non-Negro women are even more predictable than are those of any of the other three groups. Results for the SAT-Mathematical subtest are similar to those for SAT-V.

It would appear, then, that if these predominantly Negro state colleges in Georgia were abolished, the bulk of individuals formerly destined for them might not, even disregarding direct racial prejudice, be acceptable to admission officers of most of the least selective four-year predominantly non-Negro state colleges in Georgia. The situation would probably not be much better in the four Georgia state junior colleges, for which the lowest SAT-V mean of either sex in 1964-65 was 359.2; compare this with 275.8, the highest mean for either sex in any of the three predominantly Negro colleges.

Where, then, could the typical Georgia Negro go to college after graduation from high school, if there were no predominantly Negro state colleges in the state? Perhaps California-type, open-door junior colleges which are already arising in Georgia on a county

basis are needed, but it remains to be seen whether they will be truly unselective academically and whether Negroes will be welcomed in them.

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EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY

To the Editors:

In their article, "Education and Community" (HER, Winter, 1967), Professors Fred M. Newmann and Donald W. Oliver argue that the concept of the community provides a satisfactory basis on which to construct an examination of education in the United States. The authors begin by pointing out that the community and the great society are two alternative concepts frequently used to guide investigations into contemporary American civilization. Then, after making evident the major elements of each of these concepts, they contend that the community furnishes a better conceptual basis for an inquiry into American civilization than does the great society. Finally, after criticizing some specific conclusions about education in the United States, conclusions which have often been reached through analyses oriented to the great-society concept, and after criticizing the kinds of educational reform being advanced in America today, the authors offer, with a view to the community concept, what they take to be fresh proposals for educational reform in the nation. In at least one major respect, the article is quite worthwhile; for, in employing the concepts of the community and the great society, it reminds educators of

* Julian C. Stanley and Andrew C. Porter, *Predicting College Grades of Negroes versus Whites* (Madison, Wis.: Department of Educational Psychology, University of Wisconsin, 1966).

two concepts which are viable for contemporary social analysis but which have generally been ignored. On the other hand, there is at least one feature about the article which is disappointing and in need of discussion.

While the authors make numerous references to the literature on the great society, they neglect an important aspect of the history of this concept; for they do not take into account the fact that the term "the great society" has been used in two major ways. First, the term has been employed existentially; that is, it has been utilized to refer, apart from normative considerations, to a society of a special type which exists. This is the usage which was given to the term by Graham Wallas (*The Great Society*), John Dewey (*The Public and Its Problems*), Walter Lippmann (*Public Opinion*), and others in the early decades of the century. Second, the term has been employed in a normative way; that is, it has been utilized to mean a kind of society which ought to exist. This is the usage which has been made popular by President Johnson. If the authors had not ignored these two different usages of the term, they would have done their readers a scholarly favor; and they would also have been in a position to present a far better explanation of the position taken by those who investigate modern American civilization on the basis of the concept of the great society.

More directly, Professors Newmann and Oliver do not fairly state the case of those who ground their inquiries into American civilization on the concept of the great society. They mislead in three respects.

First, according to the authors, the proponents of the great-society approach assume the "optimistic view that conditions and trends in modern

America will lead not to the demise of but to more hopeful forms of self-realization" (p. 68). With regard to the major usages of the term "the great society," there are a couple of notable elements in this statement, viz., "conditions and trends in modern America" and "self-realization." By "conditions and trends" the authors intend those conditions and trends which make the nation a great society in the existential sense, and by "self-realization" they mean the goal pertinent to the nation as a great society in the normative sense. The authors are saying, therefore, that advocates of the great-society orientation hold that America as a great society in the existential sense will lead to America as a great society in the normative sense. As a general formulation of the great-society orientation, this statement is conspicuously unfair. Without question the statement does apply to a number of proponents of the great-society position, mainly, those who hold a stupid notion of self-realization and who are otherwise unable to think very well about social matters. But it certainly does not apply to all of those who take a great-society stance. There is a group who regard *some* conditions and trends in America as having the potential to contribute to self-realization but who do not look upon these conditions and trends as *leading* to self-realization. Some members of this group refer to the United States as a great society in the existential sense, but they find much that is wrong with the nation as such a great society. The other members also are quite critical of the United States as it exists, but they want it to become a great society in the normative sense. While all members of the group are dissatisfied with the nation as it exists, they recognize that a number of its conditions and trends are

potentially helpful in promoting self-realization. Emphatically, however, they argue that these conditions and trends will not *lead* to such a goal. They are quite insistent that these conditions and trends must be reworked (and others must be instituted) with a view to self-realization before they will serve to realize this objective. Wallas and Dewey are notable members of this group.

Second, the authors charge that the advocates of the great-society orientation virtually ignore the significance of community life. They write:

The major issues lie *between* obvious economic needs of individuals and the national interest: the problem of creating complex relationships where humans share common bonds which are strengthened not by consensus but by conflict and diversity, relationships in which they associate for enduring and important purposes and in which national interest is only *one* of many competing ways to justify policy. Whereas the missing community view gives these issues highest priority, the great society approach virtually ignores them. (p. 72)

No doubt, there are proponents of the great-society position who discount the importance of community life; but there are others who give great emphasis to its importance. Dewey, for example, stresses the need for enduring face-to-face associations in the solution of the problems engendered by the great society in the existential sense. Wallas, too, points out this need as a primary one. Consequently, it does not seem fair to charge that the great-society approach substantially minimizes the value of community life. The most that can be said is that *particular* uses of this approach overlook this value.

It should also be mentioned that a number of the supporters of the great society in the normative sense intend that society to be a community. To be sure, they do not mean for it to be a face-to-face community; rather, they intend it to be a large community. Thus, Dewey contends that the great society (existential sense) must be transformed into the great community (the great society in the normative sense). Insofar as the great society in the normative sense is envisioned as a large community which embraces vis-à-vis communities, it may be seen as an association which links together in an organized way (but does not oppress) the small communities. Thus, the advocates of the great-society position might ask Professors Newmann and Oliver how the face-to-face communities which they propose are to be related to one another in an orderly fashion.

Third, the authors assert that the great-society approach "in its attention to immediate and specific needs, tends to neglect and stifle consideration of basic, long range issues" (p. 72). To substantiate this claim, they cite examples from current federal legislation and policy, to wit, Medicare, highway programs and auto safety, and full employment. There is little question that these examples show, by and large, a concern for immediate and specific needs; but it is highly doubtful that they say much about the great-society orientation. What they appear to reflect is the practice of politics in this nation, which has usually, if not always, dealt with the immediate and specific. While proponents of the great society are likely to be pleased with Medicare, safety belts, full employment, and other measures which meet urgent and specific needs (and who would not

be?), they certainly are not, as a group, necessarily incognizant of basic issues. When the great society (in the normative sense) is developed as a theoretical framework within which to examine the United States, it is fully capable of pointing toward the nation's major issues (to see for themselves, the authors should look closely at Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*). That particular defenders of this framework have neglected fundamental issues does not imply that the framework cannot take such issues into account. To argue otherwise, it must be noted, is like saying that, because particular Christians are prone to sin, Christianity discounts virtue.

In effect, then, Professors Newmann and Oliver have not shown that the community is better than the great society as a concept for examining American civilization. But they have at least made plain, albeit inadvertently, that those who take the great-society stance must not neglect the issue of community life.

ROBERT D. HESLEP

The University of Georgia

To the Editors:

I don't really think that Professors Oliver and Newmann were serious in "Education and Community" (HER, Winter, 1967). Surely they must have been far more interested in stimulating their readers than in educating us; but, on the chance that anyone took them at face value, let me cite just a few examples in which the writers deliberately (I hope and trust) tried to take us down the garden path.

The device of using enormously oversimplified models for interpreting contemporary society is "straw-manism" at its worst. We find the world divided into the good guys—the advo-

cates of the "missing community"—and the bad guys—the proponents of the "great society." The bad guys are guilty of the sins one would predict: they are always short-sighted, fragmented, rigid, technocratic, bureaucratic, depersonalized, deterministic, and opportunistic; they are against individualism, beauty, truth, and, yes, motherhood. It is difficult for me to see how this simplistic, dichotomous thinking is related to fostering desirable changes.

Or perhaps of even greater significance, we find that in trying to document the need for improvement in our educational facilities, the authors have presented a caricature of the existing means for educating ourselves. I hardly recognize the educational system described. For example, public schools are not our only educative agencies and most Americans realize this full well. In fact, while education has never been the exclusive domain of public schools, I think a very good case could be made for the notion that many groups are far more anxious to perform educational roles than they were just a few years ago. I am thinking of occupational groups, churches, political parties, the mass media, businesses, spokesmen for the arts, governmental units at all levels and, obviously, the family.

Nor do the public schools have "a virtual monopoly on the lives of youth." The challenges of the afternoons, evenings, weekends, summers, holidays, and, of most importance, the preschool years have been ignored.

Also, I think this piece denigrates public school teachers by seeing them in a stereotypic, bland, value-free, conformist role that they very rarely play anymore. The authors neglect the many signs of growing teacher independence.

Perhaps the strangest point made is that schools are not doing what they should because they have accepted a weird educational philosophy which stresses individual intellectual development of students as their primary goal. Then Newmann and Oliver tell us the schools should concern themselves only with "preplanned, programmed, and formalized instruction in basic literary skills, health and hygiene, driver education, and the like." Community-action programs and reflections on significant social problems should not be undertaken in the schools. (This is the same Donald Oliver who wrote a book, *Teaching Public Issues in the High School*?) This section on goals left me confused, but one point was quite clear: the public school should omit any high-level intellectual activity from its curriculum.

One final example, we are provided with a thorough-going attempt to debunk all of the research and development activity which has occurred since the war. None of these developments, it seems, are worth anything, in spite of the fact that the authors have been involved.

Well, enough; since we know they don't mean it, the question is why did they say it? What function does this kind of article serve in this kind of journal? I can't answer these questions to my satisfaction. Certainly, public education needs critics, and surely we need to think of education as a total community process. But in HER at least, shouldn't we have critics who play it straight, who offer constructive alternatives, and who build on strengths? At a time when schools must be improved, the authors have suggested that we cut their resources, reduce the time spent in them, and multiply their administrative problems manifold. I think intellectual stimu-

lation is a fine thing, but this article borders on irresponsibility.

WILLIAM T. LOWE
Cornell University

TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION: SOME RESERVATIONS

To the Editors:

On the whole I think Professor Olafson's analysis (HER, Spring, 1967) is sound and his conclusions are eminently reasonable. It seems to me every point he makes is worthy of careful consideration by those who are actively promoting the study of religion in the public schools. I would differ from him chiefly in the priority to be assigned to religious studies in the curriculum, in view of the rather general systematic exclusion characteristic of the secular curriculum in the past—an exclusion that does not hold for either economics or science, the two topics Olafson mentions in his discussion of priorities. It also seems to me that religion, as an expression of basic life-commitments, by its very nature logically occupies a place of unique precedence in any course of study.

I think Olafson's observations are particularly helpful in cautioning against over-confident expectations about the beneficial results of studying religion, either in the form of improved moral conduct or stronger religious faith. I agree that those who expect that courses in the religions of mankind will measurably diminish delinquency or increase the love of God are likely to be disappointed. My own interest in the academic study of religion springs not from its expected social or devotional benefits but from an intellectual concern that maximum justice be done to the realities of human experience. My complaint against

the academic attitude toward religion in the past is mainly that too often it has been dogmatically excluded on the ground that it is largely a collection of falsehoods and superstitions.

As I read the contemporary religious situation, the dialogue among various religious groups and between the religious and non- or anti-religious is widespread, well-advanced, and generally approved. Under these circumstances, it would seem to me unfortunate that the last word among educators in the public discussions of religion should be reservation. Professor Olafson advances some sound counsels on how to play it cool in this domain. But it seems to me safety and tranquillity already stand too high on the educator's scale of values. I would like to see a little risk-taking in this area. I doubt that there is any subject, including religion, so sensitive that it can be freely studied only at the college level, and not at the lower levels of education.

In short, it seems to me that in respect to religion in the curriculum we should be guided, for the long haul, not primarily by prudential considerations regarding community attitudes, present preparation of teachers, and the curiously mixed motives of partisans outside the schools, pro or con religion, but by the clear need to deal adequately educationally with the realities of human life in ultimate as well as in penultimate matters, at all levels of the educational system.

PHILIP H. PHENIX
Teachers College, Columbia

THE EDUCATION INDUSTRIES:
A DISCUSSION

To the Editors:

In researching the literature for a graduate seminar project concerned with

"Science and Technology," a course in the School of Education at NYU, I read the pieces offered in the discussion on "The Education Industries" (HER, Winter, 1967) with varying interest. The predilections of the writers were a function of their respective backgrounds and no one should be astonished by this unvarying truism.

In reading the contribution of Edward L. Katzenbach of the Raytheon Company, I was overcome by a sense of unease which flowered into positive dread when I read on page 122 the recitation of the far-flung interests his company has acquired. My reaction was one of undisguised loathing that one American concern could be so involved with the hardware of education and that its crisp, corporate philosophy had the ring of Prussian autocrats.

"We are not wedded to any particular system or to any one technology," Mr. Katzenbach states, and such has been proven to be quite true!

Buried in the context of an article on Yemen, written by Thomas F. Brady, and filed from Jidda, Saudi Arabia, for the *New York Times* on April 17, 1967, is the following paragraph, appearing on page 22:

The military buildup is evidenced by stores of arms in caves, by British pilots under contract to the Saudis to fly combat missions and by American technicians of the Raytheon corporation, who will maintain and operate missiles.

Can a major American corporate concern, deeply involved in education-for-profit and in war-for-profit be allowed to continue pimping for two different masters? The present writer teaches democratic values to students in courses in sociology, many of whom, due to the nature of the school, will have only one exposure to this disci-

pline. It seems manifest that closer scrutiny should be paid to the operations of American concerns committed to money rather than moralities; to both of Erich Fromm's polarities: biophilia and necrophilia. Awake, Academic!

HARVEY LAUDIN

The College of Insurance, New York

ons of scientific reasoning and sometimes applies them even to the claims of the post-Sputnik curricula.

These remarks, like Conrad's, are *ad hominem*. Lest your readers take this as an endorsement of all views that Bruner has published, let me recommend a confrontation in Shulman and Keislar (eds.), *Learning by Discovery*, Rand McNally, 1966.

LEE J. CRONBACH

Stanford University

THEORIES OF INSTRUCTION: REVISITED

To the Editors:

I must take exception to one remark of my old teacher, friend, and colleague Herbert Conrad (HER, Winter, 1967). In his distress regarding a book by Bruner, he goes so far as to lament that the book was dedicated to the late Francis Friedman, instead of "a leading educational psychologist." As one who is on the fringes of the latter category, I must, on behalf of the profession, disavow this slight.

Francis Friedman was a being apart from the other leaders of the post-Sputnik generation of educational reformers. *He* knew that finding the solutions to educational problems was harder, not easier, than solving problems in natural science and mathematics. *He* knew that the much publicized innovations of the period were little better than promissory notes. *He* knew as well as any psychologist that evidence of change in pupils is indispensable for choice of curriculum.

Now as to Conrad's distress with Bruner's characteristic flamboyance, *chacun à son goût* and *caveat emptor*. Educators are always going to be listening to the pied piping of someone's "flowing vigorous prose." Perhaps it is best that the piper of the moment should also be one who knows the can-

ADAPTING VISUAL ILLUSTRATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE LEARNING

To the Editors:

I am in deep sympathy with the writer's concern with inconsistent results in research in media. Dr. Dwyer's statement (HER, Winter, 1967), "These studies seem to indicate no valid comparisons can be made unless materials equivalent in content appear in all the media being compared," suggests a possible cause for contradictory results in similar media-research.

I am frequently suspicious of research in which the control group is "taught by conventional methods." One is hard pressed to define "conventional methods." Actual variations in the "conventional methods" are obviously greater than the effect of many experimental factors which have been ardently researched.

In addition, Dr. Dwyer's research indicates a need for professional judgment in the selection of the specific media for any given teaching situation. This selection ought to be based on a consideration of all of the variables in a given instance, i.e., student concept level, learning objectives, age group, availability and suitability of

media, and the pedagogical skills of the teacher. Consequently, a statistically significant difference which was established under "controlled conditions" is not necessarily educationally significant. It is rare that the controlled conditions under which these statistically significant differences were secured are duplicated in the broad spectrum of education throughout the nation. To establish a new educational practice on the basis of such research is rather suspect. The differences that do exist in each of the myriad, educational situations, would be great enough in most either to obliterate or possibly to reverse the statistically significant advantages found under the controlled conditions.

Dr. Dwyer recommends further research using his present study as a basis. It is possible that several of the controlled factors which he used in his initial research need to be reconsidered. For example, one might study the criterion of evaluation. Dr. Dwyer concludes that the abstract linear representations were significantly superior to the realistic photographic presentation. It is possible that under different criteria these differences might not exist or even reverse themselves. For example, I am quite certain that there are primitive peoples in sections of the world who are familiar with the heart and its chambers, but who are ignorant of its function as a circulatory organ. Conversely, most high-school sophomores in biology are totally familiar with the function of the heart as a circulatory organ, but have probably never seen a heart, and given an animal to dissect, might be hard pressed to find this organ with any degree of certainty.

In addition, it is possible that the taped lecture used in this study, which was for this initial research a necessar-

ily controlled variable, might have an interaction effect associated with it. Perhaps the lecture was better suited to the abstract linear representation to the disadvantage of the realistic photograph. I would suggest in further research that a new taped lecture be prepared specifically for the utilization of the realistic photographic presentation. I would select a panel of teachers to develop this taped lecture, showing them only the realistic photographic presentation and not the abstract linear representations or the detailed shaded drawings. With this taped lecture customized for the realistic photographic presentation, I would then establish test groups for the abstract linear representations, the detailed shaded drawings, the realistic photographic presentation, and the control group. In this manner, if the results still favor the abstract linear representation, the superiority of this visual medium would be established, thus negating an interaction effect between the taped lecture and the visual presentation.

I believe Dr. Dwyer would concur that for a total conceptualization of this unit on the heart, or indeed many other units, a multi-media approach would be necessary for an optimal learning experience. A schematic drawing in which superfluous materials are removed would best illustrate the essential structures and function of the heart as a circulatory organ. After this concept is established, an actual heart or realistic photograph of the heart could show the theoretical elements as they actually exist. This multi-media approach in many instances should provide a higher degree of conceptualization than any one approach alone.

JOHN P. GUCKIN

Wisconsin State University of Superior

THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

To the Editors:

I have just written a review of Dr. Beeby's book *The Quality of Education in Developing Countries*. When I read the review of it by Professor John Vaizey (HER, Fall, 1966), I did not recognise the book I had presumably read. I feel so indignant about his treatment of the book—which goes far beyond differences of opinion—that I am moved to write this letter.

Professor Vaizey seems to be using his review to work off some personal malaise: is he, an economist, (one feels him asking) to be ruled out of court in educational discussions because he is not a professional "educator"? He is so upset about this that he accuses Dr. Beeby (and twice) of having exalted the "educator" by giving him a capital "E." I have looked through Dr. Beeby's book again and can find no such terrible capital letters. What made Professor Vaizey see them when they were not there?

Discussion of educational problems is indeed not to be limited to the professional educator. It is the concern of all of us, but two observations are legitimate. First, economists however much they may differ among themselves, use the concepts and language of their discipline and therefore (like all of us) run a certain risk of professional deformation (for instance in their use of the word "productivity" in educational discussion). In this sense, one may surely talk of econo-

mists in general. But to object on a sort of monopolist basis to the participation of economists in educational discussion would be silly. Vaizey protests against this silliness in Dr. Beeby's book. I cannot find it there. On the contrary, his chapter "The Economist and the Educator" seems to me to be quite free of rancour.

Secondly, any man who has devoted his life to educational administration in both well-developed and developing countries ought to have something useful to say if he has thought about his experience. Dr. Beeby has a great deal to say that seems to me illuminating. But his authority stems from his experience and the quality of his reflection of it, not from some mystical professional claim. Professor Vaizey has often said good things too when he has spoken from knowledge, but there are areas of educational experience about which he is not perfectly informed, and if people have criticised him for sometimes speaking with no less confidence about these, he must not suppose that this is some ill-tempered attack by educators against economists. The explanation is much simpler if less flattering. I am sorry that his strong feelings about this imaginary attack by Dr. Beeby led him to give such an unfair and, I must say, poor-tempered account of an excellent book.

LIONEL ELVIN
*University of London
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CORRECTION:

In the "To the Editors" section (HER, Spring, 1967, p. 270), Norman D. Kurland's affiliation was incorrectly reported. It should have read "New York State Education Department."

Book Reviews

ENTER PLATO: CLASSICAL GREECE AND
THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL THEORY.

by Alvin W. Gouldner.

New York: Basic Books, 1965. 407 pp.
\$8.50.

During the years before World War I, the scholarly world of Europe was aroused by a border conflict between the so-called human or historical sciences, including philosophy, theology, law, philology, and the arts, on the one side, and the rapidly advancing natural sciences, including the newly emerging social sciences, on the other side.

One of the leaders of the controversy, the German neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert,¹ commented that the pioneers of modern natural science, such as Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Newton, had accompanied every scientific step forward with a systematic reflection on their ways of

research and thereby laid a firm foundation to their discipline, whereas the historical sciences still lacked a systematic logic of their aims and procedures.

The defensive zeal of the humanists of the pre-war period was not merely methodological. It also derived from the fear that the invasion of naturalistic modes of thought might not only create a "confusion of genres" (to use a term of Irving Babbitt) but endanger the basic spiritual values of the Western tradition. Indeed, famous naturalists had already made all kinds of disrespectful statements about philosophical idealism, religion, and classical education—and the term "sociology" (used by Rickert in his *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* in contemptuous quotation marks) appeared more and more frequently in the academic literature. Yet, all those scholarly endeavors which today we would denote as "social science" in the broadest sense of the term were not yet granted an independent academic station. They were still guests in the departments of philosophy, and their pioneers (like William James at Harvard)

¹ See especially his *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1896), and *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Freiburg: Mohr, 1899).

divided their teaching and research between philosophy proper and the new sciences and were often looked at with suspicion by their traditionally-minded colleagues.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the nineteenth century Herbert Spencer of England had written his revolutionary works on a new empirical philosophy, psychology, social ethics, and education; in France, Auguste Comte his *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830-1842) and Emile Durkheim *Les Règles de la methode sociologique* (1894); and the German Max Weber had published his work, *Die sozialen Gründe des Untergangs der antiken Kultur* (1895). Furthermore, two German philosophers and experimental psychologists, Wilhelm Wundt and Theodor Elsenhans, even dared suggest that, contrary to Rickert's lamentation, there actually *existed* a fundamental science for the understanding of man and society. That fundamental science, they maintained, was, *horribile dictu*, psychology. And another scholar of fame, like Wilhelm Wundt teaching at the University of Leipzig, the historian Karl Lamprecht, maintained that, contrary to all one had learned from the great Leopold Ranke, history should not merely be a scholarly form of projection into unique events and personalities, but might be widened into a kind of comparative and genetic analysis of the developmental phases of nations and perhaps whole mankind. This, of course, smacked suspiciously of Comte, Marx, and Darwin. It was high time that the humanities gathered strength and self-consciousness in order to maintain their identity.

First, of course, one had to find a generic term for the historical sciences of the same impressiveness as that of "Naturwissenschaft" for the other side. For this purpose Wilhelm Dilthey, one

of the finest interpreters of German thought and literature and the teacher of the three leaders of German educational philosophy in the first half of this century (Spranger, Nohl, and Litt), used the concept of "Geisteswissenschaften," or sciences of the mind, whereas Rickert preferred the concept of "Kulturwissenschaften" because one could hardly deny that the natural scientists and psychologists also dealt with mental phenomena.

What, according to Rickert, were the decisive differences between the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Kulturwissenschaften*? Methodologically, the naturalist will avoid all value judgments. In his search for universal laws and valid models, he will eliminate every thing that is individual and peculiar. He will discriminate between spatial objects, which belong to his domain, and non-spatial and psychic objects, which he should leave to the humanist. His procedure will be "nomothetic" ("nomos" meaning "law") and consequently look for repetitive data, for only from them can regularities be deduced. He will proceed with utmost avoidance of subjective and aprioristic elements and by no means inject any purposes into his objects of observation.

In contrast, the humanist will evaluate or, at least, observe the function of will and purpose in human society. He will be intensely concerned with the "ought," not merely with the "is." He will think qualitatively, not quantitatively, and appreciate the charm of the individual and the unique. The psychic will be more interesting to him than the spatial. His procedure will be "idiographic" instead of being "nomothetic." He will not merely explain, but try to understand; even the non-understandable in persons and events will arouse his curiosity. And despite all scholarly discipline and detachment

in the discovery of relevant facts, in the process of their interpretation he will be personally involved. Something of an artist and a poet will be in every good historian. Intuition will spur his reason.

By dint of these differences, so Rickert and his humanist friends hoped, they would chase the naturalist and with him the whole drab and shallow philosophies of materialism and utilitarianism away from the sacred precincts of the *artes liberales*.

That which is astonishing in this debate is the lacuna in historical awareness exactly on the part of those who defended the historical sciences. "Historia" was for the Greeks never antithetic to the study of nature. As practiced by the Ionians, it was pure and disinterested research, with no reference to human past and no practical educational aim—as is sufficiently shown by the cosmological theories of the Milesians....² Only later, "historia" began to connote history as a recording of events, whether natural or human.

Also the medieval scholastics did not distinguish between the *humaniora* and the *naturalia*. Their cycle of knowledge, the *septem artes liberales*, comprised mathematics, geometry, and astronomy, as well as grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. Music was for them a mixture of art and science.

The greatest of the Arabic historians, Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406), was certainly not idiographic but rather searched, in his Universal History, for recurrent social phenomena. And Giovanni Batista Vico (1668-1744), in his *Principii d'una scienza nuova*, asked for the discovery of historical laws, or

for a science of human development that could reveal to us some meaning in the bewildering spectacle of individual and seemingly senseless events. One need only read the two standard works on historical research, Bernheim's *Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie* and Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos' *Introduction des études historiques*, to discover how aware historians were of the problem of general human significance in our knowledge of the past. Fortunately, human curiosity is so insatiable that it will always break through the walls of methodological definitions and search for new visions and vistas of reality. And whether or not we like it, the historical interest among intelligent laymen has been stimulated by exactly those works which experts have declined to accept as truly scholarly products: Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, Hegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte*, Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes*, and Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History*. Sometimes our academic historians themselves seem to believe that they might make their books more interesting by polemical excursions against their visionary competitors.

So, was the whole methodological debate at the turn of the twentieth century perhaps just one of the sterile neo-Kantian exercises in logic, a useless excitement of timid minds? Yes, in so far as it was an attempt to press the ever-swelling stream of thought into a Procrustean bed of unduly narrow categories. No, because questions raised under logical auspices sharpen our intellectual conscience, even though they may not solve the problem. Without constant self-examination, we may become still more uncritical about ourselves than we are anyhow and allow

² Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 291.

our imagination to revel in a vague and fanciful vocabulary.³ Although some speculations may be interesting, they may nevertheless be misleading. Indeed, a little awareness of the methodological problem concerning the adequacy of the quantitative approach to complex mental phenomena might have saved the so-called behavioral sciences from costly detours. There reigned, and still reigns, a certain primitiveness which has definite, though perhaps unintended and unobserved, philosophical implications because it creates a dogmatism of relativism and a pseudo-scientific cocksureness about man, his world, and his purposes long since abandoned by careful philosophical thinkers. In the nineteen-thirties, too many educators were uncritical about the validity of their testing procedures and their theories about the transfer of learning. A number of books appeared which too easily explained the life and work of a genius with reference to early youth or medical data without asking why thousands of other people who had gone through similar experiences had lived and died without a sign of genius.

Thus, some suspicion on the part of humanists against a certain type of social scientist was not entirely unjustified, even though the suspicion was more often based on prejudice than on knowledge. At a luncheon at the Institute for Advanced Study, a Princeton professor greeted me with the words: "Good that you come from Europe, then you are not one of 'those testers.'" The conversation revealed that

³For a systematic examination of the problems of history from the point of view of linguistic analysis, see Morton White, *Foundations of History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). See also Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1962).

he knew nothing about tests, let alone about education. I had similar experiences at Harvard also.⁴

Thus, partly rightly and partly wrongly, we still debate the frontiers between the humanities and the empirical sciences. But whereas at the time of Rickert it was the former who were searching for their identity, it appears today that the urge for self-examination has affected the whole, wide field of the social sciences. They are in a state of acute uncertainty, no longer sure where they belong methodologically, operating, as it were, in the twilight between cool scientific description of facts and norms on the one hand, and intuitive and introspective understanding on the other. The artificiality of Rickert's logical dichotomy becomes increasingly evident, for scholarship refuses to be commanded by philosophical policemen. But a new and clear way out of the predicament has not yet been found.⁵

The bewilderment will grow the

⁴It would be interesting to analyze the causes of the persistent test phobia among educated men, especially with regard to the I.Q. It has certainly to do with an aesthetic aversion against the intrusion of the "mechanical" into the life of men, perhaps also with a subconscious dualistic conviction concerning the relation between mind and matter. Another cause is a sense of uncertainty: "How would I stand up if some expert stripped me of my acquired learning and revealed my bare native intelligence?" Connected with this feeling is a status problem: "Maybe my plumber has a higher I.Q. than I." Actually, similar anxieties played a role in the obstinate opposition of the privileged classes against the rise of public education: "My children will have to compete with the children of 'the masses.' And the finer elements of culture my children receive from their home will not count in a soulless competitive system."

⁵See chapter on "Knowing and Awareness," in Gouldner's *Enter Plato*, p. 267 ff.

more the various areas of scholarship fuse into each other and the more we learn about the approaches of various cultures to identical human problems. To be somewhat competent and comprehensive in his own field, each one of us today has to venture into related areas. He will also feel compelled to ask not only what his own nation but also what other nations have done in the pursuit of similar human goals, though he may not have lived there or know their language.

In the field of comparative education alone, the question is raised increasingly as to what degree the older methods of "comparison" (which often were not more than mere juxtaposition of varieties of schooling) contribute to a truly comparative understanding of education in different cultures and permit us to draw useful generalizations.⁶ One begins to realize that the export of Western education to the so-called less developed countries may have done more harm than good.

Now an interesting book has been published in which, so author and publisher claim, for the first time the attempt has been made to apply the methods of modern sociological analysis to a field of study that hitherto appeared to many as the firmest stronghold of unadulterated humanism, namely, classical philology. Mr. Gouldner, Professor of Sociology at Washington University in St. Louis, has become widely known through his books and publications in the field of social theory and has also conducted empirical case studies of factories and mathematical studies of data on primitive societies. From the first pages of his new book, we gath-

er that the author is profoundly aware of the present confusion in the social sciences and of the hazards in an enterprise that is so far off the trodden path of scholarship as is his. The book may "mention events and processes in Greek antiquity well known to many broadly educated persons, let alone the classicists" (p. 4) while it may be alien to the student of the social sciences who, like the author, "was taught more about the Trobrianders, Nuer, and Hopi than about the Athenians" (p. 4). But, the author maintains, "there is no avoiding this hazard, and, at any rate, that is the only way that I have learned: I have never believed that anything is worth working on unless I seriously risk compromising myself in doing it" (p. 7). Needless to say, to review a book written in such a spirit of risk is itself a risk. But I will try my best, hoping for the indulgence of the reader.

Why this sense of exposure on the part of the author? Obviously, he feels himself in a methodological dilemma and in a situation of defense against two schools of thought at once, against the classicists for his use of sociological methods (the ghost of Rickert seems to have looked over his shoulders) and against the sociologist for his swerving into classical philology and philosophy.

I do not know how the sociologists will react to Mr. Gouldner's venture. Of the classicists, I believe, the author need not be afraid—provided he has achieved the quality of scholarship they have the right to expect. They are today freer from prejudice, dogmatism, and unjustified generalizations than many social scientists. As the frequent references of Mr. Gouldner himself reveal, they use scientific, anthropological, and sociological methods.⁷

⁷ See Gouldner, *op. cit.*, footnote 4 on

⁶ See especially George Z. F. Bereday, *Comparative Method in Education* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

There may be some classicists who, as Mr. Gouldner suspects, wish to preserve the old halo around the ancients, but there are others who might no longer unequivocally subscribe to Werner Jaeger's emphatic statement that the Greeks "provide the *arche*—the spiritual source to which, as we reach every new stage of development, we must constantly revert in order to reorient ourselves."⁸ They no longer admire the Greeks, as Winckelmann and Goethe, or perhaps Thomas Arnold did generations ago, as a people of "harmonious grandeur and noble simplicity," miles above the trivial affections of other mortals. Rather they see their genius—as every form of genius—always in the dangerous neighborhood of the tragic. "The glory that was Greece" is today no longer the same as it was at the time when the Greek-Roman ideals of perfection constituted the *nomos* of the upbringing of a young gentleman. To this fading of a lofty ideal, our classical scholars have contributed just as much as our

p. 35. In view of such a trans-national subject as Plato and the Greeks, I wonder why the author fails to notice the outstanding contributions of the French and Germans to ancient social history and theory, e.g. such well-known works as the *Histoire Grecque* of the *Histoire Générale*, edited by Gustave Glotz, *Griechische Geschichte* by Julius Beloch and *Geschichte des klassischen Altertums* by Eduard Meyer. The name of Max Weber occurs twice in the text, but none of his works is mentioned. Only Nietzsche occurs several times because of his interesting and popular, though doubtful, generalization concerning the Dionysian versus the Apollinian trends in the Greek character. Slavery has always been of interest to the classicists. The catalogue of Harvard Library contains about twenty titles on this subject, not to speak of hundreds of works on slavery in general and in individual periods and countries.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. xv.

erudite theologians have contributed to modern Christian disillusionment. While writing this review, I read that Cambridge has dropped the already severely damaged Latin requirements. Apparently the whole concept of the "educated gentleman" has changed, if there still is such a concept. The turn away from the classics seems to be inevitable at a time when science and technology absorb the minds of the adult and the working hours of our intelligent youth, though I do not think that our modern statesmen, who depend on public opinion polls and newspapers, face the problems of life more wisely than the "Christian gentlemen" who were expected to know the past and read the classical authors.⁹

Nevertheless, some of us will always revert to the Greeks for reasons similar to those of Hegel. Professor Gouldner, apparently, belongs to that group. The Greeks are most intensely human: rational and irrational, gentle and cruel, hoping and despairing. Within a few centuries, they created one of the most complete and fascinating images of humanity we possess. Those who have that picture in their eyes are richer, though not necessarily better, men than those who don't.

However important the methodology of research and its consequences on the interests of people, the main criterion of a book is the completion of its intention. In Mr. Gouldner's case, the criterion would be whether, as a sociologist, he has deepened our insight into the life of the Greeks and their society, especially whether he has helped

⁹ See Richard M. Gummere, *The American Colonial Mind and the Classical Tradition: Essays in Comparative Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).

us to understand Plato better, to whose teaching he devotes the largest part of the book.

My answer would be that he tells the somewhat informed reader nothing new in Part One, "The Hellenic World," though this is the sociological part of his book. The merit of this section lies in the organization of the material according to the focus we might expect of a social scientist. But one has to read only a few Greek historians to learn that their country destroyed itself by civil and inter-regional wars; that a competitive and agonistic spirit raged within individual souls as well as in the soul of the people; that any citizen of outstanding merit had always to struggle against base envy and to live under the threat of ostracism; that the Homeric ideal of *aien aristetein* (to be always the best) was often perverted into a ruthless struggle for power; and that one of the most intelligent ethnic groups of the world preferred suicide to unity. We also know that the Greek system of slavery affected not only the victims but also the moral self-respect and personal security of the free. In Mr. Gouldner's discussion of the slave system, so one feels, there speaks not only the sociologist but also the American, for whom that big shame of humanity is not yet a thing of the past.

The professor of sociology is more original in the second part of his book, where he becomes a philosophical interpreter of Plato. He discusses Plato's "alternatives to politics," which lie in the critical examination of the traditions and of one's self ("The unexamined life is not worth living," *Apology* 38 A), in the belief in the supremacy of the mind over nature, and in an ethical-voluntaristic conception of the rational qualities of man which render him capable of both envisioning the

"ought" and pursuing it. Thus, in Plato, the profound Greek scepticism and sense of the tragical are somehow balanced by a cautious optimism.¹⁰

The best parts of the book seem to me those on the therapeutic value and the dangers of dialectic—therapeutic in that dialectic is a "liberation of man's reason" (p. 260), a contest of minds, a "method" and not simply a doctrine, a heightened form of awareness and an opportunity for the gifted, but also dangerous in that it may bring about a disorderly play of ideas that induces *anomia* (a state of lawlessness or anarchy). Those who teach controversial subjects in our high schools may be interested in this chapter.

Of equal, perhaps even of greater, value are the last two chapters, "The Fatigue of Reason and the Metaphysics of Authoritarianism" and "Death and the Tragic Outlook." These chapters reveal the author's unusual capacity for living and feeling inside the complex Greek world, his gift of congeniality. They reach far beyond the explanation of a specific culture into the universal existential problem of tragicness, death, and immortality. I cannot abstain from quoting the following sentences:

The tragic outlook is a perspective developed only by those who are deeply concerned with the world of men and who are open to its suffering. The tragic outlook is born of a disparity between great hopes for man and a high conception of his estate, on the one side, and the belief that human beings labor under inescapable limitations, on the other.

¹⁰ Personally, I was again struck by the similarity between Plato and certain doctrines of Buddhism, such as the consideration of ignorance as the root of evil, the doctrine of reincarnation, and the ensuing idea of learning as remembering.

er. In the tragic view, man is seen as being less than God—rather than viewed as more than ape—and as a lower rather than a higher being. Man is seen as a noble, heart-breaking failure. (p. 361)

This sample of the style that Mr. Gouldner sometimes achieves leads me to discussion of the organization of his book as a whole. In this respect, I am afraid, few readers will be completely satisfied. "Slavery," for example, occurs eighteen times. This is understandable to a degree, for slavery permeated all phases of Greek existence. One has, nevertheless, a feeling of stumbling again and again over the same subject. The process of abstracting from a civilization, so replete with colors and inner contradictions as the Greek, those parts which lend themselves to sociological analysis, may be compared with taking stones out of a mosaic, putting them under a microscope and then re-assembling them. It may be that the microscopic examination tells us *something* about the whole, perhaps about its chemistry and the working methods of the artist, yet it remains nevertheless fragmentary, somewhat outside the genius. That, after all, is the objection of the humanist to the social scientist. But even humanists will have to admit that the finest creations of genius, by individuals as much as by whole cultures, will always remain *voce meliora*.

Regarding the difficulty involved in every interpretation of human affairs, the only legitimate question with regard to this not always easily readable book by Mr. Gouldner would be whether it has helped the reader to gain in the knowledge of a complex civilization and in general human insight. My answer would be that if I were now to read Plato's dialogues, the works of Aristotle, or Thucydides' *His-*

tory of the Peloponnesian War, I would appreciate better than hitherto their contribution to the emergence of social thinking and would read with sharpened understanding what it must have meant to be a citizen of Athens at the time of Pericles and Alcibiades. In the contest between the philosopher Rickert and the modern sociologist, the latter has not come out so badly.

At the end, however, I cannot suppress a sad reflection. It concerns not only Mr. Gouldner, but us all. At the age of seventy-one, the famous philologist, Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, wrote his great work on Plato.¹¹ For fifty years, or almost sixty when we include his years at the gymnasium, he had lived in closest intellectual and linguistic intimacy with the Greeks. In his book, we learn about their social life and their family tradition, not sociologically abstracted, but with vivid immediacy. Socrates appears. There is an excellent chapter on Greek homosexuality. We travel with Plato to Egypt and Sicily and hear that he had to take with him a cargo of Athenian oil in order to finance his journey. We experience the gradual development of Plato's thought from the Ion and Protagoras to the Theaetetus and the Laws. Yet, at so many places the great scholar confesses his ignorance. In brief, how can anyone today compete with specialists who themselves think they do not know enough? I often had the same feeling when I read books by scientists on philosophical problems and vice versa (not to speak of my own wanderings). We see the challenge, but when we cross the fence we flounder.

Yet, Mr. Gouldner's book is certainly more interesting and illuminating than the opera of those philologists about whom the Englishman A. Sim-

¹¹ *Platon* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1919).

mern remarks in his *Solon and Croesus*; "The same evidence is marshalled, the same references and footnotes are transferred, like stale tea leaves, from one learned receptacle to another."¹²

Happy (in a way) those who are satisfied with marshalling the same evidence and conveying it to their students. Those, however, who want more and search for new avenues of thought will have to pay for their ambitions with an anxious feeling. Our vistas extend toward ever wider horizons and our desire for comprehensiveness becomes more and more urgent, but our little human brain remains the same. Yet, we have to try. Professor Gouldner has done so, bravely and, despite some shortcomings, successfully.

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THE PAINTED BIRD.

by Jerzy Kosinski.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

272 pp. \$4.95.

New York: Pocket Books, 1966.

213 pp. \$.95 (paper).

I suppose in fifty years or so some sensitive social historian will pick up *Centuries of Childhood* by Philippe Ariès and realize how urgently it needs an epilogue—a long and frank account of what the most recent of centuries has seen fit to do with children. It will be a sad moment for us all, because the "progress" we have made has not kept us from unprecedented murder, of children among others. Germany, whose citizens believed strongly in science and contributed significantly to medicine,

emerged as the Anti-Christ, ready to take the world to Hell, and laugh as we all burned. To the east we saw further irony. A socialist revolution committed to economic justice fell into the hands of a vulgar, suspicious tyrant who ordered people (and associates) killed for the most gratuitous and arbitrary reasons.

If Germany and Russia have furnished us naked totalitarianism at its worst, I need not remind anyone who has lived through these past few decades how persistently we have had to face the presence of war. There was Spain, and the innocent families killed by both sides. There was Korea, only a few years after the *second* World War was over. Today there is Vietnam. Not for long in this century have we been spared the faces of terrorized children, made homeless or orphans by bombs, injured by fires and bullets, hungry and cold because soldiers have orders to kill one another and destroy whatever cannot be killed. For us, in America, it is and has been "far off." We may be asked to give a few dollars to "save the children" or to this or that "rescue" committee, but the boys and girls have belonged to other people.

A year or two ago a book appeared with the inviting but mysterious title *The Painted Bird*. From the literary viewpoint alone it was of interest: the author was a young Polish emigré who seemed in surprising control of the English language, and though we have had that kind of thing happen once before, the likelihood of a recurrence has always been considered small. Moreover, the book's form was as unusual as its content. A boy narrated his experiences, from age five or six to age twelve—though not the way it is done in a "children's book." The book concerned itself with what must be one of

¹² (London: Oxford University Press, 1928). Also, see Gouldner, p. 35.

the most sordid moments in man's entire history, and the child who lived through those moments—now to tell us about them—presumably is not talking to his age-mates, but to *us*, who still murder and otherwise torment children.

In any event, *The Painted Bird* startled its reviewers, who could only say again and again how awful and terrifying yet haunting its pages turn out to be. They didn't have to give the plot much of a summary; we have learned to be unsurprised when mention is made of the Nazis, and in general the Europe of a few years ago. One point was unusual though: the child was described as living in eastern Europe, and his experiences were not those inflicted upon inmates of concentration camps, or prisoners of the German or Russian armies; rather the boy moved from village to village, presumably in Poland, or Hungary, or thereabouts, so that the disasters he experienced could only indirectly be called the result of Hitler's war.

The sad facts of history make Hitler and Stalin mere successors to a long line of tyrants and exploiters whose benighted rule has kept countries like Poland for centuries incredibly backward. In 1782, a French nobleman and priest, Hubert Vautrin, came back to Lorraine from five years in Poland and Lithuania, full of somber and disheartening experiences and observations. In 1807, he published *L'Observateur en Pologne*, a book very much like de Tocqueville's *Démocratie en Amérique*. Much of what the boy in *The Painted Bird* comes to experience is described by Vautrin: the coarse, violent men; the fearful, superstitious women; the extreme poverty, the extreme ignorance, the extreme suspiciousness; and side by side, the isolated centers of

wealth and privilege shared by the nobility and, of all people, the Bishops of the Church.

It is safe to say that the eastern Europe of *The Painted Bird* would not surprise Vautrin. The nameless boy in Kosinski's novel—if that is the word for the book—takes us from village to village amid that squalid backwater of European civilization. At six, he learns of war, and thereafter there is nothing to face but hate, punishment, hunger, fear, and death. He is dark, but not Jewish. Because they have been anti-fascists, his parents, city people, fear he will be killed on sight by the Nazis. Thus they surrender him to a man who promises to find foster parents for him in a distant village. As the Germans approach, the parents themselves flee. Within two months of his arrival, the boy's foster mother dies; and from then on, for years and years, the boy has to wander from village to village, as if hounded by God himself.

What is one to say about this book? When I first started reading it, I thought I would find a tender and gentle story, suited for a certain kind of high-school student who was near enough the age of the book's narrator to feel very much a part of his mind, if not his experiences. That is one of the book's most brilliant and unnerving characteristics: it only gradually confronts the reader with the full dimensions of the Evil it means to describe. In so doing, the author is "true to life," and perhaps enables us to understand how this boy—and others like him—kept alive in the face of what emerges, finally, as Hell itself.

What else, after all, can people like us do but speculate intellectually on the "implications"—psychological, educational, moral, and theological—of such a book? As the pages became in-

creasingly impossible to face—the brutality and violence, the monstrous, horrible injustice—I found myself more and more “thoughtful,” to the point that the book became rather “stimulating” by the end. That is, I had a dozen things to dwell on, all of them large and weighty issues.

In contrast, the boy’s survival clearly had very little to do with his inability to speculate and analyze. Humiliated and degraded again and again, he becomes like his brutish oppressors, and stubbornly holds on, even as they have for centuries. He does not fight them—that would mean certain death—but learns to crawl, to cling tenaciously to whatever miserable, wretched half-promise is available. Home is where you find it, and survival does not require “mental health.”

What, in fact, does happen to the boy’s mind as he sees the darkest side of any moon that ever was? As do other exiles and outcasts, he develops a shrewd knowledge of the moods and susceptibilities of the powerful. If they are crudely sensual people, perverse and deceitful, he can be shrewdly disarming, cooperative or evasive. Desperate fear and paralytic anxiety are perhaps luxuries of the comfortable, or expressions of some last-ditch, impossible situation. The long, slow grind of most suffering and persecution exacts quite another order of “adaptation” from the victim. It is to this book’s credit that the boy rather briskly sets about his business: accommodation in the interests of life. Let the middle-class American intellectuals fight over the “morality” of such behavior—when a Hannah Arendt exposes its banality. Nor should the reader fall back upon the child’s “age.” The author rather obviously sees him as a representative of all refugees, all outcasts, all suffering

and debased mankind. His desire to persist, to live no matter what, can be found unbelievable or wrong—by those who cannot know how absurd it is for them even to try to comprehend the kind of choices “civilized” Europe presented to millions, in our time.

The worst part of this book, this story that tells a million stories, comes at the end, when miraculously the child is found by his parents. For years he has escaped the instant death the Germans threatened, and somehow lived through a succession of inhuman and savage experiences: torture and hunger; sexual perversions of one sort or another, including the bestiality that Kraft-Ebbing attributed to “rustic” people; assault and, worse, comfort offered, then withdrawn; bizarre, mystifying encounters with an assortment of witches, idiots, and madmen. All this becomes if not “second nature” then life itself, “world without end”; until, that is, the world catches up with its own lunacy, and confronts its bewildered prisoners with the fact that now “all is well.” To your feet—Jews, Negroes, gypsies, indeed poor men everywhere! We are through for a while. Thirty million died, and rest assured that in a few years there will be more bombs; but for a moment pause—and go back to your old ways. We will stop the firing squads, end the hangings, empty the prisons, give orders that no more ovens be stoked. You, all of you, return to one another. Accept our retribution. Receive your “rights,” your vote, if that is what you want, and some bread. And be sensible, be “mature.” Forget the past, the broken twisted past—that some of you persist in seeing still at work, still around to exploit and murder in the name, always, of God and country. Look to the future, to what you can have, can be—

that is, some of you. (Don't ask how many; that is something we shall have to learn "in time.")

I suppose we, too, will have to wait and see how this boy and all his brothers "manage." Fortunately, the author at least allows him the dignity of his own past, his own circumstances. He does not need "guidance" or "treatment." It is not a neurosis or psychosis that threatens him. Words like "rehabilitation" or "help"—with all their gratuitous, naïve, and sometimes absurd implications—are not summoned. The boy had become mute, and his parents, whatever their love, cannot draw him out. He is back with them, but he prefers the company of night people, those who for a variety of reasons live on the edge of the law. His parents are worried and hurt, but the suffering they have in common with him prevents them from becoming moralistic. They do not find him full of "problems"; they see him naturally and appropriately reluctant to deal with any world except the brutal one he has learned to deal with and, indeed, now possesses.

Eventually he talks. He has gone off to ski, sent by his parents in the hope that hills and snow would be neutral territory. In a fierce blizzard, he again struggles for life, for action and yet another victory. Again, the direction is downward; but now the struggle is different and weighted in his favor. In a hospital room, after sustaining injuries on the ski slopes, he hears a telephone and can answer it. That is the end of the book.

I note that in the original, hardcover edition the author adds something more. The boy will find eastern Europe under the Communists as hard and oppressive as the life he experienced in the villages during the war. In point of fact, Jerzy Kosinski is a pen name for

Joseph Novak, who wrote *The Future is Ours*, *Comrade*, and *No Third Path* before *The Painted Bird* was published. Fortunately, the paperback edition eliminates the author's desire to harness the power and originality of this story with a political sermon. Nothing in the book has prepared the reader for propaganda, and if Joseph Novak had to intrude on Jerzy Kosinski, he did it in the right way, with an obvious and expendable after-thought.

As for the world that presumably now has that boy as one of its men, the evil, hate, and murder continue. The title of *The Painted Bird* comes from an incident in the book. The boy meets up with Lekh, a bird-catcher who sadly and grimly paints birds, then releases them, to be killed by their own kind. The boy is, of course, a painted bird, different in one or another respects from "the majority." Yet, I fear things are even worse these days. So many birds are hunting down so many other birds that the individual tragedies created by one bird-catcher seem almost exceptional. In our world, majorities not only persecute minorities; the strong not only persecute the weak; but the powerful set themselves against the powerful, and the earth itself must live in fear.

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THE KNOWER AND THE KNOWN.
by Marjorie Grene.

New York: Basic Books, 1966. 283 pp.
\$6.00.

Subject matters have histories. Like nations and civilizations, such disciplines as physics, psychology, mathematics,

and anthropology have evolved from small, pioneering beginnings into large, self-conscious, well-organized programs of life. Again like nations, these programs occasionally grow to such proportions as to convince their votaries that they have a special mission in the world, a kingly obligation to explain all other human knowledge as footnotes to their own particular discipline.

Philosophy, more than other subject matters, has always seemed to me particularly susceptible to this *rex complex*. As a discipline, its self-appointed task often seems to be to render the entire universe knowable, manageable, and valuable, in order that lesser disciplines can find their proper place in the whole.

In taking all creation as its subject matter, philosophy has addressed itself to three major questions: What, ultimately, is the universe made of? (the metaphysical question); What can be known and how do we know it? (the epistemological question); What is good, and how should human beings behave? (the ethical question). As we all know, traditional philosophy was principally concerned with the first of these questions. However, in the modern period—since Hume—there has been a diminution of metaphysical interest and a gradual turning to the second question concerning knowledge and knowing, where more fruitful results seem to be obtainable. Contemporary philosophies of science, one might say, are the terminal, culminating expressions of this effort. By "terminal" I mean that "the age of epistemology" may be drawing to a close. Now that we know how to know, philosophers are turning more and more to the still unresolved problems of human ethics and value theory. I suspect that, in the future, philosophy will con-

cern itself preponderantly with these questions.

Marjorie Grene's *The Knower and the Known* may be thought of as a transitional piece; it shows how we might make the passage from the epistemological to the ethical question. She places before us the idea that knowing is, at bottom, an affective task. The act of knowing assumes the presence of a knower. And the only knowers we know of are live, feeling, human persons. Knowing, therefore, is always a personal act and, as such, inevitably involves us, the knowers, with our own wants and needs. (In considering this book, one's thoughts turn to an earlier book with a similar, but significantly different, title—Dewey and Bentley's *Knowing and the Known*.¹ These authors sought to formulate an objective, depersonalized process of knowledge-getting which would yield publicly warrantable assertions to which all can assent. Grene, in contrast, sees the act of knowing in human and personal terms, an act always fastened to a center of feeling and desire.)

The book's argument begins with a careful criticism of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes in a section entitled "Knowledge as Conjecture." Here, Miss Grene unravels the hidden epistemological errors in this trio's attempt to establish true knowledge as "final, impersonal, and certain." She then turns to an equally penetrating analysis of Hume and Kant under the heading "The Structure of Experience." Here we see the gradual emergence of "the knower as agent"; we are asked to entertain the notion that, in the act of knowing, the presence of the "actor" is never irrelevant.

¹ John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, *Knowing and the Known* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949).

Finally, in a section with the cryptic title "The Complexity of Things," Miss Grene dismantles Darwin and scientific epistemology generally, advancing the proposition that scientific knowledge inevitably contains as one of its hidden, but nonetheless decisive, ingredients the peculiarly human outlook of those engaged in the knowing process itself. Scientific knowledge, she asserts, can no more escape its human base than can Plato's.

It is in the chapter "Facts and Values" that we glimpse the transitional character of the book. In a very closely studied analysis of fact-gathering, Miss Grene explains the pre-cognitive factors which must be at work even before we can label an assertion as a "fact." For example, to say that Beethoven's *Eroica* is a musical composition rather than a complex sequence of noises is to endow the phenomena of the *Eroica* with a human dimension; it is to assimilate them to the human world instead of to the world of physics and acoustics. We must, as it were, make an appraisal of the noises to call them "music." "There is," she says, "no intelligible discourse independently of evaluation. Appraisal underlies all speech, and therefore all knowledge" (p. 172). Alluding more pointedly to philosophies of science, she makes the following observation:

the *objectivity* of human perception which underlies all scientific accuracy and all canons of evidence, whether in scientific or historical disciplines, is an *objectification*, the result of a commitment to withdrawal. . . . (p. 179)

A final illustration of the peculiar insinuation of human appraisal into our knowledge is offered in a close reading of Darwin's evolutionary theory. Evolution has customarily been

"explained" as the combination of mutation and natural selection. But all that these two terms explain is the persistence of changes in an organism to which the surrounding environment does not seem to be inhospitable. These two phenomena, by themselves, cannot account for the emergence of continually more complex forms from simple beginnings. Man is more complex than the insect, but evolutionary theory cannot explain the existence of man. If evolution is merely the survival of changes in the organism, the changes could just as well have been in the direction of the simpler rather than the more complex. In order, therefore, for evolutionary theory to explain the existence of man, we must endow the biosphere with a telic movement toward more and more complexity; and this, as all can see, is a gratuitous and peculiarly human contribution to the argument.

We may begin to see, therefore, that the chances for an objective kind of knowledge grow slimmer and slimmer as we gain in our understanding of the affective component constantly operating in the knower. Miss Grene's argument is hard to fault and involves potentially staggering significance for all educators. For if education's chief traffic is in knowledge and if the traffickers themselves—scholars, teachers, learners—are always personally involved in the trafficked commodity, then scholarship and teaching and learning must give up their claims of being the objective, disinterested search for truth which we have always thought them to be.

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THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC
AMERICANS.

by Andrew M. Greeley and
Peter H. Rossi.

Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966.
368 pp. \$8.95.

Measurements of ability and achievement of individual students have been standardized and widely used by educators for a long time. Acceptance, promotion, and honors, as well as academic and career counselling, are largely determined on the basis of such tests and measurements. A much greater, and frequently frustrating problem arises in the attempt to measure a whole educational system, or even an individual institution, in order to discover whether it has been successful in achieving its goals.

Greeley and Rossi took up this task, applied the measuring instruments of survey research to 2071 adult American Catholics, and here report the manner in which Catholic education has achieved its goals. The tools of survey research are limited and crude, but they are used in this study with great skill and sophistication. They make a direct approach to the hypothesis that schooling under religious auspices is supposed to have a religious effect—whatever other effect it may achieve as a by-product. The key chapter of the book deals with the research findings on the “religious consequences of Catholic education” and demonstrates conclusively that American Catholics who had all Catholic schooling are religiously different from those who had no Catholic schooling.

It appears at first that this “single factor” accounts for the higher proportion of Catholic-educated adults who practice their religion, accept Church authority, and have greater religious

knowledge, doctrinal and ethical orthodoxy. One may readily accept such “outcomes” as the main norms against which the success of Catholic education can be measured. Yet, there arise immediately other troublesome questions. How big must the difference be before the whole enterprise can be considered worth its cost? Could the Church get the same results with some simpler and less costly procedures and structures? Is it possible that the demonstrated results are really due to some intervening variables?

In attempting to ferret out the influence of intervening variables, the authors test fifteen separate items (and some of them in combination) and find that most of them can be dismissed. A bow is made to the current research fad on ethnicity, which is tested elaborately and inconclusively as a determining factor. Two other factors, however, are worth noting in this investigation. The religiosity of the respondent's parents is an important determinant in his Church attendance and in his membership in Church groups. Secondly, the *amount* of schooling he has had (educational level then substituting for social class) becomes a determinant in his score for religious knowledge, doctrinal orthodoxy, ethical orthodoxy, and the acceptance of the Church's teaching authority.

This study then is placed squarely in the middle of the question that seems to plague all educational analysts: Can one expect a school to do more than the family background and social status of its students allow? There is a profound conviction in America of the beneficial effect of universal schooling as a corrective or antidote to other cultural influences. At the same time, as James Conant pointed out, the slums have a different effect on school success

from that of the suburbs. In this study, the authors admit to a "personal feeling" that it would be "quite unrealistic to expect a school to be more important than family background or more important than social status" (p. 106). This does not answer the crucial question: To what extent can the Catholic school system—or any school system—change and improve the habits and values that a student brings from his family and community?

Other important findings of this survey are that the Catholic school system is not "divisive" in American life, that it does not develop intolerance or impede social and economic progress. The matter of "educational level" becomes important in the research data which show that the longer a student stays in the system (right on through the Catholic college) the more likely is he to be affected by it. The comprehensive and cumulative effect of Catholic education is to produce not only a religious adult but a more tolerant and socially aware citizen.

Comparative data tended to become more valuable by the fact that one out of nine of the Catholic interviewees was a convert to Catholicism with no formal schooling under the auspices of the Church, and that a control group of 530 Protestants was interviewed on questions that did not pertain directly to the Catholic Church. There was also a separate sample of *Commonweal* subscribers who (until the publication of the *National Catholic Reporter*) were considered the liberal elite among American Catholics. In order to measure "Catholic Education Today" (Chapter 8), the researchers processed 734 questionnaires filled out by adolescent children from the homes of the adult Catholic interviewees. This latter stage of the study lent strong confirma-

tion to the general findings about adults.

The final chapter summarizes the main findings of the study and comments on them in the tentative language that is appropriate to the research scholar. The authors seem determined to avoid the charge that they "claim too much" either for their data or for the Catholic school system. In this, they probably frustrate both the proponents and opponents of the Catholic schools who are seeking definitive "proofs" for their particular position in this continuing controversy. Yet, for both the educator and the religionist, this is by far the most useful study that has been attempted in the area of American Catholic education.

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THE SHAPE OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION.

edited by Robert Hassenger.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. 373 pp. \$8.95.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY.

edited by Edward Manier and John Houck.
Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Press, 1967. 225 pp. \$4.95.

A literature is rapidly beginning to emerge on Catholic higher education. *The Public Interest* has recently published a lengthy essay by David Riesman and Christopher Jencks which is easily the most perceptive overview of Catholic higher education yet produced. *The Shape of Catholic Higher Education* and *Academic Freedom in the Catholic University* are collections

of essays that serve to flesh out the skeleton so adroitly presented by Riesman and Jencks. Further works still in press or in the preparation stage will provide more detailed, scholarly analyses of certain aspects of the rapid change taking place in the three hundred and more American institutions of higher education affiliated with the Roman Church. An area of American higher education which until recently was *terra incognita* is rapidly becoming not only as well known as other branches of the American higher educational enterprise, but perhaps even better known than some of the branches.¹

However, the reader who is eager to follow the paths blazed by the explorers who are searching through Catholic higher education had better be advised of a serious hazard on the way. Catholic higher education is presently beset by major ideological controversies, and strong ideological bias can easily creep into what purports to be scholarly work. Such biases are almost entirely limited to Catholic authors and, contrary to what one might expect, are inclined to be more unfavorable to Catholic higher education than favorable.

The two volumes under consideration both suffer somewhat from the mixture of ideology and scholarship which pervades the Catholic educational environment at the present time. Thus, at least some of the essays appearing in the volumes are clearly polemical and others clearly superficial. There is nothing wrong, of course, with polemics, nor for that matter with journalism; but the mixing of, let us say, John Leo's account of the lamentable incidents at St.

John's University on Long Island with Philip Gleason's magisterial outline of the history of Catholic higher education produces a volume which, though it is sprightly, is also dramatically uneven. Similarly, in the Manier-Houck volume, Gleason's careful historical work strikes an entirely different note from John MacKenzie's insightful but polemical defense of "The Freedom of the Priest-Scholar." The mixture of important scholarly contributions with journalism or polemics is not, in the final analysis, such a good idea; and although editors may believe that the luster of the scholarship will lend plausibility to the polemics and depth to the journalism, it is to be feared that rather the opposite is more likely to occur.

One is especially puzzled by the Hassenger volume. Hassenger's own essays, "The Portrait of a Catholic Women's College," "The Impact of the Catholic College," and "The Future Shape of Catholic Higher Education," are brilliantly done, even if his review of the literature on impact tends to be exhaustive, but somewhat less than selective, in its judgments. One would have hoped that Mr. Hassenger could have produced a volume entirely composed of his own obviously excellent work instead of being constrained to mix it with Julian Foster's account of his troubles at Santa Clara and Francis E. Kearns's similar report of his difficulties at Georgetown. One does not, of course, wish to defend either Georgetown or Santa Clara, but the incidents at both schools are fairly well known and the data which Mr. Hassenger reports are not nearly so well known.

Similarly Philip Gleason's essay on the history of Catholic higher education does not appear in its best possible light when juxtaposed with John Whitney Evans's largely undocumented

¹ Such as Negro higher education, for example.

essay "Catholic Higher Education on the Secular Campus," nor does the Parsonian framework established by Paul J. Reiss, "The Catholic College: Some Built-In Tensions" gain much luster by appearing in the same volume with a rather inadequate series of suggestions about the future by Anthony Seidl. If Mr. Hassenger had not wished to write a volume entirely by himself, one would have thought that collaboration with Philip Gleason and Paul Reiss would have made for a far more effective work than the present somewhat scatter-shot approach.

Such a notion is reinforced by reading the Manier-Houck volume where the two best essays are the results of the efforts of Gleason and Hassenger. Both writers have their own ideological bias on the matter of the Catholic college, but Gleason (all the time) and Hassenger (practically all the time) refuse to permit their own ideological inclinations to interfere with their careful and competent scholarly presentations. Not all of their colleagues in either volume can be said to have done the same or even to have attempted the same.

Thus, not only in substance but in style, are the two books accurate representations of American Catholic higher education. The mixture of ideological controversy and responsible scholarship is typical of the Catholic college environment in the years since the Vatican Council. Both controversy and scholarship have their place, and scholarship can readily be controversial. But however seductive it may be, the temptation to confuse scholarship with polemical controversy is a dangerous one. In American Catholicism and in Catholic higher education, the confusion of the two was for a long time a prerogative of the conservatives, but in a dramatic shift in the years since

Pope John convened the Vatican Council, the liberals too have frequently fallen victim to the temptation. John Leo and Philip Gleason in the same volume are a perfect symbol of the power of the temptation. The former is a brilliant controversialist and the latter an extraordinarily able scholar. Both have their role to play, though in the final analysis, obviously, Gleason's is the more important role. Only when American Catholic higher education can produce collections of essays all of which are up to Gleason's standards will Catholic higher education in this country have come of age.

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STUDIES IN COGNITIVE GROWTH.

by Jerome S. Bruner, Rose R. Olver, Patricia M. Greenfield, *et al.*
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966. 343 pp. \$7.95.

Psychologists fond of quoting William James are re-searching his writings to find out what (or if) he speculated about the process by which the infant emerged from the "booming buzzing confusion" to a cognizing organism. J. M. Baldwin and Heinz Werner are referred to again. We expect that Spalding, Carmichael, Wellman, and other researchers of the 30's and 40's also are due for appropriate recognition. In no small way, however, the significance of much of current research and theorizing is enhanced by the lifetime work of Jean Piaget. The early observational studies and tentative conceptualizations provided the necessary background for his more recent *sui generis* theory of cognitive development. Piaget's observations and theory pose the problems of cognitive

development that are of central concern to the authors of this work and to Bruner in his effort to construct an alternative theory of cognitive growth. It seems most appropriate that *Studies in Cognitive Growth* should be dedicated to Piaget as the "father of modern developmental psychology."

Not since Thorndike has such a large proportion of psychologists and educators been concerned with the analysis of learning processes during early stages of childhood. A variety of influences, beginning in the early 50's, and outside psychology proper (Hebb is the exception), contributed to renewed interest in cognitive development. The research literature of intervening decades contains many suggestive findings and ideas relevant to intellectual development which are the precursors of the current breakthroughs. Logical positivism as a philosophical base for the behavioral sciences was emerging as a dominant force during this period. Its influence reached most aspects of American psychology and education, but with considerable distortion, naïve interpretation, and unwarranted prescriptions. Few were able to surmount such barriers to further exploration, extension, and theoretical interpretations of the then available facts concerning the impact of early experience on cognitive development.

The current *Zeitgeist* is different. New "theories" of cognitive processes and growth are multiplying, and extension of these theories to education is proceeding at an accelerated pace. Certainly an impressive array of evidence has emerged from current research. Not only has it been discovered that infants are born with many more learning capacities than formerly believed; but the fact that amount, quality, and structure of environmental stimulation has a tremendous impact

on the course of the many ontogenetic processes has been rediscovered.

The rediscovery of the mind of the child has many valuable theoretical and practical implications for education. The goals of education are clearly shifting to the programing of the environment to provide more stimulation for intellectual development. The lure of a "golden age of reason" for children is so great that many psychologists and educators are galloping across a virtual no-man's land with hope and conviction as their main supporting forces. The big issue today is not whether to emphasize cognitive or social development, but how early in the child's life can you teach him the principles of mathematics and science. We are told again and again, in one form or another, that it is difficult to find problems that a child cannot solve given coaching or external aid. Too often such statements are ambiguous; an evidential basis is not offered and the desirability of developmental acceleration is seldom questioned. What are the criteria for "simplification of a problem" so that the integrity of the original problem is maintained (rather than presenting a set of different and/or new problems)? Many investigators, of course, dismiss the question of desirability as of only social-value import. But Harlow, among others, has more than sufficient evidence that "sleeper" effects are very critical to the understanding of early environmental influences on development. Long-term longitudinal studies, together with the ingenious experimentation now going on in many laboratories, seem appropriate before educational practices are completely changed. Certainly we are happy that psychologists and educators are communicating again, but perhaps a platonic relationship would be more

helpful and lasting than an early marriage.

The need for alternative theoretical approaches and more systematic empirical analysis of early cognitive growth is so obvious that a report from the Center for Cognitive Studies has been looked forward to with anticipation. Professor Bruner has been a creative critic of naïve approaches to behavioral analysis. Willing to "go beyond the information," he has been in the forefront of psychologists interested in the analysis of the knowledge acquisition processes and their implications for education.¹ In earlier publications, Bruner sketched out his theory of cognitive growth,² and more recently extended some of these principles to a theory of instruction.³ *Studies in Cognitive Growth*, however, is not the systematic theoretical, nor systematic empirical, study on which to base many changes in educational principles or practice. It does have scope, interesting ideas, and several interesting findings. Students of cognitive processes and development should read it—and probably have done so. The reviewer, while aware of the book's positive attributes, experienced disappointment in the first two (theoretical) chapters, and found little to diminish the disappointment in the remaining reports. Several factors contributed to this reaction.

First, the book is a product of eleven colleagues and students who have collaborated with Professor Bruner over a period of seven years of research

at the Center for Cognitive Studies. The intent, as I interpret it, was to integrate the diverse findings of the research program by assimilating them to Bruner's theory of cognitive growth. The attempt is far from successful—rather one finds a restatement of Bruner's theory, a series of research reports insufficiently detailed for critical evaluation, and data forced into the mold of an incomplete theory. Perhaps such an outcome was unavoidable since some of the research was completed prior to Piaget's influence, and some *during* the emergence of Bruner's new conceptualizations of cognitive growth. Further, the research problems chosen were more often posed by Piaget's, not Bruner's, theory. Thus, the book is most appropriately described as a collection of research reports that have varying degrees of relevance to the theories of both Bruner and Piaget.

One would expect, under any circumstances today, that a study with this scope of problems in cognitive change would reflect something of Piaget's work. In fact, eight of the eleven "data" chapters represent concern for Piagetian concepts and problems. The reader soon becomes aware, however, that the melody of Bruner's theory is broken by a sporadic Piagetian counterpoint that is too often dominant, intrusive, and irrelevant. For example, reiterations of Piaget's "maturational bias" and his confusion of logic and "psychologic." Such comments are frequent, but too cursory for analytic purposes, seldom add to the reader's understanding, and in many cases contribute to misunderstanding of both theories.

The similarity of Bruner's conceptualization of levels of representation (action, image, symbol) to Piaget's stages of cognitive development (i.e., sensory-motor, concrete-operational,

¹ Jerome S. Bruner, *The Process of Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

² "The Course of Cognitive Growth," *American Psychologist*, XIX (1964), 1-15; and "The Growth of Mind," *American Psychologist*, XX (1965), 1007-17.

³ *Toward a Theory of Instruction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

formal-operational) creates difficulty, apparently, in making discriminations on dimensions of basic difference. The fundamental differences between Bruner's levels and Piaget's stages are: first, differences between a theory of "statics" (i.e., information selection, storage, and retrieval) and a theory of "dynamics" (i.e., information coordination and transformation); second, differences in criteria of "explanation" (descriptive metaphor vs. formal-mathematical systems); and third, differences in the formulation and use of the concept "stage" in a theory of cognitive development. The different emphases can be complementary and contribute to our understanding of cognitive development.⁴ On the other hand, cursory analysis of presumed and superficial differences and apparent lack of understanding of Piaget's theory (e.g., "conservation" is a cognitive, *not* a behavioral, product) detract from the value of this book for students of cognitive growth. Furthermore, differences in style of exposition make this book seem more a "collection" than an integrated work.

Piaget, it is true, considers the stage concept central to his theory of development; but the issue is not quite so simple as "a function of the kind of behavior one is looking at" (p. 5). Nor would Piaget disagree that "intellectual growth can be understood only in terms of the psychological mechanisms that mediate it" (p. 6); however, he (among others) would be puzzled by the meaning of the remaining part of that sentence: "and that the explanation of growth cannot be effected by involving the nature of culture, the nature of language, the inherent logic of child thought, or the nature of man's

evolutionary history" (p. 6). The quotation above represents "almost a methodological credo," yet several of the research reports deal with the effects of culture and language on children's developing thought processes, and there are many references to evolutionary history and "inherent logic." Does this reflect involvement? Or explanation? Or eclecticism? Or what?

Now, of course, the reference to "inherent logic" is meant as another reminder of Piaget's error in confusing logic and psychologic processes. Bruner makes two points: (1) that describing the formal properties of behavior is not "explanation"; and (2) the "inherent logic" of child thought is insufficient to explain cognitive growth. Many scientists would argue (including the reviewer) that structural analysis of behavioral development and matching that structure with mathematical systems (even qualitative) is *one* approach to "explanation." Furthermore, the phrase "inherent logic" as used here is highly misleading; Piaget has reiterated so often (and it should not be necessary again) that the problem is to determine empirically whether, or to what extent, behavior and thought processes are isomophoric to differing logical-mathematical systems at different stages of development. Further, the apparent disdain for "inherent" logic is surprising since these authors find it necessary to endow the five-year-old with a large number of primitive "inherents" (primitive categories, primitive identities, primitive syntactical systems, etc.) that are not unrelated to "logic." Research emanating from both Geneva and infant-study laboratories in this country indicates that analysis of the growth of cognitive structures during the first five years reveals the so-called "primitives" as products of environment-organism interactions from

⁴ Bärbel Inhelder, *et al.*, "On Cognitive Development," *American Psychologist*, XXI (1966), 160-4.

birth (e.g., neither object permanence nor classification behavior are "givens"). Piaget believes these acquisition processes, as the subsequent cognitive transitions, are amenable to a structural description and formal "explanation." Certainly such statements need to be verified (if possible), but confusing Piaget's psychology with his epistemology is not the most appropriate route to a better conceptualization.

Comments relevant to Piaget seem to dominate this review only because his theory is omnipresent in this collection. Such was not necessary, really. Bruner has a potentially fruitful theory, and many of its implications for cognitive growth are clear (e.g., the effect of conflict in the levels of representation) and demand further, detailed exploration. Also, the stronger emphasis on the effect of event-system programming on cognitive growth stimulated the most interesting studies reported (Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13).

These latter chapters reflect a more analytic approach to Piaget's conservation problems and yield important data relevant to alternative interpretations. For example, "labeling" and subject's "manipulation of materials" combined (Chapter 10) proved to be the most effective procedures for inducing conservation concepts. One interpretation might be that both procedures activate mechanisms of attention that increase the probability of assimilation of information about *object transformations* relevant to "conservation." Piaget's emphasis on "dynamics," then, may be correct; but it is clear from these data, and those on the effects of language and culture (Chapters 11, 12, 13), that the details of the "operational" theory are not yet clear. Bruner, *et al.* do not, however, provide the reader with the specifics of their alternative interpretation,

nor are these latter findings integrated with those reported earlier in the series (e.g., "On Conceptual Strategies," Chapter 6; and "On Relational Concepts," Chapter 8). We are looking forward to a book that more clearly explicates and extends the potentials of Bruner's theory of cognitive growth.

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PSYCHOLOGY IN COMMUNITY SETTINGS.

by Seymour B. Sarason, Murray Levine, I. Ira Goldenburg, Dennis L. Cherlin, and Edward M. Bennett.

New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966. 714 pp. \$12.95.

This is an important book, a useful book, an exciting book, yet it leaves one frustrated and unhappy for a number of reasons. Sarason and his colleagues have described in great detail how the Yale University Psycho-Educational Clinic and New Haven's forerunner of antipoverty programs, Community Progress, Inc., handled a wide variety of important problems and issues, with particular reference to the disadvantaged child of the "Inner City." The clinic's activities ranged from work with elementary-school children, to a neighborhood employment center, a work-crew program, and a center for the mentally retarded. There are a great number of case examples which are probably the book's strongest asset as a teaching vehicle. Young community and school psychologists-to-be and other school and community mental-health workers will find a wide variety of problems presented in these cases, which can be used for seminar discussion or beginning practicum reading. More experienced workers would wish that the

discussion of the examples had less of a "soap box" quality and more of a tie to the increasing literature in this area. This is one of the frustrations; one is left with the feeling, for example, that the use of consultation methods in elementary schools was newly discovered and developed by the members of the Psycho-Educational Clinic. The reader is given little indication of the large number of theoretical and anecdotal papers already published about consultation techniques and how the present study relates to these.

While the authors are "weak" in relating some of their work to previous similar attempts, they are "strong" in their repetition of the things they did. The result is a rather overwritten book, as if they were fearful that their thoughts would not be acceptable, and felt they had to repeat in order to be understood. This heavy style, combined with an uneven quality in the presentation, also leaves one unhappy. (Perhaps the fact that there were five authors would account for variations in style from one part of the book to the next.)

On the positive side of the ledger, one cannot deny that a number of ground-breaking efforts are being described in this book. After a short history of the development of clinical psychology following World War II and the present problems of this profession, we are hurled immediately into attempted solutions: (a) psychologists should go where the problems are, such as in schools and other community settings; (b) traditional clinic approaches will not work with the disadvantaged; (c) professional preciousness or mental-health parochialism cannot be acceptable if we are to accomplish change and to extend services; (d) the field of mental subnormality cannot be periph-

eral to our focus if we are to accept our social responsibilities as a profession. Not all of these issues are treated with equal depth, but the reader is left with the repeated impressions from case examples that the authors prove their points.

Perhaps today, as we prepare for the advent of many new community mental health centers, these same suggestions should stand out in bold relief. If, as Albee noted, we are to have merely "old wine in new bottles," or old-fashioned mental-health programs housed in new, fancy buildings, we will have accomplished nothing. Sarason *et al.* point a way to new methods, aims, and goals. Instead of attacking difficult problems with traditional methods, such as lengthy child-guidance clinic diagnostics, long waiting lists, the team approach, or waiting for the patient to express his need, they have "gone where the action is." They have focused on two major areas which are not necessarily the bailiwick of the physician (psychiatrist); i.e., the world of education and the world of work. Instead of waiting for the patient, they have gone more than halfway to meet him; instead of dealing with mental health issues and questionable one-to-one therapy methods, they have emphasized consultation through significant others, such as parents, teachers, supervisors, administrators, and employees; instead of waiting for a team to work through its individual members' professional and status problems, they have reduced professional preciousness by assigning all responsibility for a case to one staff member who guides the case with some assistance and consultation from others. The result is one of the first psychological service centers with primary emphasis on the difficult problems of the disadvantaged.

The initial portion of the book deals with an approach to the schools and its problems. Description of entrance into this complex social system and the development of a consultant role is given in great detail, as is the analysis of the teacher's role. Much was accomplished. The mental-health workers felt they were able to bring about many changes in teachers' perceptions and handling of children, and they note a positive "spread of effect" to other children. On the other hand, all was not sweetness and light. They faced many limitations in regard to the social system of the school, the personal limitations of certain principals and teachers, and finally their own professional limitations and lack of experience in dealing with these problems within schools.

Their relationship to Community Progress, Inc., gave the members of the Psycho-Educational Clinic a much different type of problem with which to deal. Although many of the problems were of a mental-health type, the staff was wise to see that the usual mental-illness model and its solutions would not provide the answer. By using indigenous people, who were in no way trained mental-health workers, for staffing a Neighborhood Employment Center, the program was able to reach out to applicants, even going into peoples' homes and bringing them into their offices. The Psycho-Educational Clinic provided consultation.

Perhaps the most interesting and different consultant function is in relation to the so-called work-crew program. This consists of crews of youths, under the direction of a foreman, undertaking a combination of prevocational training on a job with remedial education—twenty hours of work plus four and a half hours of remedial education each week. There were eighteen such

crews with five to seven youngsters each. The consultant worked closely with the foreman in effecting the various changes and also helped to facilitate communication between the foremen on the job and the teacher in the remedial program. One of the difficulties which seems to arise from time to time in the discussion is the blurring of the consultant's role: Is he an extramural or intramural consultant? In both the school and work-program setting, it would seem that the consultant came from an outside agency, the clinic. Yet the type of payment for services and the method of close involvement with on-going programs would suggest more of an intramural functioning. This increases the pressure on the consultant in that he must be even more sensitive to possible breach of confidential material or the possibility of being manipulated by the setting of which he becomes so much a part. These issues have often been carefully discussed by writers on consultation, but there is little note made of these factors by the authors. Somehow, good clinical sensitivity, social awareness, and the ability to land "right side up" in new settings seemed to have worked for the Psycho-Educational Clinic group.

In conclusion, this book will have an impact. It is not perfect, but it does pack a punch. It describes vividly how psychologists can leave their offices and work with difficult problems in the "real world." It is hoped that many others will follow these leads. Perhaps the ultimate frustration engendered by this book is that not enough mental-health professionals are dealing with these problems in a similar fashion; the old systems die slowly and hard.

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MEN, MACHINES, AND MODERN TIMES.
by Elting E. Morison.
Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press,
1966. 235 pp. \$5.95.

Professor Morison's book brings together a number of essays he has written over the years based upon case histories of technological innovations. He can be praised for the delightful way in which he captures the spirit and character of situation and protagonist in the stories he narrates. But the essays fall more in the spirit of the anecdote than in the tradition of analytic history. The book becomes successful if read in the former light, but does not acquit itself well if viewed in the latter context.

The form of each essay is similar. The events surrounding the introduction of nineteenth-century technology are described. From this, broad principles are deduced which describe both the requisite conditions for the successful introduction of the mechanical invention and the origins of the social reception accorded it. In each essay, there is particular concern for finding the causes of resistance to the innovation. Though Professor Morison hopes these case studies teach us ways to respond more easily to change, he generously admits that the experience of the nineteenth century serves "more as the substance for illuminating parable than as confirming evidence in a contemporary situation" (p. 12).

The parables are engaging. An excellent account, for example, is given of the introduction of continuous-aim firing in the U.S. Navy. In this episode, a young naval officer persists in his claim that a change in the gear ratio for elevating and depressing the ship's guns and a re-designing of the mounting apparatus of the sighting telescope would markedly increase the accuracy

and rapidity of gunfire at sea. A final appeal to President Theodore Roosevelt is required before the innovation gains general acceptance. Also enlivening is Professor Morison's tale of the ship, Wampanoag, and the conversion of the U.S. Navy to the use of steam power. And an account of the introduction of the Bessemer process of making steel into the United States and England is done with considerable skill.

These anecdotes, however, do not provide sufficient evidence for the general postulates drawn from them. And indeed, even weaker are the prescriptive comments in the essays. For example, Professor Morison's parable about naval gunnery is supposed to suggest the following hypothesis and solution:

(1) *hypothesis*: personal or limited identification with a concept, convention, or attitude is a great barrier to change.

(2) *solution*: (a) broaden the sphere of identification from the part to the whole by defining the group's "grand object" and making sure that it is communicated to every member of the group (p. 42); (b) become an "adaptive society," one which "extracts the fullest possible returns from the opportunities at hand" (p. 43); (c) construct "a new view of ourselves as a society" by developing greater respect for the process of living and a lesser reverence for attachment to "any special product" of society (p. 43).

In the final chapter, Professor Morison expresses his concern that we may have created an artificial environment from our technology which has grown too complicated for man to control. To deal with this dilemma, he proposes the conscious building of a new culture which would "contain the new technol-

ogy within its appropriate limits... that will give clear definition to what in the scheme of things our new interests really are" (p. 214). He would achieve this end mainly by allowing members of society to have a direct part in social decisions through their conducting small experiments with new inventions in the environment in which the innovation is to be used. By so doing, they would understand better, he believes, the social effects of the new technology. He would like to build such an experimental approach to technological innovation "into our habits of mind" (p. 223). This is an admirable suggestion, outlining a procedure which is already being carried out, though on a much smaller scale than he proposes. What is irksome about it all is that, although the problems he discusses are indeed genuine, his proposals, lacking substantive methods of implementation, become platitudinous.

Finally, though similar conclusions are drawn from the several anecdotes, the essays in no sense form a conceptual whole. It is clear that they were written at different times for different audiences.

Professor Morison's book is not recommended for those seeking a substantive analysis of either the effect of technology on society or the posture society might adopt in response to it. The book is recommended to those interested in well-written case studies about the origins of some nineteenth-century technologies.

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BRITISH UNIVERSITIES.

by Sir James Mountford.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. vii + 180 pp. \$1.85 (paper).

This book is intended as an authoritative introduction to the British university system. Because Sir James does not define the term British universities, the unsuspecting reader may assume incorrectly that the topic of the book is British higher education. It would have been useful to the reader had the author stipulated, in the introductory pages, what he meant by the term British universities, and discussed these institutions in the total context of British higher education.

Sir James, in fact, is referring to some forty-three institutions chartered as universities which in January 1966 enrolled a total of 168,963 full-time students. The 1963 Robbins Report indicated that 290,000 full-time places would be needed in British higher education in 1966. Assuming the Robbins estimate to be fairly accurate, in 1965-66 the British universities accounted for approximately two-thirds of full-time enrollment in British higher education. The principal institutions of higher learning other than the universities are the Colleges of Education, which in 1965-66 enrolled over 80,000 persons.

Sir James states that since 1945 the number of institutions of university status has almost doubled and the enrollment of students has increased almost fourfold. He continues:

What the universities do and how they do it have become topics of general interest to the community at large. It is the purpose of the following pages to describe these activities with as much factual detail as seems necessary and against an historical

background which it is hoped will be illuminating. (p. 2)

British Universities is divided into five chapters—"Historical Outline," "Universities at Work," "Students and Staff," "Organization and Finance," and "Universities and the State." Rather than summarize each of these chapters, the reviewer hopes that his critical comments will elicit an accurate idea of the nature of this book.

A major merit of the book is its presentation of interesting and up-to-date information. Furthermore, Sir James' historical chapter is both comprehensive and well-researched. As a whole, the book contains much material that is not always readily available. For instance, there is an illuminating, itemized table on the recurrent expenditure and income of the universities and a good discussion of the membership, functions, and procedures of the University Grants Committee.

The book, nevertheless, has many shortcomings. The problem of definition has been introduced above. This problem, however, goes beyond the need of careful definition to the necessity for thinking through a sharply delineated classification scheme with which to analyze both institutional and national systems of higher education. Had Sir James, for instance, applied the concepts of structure and function to British universities, he might have made clearer distinctions between the different kinds of complex wholes which constitute the system.

Another shortcoming of the book is the author's tendency to make inadequately supported statements. A glaring example of this is his remark: "Within a university context there is no opposition between teaching and research: the two interact upon one another" (p. 50). In terms of the

scarcity of faculty time alone, the teaching/research conflict cannot be sloughed off so lightly. A second example is the author's assertion concerning the adjustment of the universities to the changing needs and desires of society:

but the history of (say) the last hundred years shows how well universities have adjusted themselves by expanding their range of studies and the balance between them. (p. 162)

This reviewer would like much more supporting evidence for this statement on the responsiveness of British universities to the demands of changing times before he would ever be prepared to accept it. Other examples can be found in the passage on methods of teaching, in which Sir James does not take into account the research evidence that is available, and relies instead on impressionistic evidence.

The section on curriculum might well have been expanded. Sir James has a tantalizing passage on the curricula at the newer universities—enough material to stimulate interest, but not enough to satisfy it. The passage on postgraduate studies also might have been amplified to indicate more exactly the nature of graduate work in Britain. The reviewer was left wondering whether graduate students are required to take course work; how much of the nation's professional education is done in the universities; and what might be the state of the social sciences in graduate education—not to mention undergraduate education.

One further matter which might have been elaborated is the rationale for siting the newer universities. To what extent was the regional universities approach considered in the location of these universities? Universities established on this basis would educate

the young people of a particular region and, in all likelihood, would be able to more readily attract financial support from that region. In a country where, in 1963-64, Exchequer grants comprised 71.3 per cent of the current income of the universities as well as a large share of their capital funds, the issue of the advantages and disadvantages of pluralism in educational finance is extremely germane.

In conclusion, as a compendium of facts and information, *British Universities* has distinct merits. This reviewer learned much from it even though, in certain instances, he wished he could have learned more.

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SCHOOL, CURRICULUM, AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

by John I. Goodlad.

*Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing
Company, 1966. 259 pp. \$6.50.*

In this new and significant book, John Goodlad moves about within the complex structure of the school with the easy familiarity of one who has met and mastered each bump along the way to his position of eminence in the curriculum field, and who can see more clearly than most what lies ahead. Goodlad is always worth reading or hearing. This book lives up to the promise of his earlier works in that it is a timely and valuable contribution to the inadequate store of knowledge on the heart of an educational system—the day's work for the student: the school curriculum.

A less than careful reading of *School, Curriculum, and the Individual* might

lead one to believe that Goodlad has merely cleaned out his files and put two dozen papers between covers. Fortunately, this is not the case. There are recurring themes in this well-organized collection of papers. In Part I, three previously published papers on school function, individual differences, and other educational matters are presented in a single chapter. Part II presents ten papers organized into three chapters under the general title, "Organizing School and Classroom." In this section, dimensions of school organization, the promotion-nonpromotion dilemma, and alternative patterns and practices are discussed. Part III deals with problems of organizing the curriculum. Particularly interesting to this reviewer is Chapter V, which discusses the status of curriculum as a field of study and the need for conceptual systems to guide curriculum inquiry and practice. Chapters VI and VII are especially useful in helping one think about data sources and a cluster of key questions with which curriculum workers concern themselves. The four concluding chapters in Part IV look into the future and present exciting ideas about well-stocked pharmacies of tested educational alternatives.

The author deals first with his thoughts on an often-forgotten subject in works on education, the product that emerges from the school—battered by twelve or thirteen years of unremitting instruction, beckoned by the draft board, the college door, and the girl next door. His concern for the individual is a recurrent theme in the book:

Traditionally, we have viewed schools as society's crucibles for molding the talents needed by that society. But predicting the talents likely to be needed by a given society

a generation hence and, therefore, to be developed in the young today is a difficult, if not impossible, task. We cannot predict what society will be like, but only that a dynamic, self-renewing society will require self-renewing individuals.

Schools, if they are to contribute to the production of such individuals and such a society, must identify and foster human abilities not always cherished by schools of today and yesterday. Furthermore, in the process, they must take into account the vast differences in background, aptitude, and present attainment of students in each and every trait to be developed. Increasing insight into the nature of these differences makes the problems of schooling no less easy. (p. 1)

Goodlad then states the central task of education which, in his view, is to develop "universal individuals who value as one both self and all mankind, sensing immortality as the idea of mankind and not the fact of man" (p. 3). One decides immediately, I think, that here is a portrait of an individual as elusive as the Holy Grail, whose discovery is worth infinite effort, worth all the change that brings discomfort to the daily life of the professional schoolman, worth all the strife between teachers and principals, superintendents and school boards, chairmen and legislators, state agencies and federal agencies—a task for education that makes the whole game worthwhile.

Warning that to be intellectual or well-educated does not necessarily clothe one with a mantle of rationality, Goodlad says:

The rational man not only is committed to the rich fruits of inquiry but also is prepared to act and, indeed, acts upon insight rendered

compelling by commitment. He knows, as perhaps the most vital ingredient of his rationality, that only through action following understanding and commitment does man forge the links in the chains of his own humanity and of mankind's immortality. He senses his place in time and space and his individual responsibility to that place, time, and space. (p. 4)

Goodlad issues a challenge to educational reformers: Go after the intellectual "standing disdainfully uncommitted, the educated man standing impeccably uninvolved" (p. 4).

As he progresses from school and classroom organization to an examination of tomorrow's schools, Goodlad pursues his defense of the individual. He charges, and I agree, that the school tends to play it safe and cozy on the side of conformity, a charge which unfortunately can be applied with equal devastation against anything old enough or big enough to be called an institution, whether it be a car manufacturer flinching from the accusations of a Ralph Nader or a school official avoiding controversy with the P.T.A. According to Goodlad, the school too often smoothes out the rough edges of the individual so effectively that all students tend to emerge as if from the same mold. The need for the school to find firm ground combining the discipline of conformity with the exciting, often dangerous appeal of nonconformity comes through loud and clear.

The part of the book that is particularly appealing to this reviewer is the author's down-to-earth look at both the content of the curriculum and the structure of its organization. In its examination of these matters, the NEA Project on Instruction reached conclusions that are in accord with Goodlad's

views. Because the Project dealt with these matters in considerably more detail, however, it may be useful here to present some of its findings that are most relevant to the volume under review. For example, one of the Project's concerns was to establish priorities in school responsibility, to help people decide that reading is more important than cheerleading. It was recommended that the first responsibility of the school embraces the teaching of reading, writing, speaking, disciplined thinking, methods of inquiry, and, essential to it all, the *use* of knowledge. Other priorities for the school, the Project concluded, are understanding of the humanities and the arts, the social and natural sciences, and mathematics, as well as appreciation of literature, music, and visual arts, and instruction in health education and physical education. The Project on Instruction concluded that the development of values and ideals, social and civic competence, and vocational education are responsibilities shared by the school, the family, and other outside influences.

The Project also shared with Goodlad a keen interest in who makes decisions about what is to be taught. In a section on curriculum decisions, Goodlad draws upon the NEA Project on Instruction as a reference when he calls for establishment of independent, regional, curriculum-study centers, staffed with specialists in relevant fields of inquiry for the purpose of conducting the necessary studies and disseminating their findings. School boards, he emphasizes, seldom assume adequate responsibility in determining aims for their schools and lack the professional resources for continuing studies. The recently established R & D Centers and Regional Educational Laboratories are examples of the re-

sponse of the federal government. The National Education Association has responded in a similar way by setting up the NEA Center for the Study of Instruction.

Goodlad makes a good case for an informed school board by pointing out that school officials who set forth comprehensive educational aims reflecting consensus in the community are giving the school staff clear guidelines so they can proceed with confidence in carrying out their objectives.

In an examination of curriculum balance, Goodlad poses the provocative opinion that it is not enough to know that a child can learn physics or logic at an early age; research is needed to determine whether the time is well-spent or wasteful—whether the same knowledge might not be acquired more quickly and more effectively at a later age.

Goodlad concludes from his review of curriculum organization that a school's curriculum must emphasize fundamental concepts, skills, and values and leave the teacher free to make the decisions that will match the learner to the particular learning opportunity with the greatest degree of effectiveness. He is critical of school boards and state policy-makers for their apathy in regard to curriculum-building. Nor does the teacher escape criticism:

Local school districts still use committees of teachers for the development of curriculum guides, although this practice has declined in recent years, especially at the secondary school level. Their work often is cyclical in nature. The teachers take many of their cues for what should be taught from existing textbooks, and textbook publishers, in turn, use these curriculum guides in de-

termining what should go into the texts. (p. 187)

Such an indictment of nonsystem, he concludes, is an argument for the use of regional curriculum centers staffed by experts on the theory and practice of curriculum planning, accessible to specialists in the behavioral sciences and the academic disciplines. Education has never adequately tapped the rich resources of our colleges and universities. The potential for partnership between the university and the public school system, utilizing also the potential for cooperative efforts by federal, state, and local governments, is only beginning to be realized. Goodlad, furthermore, details the gap

between research and experimentation, on the one hand, and the use of new findings in the classroom on the other.

I have dealt here more with Goodlad's general views on curriculum than on school organization for the simple reason that curriculum seems to me the more important of the two interwoven topics and, therefore, in need of more emphasis. Goodlad is an authoritative voice on curriculum and school organization. He is, as always, a rational man, a most valued spokesman for the schools he serves.

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The author examines the ideas of Piaget and Montessori and notes the parallels and divergences in the interests, backgrounds, and ideas of these two researchers. Illustrating these ideas with his own and other research, the author points up several popular misunderstandings.

DAVID ELKIND

University of Rochester

Piaget and Montessori

In recent years there has been a renaissance of American interest in the work of two Europeans, Jean Piaget and Maria Montessori. Although the reasons for this rebirth of interest are many and varied, two reasons appear beyond dispute. First of all, both Piaget and Montessori have observed hitherto unexpected and unknown facets of child thought and behavior. Secondly, and in this lies their impact, both of these innovators have derived the general laws and principles regarding child thought and behavior which were implicit in their observations. In the case of Piaget, these observations led to a new philosophy of knowledge while in the case of Montessori, they led to a new philosophy of education.

Unfortunately, it is not possible, in a presentation such as this one, to do any sort of justice to the contributions of these two innovators. Under the circumstances, all that I would like to do is to describe, and to illustrate with research data, three original ideas about child thought and behavior which Piaget and Montessori arrived at independently but share in common. Before turning to those ideas, however, it seems appropriate, by way of introduction, to note some of the parallels and divergences in the Piagetian and Montessorian approaches to child study.

PARALLELS AND DIVERGENCES

Among the many parallels between the work of Piaget and Montessori, one of the most pervasive is the predominantly biological orientation which they

take towards the thought and behavior of the child. This is not surprising in view of their backgrounds. Piaget, for example, was publishing papers in biology while still in his teens and took his doctorate in biology at the University of Lausanne. Likewise, Montessori was trained as a physician (she was, it will be recalled, the first woman in Italy to receive a medical degree) and engaged in and published medical research (cf. Standing, 1957). This shared biological orientation is important because both these workers see mental growth as an extension of biological growth and as governed by the same principles and laws.

In addition to, and perhaps because of, this shared biological orientation, both Piaget and Montessori emphasize the normative aspects of child behavior and development as opposed to the aspects of individual difference. Piaget, for example, has been concerned with identifying those mental structures which, if they hold true for the individual, also hold true for the species. Likewise, Montessori has been concerned with those needs and abilities that are common to all children such as the "sensitive periods" and the "explosions" into exploration. This is not to say that Piaget and Montessori in any way deny or minimize the importance of individual differences; far from it. What they do argue is that an understanding of normal development is a necessary starting point for a full understanding of differences between individuals.

The last parallel in the approaches of Piaget and Montessori which I would like to mention is of a more personal nature. Both of these workers manifest what might be called a *genius for empathy with the child*. When reading Piaget or Montessori, one often has the uncanny feeling that they are somehow able to get inside the child and know exactly what he is thinking and feeling and why he is doing what he is doing at any given moment. It is this genius for empathy with the child which, or so it seems to me, gives their observations and insights—even without the buttressing of systematic research—the solid ring of truth.

Despite these parallels, Piaget and Montessori also diverge in significant ways in their approaches to the child. For Piaget, the study of the child is really a means to an end rather than an end in itself. He is not so much concerned with children *qua* children as he is with using the study of the child to answer questions about the nature and origin of knowledge. Please do not misunderstand; Piaget is in no way callous towards the child and has given not a little of his considerable energies and administrative talents to national and international endeavors on the part of children. He has not, however, concerned himself with child-rearing practices, nor—at least until recently and only with reluctance—has he dealt with educational issues (e.g. Piaget, 1964). There is only so much any one person can do, and Piaget sees his con-

tribution primarily in the area of logic and epistemology and only secondarily in the area of child psychology and education.

Montessori, on the other hand, was from the very outset of her career directly concerned with the welfare of the child. Much of her long and productive life was devoted to the training of teachers, the education of parents, and the liberation of the child from a pedagogy which she believed was as detrimental to his mental growth as poor diet was to his physical growth. Montessori, then, was dedicated to improving the lot of the child in very concrete ways.

The other major divergences between these two innovators stem more or less directly from this central difference in approach. Piaget is primarily concerned with theory while Montessori's commitment was to practice. Moreover, Piaget sees his work as being in opposition to "arm chair" epistemology and views himself as the "man in the middle," between the arch empiricists and the arch nativists. Montessori, in contrast, saw herself in opposition to traditional Herbartian pedagogy, which she regarded as medieval in its total disregard for the rights and needs of the child.

CONVERGING IDEAS

I hope that I will be excused if I focus upon Montessori's ideas rather than her methods, for that is where the convergence of Piaget and Montessori is greatest and where the available research is most relevant. Definitive research with respect to the effectiveness of Montessori's methods seems, insofar as I have been able to determine, yet to be completed.

Nature and Nurture

It would be easy, but unfair and incorrect, to contrast Piaget and Montessori with those who seem to take a strong environmentalist position with respect to mental development. Even if we start with writers at the extreme end of the environmentalist camp such as Watson (1928) or more recently, at least apparently, Bruner (1960), it would be a misrepresentation to say that they deny the role of nature in development. The real issue is not one of either nature or nurture but rather one of the character of their interaction. One of the innovations of Piaget and Montessori lies, then, not so much in their championing of the role of nature as in the original way in which they have conceived the character of nature-nurture interaction.

As was mentioned earlier, both Piaget and Montessori see mental growth as an extension of physical growth, and it is in the elaboration of this idea that they have made their unique contribution to the problem of nature-nurture interaction. Their position means, in the first place, that the en-

vironment provides nourishment for the growth of mental structures just as it does for the growth of physical organs. It means in addition, and this has been stressed particularly by Montessori, that some forms of environmental nourishment are more beneficial than others for sustaining mental growth just as some foods are more beneficial than others for sustaining physical growth. The "prepared environment" in the Montessori school is designed to provide the best possible nourishment for mental growth.

The relation between nature and nurture in mental growth is, however, not as one-sided as that. Not only does the child utilize environmental stimuli to nourish his own growth, but growth must adapt and modify itself in accordance with the particular environment within which it takes place. Of the many possible languages a child can learn, he learns the one to which he is exposed. The same holds true for his concepts and percepts which are, in part at least, determined by the social and physical milieu in which he grows up. Both Piaget and Montessori recognize and take account of this directive role which the environment plays in the determination of mental content. Indeed, the beauty of the Montessori materials (such as sandpaper letters, number rods, form and weight inset boards) lies in the fact that they simultaneously provide the child with nourishment for the growth of mental capacities and with relevant educational content. In short, for both Piaget and Montessori, nature interacts in a dual way with nurture. As far as mental capacities are concerned, the environment serves as nourishment for the growth of mental structures or abilities whose pattern of development follows a course which is laid down in the genes. Insofar as the content of thought is concerned, nurture plays a more directive role and determines the particular language, concepts, percepts, and values that the child will acquire.

What evidence do we have for this conception of the dual character of nature-nurture interaction? With respect to the environment as a provider of nourishment for an inner-directed pattern of structural development, there is considerable evidence¹ from Piaget-related research. In a study by Hyde (1959) for example, children of different nationalities—British, Arab, Indian, and Somali—were given a battery of Piaget-type number and quantity tasks. Regardless of nationality and language, these children gave the same responses as Piaget had attained with Swiss children. More recently, Goodnow and Bethon (1966) found little difference between Chinese and American children with respect to the age at which they manifested concrete reasoning. These cross-cultural findings suggest that children can utilize whatever stimuli are available in their immediate environs to foster their mental

¹For a more complete summary of this evidence see J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1963).

growth just as children all over the world can utilize quite different diets to realize their physical growth.

At the same time, there is also considerable evidence with respect to the directive role which environmental stimulation plays with respect to the content of thought. In a cross-cultural study by Lambert and Klineberg (1967) for example, there were differences even at the six-year-old level in response to the question "What are you?" Most American children thought of themselves primarily as "a boy" or as "a girl" while Bantu youngsters usually described themselves in terms of race. Furthermore, Lebanese children, frequently responded to the question in kinship terms and gave responses such as "the nephew of Ali." This study amply illustrates the role of the physical and social environment in shaping the child's self-concept.

For both Piaget and Montessori, then, nature-nurture interaction has a dual character. In the case of mental capacities, nature plays the directive role and nurture is subservient, while just the reverse is true with respect to the content of thought. It is in their emphasis upon the dual character of nature-nurture interaction that Piaget and Montessori have made their signal contribution to this age-old problem.

Capacity and Learning

Within experimental psychology, the child is generally viewed as a naive organism. That is to say, a child is one who is lacking in experience although his capacity to learn is no different from that of the adult. If differences between children and adults exist, then they reside in the fact that adults have had more opportunity and time to profit from experience than have children. For both Piaget and Montessori, however, the child is a *young* organism which means that his needs and capacities are quite different from those of the adult. This issue can be put more directly by saying that for the experimental psychologist capacity is determined by learning, whereas for the developmental psychologist learning is determined by capacity or development.

To make this point concrete, let me use a crude but useful analogy. Over the past ten years, we have seen several "generations" of computers. The early computers were relatively slow and quite limited in the amount of information which they could store. The most recent computers, on the other hand, are extremely fast and have enormous memories. Even the earliest computers, however, could handle some of the programs that the high-speed computers can. On the other hand, no matter how many programs were run on the early computers, their capacity was not altered but remained fixed by the limits of their hardware. To be sure, by ingenious programing, these early computers were able to do some extraordinary things, but their limitations in terms of hardware persisted.

As you have anticipated, the several generations of computers can be likened to the several stages in the development of intelligence. Just as the hardware of the computer determines its memory and speed, so the mental structures at any given level of development determine the limits of the child's learning. Likewise, just as the number of programs run on a computer leaves its speed and memory unaltered, so does the number of problems a child has solved or the number of concepts attained not change his problem-solving or concept-learning capacities. Furthermore, just as we can, with elaborate programing, get the computer to do things it was not intended to do, so we can with specialized training get children to learn things which seem beyond their ken. Such training does not, however, change their capacity to learn any more than an ingenious computer program alters the speed or memory of the computer. This is what Piaget and Montessori have in mind by the notion that capacity determines learning and not the reverse.

This idea is frequently misunderstood by many advocates of Piaget and Montessori. Indeed, and here we must be frank, much of the acceptance of Piaget and Montessori in America today seems to be based on the promise which their ideas hold out for accelerating growth. Nothing, however, could be further from their own beliefs and intentions. Piaget was recently quoted as saying, "Probably the organization of operations has an optimal time. . . . for example, we know that it takes nine to twelve months before babies develop the notion that an object is still there even when a screen is placed in front of it. Now kittens go through the same stages as children, all the same substages, but they do it in three months—so they are six months ahead of babies. Is this an advantage or isn't it? We can certainly see our answer in one sense. The kitten is not going to go much further. The child has taken longer, but he is capable of going further, so it seems to me that the nine months probably were not for nothing" (Jennings, 1967, p. 82). In the same vein, Montessori wrote, "We must not, therefore, set ourselves the educational problem of seeking means whereby to organize the internal personality of the child and develop his characteristics: the sole problem is that of offering the child the necessary nourishment" (Montessori, 1964, p. 70).

The view that capacity determines what will be learned has been supported in a negative way by the failure of many experiments designed to train children on Piaget-type reasoning tasks² (e.g., Greco, 1959; Smedslund, 1959;

² Most of these tasks deal with conservation or the child's ability to deduce permanence despite apparent change. For example, the child might be "shown" two equal quantities of colored water in identical containers one of which is emptied into two smaller containers before his eyes. Since the child has no way of measuring the equality of the liquid in the large container and that in the two smaller containers, he must—if he can—deduce the equality on the basis of their prior equality and his awareness that pouring does not change amount.

Wohlwill, 1959; 1960). In addition, however, there is also evidence of a positive sort which substantiates the role of capacity in the determination of what is learned. In one of our studies, for example, we demonstrated that while six-, seven-, and eight-year-old children could all improve their perceptual performance as a result of training, it was also true that the oldest children made the most improvement with the least training (Elkind, Koegler, and Go, 1962). We have, moreover, recently shown (Elkind, Van Doorninck, and Schwarz, 1967) that there are some perceptual concepts—such as setting or background—which kindergarten children cannot attain but which are easily acquired by second-grade youngsters. In the same vein, we have also demonstrated that there are marked differences in the conceptual strategies⁸ employed by children and adolescents and that these strategies limit the kinds of concepts which elementary-school children can attain (Elkind, 1966; Elkind, Barocas, and Johnsen, forthcoming; Elkind, Barocas, and Rosenthal, forthcoming). Similar findings have been reported by Weir (1964) and by Peel (1960).

There is, then, evidence that capacity does determine what is learned and how it is learned. Such findings do not deny that children "learn to learn" or that at any age they can learn techniques which enable them to use their abilities more effectively. All that such studies argue is that development sets limits as to what can be learned at any particular point in the child's life. These studies are in keeping with the positions of Piaget and Montessori. As we have seen, neither of these innovators advocates the acceleration of mental growth. What they do emphasize is the necessity of providing the child with the settings and stimuli which will free any given child to realize his capacities at his own time and pace. Such a standpoint is quite different from one which advocates the acceleration of mental growth.

Cognitive Needs and Repetitive Behavior

One of the features of cognitive growth which Piaget and Montessori observed and to which they both attached considerable importance, is the frequently repetitive character of behaviors associated with emerging mental abilities. Piaget and Montessori are almost unique in this regard since within both psychology and education repetitive behavior is often described pejoratively as "rote learning" or "perseveration." Indeed, the popular view is that repetition is bad and should be avoided in our dealings with children.

What both Piaget and Montessori have recognized, however, is the very

⁸ In a problem-solving task, for example, once a child sets up an hypothesis, he continues to maintain it even when the information he receives clearly indicates that it is wrong. The adolescent, on the other hand, immediately gives up an hypothesis that is contradicted by the data and proceeds to try out a different one.

great role which repetitive behavior plays in mental growth. In his classic work on the origins of intelligence in infants, Piaget (1952a) illustrates in remarkable detail the role which primary, secondary, and tertiary circular reactions play in the construction of intellectual schemas. Likewise at a later age, Piaget (1952b) has pointed out the adaptive significance of children's repetitive "Why?" questions. Such questions, which often seem stupid or annoying to adults, are in fact the manifestation of the child's efforts at differentiating between psychological and physical causality, i.e., between intentional or motivated events and events which are a consequence of natural law.

Montessori has likewise recognized the inner significance of repetitive behavior in what she calls the "polarization of attention." Here is a striking example with which, I am sure, many of you are familiar:

I watched the child intently without disturbing her at first, and began to count how many times she repeated the exercise; then, seeing that she was continuing for a long time, I picked up the little arm chair in which she was seated and placed chair and child upon the table; the little creature hastily caught up her case of insets, laid it across the arms of the chair and gathering the cylinders into her lap, set to work again. Then I called upon the children to sing; they sang, but the little girl continued undisturbed, repeating her exercise even after the short song had come to an end. I counted forty-four repetitions; when at last she ceased, it was quite independently of any surrounding stimuli which might have distracted her, and she looked around with a satisfied air, almost as if awakening from a refreshing nap. (Montessori, 1964, pp. 67-68)

The role of repetitive behavior in intellectual development is not extraordinary when we view mental growth as analogous to physical growth. Repetitive behavior is the bench mark of maturing physical abilities. The infant who is learning to walk constantly pulls himself into an erect position. Later as a toddler he begins pulling and dropping everything within reach. Such behavior does not derive from an innate perversity or drive towards destruction but rather out of a need to practice the ability to hold and to let go. What the child is doing in such situations is practicing or perfecting emerging motor abilities. Mental abilities are realized in the same way. In the course of being constituted, intellectual abilities seek to exercise themselves on whatever stimuli are available. The four-year-old who is constantly comparing the size of his portions with those of his siblings is not being selfish or paranoid. On the contrary, he is spontaneously exercising his capacity to make quantitative comparisons. The Montessori child who repeatedly buttons and unbuttons or replaces inserts into their proper holes is likewise exercising emerging mental abilities. Piaget and Montessori see such

repetitive behaviors as having tremendous value for the child and as essential to the full realization of the child's intelligence.

Although there is not a great deal of research evidence relevant to the role of repetition in mental growth, I would like to cite some findings from one of our studies which points in this direction. In this study (Elkind and Weiss, 1967), we showed kindergarten-, first-, second-, and third-grade children a card with eighteen pictures pasted upon it in the shape of a triangle. The children's task was simply to name every picture on the card. The kindergarten children named the pictures according to the triangular pattern in which the pictures were pasted. That is to say, they began at the apex and worked around the three sides of the triangle. This same triangular pattern of exploration was employed by third-grade children and to some extent by second-grade children. First-grade children and some second-grade youngsters, however, did a peculiar thing. *They read the pictures across the triangle from top to bottom and from left to right.*

Why did the first-grade children read the pictures in this clearly inefficient way? The answer, it seems to me, lies in the fact that these children were in the process of learning the top to bottom and left to right swing which is essential in reading English. Because they had not entirely mastered this swing, they spontaneously practiced it even where it was inappropriate. Viewed in this way, their behavior was far from being stupid, and the same can be said for older slow-reading children who read the pictures in the same manner as the first-graders.

These findings thus support the arguments of Piaget and Montessori regarding the adaptive significance of repetitive behavior in children. Repetitive behavior in the child is frequently the outward manifestation of an emerging cognitive ability and the need to realize that ability through action. It was the genius of Piaget and Montessori which saw, in such repetitive behaviors as sucking and putting insets into holes, not stupidity, but rather, intelligence unfolding.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have tried to describe and illustrate with research data, three original ideas about child thought and behavior which Piaget and Montessori arrived at independently but which they share in common. The first idea is that nature and nurture interact in a dual way. With respect to the growth of abilities, nature provides the pattern and the time schedule of its unfolding while nurture provides the nourishment for the realization of this pattern. When we turn to the content of thought, however, just the reverse is true; nurture determines what will be learned while nature provides the pre-

requisite capacities. A second idea has to do with capacity and learning. For both Piaget and Montessori, capacity sets the limits for learning and capacity changes at its own rate and according to its own time schedule. Finally, the third idea is that repetitive behavior is the external manifestation of cognitive growth and expresses the need of emerging cognitive abilities to realize themselves through action.

The recent acceptance of Piagetian and Montessorian concepts in this country is gratifying and long overdue. It would be a great loss if within a few years these ideas were once again shelved because they failed to accomplish that which they were never designed to achieve. To avoid that eventuality, we need to try and accept Piaget and Montessori on their own terms and not force their ideas into our existing conceptual frameworks, or distort them for our own pragmatic purposes. Only in this way can we hope to gain lasting benefit from the outstanding contributions which Piaget and Montessori have made to the study of the child.

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The authors review evidence and suggest future directions for research on the learning patterns of disadvantaged children. After a detailed description of a specific case of research, some implications for educational policy are discussed. The authors take issue with James S. Coleman's definition of the concept of "equal educational opportunity" and advance an alternative definition. The problem of achieving a useful definition of the term "disadvantaged" is addressed throughout the paper.

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Learning Patterns in the Disadvantaged*

GENERAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH

In a review of learning patterns in the disadvantaged, it is necessary to delimit certain key concepts: (1) Which population groups shall be included in the "disadvantaged"? (2) Which constructs or variables shall we consider as relevant indicators of learning?

We shall return at several points in this paper to the problem of definition of the term "disadvantaged." Since each new issue raised forces revision and refinement of this definition, we shall offer successive approximations to a useful definition as we proceed. For the review of research with which we begin this paper, we will follow the usual conventions regarding delimitation of the disadvantaged or deprived population. Typically included under this rubric are children who come from families of low socio-economic status (as measured by occupation of the breadwinner, educational attainment of the

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parents, income, place of residence, etc.) and children from minority groups (as determined by recent immigration of families from countries outside the United States or notable lack of acculturation of groups that may have been residents for generations) and minority racial status (in particular, Negroes and Indians who have been in a caste-like status in this country for generations). Also included in this population are children from rural areas which have been isolated from the mainstream of American culture (see Havighurst, 1964). These definitions usually have in common the element of poverty or low income in relation to the median income of Americans.

We have chosen to examine five classes of learning indicators: general intelligence, specific mental abilities, school achievement, laboratory learning, and expressions of cognitive development deriving from stage theory. Although these constructs vary in their clear-cut relevance to educational procedures and outcomes, we believe they all contribute some important insights into the learning patterns of the disadvantaged. We shall judge the approaches to research using each of these constructs in light of the power of the findings for improvement of the educational experiences of disadvantaged learners.

General Intelligence

The performance of children from low socio-economic status and minority groups on intelligence tests has been quite well documented. Studies of intelligence test performance and social-class status have provided the broad outlines of a picture which generally fits a *deficit* or less-than model. Mean differences between children of high SES and low SES have been found consistently when measures of intelligence are administered. These differences are unequivocally present at age four and have occasionally been demonstrated at younger ages (Bereiter, 1965; Gray & Klaus, 1965; Pasamanick & Knobloch, 1955; Bloom, 1964).

With increases in children's age, such intelligence test differences tend to increase. Thus, there are larger mean differences in intelligence between low and high SES children in adolescence than in the early years of school. This fanning-out effect and the evidence to support it has been carefully reviewed by a number of workers (Bloom, 1964; Hunt, 1961; Silverman, 1965; Gordon, 1965; Davis, 1948; Karp & Sigel, 1965; Coleman et al., 1966).

The nature of the tests and conditions of administration have been an object of considerable study. The hallmark work of Eells and Davis (1951) on cultural biases in intelligence tests spurred a multitude of studies which demonstrated inadequacies in the tests themselves as good samples of general intelligence in diverse populations. Factors which might influence test per-

formance such as rapport, speed, motivation, and reward conditions were also studied (e.g., see Haggard, 1954). It appears clear now that Davis and his colleagues in their attempt to develop a culture-free measure of intelligence were accepting the idea that it was in fact possible to measure innate ability independent of cultural and experiential factors. They were assuming that it would be possible to tap the genotype of intelligence, and that intelligence would in fact be a stable quantity, randomly distributed by social class. (See Charters, 1963.)

Partly through the failure of the *Davis-Eells Games* and through increasing evidence from other quarters, both the belief in fixed intelligence and the notion of ridding intelligence measurement of cultural contamination have been abandoned. Now, rather than rejecting cultural effects as contaminants, researchers study them and take them into account in test construction and prediction. However, the notion of "culture-fair" testing has been widely accepted in the interest of making comparative statements about groups. Thus, as exemplified in one study of mental abilities (Lesser, Fifer, & Clark, 1965), items are based on a pool of experiences common to the subject population to be studied. Conditions of administration are arranged to minimize differences in rapport, motivation, and prior experiences with testing when inter-group comparisons are being made. Further, validity and reliability must be established for the relevant population. An excellent review of factors to be considered in testing minority groups is available (Deutsch et al., 1964). /

The most important outgrowth of the work in the 1950's is the changed conception of intelligence. Only a few hardy souls will now maintain that intelligence tests measure something innate, fixed, and pre-determined. (Hunt, 1961, reviews these ideas.) The validity of intelligence tests for predicting school achievement cannot be doubted, but the ability (aptitude) *versus* achievement distinction has been attenuated. Intelligence tests must now be thought of as samples of learning based on general experiences. A child's score may be thought of as an indication of the richness of the milieu in which he functions and the extent to which he has been able to profit from that milieu. In contradistinction, school achievement tests assume deliberate instruction oriented to the outcomes measured in the tests.

We have indicated that consistent differences on general intelligence tests are found when groups of children from varying SES backgrounds are compared. Some of the determinants of such differences have been explored and a new understanding of the construct of intelligence has been presented. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the procedures for test construction and administration now recognized as essential were not consistently followed in much past research on group comparisons.

Differences in intelligence-test performance have been found when Negroes and whites are compared. In general, Negroes have been found to have lower tested intelligence than whites even when social class is controlled (Dreger & Miller, 1960; Deutsch & Brown, 1964), although the difficulties of measuring social status within the Negro population for comparisons with the white population have not been adequately overcome. Studies of other minority groups, though not nearly as plentiful as Negro-white comparisons, generally indicate similar mean differences. (See Anastasi, 1958, Ch. 15, for a review.)

It should be remembered that the studies we have reviewed deal only with group differences using social class, ethnicity, or both as classificatory variables. Although mean differences favor majority group and high SES children, the overlap in distributions is great. It is by now a truism that *all* disadvantaged children do not fall below their more advantaged peers on tested intelligence and mental abilities. The deficit model applies to groups only. Individual differences within groups must also be examined.

A number of recent studies (e.g., Karnes et al., 1965; Mackler et al., 1966; McCabe, 1964) attempt to locate and study disadvantaged children who in fact are superior to the normative status of the disadvantaged. These researchers are attempting to characterize successful children and to study environmental factors which may account for success in disadvantaged children. The ability of these workers to locate children who test above average on intelligence tests and who perform above grade level on achievement tests is witness to the overlap in populations of advantaged and disadvantaged children. It should be noted, however, that the criteria on intelligence tests for "gifted" are typically lower than those employed with a middle-class population.

Diverse Mental Abilities

Early research in subcultural differences attempted to demonstrate that minority-majority group differences were attributable to the verbal nature of most general intelligence tests. The results of investigations which utilized tests of a less verbal character are equivocal (Higgins & Sivers, 1958; Fowler, 1957; Stablein et al., 1961; MacCarthur & Elley, 1963). The most adequate conclusion for the moment seems to be that although group differences may be reduced somewhat by eliminating verbal components from the tests, other factors (such as experiential differences, attitudes toward test-taking, and speed) still affect test performance. And for certain groups such as Negroes, eliminating verbal items results in lower performance levels.

Coleman et al. (1966), as a part of a massive survey on equality of educational opportunity in the United States, administered a verbal and nonverbal (reasoning) measure to first graders of various backgrounds at the beginning

of the school year. He found that children of low social status and children from minority groups (Negroes, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and American Indians) start school at grade one with mean scores on verbal and nonverbal tests of general ability that are below the national white average. The only exception to this general finding is that Oriental children score at the national average on the verbal measure at grade one and above the average on the nonverbal measure. In addition, the American Indian group that was sampled score at the national average on the nonverbal measure at grade one.

Aside from comparisons of verbal and nonverbal abilities, little in the way of study of other mental abilities has been systematically undertaken. Especially limited is such information with young subject populations. One exception is the work of Lesser, Fifer, and Clark (1965) who have studied four mental abilities (Verbal ability, Reasoning, Number facility, and Space Conceptualization) in first-grade children. They compared performance of four subcultural groups (Chinese, Jews, Negroes, and Puerto Ricans) of high and low social status, studying the organization (patterns) of these abilities as well as level of performance. The study will be described in greater detail later in this paper.

The organization of mental abilities in disadvantaged groups as studied through factor analysis has received relatively little attention. Recent work by Lovinger et al. (1966) with junior-high-school students and Semler and Iscoe (1966) with elementary-school children makes an important contribution. Lovinger found that a factor analysis of the WISC responses of Negro lower-class seventh graders produced a factor structure which was congruent with that found for the normative group (Cohen, 1959), although level of performance on the WISC was considerably lower for his population and subtest scores were also variable. Semler and Iscoe (1966) administered the WISC and Progressive Matrices to white and Negro children who were seven to nine years of age. They found sufficient incongruity in the intercorrelations of the WISC subtests by race to warrant separate factor analyses. Intercorrelations among the Progressive Matrices subtests, however, were highly similar for both groups.

In summary, many data are available for purposes of comparing social-class groups on tests of general intelligence. When one wants to make more detailed analyses, however, either by minority-group membership or on particular mental abilities, the data become sparse. In addition, data on the organization of mental abilities within sub-groups are just becoming available. Testing of the same samples on a number of mental abilities (such as the PMA) has been done only occasionally (Havighurst & Breese, 1947; Havighurst & Janke, 1944; Lesser, Fifer & Clark, 1965).

School Achievement

Massive amounts of data are now available on a national sample of children at grades one, three, six, nine, and twelve in regard to school achievement (Coleman et al., 1966). The Coleman study employed verbal and nonverbal measures and tests of reading and mathematics achievement. As indicated in the previous section, most groups of minority children and those of low SES scored below the national average on verbal and nonverbal tests at the beginning of their school careers. The findings from this study are consistent with earlier ones dealing with the school achievement of disadvantaged children. Indications of social-class and racial differences, in favor of majority and high SES groups, had been found earlier when reading and arithmetic readiness tests¹ were administered to children at the kindergarten level (Brazziel & Terrell, 1962; Montague, 1964).

As minority-group children (with the exception of Orientals at grade three) proceed through school, they continue to perform below the national average at all grade levels on all measures: the relative standing of these groups in relation to the white population remains essentially constant in terms of standard deviations, but the absolute differences in terms of grade-level discrepancies increase (Coleman et al., 1966). This increase in the number of grade levels behind the normative population is what is commonly referred to as the "cumulative deficit" (Deutsch, 1960).

The Coleman survey is cross-sectional. The few longitudinal studies of achievement in the literature reflect essentially the same pattern: as disadvantaged children move through the current school system, their achievement in grade levels as compared to the normative population becomes increasingly discrepant and low (Osborne, 1960).

The picture of educational disadvantage which emerges with examination of achievement data is a clear indication of the failure of the school systems. When intelligence test data and early achievement data are combined, we have a predictor's paradise, but an abysmal prognosis for most children who enter the school system from disadvantaged backgrounds. At the very least, this ability to predict school failure should be better exploited by the schools in an effort to remedy the situation. Payne (1964) has demonstrated that by the end of grade one, over one-half of the children who will be failing in arithmetic in grade six can be identified on the basis of socio-economic data, intelligence test scores, and an arithmetic achievement test. By the end of grade two, two-thirds of the failing children can be identified. This pro-

¹ The readiness tests, as opposed to the general ability tests, are more specifically oriented to learning necessary for successful achievement of a school subject. In fact predictive validities of the two types of tests do not differ appreciably.

vides the school not with group tendencies but with individual tagging of children for whom the usual curriculum will surely fail. It also provides five years of lead time to remedy the situation.

Taken together, the data on general intelligence, mental abilities, and school achievement all give indications that general learning, first in the home and community and later within the school as well, is clearly associated with socio-economic status: the level of such learning is generally lower for children of most minority groups and children in low socio-economic status. Important variations in patterning of such learnings have yet to be studied systematically, with a few notable exceptions. Even in the school achievement area, data regarding progress in school subjects other than reading and mathematics are not readily available. It can perhaps be safely assumed that achievement in social studies, science, and other academic areas will be highly correlated with achievement in reading and arithmetic. Nevertheless, studies of performance of disadvantaged children in these areas should be carried out.

Laboratory Learning

There are only a few studies which have used laboratory learning paradigms to compare performance of children from different social and cultural backgrounds. As Jensen (1967a) has pointed out, it is somewhat inconsistent with the traditions of the learning laboratory to introduce examinations of individual difference variables. Thus, Subjects \times Independent Variables interactions are usually considered to contribute to error variance (Jensen, 1967a, p. 117).

Semler and Iscoe (1963) compared the performance of Negro and white children on four conditions of paired-associate learning tasks; they also obtained WISC data on the children who ranged in age from five to nine years. Although significant racial differences were present on the WISC, they were not found in the paired-associate learning. Correlations between IQ and learning-task scores were low for both groups (.09 for whites, .19 for Negroes).

Zigler and DeLabry (1962) compared groups of middle-class, lower-class, and retarded subjects on a concept-switching task, using different reward conditions. They found that when each group performed under the reward condition considered optimal, there were no group differences in performance. The intangible reward condition was considered optimal for the middle class; tangible reinforcement was optimal for the lower-class group and the retardates. A similar study using a discrimination task was carried out by Terrell, Durkin, and Wiesley (1959). They also found material reward pro-

duced better performance in lower-class children and nonmaterial reward proved more effective with middle-class children.

Rohwer (1966), Jensen (1961), and Rapier (1966) have found that performance of lower- and middle-class Negroes, Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans, and lower- and middle-class Caucasians, respectively, does not differ markedly in laboratory learning tasks such as selective trial-and-error learning and paired-associate learning. These workers find that the relation between tested intelligence and performance on the learning tasks is high for the upper-status groups but negligible for the lower-status groups. Jensen (1967b) suggests that the equivalence of performance of the lower-status children with middle-class children on these tasks which do not require transfer from previous learning suggests the learning ability of children from lower-status backgrounds is not adequately reflected in general intelligence tests. Taken together with the findings of high correlations on these learning tasks and intelligence tests for upper-status groups and low correlations for low-status groups, he argues that research is needed to clarify the reasons for these unique relationships which probably reflect that intelligence tests are "truer" estimates of ability for the middle-class groups than for the lower-class groups.

Whether or not one wishes to join Jensen in his search for more accurate measurements of ability in low-status populations—it is admittedly reminiscent of the quest for culture-free measurement—his findings and those of his colleagues suggest the relevance of combining differential psychology with the tools of the learning laboratory in studying the learning patterns of the disadvantaged.

Along these lines, some recent factor analytic studies have been carried out with measures of various abilities and measures of learning on laboratory tasks. Illustrative of this work is a study by Duncanson (1966) who administered concept-formation, paired-associates, and rote-memory tasks to sixth-grade students, along with a number of tests from the Reference Tests for Cognitive Factors, the Kuhlman-Anderson Test, and some parts of the Stanford Achievement Battery. The socio-economic level of the students sampled is not specified in this study. However, the factor analysis carried out on these data did show common variance between certain ability tests and the laboratory tasks, with the exception of the concept-formation tasks. In addition, there were unique learning-task factors. Such factor analytic studies should help clarify the nature of learning-task performance and ability measurements on populations of different ages and backgrounds.

Other Studies of Cognitive Development

A number of other studies have been undertaken which deal with cognitive

functioning but come from traditions other than the psychometric or learning laboratory. One such dimension of cognitive functioning is classificatory behavior. Classificatory behavior has often been considered a language function and has been studied along with other linguistic behaviors. Although we have not reviewed language studies of the disadvantaged, classificatory behavior can be seen as representative of linguistic or cognitive functioning. John (1963) asked children to sort pictures of common objects and to label the piles they created; she studied first- and fifth-grade Negro children of varying social class. With the fifth-graders, she found that lower-class children made more piles and gave fewer verbalizations about their sorting than did middle-class children. Hess and Shipman (1965), in presenting the Sigel Sorting Task to four-year-old Negro children of varying social class, also found that level of abstraction was related to social class, although the number of unscorable responses was extremely high for all children of this age.

Although child psychologists are showing increasing interest in the work of Piaget, few studies from a stage theoretic point of view have been undertaken with children from disadvantaged backgrounds. In one study, a sorting task and a class-inclusion task were administered to part of the Hess and Shipman (1963) sample when they reached age five. The tasks had been developed by Kohlberg (1965). In a middle-class sample of children, patterns of responses had been found to form a Guttman scale reflecting a Piaget-based developmental sequence. The developmental sequence was found to exist within this Negro population of mixed social class; that is, the Guttman scale was reproduced. There were differences by social class in the developmental level attained, the upper-middle-class group being more advanced developmentally (Stodolsky, 1965).

Other work from the stage theoretic point of view is reported by Wallach (1963). He reports studies by Hyde and Slater dealing with conservation of number in samples of children of differing social background. According to Wallach, these researchers have found variations in age norms in differing social groups but no indication of discrepancies in developmental sequences.

From the limited evidence to date, it appears reasonable to expect that the stage theory of Piaget is generally applicable to all children regardless of social-class background. Nevertheless, longitudinal studies and studies of older children are needed. The studies which have found developmental sequence to apply to diverse samples of children have been with young children. It is still not known how much of the developmental sequence is general. Thus, we might find a truncated developmental sequence if we tested children of disadvantaged background in adolescence. In other words, such children might display the sequence to a point, but the stage of development reached might be lower than that achieved by their more advantaged peers. Such

studies should be considerably aided by the availability of standard testing techniques (Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962).

A Note on Testing

The types of achievement and intelligence tests which are most often used can have only limited value in describing the cognitive functioning of children. In almost all instances, we are concerned with scratchings on an answer sheet, not with the ways in which a student arrived at a conclusion. No matter how much we may think we know by looking at scores on such psychometric procedures, unless tests are constructed deliberately to reveal reasoning processes, these processes will not be identified. Zigler (1966), in discussing mental retardation, points out this content-versus-process distinction, making a plea for testing procedures which give us information about the "cognitive structures and processes that give rise to content" (p. 113).

Historically, there has been some incompatibility between test constructors working within the measurement tradition and those psychologists interested in cognitive processes. There does not seem to be any necessary reason for this split. The testing procedures developed by Smedslund (1963), Laurendeau and Pinard (1962), and by the Educational Testing Service (in the new series "Let's Look at First Graders") are procedures which allow statements about individual differences and also provide information about cognitive processes of children. These tests are outgrowth of Piaget's theories of cognitive development.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

Although the above review of recent studies relating to learning in the disadvantaged does not pretend to be totally comprehensive, it does give representation to the various emphases in prior research. There are at least two major orientations which research on the learning of disadvantaged students can take. Both seem important, but have different pay-offs in terms of relevance to educational procedure and outcomes.

Developmental Origins

The explanatory, developmental direction of research would be oriented to tracing the origins of the characteristics which have been observed in the disadvantaged, as well as to charting the etiology of characteristics not studied to date.

Beginning with a broad description of the relation between a characteristic such as general intelligence and social-class status, one might ask: How can we account for the observed differences in performance among groups? What

does it mean in psychological-process terms to be a member of a given social class? In order to answer these questions one moves quickly to variables which are more detailed and which should explain within-class variations as well as between-class variations.

- A start in this research direction has been made in a number of quarters. Milner (1951) assessed parent-child relations and certain attributes of the home environment in relation to reading readiness. She used interview procedures in her study of first-grade children and their parents. More recently, Davé (1963) and Wolf (1965) related indices of home environment to school achievement and intelligence test scores respectively, in a fifth-grade white population of varying social class. These workers began by conceptualizing the home in terms of environmental process variables believed to be salient for the development of the outcome measures in which they were interested. They also used interviews to assess these environmental characteristics. They rated such characteristics as press for achievement, language models in the home, academic guidance provided by the home, and provisions for general learning. The ratings which they derived on the environmental process variables were then correlated with children's performance.
- Davé found a multiple correlation of .80 between his environmental indices and over-all achievement on a standard test battery. Wolf achieved a multiple correlation of .69 between his ratings and intelligence-test performance.

From the point of view of prediction, these correlations represented a considerable advance over the usual relation found between social class and achievement or intelligence-test performance. More important, however, is the direction in which they orient future research. It is clearly demonstrated that one can move beyond gross classificatory variables, such as social class, to much more detailed assessment of environments. Although these studies are correlational, they move us conceptually in the direction of experimental studies of development by viewing environmental variables in dynamic, process-oriented terms.

A study reported by Peterson and DeBord (1966) investigated various home factors and their relation to achievement in eleven-year-old Negro and white lower-class boys in a southern city. Using interview procedures, they assessed family composition, economic and social stability of the family, social participation, cultural level of the home, educational press, and certain aspects of the parents' orientation to the world. Peterson and DeBord performed separate multiple regressions on their data by race. For both groups, they achieved high multiple correlations between certain home variables and achievement: multiple correlation for Negroes was .82 using eleven variables regressed on achievement scores; the comparable correlation for whites was .75 using fourteen home variables. Although there were certain variables

which were significantly correlated for both the Negroes and whites, others were unique for each group. The fact that such multiple correlations were obtained *within* a lower-class sample indicates the extent to which home conditions vary within social-class groups.²

Another important step in this direction is the research of Hess and Shipman (1965). In an extensive project studying Negro pre-school children, they have assessed numerous maternal characteristics including language (Olim, Hess, and Shipman, 1965) and teaching style (Jackson, Hess, and Shipman, 1965). Maternal teaching style is assessed in an experimental interaction session in the laboratory in which the mother is instructed in a simple task and then instructs her child. All interactions, both verbal and physical, are recorded and later analyzed into a number of dimensions. Olim, Hess, and Shipman report that maternal language is a better predictor of child's abstraction score on a sorting task than either the mother's IQ or the child's IQ. Jackson, Hess, and Shipman found that certain teaching variables were highly related to the learning outcome of the child in the experimental teaching situation. In addition, Stodolsky (1965) has extended these findings to predict a child's vocabulary at age five using a combination of maternal language and teaching variables assessed when the child was four. The multiple correlation of these process variables and the child's language score was .63, very close to the theoretical limits imposed by the reliability of the vocabulary test. She found that the quality of the mother's own language, the mother's use of reinforcement in a teaching situation, and the extent to which the mother made task-relevant discriminations in teaching a task were highly related to the child's vocabulary level.

The Hess and Shipman work posits that the mother's behavior, especially her linguistic and teaching behavior, is a key to the child's learning in the home. By drawing on learning theory and theories of language learning, they are able to point to relations between developments in the child and the mother's behavior which are both theoretically reasonable and have great heuristic power. The Hess and Shipman study is clearly an advance in the direction of explaining the origins of cognitive abilities in young children. Their work is more embedded in natural observation than the interview studies previously cited, but still does not go the whole way in assessment of what actually takes place in the home.

It should be clear that it will eventually be necessary to execute detailed observational studies of children in home environments if one wants to arrive at valid hypotheses about the dynamics of development in interaction with environment. The dearth of naturalistic data about children's behavior

*These multiple correlations have not been cross-validated.

and concomitant environmental circumstances is most regrettable. Some attempts are now being made to remedy this situation in Harvard University's Pre-School Project under the general direction of Burton White. This project is planned as a long-term study of pre-school children in home and school environments to trace the development of various abilities which promote educability. Beginning with first-hand observations of children and environments, this project will generate ideas about developmental regularities which will be tested through longitudinal studies of children from birth through six years of age. In addition, the project will generate hypotheses regarding environmental factors which interact in important ways with the developmental phenomena which are isolated. In the long run, these hypotheses will be subject to experimental test through manipulations of environmental conditions.

In order to extend knowledge of the development of intellectual abilities and learning in children, more investment in longitudinal studies which chart the course of growth within individuals will be needed. Such studies should be accompanied by investigations of relevant environmental circumstances. The longitudinal work of Thomas and his colleagues on the development of personality and temperamental characteristics in infants and young children is illustrative of the power of this approach (Thomas, Chess, Birch, Hertzog, & Korn, 1964).

The types of studies we are suggesting here clearly need not be restricted to disadvantaged populations. It is to be hoped that such research would include children of diverse backgrounds. From a methodological point of view, variations in environmental circumstances and variation in child characteristics would be less restricted by studying a wide range of children. On the other hand, it is altogether possible that circumstances which are relevant in one subcultural context would not generalize across subcultures.

Is such developmental research of highest priority for school people? In many ways, we think not. We think we should assume for the moment that the job of the schools is a limited one (however arduous and complex). Children are sent to schools for a limited part of their daily lives to acquire certain knowledge and skills and ways of thinking which are considered essential for functioning in the society—in the world of work, leisure, and citizenship.

Some compensatory programs have operated on the assumption that school programs should be oriented toward changing home conditions relevant to educability. If school people want to take on the job of changing home conditions, for example, changing parent-child interactions in the home, then the study of developmental origins becomes more relevant. But we should also like to suggest that such home-based interventions will prob-

ably not be sufficient. Let us remember that life styles are usually quite adaptive to life circumstances (Lewis, 1961). We are not suggesting that it is impossible to achieve some modification of parental behaviors to facilitate the educational progress of students, but we would probably be a lot more successful if we were to modify the conditions which probably lead to many of these behaviors: namely, lack of money and of access to jobs.

Now perhaps we are talking about politically-based action research! But while we are keeping psychologists and anthropologists busy studying the characteristics of people who are poor, might it not also be advisable to assess the degree to which these characteristics are situation-dependent? We are suggesting here a rather simple experiment which seems very important. Would poor people, given jobs and money, change in their behaviors relevant to the child's educability? Would parental behaviors such as cognitive level, teaching style, values, and attitudes change with a change in economic conditions? We do not know; but we think the matter bears empirical investigation.

We are suggesting that heavy investment in investigations of children in conditions (low income, poor housing, etc.) which are modifiable through political and economic actions, should be accompanied by knowledge of the outcomes of changing these conditions. We must know to what extent poor children's characteristics are simply a function of their economic circumstances. Further, we suggest that the type of research which is both legitimate and important for developmental psychologists is not the most direct route to solving the educational problems which the schools have to tackle right now. It is our opinion that a more ostrich-like approach to the learning of disadvantaged students might have salutary effects.

School-Based Research

The schools have a job to do. Ask any teacher; he knows what he is to "cover" in a term. How can researchers assist teachers in doing this job better?

First, one assumption must be made explicit. Most, if not all, teachers want to teach effectively and to see their students learn. We do not believe the cumulative deficit in achievement of disadvantaged students reflects any willful or determined attempts on the part of teachers to "keep these students down." Nor do we think it reflects laziness. The most parsimonious assumption would seem to be that teachers are not effective and students are not learning at an adequate rate because techniques have not been devised which produce desired learning outcomes in many children whom we label disadvantaged.

What can researchers do to help change this situation? One strategy would be to start where the teacher has to start; that is, with a curriculum to be

taught and a group of students who are to learn it. Two broad questions can be asked: What is required in the way of student behaviors and attributes to begin the prescribed learning task? How does the student's current state match these requirements?

We are suggesting here that we formalize that process which typically goes on in a teacher's mind. The teacher attempts at some level to analyze the objective he wants his student to achieve into a logical sequence of learnings. He concomitantly assesses the state of readiness of the student in terms of prior learnings and behaviors which seem relevant to the learning task at hand. He then devises an instructional strategy which takes both curricular and student facts into account. We are talking here about the old-fashioned process of diagnostically-based instruction.

It seems that we could dramatically affect the educational progress of *all* students if a large investment were made along these lines. The idea, though simple to state, would be extremely laborious to execute. What would be needed first would be detailed analyses of tasks or objectives expressed in behavioral terms. We know of two groups who have attempted such work to date. Gagné (1966) describes a number of such analyses of cumulative learning in mathematics. For example, he attempts to analyze the task of learning to "add integers" into a hierarchical sequence of learnings which begins with the least complex learnings (associations) and proceeds in hierarchical fashion to the learning of simple and complex rules and principles. The task analysis which begins as a logical one can then be verified in part in the actual performance of students. Gagné has found that learning to add integers does in fact follow the hierarchical sequence he proposed; that is, students who learn higher-level tasks have achieved the lower levels; children who have not mastered the lower-level tasks in the hierarchy do not learn the higher-level tasks.

This type of task analysis provides sequencing for the instructional program and diagnostic power. Such analyses, since they are made in behavioral terms, could be readily translated into quick testing procedures to assess a student's readiness for learning a given task. Such testing would immediately orient the teacher to the appropriate part of the instructional sequence to begin with a particular student.

Another example of this type of work is provided by Smilansky (1964). Her interest was in the development of a kindergarten curriculum which would provide disadvantaged Israeli children with the necessary skills and behaviors to enter the first-grade curriculum. The approach she used was to begin with first-hand observations of successful first-grade children in classrooms. She analyzed the behaviors required of the students in these classrooms, compiling a long list and then constructed assessment techniques

which would give evidence about these behaviors in five-year-old children. Simultaneously, she and her colleagues started to develop curricular approaches which would develop these behaviors in children who had not achieved them. The final success of their intervention program will be judged in terms of the achievement of these objectives in disadvantaged children.

Both the Gagné and Smilansky approaches result in very detailed statements of behavioral requirements for a learning task. They do not specify how the teacher would proceed in the instructional program, but they do pinpoint where to begin. In addition, the effort invested in the logical analysis of the task requirements, or the actual observation of children achieving tasks, is highly suggestive of instructional strategies. A heavy investment in such analyses of curriculum, and the development of diagnostic techniques which are curriculum-specific could make high-value information readily available to the teacher.

The task-analysis approaches described should serve as first steps in an iterative matching strategy. One begins with a set of behavioral characteristics which fit a learning task. Students are assessed to see which behaviors and prerequisite skills they display. Then an instructional procedure is adapted for the student. The process is iterative in that we can anticipate continuous refinements of both the assessments of students and the instructional procedures in the context of a given task. In addition, the process should be a continuous one, applying to each new task as it is reached.

The matching of instructional procedures to student characteristics could take at least two forms. One would be essentially remedial; that is, an instructional method considered suitable for all students would be settled on in advance. Therefore, only one set of prerequisite skills would have to be achieved by all students. After assessment of students, the teacher's first job would be to bring all students to this one configuration of necessary minimal skills before proceeding with the pre-selected regimen. Although this remedial strategy would clearly improve much current practice, as there often is only one instructional method sanctioned by a school system, it is not the most desirable approach.

The second approach would make use of multiple instructional methods. Certain initial patterns of skills and learnings would be associated with certain instructional procedures. Optimal matching of students to curricular approaches could then be executed on the basis of initial assessments. Such matching would be far more diagnostic and precise than the usual sort of tracking which goes on in the schools. Presently, tracking, at least in the early grades, is usually based entirely on *level* of student ability. Under such a procedure, student characteristics are not meaningfully articulated with curricular content or requirements. The real power of the matching procedure we

are suggesting would be in the extent to which alternative instructional strategies could be generated which would be based on a complex analysis of student characteristics and curricular contents.

The research program we are suggesting would be tedious. First, a large-scale investment in curricular analyses would be necessary. Once such analyses were completed, an enormous effort would have to be expended in the development of diagnostic methods which could be used effectively by teachers. Some of these methods might be widely useful whereas others might be very specific to a given school or classroom.

Once this approach is begun, it would feed into a deeper understanding of the conditions of learning which are appropriate for children with various characteristics. It is to be hoped that it would lead to much more pointed learning experiments in which children could be selected on the basis of a wide variety of characteristics.

Extension of test construction from the point of view of the psychologist (as in Lesser, Fifer, & Clark, 1965) should also contribute to this approach. Although it appears most efficient to start building diagnostic tools on the basis of curricular approaches, theories of intellect should also lead to profitable constructs. Once the matching procedure gets started, it has built-in corrective features. Analysis of curricular approaches leading to diagnostic tools will lead in turn to new insights into student performance and curriculum. The beginning point is not crucial as long as the process gets under way.

We have proposed a program of school-based research which we believe would enormously assist the work of teachers on a day-to-day basis. Most important it should have great value in creating more successful students because it recognizes the background they bring with them.

A SPECIFIC CASE OF RESEARCH

**The Original Study*

Aims. Our goal was to examine the patterns among various mental abilities in six- and seven-year-old children from different social-class and ethnic backgrounds. We accepted the definition of intelligence which postulates diverse mental abilities and proposes that intelligent behavior can be manifested in a wide variety of forms, with each individual displaying certain areas of intellectual strength and other forms of intellectual weakness. A basic premise of this study is that social-class and ethnic influences differ not only in degree but in kind, with the consequence that different kinds of intellectual skills are fostered or hindered in different environments.

Design. Hypotheses were tested regarding the effects of social-class and ethnic-group affiliation (and their interactions) upon both the level of each

mental ability considered singly and the pattern among mental abilities considered in combination. Four mental abilities (Verbal ability, Reasoning, Number facility, and Space Conceptualization) were studied in first-grade children from four ethnic groups (Chinese, Jewish, Negro, and Puerto Rican). Each ethnic group was divided into two social-class components (middle and lower), each in turn being divided into equal numbers of boys and girls.

Thus, a $4 \times 2 \times 2$ analysis-of-covariance design included a total of sixteen subgroups, each composed of twenty children. A total sample of 320 first-grade children was drawn from forty-five different elementary schools in New York City and its environs. Three test influences were controlled statistically: effort, responsiveness to the tester, and age of the subject.

		<i>Ethnic Group</i>			
		CHINESE	JEWS	NEGROES	PUERTO RICAN
<i>Social Class</i>	MIDDLE	BOYS			
	LOWER	GIRLS			
					Total N = 320

The selection of four mental abilities (Verbal ability, Reasoning, Number facility, and Space Conceptualization) is described in detail elsewhere (Lesser, Fifer, & Clark, 1965, pp. 32-43). To obtain a first approximation to the assessment of intra-individual profiles of scores for the various mental abilities of children, these skills were assessed:

Verbal—The skill is defined as memory for verbal labels in which reasoning elements, such as those required by verbal analogies, are reduced to a minimum. Verbal ability has long been regarded as the best single predictor of success in academic courses, especially in the language and social-science fields. It is involved to a marked degree in the work of all professions and in most semiprofessional areas.

Reasoning—Reasoning involves the ability to formulate concepts, to weave together

ideas and concepts, and to draw conclusions and inferences from them. It is, almost by definition, the central element of aptitude for intellectual activities and, therefore, is of primary importance in all academic fields and in most vocations.

Number—The ability is defined as skill in enumeration and in memory and use of the fundamental combinations in addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. It is of great importance in arithmetic in elementary schools and in mathematics in secondary schools.

Space Conceptualization—The ability refers to a cluster of skills related to spatial relations and sizes of objects and to visualizing their movements in space. It is involved in geometry, trigonometry, mechanics, and drafting; in elementary-school activities, such as practical arts and drawing; and in occupations such as mechanics, engineering, and architecture.

Procedural Issues. In this brief report, it is impossible to describe all the details of the procedures employed. Yet since research on the intellectual performance of "disadvantaged" children does impose some unique demands upon the investigator, at least the following procedural issues should be outlined.

1. a. Gaining access to the schools: Perhaps the most formidable problem was that of gaining the cooperation of school boards and school authorities for research on such a supposedly controversial issue. An honest approach by the researcher to the school authorities must contain the words "ethnic," "Negro," "Jewish," and "lower-class," and yet it is precisely these loaded words which arouse immediate anxiety and resistance in those who are authorized to permit or reject research in the schools. We believed that our objective of supplying information and understanding about the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of the children being taught in school would be a strong inducement to participation. Not so. Only enormous persistence and lengthy negotiation—during which the researcher must agree to a succession of incapacitating constraints—permits such research at all.

Surely there are serious problems of ethics in educational research. Researchers should be (and most often are) as scrupulous as school authorities in maintaining the conditions of consent and confidentiality which protect subjects from unwarranted intrusions of privacy. But the legitimate ethical issues of privacy and free inquiry are not those that block access to the schools—the fear of controversy over racial issues seems to immobilize school authorities.

Beyond our own experiences in gaining access to the schools, numerous examples exist of how research on the disadvantaged is prevented or distorted by the decisions of school authorities. For example, in Coleman's (Coleman et al., 1966) study of *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, requested by the President and Congress of the United States, many major cities refused

to participate, often because comparisons among racial groups were being made (although reasons for refusal were rarely stated).

Later in this paper, we shall discuss several new directions for future research comparing "disadvantaged" and "non-disadvantaged" children. These suggestions will remain the mental exercises of the academics unless some reasonable policies can be developed by researchers and school authorities to provide honest access to the school children, their parents, and their teachers.

b. Locating social-class and ethnic-group samples: An associated problem was to achieve an unambiguous definition and assessment of social-class and ethnic-group placement. (The detailed procedures used for sample selection are described in Lesser, Fifer, & Clark, 1965, pp. 21-32.) Both variables are clearly multidimensional in character, and to define and measure the necessary components in each is a formidable task. Since members of each ethnic group were to be located in both lower- and middle-class categories, additional problems arose in attempting to maintain an equal degree of separation between the two social-class categories for each ethnic group.

In addition, obtaining the data necessary to identify the social-class and ethnic-group placement of each child presented many practical problems. There are strong legal restrictions in New York State upon collecting the data necessary for social-class and ethnic identification—and these restrictions are perhaps quite justified—but since we were not allowed to ask parents or school authorities directly about education, or religion, or even occupation, we were forced to use information gathered indirectly through twenty-three different community agencies and four sources of Census and housing statistics. Among sources such as the New York City Regional Planning Association, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the China Institute in America, the Demographic Study Committee of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, and the *New York Daily News* Advertising Department, our best single source of information was one of the largest advertising agencies in New York City, which has within its "Component Advertising Division" (which develops special marketing appeals for different ethnic groups) enormous deposits of information on the locations of the many cultural groups in New York City. There was little willingness, of course, to allow us to use these data. But after endless sitting-in and sheer pestering, we were given access to this information. We could not possibly have completed this study without it.

c. Developing "culture-fair" test materials: Perhaps the major technical problem was to insure the fact that observed differences among social-class and ethnic groups are in the children and not in the test materials themselves (or in the definitions upon which the tests are based). Therefore, tests

were constructed which presuppose only experiences that are common and familiar within all of the different social-class and ethnic groups in an urban area. We had no intention to "free" the test materials from cultural influence, but rather to utilize elements which appear commonly in all cultural groups in New York City. If, for example, other Picture Vocabulary tests use pictures of xylophones or giraffes (which a middle-class child is more likely than a lower-class child to encounter in a picture book or in a zoo), we used pictures of buses, fire hydrants, lamp posts, garbage trucks, and police cars—objects to which all urban children are exposed.

d. Controlling "examiner bias": Each child was tested by an examiner who shared the child's ethnic identity in order to maintain chances of establishing good rapport and to permit test administration in the child's primary language, or in English, or, more often, in the most effective combination of languages for the particular child. Thus, we had a Negro tester, a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican tester, a Yiddish-speaking Jewish tester, and three Chinese-speaking Chinese testers to accommodate the eight different Chinese dialects encountered among our Chinese children. Each tester had been trained beyond the Master's degree level, and each had extensive experience administering psychological tests; but the tendency of the testers to empathize with the children from their own cultural groups demanded careful control of the testing procedures to insure uniform test administration. This standardization was accomplished through extensive video-tape training in which each examiner observed other testers and himself administer the test materials.

Some Findings. Hypotheses were tested regarding the influence of social class and ethnicity (and their interactions) upon the levels of the four mental-ability scores and upon the patterns among them. The results are summarized in Table 1.

a. Distinctive ethnic-group differences: Ethnic groups are markedly different ($p < .001$) both in the absolute level of each mental ability and in the pat-

TABLE 1
Summary of Results

Source of Influence	Effect upon Mental Abilities	
	Level	Pattern
Ethnicity	Highly Significant*	Highly Significant*
Social Class	Highly Significant*	Nonsignificant
Social Class x Ethnicity	Significant**	Nonsignificant

* $p < .001$

** $p < .05$

tern among these abilities. For example, with regard to the effects of ethnicity upon the *level* of each ability, Figure 1 shows that

(1) on Verbal ability, Jewish children ranked first (being significantly better than all other ethnic groups), Negroes second, Chinese third (both being significantly better than Puerto Ricans), and Puerto Ricans fourth.

(2) on Space Conceptualization, Chinese ranked first (being significantly better than Puerto Ricans and Negroes), Jews second, Puerto Ricans third, and Negroes fourth.

But the most striking results of this study concern the effects of ethnicity upon the *patterns* among the mental abilities. Figure 1 (and the associated analyses-of-variance for group patterns) shows that these *patterns* are different for each ethnic group. More important is the finding depicted in Figures 2-5. Ethnicity does affect the pattern of mental abilities and, *once the pattern specific to the ethnic group emerges, social-class variations within the ethnic group do not alter this basic organization*. For example, Figure 2 shows the mental-ability pattern peculiar to the Chinese children—with the pattern displayed by the middle-class Chinese children duplicated at a lower level of performance by the lower-class Chinese children. Figure 3 shows the mental-ability pattern specific to the Jewish children—with the pattern displayed by the middle-class Jewish children duplicated at a lower level of per-




Fig. 1. Pattern of Normalized Mental-Ability Scores for Each Ethnic Group




Fig. 2. Patterns of Normalized Mental-Ability Scores for Middle- and Lower-Class Chinese Children.




Fig. 3. Patterns of Normalized Mental-Ability Scores for Middle- and Lower-Class Jewish Children.

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


Fig. 4. Patterns of Normalized Mental-Ability Scores for Middle- and Lower-Class Negro Children




Fig. 5. Patterns of Normalized Mental-Ability Scores for Middle- and Lower-Class Puerto Rican Children.

In the Fall 1967 issue, page 569, the captions were correctly placed but the figures were reversed. The figure depicting patterns of Negro children should appear with the Fig. 4 caption. The figure depicting patterns of Puerto Rican children should appear with the Fig. 5 caption. Please make the corrections in your copy.




Fig. 4. Patterns of Normalized Mental-Ability Scores for Middle- and Lower-Class Negro Children




Fig. 5. Patterns of Normalized Mental-Ability Scores for Middle- and Lower-Class Puerto Rican Children.

formance by the lower-class Jewish children. Parallel statements can be made for each ethnic group.

The failure of social-class conditions to transcend patterns of mental ability associated with ethnic influences was unexpected. Social-class influences have been described as superceding ethnic-group effects for such diverse phenomena as child-rearing practices, educational and occupational aspirations, achievement motivation, and anomie. The greater salience of social class over ethnic membership is reversed in the present findings on patterns of mental ability. Ethnicity has the primary effect upon the organization of mental abilities, and the organization is not modified further by social-class influences.

Many other findings are described in our full report of this original study (Lesser, Fifer, & Clark, 1965). Only a few additional findings will be mentioned here, either because they are prominent in our recent replication study or in our plans for future research.

b. Interactions between social-class and ethnicity: Table 1, summarizing our earlier findings, indicates significant interactions ($p < .05$) between social class and ethnicity on the level of each mental ability. Table 2 shows the mean level of each mental ability for Chinese and Negro children from each social-class group; the same interaction effects appear when Jewish and Puerto Rican children are included, but the present table has been reduced to the Chinese and Negro children to simplify the present discussion. Two effects combine to produce the interaction effect between social class and ethnicity:

TABLE 2
*Mean Mental-Ability Scores for Chinese and Negro Children
for Each Social-Class Group*

Verbal				Reasoning			
	Chinese	Negro		Chinese	Negro		
Middle	76.8	85.7	81.3	Middle	27.7	26.0	26.9
Lower	65.3	62.9	64.1	Lower	24.2	14.8	19.5
	71.1	74.3	72.7		25.9	20.4	23.2
Class x ethnicity, $F = 7.69, p < .01$				Class x ethnicity, $F = 11.32, p < .01$			
Number				Space			
	Chinese	Negro		Chinese	Negro		
Middle	30.0	24.7	27.4	Middle	44.9	41.8	43.4
Lower	26.2	12.1	19.2	Lower	40.4	27.1	33.8
	28.1	18.4	23.3		42.7	34.4	38.6
Class x ethnicity, $F = 8.91, p < .01$				Class x ethnicity, $F = 10.83, p < .01$			

(1) On each mental-ability scale, social-class position produces more of a difference in the mental abilities of the Negro children than for the other groups. That is, the middle-class Negro children are more different in level of mental abilities from the lower-class Negroes than, for example, the middle-class Chinese are from the lower-class Chinese.

(2) On each mental-ability scale, the scores of the middle-class children from the various ethnic groups resemble each other to a greater extent than do the scores of the lower-class children from the various ethnic groups. That is, the middle-class Chinese, Jewish, Negro, and Puerto Rican children are more alike in their mental ability scores than are the lower-class Chinese, Jewish, Negro, and Puerto Rican children.

Some earlier research (see Anastasi, 1958, Chapter 15) suggested that social-class influences upon intelligence are greater in white than in Negro groups. No distinct contrast with white children was available in our study, but the evidence indicates that social-class influences upon the mental abilities of Negro children are very great compared with the other ethnic groups represented. One explanation for the apparent contrast between the earlier and present findings is that the earlier research, perhaps, did not include middle-and lower-class Negro groups that were distinctively different. In any event, our findings show that the influence of social class on the level of abilities is more powerful for the Negro group than for the other ethnic groups.

c. Group data vs. individual data: The data analyses described to this point refer to differences in the performance of groups and not to the performance of individuals. These analyses do not indicate how an individual will perform, but they suggest how he is likely to perform if he belongs to one of these eight groups. One technique we have used to proceed from group analyses to identifying particular patterns for individuals is called a "classification analysis" (see Table 3). This analysis allows the researcher to compare the pattern of mental-ability scores for each individual subject with the pattern profiles of his group and other groups. It yields data on the degree to which a subject's profile resembles the profile of his or the other groups (Tatsuoka, 1957). If mental-ability scores were not associated significantly with social class and ethnicity and hence a chance frequency of correct placement of individuals occurred, random cell assignment in Table 3 would be approximately five cases per cell. Thus, if the forty middle-class Chinese children showed no distinctive pattern of their own, they would be expected to be distributed equally among all eight group patterns. The deviation of the actual frequencies in the underlined diagonal cells from the chance frequency of five indicates the degree of correct classification beyond chance obtained through knowledge of the individual's mental-ability scores. Thus, thirty-two middle-class Jewish children and twenty-eight lower-class Negro children

TABLE 3
Classification Analysis

Group	Group patterns							
N = 40, each Group	M Ch	L Ch	M J	L J	M N	L N	M PR	L PR
Middle Chinese	13*	10	6	1	5	1	2	2
Lower Chinese	6	14	2	4	3	1	1	9
Middle Jewish	4	0	32	4	0	0	0	0
Lower Jewish	0	1	9	18	7	4	0	1
Middle Negro	5	1	11	10	11	0	0	2
Lower Negro	1	3	0	3	0	28	0	5
Middle Puerto Rican	6	6	3	6	4	0	3	12
Lower Puerto Rican	0	7	1	1	0	8	3	20

* Figures to read across as follows: The scores of 13 middle-class Chinese subjects fit the middle-class Chinese pattern and level on the four mental ability scales; 10 middle-class Chinese look more like lower-class Chinese; 6 look more like middle-class Jews, 1 more like a lower-class Jew, etc.

fit their group patterns. In contrast, only three middle-class Puerto Rican children (two less than chance) were classified correctly. It is clear that the middle-class Puerto Rican children were the most heterogeneous of the eight groups. Overall, the number of cases classified correctly through knowledge of the mental-ability pattern surpassed chance classification at a probability value associated with thirty-six zeroes; i.e., the probability value for correct classifications was less than one in ten to the thirty-fifth exponent. In short, knowledge of the child's pattern of mental abilities allows the correct identification of his social-class and ethnic-group membership to a degree far exceeding chance expectations.

We note this analysis for two reasons. Methodologically, it provides a useful device for moving from group data to the analysis of the individual case. Substantively, it has allowed us to identify the children who fit closely the profile of their group and those who are exceptions in their group but resemble the profile of some other group. This capability allows us to pinpoint cases in exploring questions about the origins of patterns of mental ability and about the fitting of school practices to these patterns.

Some Conclusions. The study demonstrated that several mental abilities are organized in ways that are determined culturally. Referring to social-class and ethnic groups, Anastasi (1958) proposed that "groups differ in their relative standing on different functions. Each . . . fosters the development of a different pattern of abilities." Our data lend selective support to this posi-

tion. Both social-class and ethnic groups do "differ in their relative standing on different functions"; i.e., both social class and ethnicity affect the *level* of intellectual performance. However, only ethnicity "fosters the development of a different *pattern* of abilities," while social-class differences within the ethnic groups do not modify these basic patterns associated with ethnicity.

To return to our continuing discussion of defining and delimiting the term "disadvantaged": Defining the "disadvantaged" as belonging to a particular ethnic group has one set of consequences for the development of intellectual skills—ethnic groups differ in both level and pattern of mental abilities. Defining the term using the social-class criteria of occupation, education, and neighborhood leads to quite different consequences—social-class affects level of ability, with middle class being uniformly superior, but does not alter the basic patterns of mental ability associated with ethnicity. Still other definitions—for example, unavailability of English language models, presence of a threatening and chaotic environment, matriarchal family structure, high family mobility, parental absence or apathy, poor nutrition—probably generate still other consequences, although we really know very little empirically about these relationships.

A Replication Study^a

Since our early results were both surprising and striking in magnitude, our next step was to conduct a replication and extension with first-graders in Boston. The replication was conducted with middle-class and lower-class Chinese and Negro children (the samples of Jewish and Puerto Rican children who fit our social-class criteria were not available); the extension included an additional ethnic group—children from middle- and lower-class Irish-Catholic families.

Once again, the results were both striking and surprising. The replication data on Chinese and Negro children in Boston duplicated almost exactly our earlier data on similar samples in New York City. The striking, almost identical test performances in the original and replication study are shown in Figures 6-10. The raw mean scores of the Chinese children in Boston and in New York were different by an average of one-third of one standard deviation (Figure 6), and the Negro children in Boston and in New York were one-fifth of one standard deviation different from each other (Figure 7). Only one mean difference (numerical scores of Boston and New York Chinese) slightly exceeded one-half of one standard deviation.

The resemblance of the original and replication samples in patterns of mental ability is shown in Figure 8 (which contrasts the ethnic groups in

^a This replication study was conducted under the direction of Dr. Jane Fort, Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University.




Fig. 6. Mean Mental Ability Scores for Chinese Children in Boston ($N = 20$) and New York ($N = 80$).






Fig. 7. Mean Mental Ability Scores for Negro Children in Boston ($N = 20$) and New York ($N = 80$).



**Fig. 8. Patterns of Mental Ability for Chinese and Negro Children:
NY vs. Boston.**



**Fig. 9. Patterns of Mental Ability for Chinese Children; Middle- and
Lower-Class, NY vs. Boston.**




Fig. 10. *Patterns of Mental Ability for Negro Children; Middle- and Lower-Class, NY vs. Boston.*

the two cities with middle- and lower-class samples combined), Figure 9 (which displays the Chinese patterns in Boston and New York for each social-class group), and Figure 10 (which displays the Negro patterns in Boston and New York for each social-class group). With very few exceptions (number skills, especially multiplication and division, of the middle-class Chinese in Boston are slightly superior to the middle-class Chinese in New York), both the levels and patterns of mental ability in the Boston data almost duplicate the New York City data for Chinese and Negro children.

This replication study also included an ethnic group not previously studied in New York City: middle- and lower-class Irish-Catholic children. These first-grade Irish-Catholic children, in contrast to all the other ethnic groups tested, displayed neither a distinctive ethnic-group pattern nor similarity of patterns for middle- and lower-class segments of the Irish-Catholic sample. Although we have no definitive explanation of this finding as yet, the absence of a distinctive ethnic-group pattern may be related to our failure to locate homogeneous concentrations of middle- and lower-class Irish-Catholic families in Boston. The Irish-Catholic families are less confined to limited geographic areas than the other ethnic groups. We could not locate either middle- or lower-class Irish-Catholic families who fit clearly the occupational, educational, and neighborhood criteria for social-class placement. In short, there are at least two plausible explanations for the failure to replicate our

results on other ethnic groups with the Irish-Catholic children: poor sampling of middle-class and lower-class Irish-Catholic families (due to their unexpected unavailability in Boston) or a real difference between Irish-Catholic children and those from other ethnic groups tested.

In the report of our original study, we noted an interaction effect between social class and ethnicity in which the social-class difference produces more of a difference in the mental abilities of the Negro children than for the other ethnic groups. In the replication study, this finding reappeared: the middle-class Negro children are more different in level of mental abilities from the lower-class Negro children than the middle-class Chinese or Irish-Catholic children are from the lower-class Chinese or Irish-Catholic children. It was also true in the replication, as in the original data, that the scores of the middle-class children from the various ethnic groups resembled each other more than the scores of the lower-class children from these ethnic groups. That is, the middle-class Chinese, Irish-Catholic, and Negro children are more alike in their mental ability scores (with the one exception of the middle-class Chinese in numerical ability) than are the lower-class Chinese, Irish-Catholic, and Negro children.

One further specific analysis should be noted before proceeding to a discussion of future research and the implications for educational policy. We have assessed the relative contributions of the five ethnic groups tested to the distinctiveness of ethnic-group patterning. The percentage of total ethnicity variance contributed by each ethnic group appears in Table 4. While the groups differ markedly in their relative contributions to the distinctiveness of ethnic-group patterns, all except the Irish-Catholic contribute to a statistically significant degree.

Some results of Coleman's recent study, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, are compatible with these findings. The study included children from Oriental-American, Negro, Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, Indian-American, and white groups. This study does not include all our mental-

TABLE 4

*Percentage of Variance Contributed by Each Ethnic Group
to the Group \times Tests Interaction Term*

<i>Ethnic Group</i>	<i>% of Variance</i>
Chinese	39
Irish-Catholic	1
Jewish	38
Negro	13
Puerto Rican	9

ability variables nor does it provide a good assessment of social-class for the younger children, but Coleman's data for Chinese, Negro, and Puerto Rican children on Verbal and Reasoning tests show patterns very similar to ours.

We have some confidence, then, in our earlier findings on the effects of social-class and ethnic-group influence on the development of patterns of mental abilities in young children: at least several mental abilities are organized in ways that are determined culturally, social-class producing differences in the *level* of mental abilities (the middle-class being higher) and ethnic groups producing differences in both *level* and *pattern* of mental abilities.

Future Research

To pursue the educational relevance of these findings, we are now studying the following questions:

- (1) What actual school behaviors are predicted by the patterns of mental ability?
- (2) Are the differential patterns related to ethnic-group differences stable over time or do intervening experiences modify them?
- (3) What are the specific origins or antecedents of differential patterns of mental ability?
- (4) How can our knowledge about patterns of mental ability be fitted to the content and timing of instruction?

Mental-Ability Patterns as Predictors of School Achievement. We have stressed the importance of examining a variety of criteria related to school achievement in research on the "disadvantaged." We are assessing the predictive value of our mental-ability data for forecasting various patterns of school achievement, asking these questions: Is there an optimal pattern of mental abilities that results in superior school performance; or are different optimal patterns associated with superior school performance in different subject-matter areas? If optimal patterns are identified, can the child's abilities be reinforced differentially so that these optimal patterns are produced; or should the educational program adjust itself to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the child?

*Convincing laboratory demonstrations (e.g., Duncanson, 1966) exist of the interrelations between measures of abilities and performance on several learning tasks. Using our mental-ability measures as predictors, we are attempting to extend these analyses to classroom learning performance.

In the research effort on matching instructional strategies and patterns of abilities, which we describe below, we go more deeply into the relations between types of intelligence and school performance. The achievement test

measures used in our predictive validity study are static criteria of school performance; what really interests us is the predictive value of the mental-ability measures in forecasting learning in response to variations in instructional strategies. The relationships between mental-ability patterns and achievement test measures do, however, provide some assessment of the predictive validity of the mental-ability patterns.

Stability over Time of Mental-Ability Patterns. Will the major finding of this study, that differential patterns of ability are related to ethnic-group differences, remain stable across age groups? That is, does ethnic-group membership continue to determine the pattern of abilities for children with increasing maturity? Do the relative strengths and weaknesses of the subjects represent different rates of learning that eventually level off to a more or less common mean for all groups, or do they indeed represent stable cognitive organizations? What is the role of school experience in modifying distinctive ethnic-group patterns? That is, do the different patterns of mental ability persist in spite of the possible homogenizing effects of schooling through the heavy emphasis on verbal forms of instruction and the de-emphasis on the use of other intellectual skills?

To answer these questions, we have recently completed the construction of an upward extension of the tests of mental ability, providing appropriate measuring instruments for fifth- through eighth-grade children. Since our original New York City sample will be entering sixth-grade and we have located about 85 per cent of them, we will attempt to assess the size and magnitude of changes in mental-ability patterns over a five-year period.

There are few empirical precedents here. Studies of the differentiation of mental ability have not traced the course of social-class and ethnic influences through the use of samples followed longitudinally. Evidence on ethnic-group variations on samples of older subjects is conflicting: Stewart, Dole, and Harris (1967) do not find variations in the factorial structures of different ethnic groups, but Guthrie (1963) does. Cross-sectional findings (e.g., Meyers, Dingman, & Orpet, 1964) show stability in factorial structure across three age groups (two-, four-, and six-year-olds). But no direct evidence tells us whether there are ethnically distinctive patterns of mental ability which persist, dissolve, or change with age.

Developmental Origins: Antecedents of Diverse Mental Abilities. What early experiences produce the particular patterns of mental ability in different ethnic groups?⁴ Many different environmental influences may be operating:

⁴ We assume that our ability tests reflect student development produced by the interaction of environmental and genetic conditions. We are exploring the modifiability of these abilities and the degree to which they can be used in maximizing instruction.

the reinforcements the parents offer for different types of intellectual performance, opportunities inside and outside the home for learning different skills, the value placed on different forms of intellectual performance, the parents' intellectual aspirations for the child, work habits developed in the home, and so forth. Some suggestions exist in the literature (e.g., Bing, 1963) that less direct child-rearing influences—for example, the fostering of dependence or independence or the presence of a tense parent-child relationship—affect the development of mental abilities differentially.

We are now setting out to investigate the variations among ethnic groups in the history of differential experience in learning different mental skills. We assume that different emphases exist among ethnic groups in the specific intellectual functions that are stimulated and encouraged and that these different emphases are reflected in their different organizations of mental abilities. This research demands a longitudinal analysis which begins very early in the child's life as well as naturalistic observation in and out of the home. Since the little empirical research on the history of differential mental abilities is essentially retrospective in design, extensive methodological development is demanded by this research.

School-Based Research: Matching Instructional Strategies to Patterns of Mental-Ability. How can knowledge of a child's pattern of mental abilities be fitted to the content and timing of his instruction? How can instruction be adjusted to the child's particular strengths and weaknesses, or the child's abilities modified to meet the demands of instruction? In the context of individualizing instruction, we are attempting to fit instruction to particular forms of ability and *vice versa*. In the context of research design, we are searching for the interactions between instructional treatments and the abilities of the learner in order to determine how selected mental-ability variables are differentially related to learner performance under different treatments or conditions of instruction.

Answering these questions requires continuous, successive approximations to an analysis of the child's special combination of intellectual resources and the demands for intellectual resources placed upon him by the curriculum. We have begun two preliminary studies, one in the teaching of beginning reading, another in learning the concept of mathematical functions at the sixth-grade level. One approach we have used begins with an assessment of the child's particular pattern of mental ability and seeks to build an instructional strategy to capitalize on the child's intellectual strengths and minimize his weaknesses. For example, in teaching mathematical functions to children strong in Space Conceptualization but weak in Numerical facility, we

use graphical presentation; in teaching the same concept to a child strong in Number facility but weak in Space Conceptualization, we rely on the manipulation of numbers in a tabular form. Using this approach, a correct matching of child and curriculum (e.g., a spatial child given a spatially-oriented curriculum) results in some learning for most children; however, there is wide variation in amounts of gain within the correctly-matched group. Incorrect matching (e.g., a numerical child given a spatially-oriented curriculum) results uniformly in insignificant gain. That is, at this point we seem to be able to create destructive mismatches more successfully than constructive matches. Practically, this is not much of a gain. Conceptually, however, we are discovering the forms that the matching and mismatching of intelligence and curriculum can take. We consider this research a useful first approximation to the iterative process of matching curriculum and individual differences. We now have identified one set of necessary conditions for fitting instruction and individual differences: to learn a space-oriented curriculum, the child must possess (or be taught first) a specifiable minimum skill in space conceptualization. How far and how rapidly he progresses in responding further to the space-oriented curriculum is not explained by his initial status. It is therefore necessary to extend our assessment to other relevant attributes of the child and thereby extend the iterative process of matching curriculum and individual differences in intelligence.

Another approach to intelligence-curriculum matching starts with a task analysis of the intellectual demands imposed by a curriculum and proceeds to an analysis of the intellectual skills available to the child, with the purpose of modifying or developing these skills to the requisite levels necessary to the task. Our only attack on this approach to date is some preliminary analysis of the modifiability of mental-ability variables. Some earlier work by Thelma Thurstone (1948) and more recent work at Educational Testing Service (Bussis, 1965) for first-graders in New York City and by Julian Stanley at Wisconsin hold promise that mental abilities can be modified to match the demands of the curriculum.

It is clear that knowledge of four mental abilities is insufficient to the task of matching individual differences in intelligence to the demands of complex curricula. It is also clear that we have few tools available for the adequate task analysis of different instructional strategies. Additional preliminary research is attempting to expand our conceptualization based on mental abilities by categorizing both the intellectual skills and the curriculum demands by means of three-dimensional models of intelligence, such as Guilford's (1959) scheme which includes not only mental operations (related to mental abilities) but contents and products as well, or Jensen's

(1967a) model which includes not only modality variables (related to mental abilities) but types of learning and procedures for presenting learning materials.

Thus, we are applying our analysis of patterns of mental ability to an issue which we believe has promise for classroom learning and teaching—how to match instructional strategies and individual differences in intelligence to produce effective learning performance.

Implications for Educational Policy

Coleman's Argument in "Equality of Educational Opportunity." *Equal Opportunity for Equal Development.* We mentioned earlier the recent study on *Equality of Educational Opportunity* directed by James S. Coleman. The results and particularly the interpretation of this study provide a useful point of departure for analyzing the implications for educational policy of the data described here on ethnic-group and social-class differences in mental-ability patterns.

Coleman failed to find what he expected to find, direct evidence of large inequalities in educational facilities in schools attended by children from different majority or minority groups. The study set out to document the fact that for children of minority groups school facilities are sharply unequal and that this inequality is related to student achievement. The data did not support either conclusion. What small differences in school facilities did exist had little or no discernible relationship to the level of student achievement.

Starting with these facts, Coleman develops an argument which we shall contrast with the implications of our mental-ability study. Inequality of educational opportunity still prevails, he says, because white and Negro (and other minority-group) students do not display equal levels of educational achievement when they complete high school. *Ipsa facto*, the schools are unequal, despite the absence of direct evidence of such inequality.

Coleman's argument starts with the premise that the proper function of the schools in a democracy is to produce equal achievement levels among different groups in our society. Arguing from this premise, the demonstrated fact that Negroes and whites are unequal in level of educational attainment testifies to the inequality of educational opportunities provided by the schools. That is, by definition, schools are designed to make groups equal. They do not do so. Therefore, schools are unequal in the educational opportunities they provide. Indeed, following this argument, the single decisive criterion for judging equal educational opportunity is that mean school performance of all groups be equal.

Coleman makes his position clear by saying that the role of the schools is

to "make achievement independent of background" and to "overcome the differences in starting point of children from different social groups" (Coleman, 1966, p. 72). This position is shared by much research on the "disadvantaged," where the objective is to seek means to reduce the discrepancy in achievement levels between "deprived" and "nondeprived" children.⁵

The "Equal-Footing" Basis of Coleman's Argument. At one level—the "equal-footing" level—Coleman's line of reasoning seems to epitomize logic, common sense, and compassion. It seems to ask only that we give children from "disadvantaged" backgrounds a fair shake—that through the educational system, we educate all children to a point of equality in school achievement so that all groups can compete on equal terms for jobs or future educational opportunities.

However, it is our contention that Coleman's analysis does not go far enough, does not tell the whole story or consider all the evidence, and therefore is misleading and perhaps destructive. It fails to consider either the role of diversity and pluralism in our society or several alternative definitions of the function of schooling. Should schools provide equal opportunities to promote the *equal* development of all groups and individuals or equal opportunities for the *maximum* development of each group or individual? Can schools aim to do both?

An Alternative Argument: Equal Opportunity for Maximum Development. We believe that our data on patterns of mental ability clarify these two alternative and perhaps complementary assumptions regarding the function of education: (1) to provide equal opportunity for *equal* development, or (2) to provide equal opportunity for *maximum* development of each group or individual, whether or not group differences remain, enlarge, or disappear as a consequence. These positions are apparently incompatible but need closer examination in the light of empirical evidence.

a. Data on social class: From our mental-ability data, what would we predict would happen if we modified the social-class characteristics of all our lower-class families—elevating the jobs, educations, and housing of the lower-class

⁵ The counterpart to Coleman's reasoning about equal educational opportunity exists in the history of "culture-free" test construction, another topic of great relevance to the education of the disadvantaged. Early developers of "culture-free" tests (e.g., Eells et al., 1951) argued that only tests which eliminated items distinguishing among groups were free of "bias." The parallel to Coleman's argument is apparent: (1) the proper function of a "culture-free" test is to produce equal test scores for different social-class and ethnic groups; (2) if equal scores are not obtained, the fault is that the test (or some kinds of test items) produce the difference. Difference in test scores, *ergo*, bias in test items. The logical fallacy of this argument is now well-documented (e.g., Anastasi, 1958; Lorge, 1952), but the simple and surface persuasiveness of the argument stalled progress for many years in the study of cultural influences upon intelligence.

families in all ethnic groups? Within each ethnic group, we would expect to elevate the mental abilities of the lower-class children to resemble those of the middle-class children in that ethnic group, making them more similar to their middle-class counterparts in that ethnic group in level of ability. In this sense, we would be making groups of children more similar, removing the differences in mental ability associated with differences in social-class position.⁶

If we elevated the social-class position of lower-class families, we might produce still another effect which increases the similarity among groups. The interaction effect between social class and ethnicity showed that the mental-ability scores of middle-class children from various ethnic groups resembled each other more than the scores of the lower-class children from these ethnic groups. This interaction can be described as a convergence effect: the scores of the middle-class children across ethnic groups converge to a greater extent than the scores of lower-class children.

Thus, by elevating the occupations, educations, and neighborhoods of our lower-class families, our data would lead us to expect an increased resemblance of mental-ability levels for children within each ethnic group and, in addition, a convergence of scores of children across ethnic groups. To the extent that level of performance on mental abilities predicts school achievement, these convergences would narrow the range of differences in school achievement among social-class and ethnic groups.

b. Data on ethnic groups: To this juncture, our analysis supports the argument for equal educational opportunities for *equal* development: our data on level of mental ability suggest that elevating social-class characteristics of lower-class families would contribute to a greater degree of equality of development in level of intellectual functioning. Now, what of the alternative conception that the proper function of education is to provide equal opportunity for *maximum* development no matter what the consequences for the absolute magnitude of group differences? Since the data on patterns of intellectual functioning indicates that once the mental-ability pattern specific to the ethnic group emerges, social-class variations within the ethnic group do not alter the basic organization associated with ethnicity, this finding suggests that lower-class children whose social-class position is elevated would still retain the distinctive mental-ability pattern associated with their ethnic group. The implication is that no matter what manipulations are under-

⁶ We noted earlier that social-class position produces more of a difference in the mental abilities of Negro children than for the other groups. From this finding, it is possible to speculate that elevating the social-class characteristics of lower-class Negro families would produce a more dramatic increase in the level of the Negro children's abilities than would a comparable change in social-class position affect the children from other ethnic groups.

taken to modify the social-class positions of children within an ethnic group, the distinctive ethnic-group pattern of abilities will remain.

From this set of observations, the question then arises: how can we make *maximum* educational use of the distinctive patterns of ability the child possesses? We do not have definitive answers to this question, which forces us to consider the line of future research discussed earlier on matching instructional strategies to the patterns of mental ability. In our discussion of school-based research, we called for a program to identify and explore mental attributes of children and the instructional methods which could be matched most effectively to these attributes to produce successful learning. In the simplest case, we can conceive of successful matching producing equal levels of achievement for children; such an outcome would be consistent with Coleman's argument. We think that at least for basic skills (e.g., literacy) the achievement of equal levels by all children is desirable.

Two possible contradictions to Coleman's argument remain, however. Beyond deploying all necessary resources to achieve minimal equality in essential goals, further development of students may well be diverse. A continuous utilization of student strengths and weaknesses may well lead to diverse development beyond a minimal set of achievements. To the extent that past experience, interests, and achievements of students are regularly related to subcultural membership, educational outcomes may differ. Second, we do not know what effects the matching procedure will have over time. We start, let us say, by using suitable alternative routes to identical educational objectives. Assuming we successfully achieve these outcomes, what else have we done? Have we, perhaps, reinforced and strengthened abilities, interests, or personality characteristics which are in fact associated with subcultural membership? In the long run, will we develop more diverse students than we started with?

Let us take a specific, if partially hypothetical, case. Our evidence indicates (see Figure 1) that young Chinese children have their strongest skill in Space Conceptualization and their weakest in Verbal ability. Conversely, young Jewish children are strongest in Verbal ability and weakest in Space Conceptualization. Following our principle of matching instruction and ability, we incidentally may enhance the initial strengths which each group possesses. For example, through the incidental enhancement of the space-conceptualization skills of the Chinese children, we may produce proportionally more Chinese than Jewish architects and engineers. Conversely, through incidental enhancement of verbal skills of the Jewish children, we may produce proportionally more Jewish than Chinese authors and lawyers. We will not have put members of these two ethnic groups on an "equal footing" for entering a particular occupation. But can we say that we have produced a socially-

destructive outcome by starting with the knowledge of differences in ability patterns and adapting our instructional strategies to this knowledge to produce a maximum match for each child, even if this process results in inequality of certain educational and professional attainments? We are willing to accept, then, one possible consequence of arranging instruction to capitalize maximally on distinctive patterns of ability: that, in certain areas of intellectual accomplishment, rather than reducing or bringing toward equality the differences among various groups, we may actually magnify those differences.⁷

A Summary. We challenged Coleman's "equal-footing" argument on the grounds that it did not tell the whole story or use all known data. Some of these data, mainly the effects of social class upon level of mental ability, testify in favor of the argument for equal educational opportunity for *equal* development. Other data, namely the effects of ethnicity upon patterns of mental ability, testify to the importance of providing equal educational opportunities for the *maximum* development of groups and individuals, even if inequality of groups occurs as a consequence.

Are equalization and diversification necessarily incompatible goals? We do not believe so. If accelerating the feasible gains in jobs, education, and housing of lower-class families accelerates the gains in intellectual development of their children and *reduces* the difference in intellectual performance between social-class groups, we can all agree on the desirability of this outcome. On the other hand, if recognizing the particular patterns of intellectual strengths and weaknesses of various ethnic groups and maximizing the potential power of these patterns by matching instructional conditions to them makes the intellectual accomplishments of different ethnic groups more diverse, we can all accept this gain in pluralism within our society. Thus, if lower-class children now perform intellectually more poorly than middle-class children—and it is clear that they do—and lower-class status can be diluted or removed by a society truly dedicated to doing so, this gain in equalization seems to be one legitimate aim of education. If the maximum educational promotion of particular patterns of ability accentuates the diverse contributions of different ethnic groups, this gain in pluralism seems another legitimate aim of education.

⁷ At this point in the argument, the counterpart topic is that of the difference between "compensatory" and "supportive" educational programs for "disadvantaged." Compensatory programs aim to compensate, to make amends, to eradicate symptoms and causes—to give "disadvantaged" children what they need to make them like everyone else. In contrast, the aim of what might be termed "supportive" education is to give disadvantaged children what they need and can use maximally in order to learn to cope with and change their particular environments, even if they are made more different from everyone else in the process.

Our main point is that the study of mental abilities suggests that there may be patterns of attributes (cognitive, personality, motivational, and so forth) which are related in some regular way to ethnic-group membership. School-based research has not as yet identified the particular patterns of attributes which are educationally important and which (when matched with the appropriate instructional strategies) will maximize school achievement. Thus, we do not yet know if attribute patterns associated with ethnic-group membership will, in fact, be identified as educationally important. We believe, however, that data such as those derived from the current mental-abilities study must be considered since their implications may in fact require revisions of Coleman's position. We raise the issue because we are committed to our program of school-based research; whether ethnic-group differences are in fact minimized, held constant, or inflated by the programs which match individual differences to instructional strategies, we believe it important to pursue these programs nonetheless.

Perhaps this position asks no more than to change what is bad and changeable in education and society (resulting perhaps in greater equalization) and to use maximally what is good in education and society (resulting perhaps in increased diversity). Logic—and the empirical evidence—endorses both conclusions.

✓ TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF THE DISADVANTAGED

Let us start with the simplest possible definition of "disadvantaged," i.e., the "not advantaged." Given this definition, one might argue that the "advantaged" have something (or many things) that the "disadvantaged" do not have, that these "have not's" should be given what the "have's" already possess, and then we shall all be equal. Certainly, matters are not that simple.

Defining the "disadvantaged" in terms of differences in social-class position adds some precision to the definition of "not advantaged." It identifies more clearly some of the characteristics on which the "have's" and the "have not's" differ: jobs, education, housing. A social-class definition thus specifies three dimensions of the limited social boundaries within which the lower-class child may move. The empirical implications of the social-class definition are not very different in substance, however, from the definition of "not advantaged." We have argued from our data that providing a lower-class family with what a middle-class family has—better jobs, education, and housing—will produce levels of mental ability resembling those of middle-class children. We thus provide equal education and social opportunities for equal development.

What happens, however, when we introduce ethnicity into our definition

of "disadvantaged"? The consequences now change. It is no longer possible to follow the strategy of giving the "have not's" what "have's" possess; changing ethnic membership cannot be accomplished through the social decree of federal action programs. We know ethnic groups differ in patterns of ability no matter what the social-class level within the ethnic group, and our educational problem now becomes that of providing equal educational opportunity to all ethnic groups to maximize their development, even at the expense of magnifying differences among the groups.

The point for defining the term "disadvantaged" is clear. The many different meanings assigned to this label may have accumulated arbitrarily according to the idiosyncratic choices of the various users of the term. But it is not merely a matter of whose definition sounds most convincing, or elegant, or compassionate. Each definition brings different empirical results and suggests different implications for educational policy and social action. We cannot afford this confusion; we are forced to be clearer about our definitions and their educational and social consequences.

We began this paper by accepting the common definition of disadvantaged status based on gross environmental characteristics: social class and ethnicity. This definition of disadvantage is strictly environmental and pre-assigned; it ignores the child's characteristics completely. It is a gross classification of children according to group membership only, and what we can learn about children by using this definition is usually expressed in terms of group tendencies (although we have suggested some techniques for moving from group data to individual analysis). Our suggestions for future research, both of developmental origins and school-based studies, direct us to some necessary refinements and extensions of these gross classifications.

Our recommendations for studies of developmental origins or environmental process analyses move us strongly in the direction of more precision and detail about environmental circumstances. Developmental research demands that a new definition of disadvantaged status be based on a much more refined assessment of environmental circumstances. Such an assessment would proceed far beyond the group characteristics we have dealt with in the past, specifying environmental circumstances which are closely articulated with developmental processes and which vary considerably within and across social-class and ethnic lines. Particular clusterings of environmental circumstances known to be related to developmental processes would lead to identification of disadvantaged status in more complex but precise terms.

Our discussions of school-based research suggest that disadvantaged status be expanded to include characteristics of the child. We refer now to assessments of children which are intimately connected with instructional objectives and procedures. From this point of view, a multiplicity of child

attributes would have to be used to assess readiness for learning a variety of school tasks. Such measurements of readiness would give much power and operational substance to the concept of disadvantage.

We are therefore suggesting that an important advance in definition could be made by joining more precise descriptions of environments with instructionally-based assessments of child characteristics. Beginning with environmental characteristics and then assessing children's learning patterns would lead to one grouping of those we would class as disadvantaged; the other direction of attack, starting with child characteristics and then assessing environments, would lead to another grouping. The usefulness and desirability of each direction of approach must await both empirical and practical assessment. In either case, the lesson is clear: a new definition of "disadvantaged" should include psychologically-meaningful statements about the environment and the child. The complexity of such statements will reflect a plethora of constructs and if-then statements about child-environment interactions but will be a realistic reflection of the diversity and individuality of children and the lives they lead.

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The author discusses the social, moral, and academic effects resulting from the interaction of adolescent and adult students in a secondary school setting. Dr. Elder specifies the social and psychological features of age-integration—beyond sheer propinquity—which contributed to the observed effects.

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Age Integration and Socialization in an Educational Setting*

Research has disclosed negative consequences of segregation by age in educational settings,¹ yet few studies have examined directly the impact of varying age compositions—such as adults and adolescents, preadolescents and young children, etc.—on the process and content of learning in the classroom.² In a current study of relationships between children of different ages, Lippitt and Lohman suggest that “cross-age interaction is probably a potent learning experience for children of all ages.”³ Furthermore, they note that “we may not be making the best use of the powerful educational resource represented

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¹ James Coleman's research, in particular, suggests some of the negative consequences of the segregation of youth from the adult community in large high schools; *The Adolescent Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964). See also David Riesman, *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday, 1956).

² This is not true in Great Britain; see R. R. Dale, “Co-education II: An Analysis of Research on Comparative Attainment in Mathematics in Single-Sex and Co-educational Maintained Grammar Schools,” *Educational Research*, V (November, 1962), 10-15. On research in the U.S., see the following report of an ongoing study at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan: Peggy Lippitt and John E. Lohman, “Cross-Age Relationships—An Educational Resource,” *Children*, XII (May-June, 1965), 113-17.

³ Lippitt and Lohman, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

by cross-age relationships among children." They continue, "It is an observed fact that children, with proper training and support from adults, are able to function effectively in the roles of helpers and teachers of younger children—and that the older children find this type of experience meaningful, productive, and a source of valuable learning for themselves."⁴ A similar conclusion may apply to relationships between adolescents and adult students. Although thousands of older adolescents have attended trade and evening schools with adults, the consequence of this type of age composition on learning processes—whether positive, negative, or both—is as yet largely unexplored.

The consequences of cross-age relations for adolescent students may be observed as positive in at least three areas: interpersonal, academic, and vocational. In the domain of interpersonal learning, cross-age interaction on the student level may foster primary-type friendships between adults and youths, replace negative stereotypes with mutual understanding, establish shared perspectives, and develop reciprocal patterns of assistance and modeling. These conditions facilitate anticipatory socialization in which adolescents learn the responsibilities, rights, and behavior patterns appropriate to future roles. Relations with adults provide an apprenticeship in getting along with older people which could be generalized to adults in authority positions.⁵

In returning to the classroom after many years in family and occupational roles, adult students bring with them a life history that has potential academic and vocational significance for their younger classmates. Such a return reflects a certain amount of courage, considerable sacrifice, motivation for self-improvement, and the necessity and relevance of completing a high-school education for successful employment. Through processes of reciprocal assistance, encouragement, and modeling, adolescent students in this type of setting may acquire motivation, self-confidence, and skill in mastering their course work; and they may perceive the relevance of their studies and a diploma for adult roles. Cross-age interaction should strengthen an adult orientation among youth at the expense of adolescent commitments and heighten their awareness of adult responsibilities. Adults, on the other hand, could benefit from the scholastic skills and academic know-how of their young counterparts who are more accustomed to the school setting and have

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Relevant to this point is the following proposition which Cottrell extracted from the literature on age and sex roles:

The degree of adjustment to a future role varies directly with the degree of opportunity for (1) emotionally intimate contact which allows identification with persons functioning in the role, (2) imaginal or incipient rehearsal of the future role, and (3) practice in the role through play or other similar activity.

"The Adjustment of the Individual to His Age and Sex Roles," *American Sociological Review*, VII (October, 1942), 619.

experienced relatively continuous instruction. The opportunity to help adults might also enhance the adolescent students' self-esteem.

Segregation by age, exemplified in most American high schools, sharply reduces such learning experiences, maintains negative stereotypes of age groups, and appears to contribute to the discontinuities between adolescents and adults of which Benedict and others have spoken.⁶ This social pattern has also encouraged a questionable differentiation in educational thinking along age-group lines.

The social consequences of student stratification by age are also seen in the way public schools treat the so-called "over-age child," a student who is substantially older than his classmates. An adolescent who reaches a certain age (in some districts, nineteen) may be asked to leave school simply because he is "too old."⁷

The contribution of adult students to interpersonal, academic, and vocational learning appears more critical for adolescents from the lower than middle classes. These adolescents are more likely to be isolated from competent adults outside the family.⁸ Moreover, the prevalence of disorganized family life and low occupational status of parents lessen the attractiveness of parents as adult models. A lower-class parent with a grade-school education can express interest in education but often lacks the resources or educational achievements to implement such goals for his children. On the interpersonal level, much of the lower-class youth's contact with adults is negative, as with law enforcement officials and other punitive authority figures.⁹ Lack of contact between supportive and successful adults and lower-class youth is com-

⁶ Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray (eds.), *Personality: In Nature, Society and Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 522-31; see also Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *American Sociological Review*, V (1940), 523-35 and "Adolescence and the Social Structure," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXXXVI (1944), 3-17. Age segregation, like segregation by race, may foster negative stereotypes of adults and youth in the minds of members of each group. On the image of youth in society, as youth perceive it, see Robert D. Hess and I. Goldblatt, "The Status of Adolescents in American Society: A Problem in Social Identity," *Child Development*, XXVIII (1957), 459-62; Frank Musgrove, *Youth and the Social Order* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1965); and Otto Wiefert, "Youth-Adult Relationships: The Social Milieu," *International Journal of Adult and Youth Education*, XV (1963), 43-9.

⁷ In California, many of these students are sent to continuation schools. See E. Evan Shaffer, *A Study of Continuation Education in California* (California State Department of Education, 1955); W. W. Leis, *Some Characteristics, Needs, and Wants of Pasadena Students* (Pasadena, Calif.: Pasadena City Schools); and Lawrence B. White, "Continuation Education for Disadvantaged Youth in California," *Journal of Secondary Education*, XXXVII (November, 1962), 399-406.

⁸ Cf. James F. Short, Jr. and Fred L. Strodbeck, *Group Process and Gang Delinquency* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 275-6. See also Martin Gold, *Status Forces in Delinquent Boys* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1963).

⁹ Ames W. Chapman, "Attitudes Toward Legal Authorities by Juveniles," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXXX (1965), 170-5.

monly observed in reports from Federal training programs, i.e., Neighborhood Youth and Job Corps. Inadequate support and encouragement makes a successful transition to adult status highly problematic. Thus relations with accepting and motivated adults offer a potential bridge of training for youths in the transition between dependency and adult roles. Srole suggests that educational agencies should be designed to provide youth with anticipatory training for the requirements of the adult role through group discussion and counseling.¹⁰

A mixture of adults and adolescents in the same classroom by no means assures benefits for the educational process, for there is a significant difference between age integration in physical and in social space. Physical proximity provided by an adult-youth school facilitates cross-age interaction which may result in the social integration of members of each age group, but it is not a sufficient condition for producing this outcome. In fact, under particular circumstances, the interpersonal consequences of adult-youth contact would result in conflicts and cleavage. It is not uncommon in recreational settings and community functions for such contact to engender conflict and distrust. Likewise, we are aware that the presence of Negro and white children in the same school does not assure the development of interracial friendships. In the following case study, classroom integration of adolescent and adult students represents more than coexistence; it includes assumed similarity in status, evaluations of students in each age group expressed in the context of status equality, the development of personal relationships between members of each age group, frequent interaction between adults and youth, and shared perspectives on common educational problems. We assume that only minimal integration of adults and youth in the classroom would result from a relative absence of these conditions.

We shall view the adult-youth composition and resulting social conditions as the determinants of both positive and negative outcomes in an educational setting. A hypothetical model of these conditions and the effects of variations in age integration on adolescent students are shown in Figure 1. Full consideration of the outcomes experienced by adult students is reserved for a subsequent paper. To provide theoretical guidelines for the case study, let us briefly examine conditions resulting from an adult-youth composition and their potential consequences with reference to cross-age relations and the moral, social, and academic influences of the adults.

We assumed that four conditions resulting from the presence of adults and adolescents in the same school would facilitate the development of meaningful cross-age relations or age integration and that this outcome would

¹⁰ Leo Srole, T. S. Langner, S. T. Michael, and T. A. C. Rennie, *Mental Health in the Metropolis: The Midtown Manhattan Study* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), I, 361.

be beneficial to adolescents, adults, and teachers in the educational process. The four conditions appear in the second column from the left in Figure 1: status equality between students in each age group, stemming in large measure from their similar relation to and treatment by the teaching staff; involvement of adult and adolescent students in the same educational task; an age-ratio in the classroom allowing for one-to-one relations between adults and youth; and common grounds for inter-group relations provided by relatively similar backgrounds and ability levels among adult and adolescent students. These conditions could be unplanned or planned features of an adult-youth school. As suggested in the above diagram, specific programs and policy regarding adult-youth relations could enhance the development of these four conditions, and thereby increase the potential educational value of cross-age relations.¹¹

A high degree of integration between adults and adolescents is likely to result from a social context defined by conditions such as equality in status and involvement in the same task. Factors indicating the classroom integration of adults and youth—such as assumed similarity in status—are listed under the quality of cross-age relations in Figure 1. These qualities should reinforce attitudinal bases of cross-age attraction and produce a variety of consequences for youth, including cross-age friendships, modeling of adults, and heightened awareness of the connection between education and adult role responsibilities. If, on the other hand, teachers give preferential treatment to the older students and adult students greatly outnumber their younger counterparts, relatively low integration between adults and adolescents, as well as intergroup hostility and conflict, would be likely.

Of the four conditions which facilitate age integration, status equality is most important. As students, adults and adolescents are likely to be status equals to the extent that they assume the same relation to teachers and administrative staff, experience similar task requirements, and receive similar treatment from teachers in rewards, attitudes, approval, and privileges under comparable circumstances. The informal nature of equalitarian relations between adult and adolescent students contrasts sharply with student-teacher relations which are formally structured, task-oriented, and unequal in status, and which provide a segmented exposure of the adult to the adolescent, thus restricting opportunities for primary relations. An equal-status relationship should enhance the influence of adult students on youth who have had difficulty in getting along with authority figures, a problem common to many

¹¹ On training programs designed to increase the value of cross-age relations in the classroom, see Jeffrey W. Eisman and Peggy Lippitt, "Olders-Youngers Project Evaluation," Report for the Stern Family Fund and the Detroit Board of Education (February, 1966).




FIGURE 1
*Adults and Adolescents in an Educational Setting:
Some Hypothetical Consequences for Youth*

adolescents from socially disadvantaged environments.¹² Furthermore, the salience of autonomy among working- and lower-class youth, especially boys, should enhance the attractiveness and potential influence of the adult student.¹³ The structure of the student-teacher relationship places the adolescent in a submissive, dependent role, whereas pressures in a student collectivity composed of adults and adolescents would expose the latter to adult standards of behavior.¹⁴ Adolescents with these experiences in an age-integrated school are likely to feel that they are treated like adults and to behave accordingly.¹⁵

In the shared student role, adults and youth are involved in the same educational task (the second condition facilitating age integration), and as long as the behavior of one does not interfere with the performance of the other, inter-age relations are likely to be neither necessarily dependent on, nor significantly influenced by, varying levels of success and failure in classwork. In addition, adult approval and disapproval of the school performance and classroom behavior of the adolescent students would tend to be expressed in the context of equalitarian rather than authority relations. Although disapproval by adult students may be threatening and ego-deflating, depending on the manner in which it is expressed, this consequence would be more likely from teacher disapproval. Generally student achievement and social behavior are interdependent. Relations are likely to be harmonious and mu-

¹² Richard Korn suggests that it is possible that "the roles of patient and client, in their passivity, their dependency, and lack of mutuality contribute to the perpetuation of the illness. It logically follows that the status of patient, delinquent, deviant, or parolee may be the most significant part of the illness or problem"; "The Private Citizen, the Social Expert, and the Social Problem in an Excursion Through an Unacknowledged Utopia," in Bernard Rosenberg, Israel Gerver, and F. William Howton (eds.), *Mass Society in Crisis* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 589-90. The effectiveness of nonprofessionals in working with problem children appears to be partly due to their ability to establish informal, equalitarian relations. An exciting program in which college students are paired with fifth- and sixth-grade boys referred by parents as being emotional problems is described by Gerald Goodman in "Companionship as Therapy: the Use of Non-Professional Talent," in J. T. Hart and T. F. Tomlinson (eds.), *New Directions in Clinic-Centered Psychotherapy* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, in press).

¹³ William B. Miller, "Lower-Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency," *Journal of Social Issues*, XIV (1958), 5-19. See also Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Chap. 4.

¹⁴ McDill and Coleman suggest that the dependent role of the student in comprehensive schools partially accounts for rejection of grade-achievement among some college-oriented students; see Edward L. McDill and James Coleman, "High School Social Status, College Plans, and Academic Achievement," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (December, 1963), 905-18.

¹⁵ Lippitt and Lohman list several aspects of the cross-age modeling process—among children ranging in age from four to fourteen—which are similar to those which we have described for adult-youth interaction on the student level:

an older child's ability to communicate more effectively than adults at the younger child's level; the fact that an older child is less likely to be regarded as an "authority figure" than an adult would be; the younger child's greater willingness to accept influence attempts when he perceives a greater opportunity for reciprocal influence (*op. cit.*, p. 114).

tually rewarding as long as the student does well in his studies, or at least conforms satisfactorily to behavioral expectations in the student role. Low achievement and infrequent rewards from the teacher may result in apathy and boredom or aggressive and disruptive behavior in the classroom. Adult-youth relations on the student level should minimize the authority impediment to supportive relations between members of each age group.

Relative equality in status and common task involvement provide an interpersonal environment suitable for primary relations in which youths and adults share experiences and problems that extend beyond the confines of the school. The ratio of adults to adolescents—as the third condition leading to age integration—is likely to be a critical determinant of this type of relationship. In a classroom composed mostly of adults, youth are likely to feel intimidated and may be neglected by the teacher who attempts to meet the requirements of the adults.

Increased adult-adolescent contact can have potentially negative and positive implications for youth: adults may present themselves as negative examples, such as a school dropout or a failure in marriage, and as persons worthy of emulation in aspiration. The negative and positive example of the adult students in returning to school might emphasize the connection between education and desirable employment. This lesson would be compatible with the vocational orientations of youth from the lower classes.¹⁶ In contrast to this informal type of adult-youth interaction, adolescent relations with teachers would be segmental or secondary due to the formal requirements of the relationship and to the unfavorable ratio between teacher and students. In addition, a teacher is unlikely to appeal as an attractive model to students with an acquired dislike for school, teachers, and authority.

A fourth condition that should promote positive cross-age relations is similarity of social-class background and educational experience between adults and youths, which provides shared experiences and interests. Common experiences are likely to establish a sense of equality and familiarity which is difficult to achieve in the formal teacher-student relationship marked by social, cultural, and economic differences. Possession of a common background may account for the effectiveness of nonprofessionals in establishing rapport and trust with youth and adults from similar residential areas.¹⁷ An adult-youth school which recruits adults with less than a high-school diploma and youth who dropped out or were forced out of comprehensive school provides similarity in class background and educational experience. In this case, both

¹⁶ Martin Trow, "The Democratization of Higher Education in America," *European Journal of Sociology*, III (1962), 231-62.

¹⁷ See Frank Riessman and Arthur Pearl, *New Careers for the Poor* (New York: Free Press, 1966) and Robert Williams, "Contra Costa County Field Test in Adult Basic Education as Conducted in the Richmond Unified School District" (Richmond, Calif., July 20, 1966).

adults and youth would have experienced academic difficulty in the regular school environment.

In the conceptual model of adult-youth relations, we leave open the possibility that some of the assumed consequences of age integration result simply from the presence of an adult-youth student body—regardless of the quality of relations between adults and adolescents. For instance, even in a context of hostility and mutual distrust, the presence of a large number of adults could represent a moderately effective force in controlling the classroom behavior of restless, unmotivated youth. This would be most likely in classrooms in which adults far outnumber their younger counterparts. In this situation, however, adult enforcement is likely to be deeply resented. Other possible consequences of inter-group hostility and a disproportionate number of adults include conceptions of youth as irresponsible children and a fragmentation of adolescent peer-group influence in the school setting.

There are also other potentially negative consequences of an adult-youth mixture in the same educational setting which would not be influenced by variations in age integration. Assuming that the presence of adults hastens the passage of youth from adolescent to adult roles, this arrangement necessarily limits the usual "psychosocial moratorium"¹⁸ common to the adolescent experience in regular high schools. The omnipresence of adults in student and authority roles would probably inhibit social activities that are a major feature of the comprehensive high school. Since an extended preparatory period is most common to middle-class youth, they would be more sensitive to these deprivations than adolescents from the lower classes or school dropouts.

ADULT STUDENTS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS IN AN ADULT-YOUTH SCHOOL: A CASE STUDY

The hypothesized ways in which adult students might influence adolescents in an educational setting guided our exploration of adult influence in an age-integrated school in two general areas: (1) the academic, vocational, and moral models the adults present and (2) the patterning of adolescent behavior in relation to adult standards of behavior. Although this case analysis is based on limited data, it is hoped that the results will identify significant hypotheses for subsequent research.

The Setting, Sample, and Methods

The continuation school on which most of the following analysis is based is

¹⁸ See Erik H. Erikson's discussion of this concept in "Identity and the Life Cycle," *Psychological Issue* (1959), I, No. 1.

located in a large city on the West Coast.¹⁹ The physical plant is old and in need of repairs. From the school's inception in the 1930's, adults and adolescents have attended classes together although there is no evidence that the age composition of the student body was based on recognition of the potential educational value of cross-age relations. During the Depression decade and World War II, educational needs, financial limitations, and the low priority of educational programs outside the comprehensive school system appear to have made the adult-youth intake necessary. Only in the last several years have the educational implications of the adult-youth composition been subjected to critical assessment.²⁰

During the spring of 1965, the ratio of adults to adolescents was generally more than two to one, with the average daily attendance consistently above three hundred. Most of the adolescent and adult students came from the working or lower classes and had not been able to complete their secondary education in comprehensive school. Within the school district, the adult-youth institution recruits adolescents who cannot be handled in the regular high school; these include youths with records of habitual truancy, poor academic performance, interpersonal conflicts with students and teachers, and girls who left school due to pregnancy. In addition, school dropouts, parolees, and students on probation were frequently assigned to the school by attendance and Youth Authority officers. Characteristics of adolescents enrolled in the school are indicated by a questionnaire survey conducted in March, 1965. Of the 116 students age eighteen or less who participated in the survey, slightly more than half were boys, and approximately three-fourths were Negroes. Only a third were living with both real parents; most of the fathers in these homes were employed in manual jobs. The anti-social histories of the boys are particularly striking; only 14 per cent had never been picked up by the police, 57 per cent had been picked up four or more times, 20 per cent had been in a Youth Authority camp, and 60 per cent had probation experience. Girls were less likely to have been picked up by the police (45 per cent) or to have been placed on probation (44 per cent). Approximately one-third of the adolescents reported that they chose to enter the school, with the remainder indicating that they were assigned by school and other officials.

Most of the adults in the school were either diploma candidates or were seeking to improve their basic educational and technical skills. Technological changes in the labor market, financial problems, desire for a better job,

¹⁹ The research conducted in this school is part of a study of twelve continuation schools in California. All teachers and administrators in these schools have been surveyed, and the data from students have been collected in four schools.

²⁰ An evaluation of the school was completed in May, 1966 by a committee selected by the superintendent. Continuation of the adult-youth program was one of the recommendations in the report.

and death or illness in the family figured prominently in their return to school. Most adults enter with ninth-grade status. A questionnaire survey of 210 adults in June, 1965 indicated that more than two-thirds did not have a high-school diploma, three-fourths were females, and 42 per cent were Negro. From these data, we can see that the two age groups were relatively similar in social background and in educational level, a condition which is likely to provide an important basis for the development of cross-age relationships. One of the main differences between the age groups was academic motivation; the adults generally displayed stronger motivation in the classroom than their younger counterparts.

The educational program of the adult-youth program differs from that of the comprehensive high school in courses offered, in style of instruction, and in grading practices. The curriculum is intended to develop positive learning attitudes and skills as they relate to the student's orientation toward self and others in the school and community context and to his contemporary as well as future position in society. Course offerings include English and literature, American history, civics, sociology and psychology, algebra 1 and 2, general science, basic science, and an extensive vocational program in business and secretarial skills, domestic arts, and carpentry, metal-work, and electronics. Remedial courses are also provided in reading and arithmetic. Insufficient economic support from the school district has resulted in inadequate laboratory facilities for science courses and deficiencies in meeting textbook needs. Although adult students outnumbered the adolescents in the school, this imbalance was pronounced only in business education and domestic arts courses.

All teachers with adults and adolescents in their classes attempt to individualize instruction as much as possible through the tutorial method, but class size in most subjects generally requires heavy reliance upon the lecture technique. Group discussion is used frequently by teachers in civics, history, sociology, and psychology classes. Teachers prefer to grade students on an individual basis, relative to their ability and progress, rather than use a class standard. This has the effect of reducing student competition and academic pressures, but it also places the academic standards of the school well below those in the regular high school. Teacher-student relations are less formal in this setting than in the comprehensive high school, and there is greater tolerance of deviation in student conduct and dress.

Since most adolescents assigned to the adult-youth school are either academic failures or troublemakers, it is not particularly surprising that the school has a negative reputation among students in the regular high school. Deficiencies in the physical plant also contribute to this reputation. Although the school's history is one of economic deprivation and low priority in the

school district, this pattern has changed markedly during the last two years. Recommendations from a committee assigned to study the school include a new physical plant, substantially improved staff resources and equipment, and a continuation of the adult-youth program.

Data on adult-youth interaction and on the educational process in the school were obtained in field observations, in two questionnaires, and in interviews. Repeated field observations and informal interviews with students and staff were made in the school between October, 1964, and June, 1965, by the author and a research assistant. Field notes from this period of observation and from concurrent observations in another continuation school provided a basis for constructing a questionnaire, which was administered to 116 adolescents in the adult-youth school in March, 1965. The students received the questionnaire in small groups of fifteen to twenty. Most completed it in two consecutive class periods. A diligent effort was made over a two-week period to present the questionnaire to students who were absent on the regular date of administration. As a result, only six students indicated as actively enrolled in the school at the time were not included in the survey. In the first week of June, 1965, a short questionnaire, which focused on adult-youth relations in the classroom, was administered to approximately 90 adolescent students, fifteen to eighteen years of age, and to 210 students over the age of eighteen. The smaller number of adolescent students, in comparison to the total in the March survey, is largely the result of dropouts and of transfers to the comprehensive high school. Both open- and closed-ended questions were included in the questionnaire; the former dealt primarily with the perceived disadvantages and advantages of a school with adults and adolescents and also asked for descriptions of incidents resulting from adult-youth interaction. Code categories were constructed from student responses on the disadvantages and advantages experienced by the adult and adolescent students from the age mixture. Refinements in the code categories were made after a trial run. Two graduate research assistants then independently applied the codes to all questionnaires; agreement on each item was at least 80 per cent. All disagreements were reconciled by a third coder.

Twelve adults and an equal number of adolescents were drawn from the June survey to serve as informants regarding adult-youth relations in the school. The primary objective of the interview was to determine in greater detail than was possible in the questionnaire survey the kinds of conflicts and disadvantages as well as benefits which adult and adolescent students experienced in the school. Reports of situations illustrating these outcomes were elicited through probes. These informants were selected on the basis of their responses to a question asking whether there were advantages in having adults and youth in the same classroom. Six adolescents and six adults over

the age of twenty-one were selected from a pool of respondents who replied that there were many advantages, and the same number of adolescents and adults were drawn from respondents who felt that there were no advantages in an adult-youth mixture in the classroom. The proportion of students of each sex selected to be interviewed within each group was set as close as possible to the proportion of males and females in each age group in the sample. When available students exceeded the number required, sub-group selection of interviewees was made by drawing case numbers from a table of random numbers. Each interview was conducted in privacy by the author or research assistant in an unoccupied room near the counselor's office. Interview responses were not coded for quantitative analysis.

Student Interpersonal Environment: Social Climate and Interaction

The environment of the adult-youth school was distinguished by an adult atmosphere and by relaxed, informal relationships between students differing in age and, to a lesser extent, between teachers and students in comparison to the more impersonal, youth-oriented environment characteristic of the larger, regular high school in the city. These qualities—recorded in observations, questionnaires, and interviews—seemed partly due to the smaller size of the adult-youth school and to more liberal standards on student conduct. In a series of questions which compared the adult-youth school with the regular high school, between a half and two-thirds of the adolescents felt that student relationships were more relaxed, that it was less difficult to know students, and that students seemed to get along better with each other. Less than a fifth of the students expressed contrary opinions. For the most part, relationships between students differing in age in the adult-youth school were appraised as positive features of the school. In the June survey, all but a few of the adolescent and adult students reported that members of each age group got along fairly well or better (93 and 84 per cent, respectively). When asked whether there were any advantages in having adults and youth in the same classroom, a large majority of students in both age groups gave an affirmative response, but older students were more likely to give this response than the adolescents (approximately 88 vs. 75 per cent). Though most students in each age group felt that difficulties due to the adult-youth mixture occurred more than once a month, the adolescents were more likely to report that they occurred about every day (21 vs. 3 per cent). We shall consider the nature of these advantages, disadvantages, and cross-age difficulties in the following pages within the context of particular types of adult-youth contact.

From observations and questionnaire data, we found that cross-age interaction occurred frequently throughout the school day in response to a variety

of concerns and involved most adolescents. When asked, "On the average how often have you talked to an adult student during the day?" 90 per cent of the adolescents reported at least once, and 70 per cent indicated at least four or more times. Four-fifths claimed that they had at least one close friend among the adult students; three-fourths said they had asked an adult student for help on a problem; and a similar proportion indicated that they had assisted an adult student on a school problem two or more times. Not surprisingly, adolescents who reported frequent interaction with adults generally had close adult friends ($r = .63$).²¹

We have suggested that an equal number of adults and adolescents in an educational setting, among other conditions, would be most favorable for the development of positive cross-age relations and age integration. In relation to this standard, the over-all age ratio in the adult-youth school is a potentially negative factor, in that adults outnumbered the adolescents more than two to one. However, the age ratio of particular classes shows a disproportionate number of adults only in domestic arts and business education courses. Overall, we find that none of the adolescents were without adults in their classes, and 60 per cent attended at least one class in which more than half of the students were adults. To explore the effects of an unbalanced age ratio on cross-age relations, we used various indicators of cross-age interaction to compare adolescents in three groups defined by the maximum proportion of adults in their classes: 30 per cent or less, 31 to 60 per cent, and 61 per cent or more. The sex-ratio in each of these groups was relatively similar.

Contrary to our initial expectations, we found a large rather than small proportion of adult students in the classroom to be associated with favorable attitudes and experiences among the adolescents regarding their older counterparts. The data indicate that adolescents with relatively few adults in their classes, compared to other youth, were less likely to have had encounters with older students and to feel that attending classes with adults offered advantages, particularly with respect to their own educational experiences. However, these students were not more likely to report that they did not get along with the adults. Thirty per cent of the adolescents with few adults in

²¹ The index of adolescent interaction with adults was constructed from two highly inter-correlated items (r is over .50 in age, sex, and race groups): "On the average, how often have you asked an adult for help on a problem? The problem may deal with school or other things": "never"—0, "very seldom"—1, and a score of 2 was given to "once in a while," "frequently" and "very often" responses; and "On the average, how often have you talked with an adult student during a school day?"—"I don't," "once," and "twice," were scored 0, "three to five times" was scored 1, and "six or more times" was scored 2. The decision to group "I don't" with "once" and "twice" responses was based on cross-tabulations between this item and other items pertaining to adult-youth contact. The students in these three response categories were very similar in their responses to these other items pertaining to adult-youth contact. For instance, they were likely to say they did not have a close adult friend and never asked for adult help.

their classes claimed that there were advantages in having older students in the school, compared to 47 and 67 per cent of the adolescents in the relatively balanced and largely adult groups. Comparison of the adult minority and majority groups indicated that youth in the latter group were more than twice as likely to have friendships with adult students, to talk with adults four or more times a day, and to have received help from adults on classwork. Although approximately 50 per cent of the adolescents in the school felt that the ideal proportion of adults in the student body would be between 31 and 50 per cent, this judgment varied markedly by the maximum proportion of adults in their classes; the larger the adult proportion, the larger the preferred ratio of adult to adolescent students. For instance, approximately half of the students with relatively few adults in their classes reported that the ideal proportion would be less than 31 per cent; in contrast, all of the students who had a majority of adults in at least one class preferred an adult proportion of 31 per cent or more. Although youth who attended classes in which they were a minority do not appear to have reacted less positively toward the presence of adults than adolescents in the more balanced age group, it is clear that the preferred age ratio is one in which they equal or slightly outnumber the adults.

Adolescent students with histories of anti-social behavior did not differ appreciably from relatively conforming adolescents on interaction with and closeness to the adult students. An index was constructed from questions on classroom suspensions, school suspensions, and contact with the police.²² Adolescents with high scores on the index were slightly less likely to interact frequently with adult students (50 vs. 62 per cent) and to have close adult friends (60 vs. 68 per cent). Considering the amount of trouble the deviant students had created in regular schools for adults in authority positions, the differences are surprisingly small.

Rate of interaction between adult and adolescent students in the school

²² Data for this index were obtained from the March survey and were available on 61 of the 90 adolescents in the June survey. Since 116 students were in the March survey, slightly less than half of these students were not included in the June sample. There are several reasons for this loss. Student turnover and a decrease in enrollment tend to be greatest at the end of every academic year due partly to transfers back to comprehensive school before graduation. Heavy work responsibilities, family problems, and lack of interest are other reasons for the decrease. Research in progress suggests that a large proportion of youth who drop out return to continuation school within the next year. Available evidence does not indicate that the 61 students represent fewer behavior problems than students who left the school after the March survey. The three items are: "During the last year, were you ever sent out of the classroom by a teacher?" "Yes" was scored 1 and "no" was scored 0; "Have you ever been suspended from school?" "Yes" was scored 1 and "no" was scored 0; "Have you ever been picked up by the police?" "Never" was scored 0, "one to three times" was scored 1 and "four or more times" was scored 2. Relatively conforming youth were defined as those with scores of 0-2; deviants include all youths with higher scores on the index. The 37 conforming youth were approximately equally distributed by sex and race. Two-thirds of the 24 deviants were males and most were nonwhite.

seemed to be facilitated by the unique structural features of student relations—relative status equality in relation to the authority structure and to the common educational task. Desire to interact appeared to stem partly from involvement in a similar task. Our observations and interviews indicate that exchanges between members of each age group frequently centered on academic problems, and that the initial offer to help or to request assistance most often came from the adults. In part, this appeared to be an outgrowth of difficulties experienced by the adolescent students in starting conversations and friendships with adults. From past experience, some youth had become apprehensive and distrustful of older persons.²⁸

Most of the adults who were interviewed recognized the advantage in offering friendship, understanding, and assistance to their younger counterparts. They noted such overtures had frequently minimized disruption of classroom instruction, thus preventing wasted time. An indication of the extent to which adult students assisted the adolescents in solving academic and personal problems is provided by data from the June survey. Three-fourths of the adolescents said they were helped on school problems by older students, and half claimed they received occasional assistance on personal problems. Those who received help from adults usually stated that they had frequently interacted with adults ($r = .66$).

Since adults and youth in this setting are generally similar in social background and in educational experience, we cannot assess the relative contribution of these conditions to the development of positive cross-age relations. Nevertheless, interviews with the adult students suggested an unanticipated factor—their experience as parents—which seemed to increase the receptivity of some adults to relations with the adolescent students. Several of the interviewed adults observed that their own experiences as parents had helped them to understand the problems of the adolescent students. They also noted that relationships with the teenagers had increased their insight concerning problems encountered in rearing their own children. To explore the effect of parental experiences on adult orientations toward the adult-youth composition, we compared adults with and without children at home on a set of questions included on the adult-youth questionnaire. The former group agreed more often with the following statements: "There are advantages in having adults and youths in the same classroom"; "Attending classes with adults and youths has helped me get along better with people of all ages"; and "In my opinion most teenagers are nice, pleasant, motivated, competent, etc." An average percentage difference of 16.5 was obtained across these items between adult students with and without child-rearing responsibilities.

²⁸ On the attitudes of youth toward seeking help from adults see Miriam Holman, "Adolescent Attitudes Toward Seeking Help with Personal Problems," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, XXV (1955), 1-31.

Adult Students as Models of Behavior

Most adolescents in the school perceived the adult students as influential models of academic and moral behavior. When asked in an open-ended question about the advantages of having adults in their classrooms, 20 per cent of the adolescents said they had benefited from the academic competence and motivation of the adults; 27 per cent felt they had gained from the moral example of adults in qualities such as consideration, responsibility, and patience; and 20 per cent claimed they were helped in both areas by the adults. Another 12 per cent said they had benefited by the control which adults exercised over student behavior in the classroom. Over-all, 60 per cent of the adolescents acknowledged some type of adult moral influence in comparison to 40 per cent who cited academic influence.

One-fifth of the adolescents felt that there were no advantages in having adults in their classrooms. We anticipated that most complaints of these students would deal with some aspects of perceived inequality between adult and adolescent students. We were aware that some school district officials believed that teachers showed greater interest in teaching the more highly motivated adults than the adolescent students. Data from the adult-youth questionnaire indicated that two-thirds of the students who reported no advantages with the adult-youth mixture felt either that they were held back by the slowness of adults, or were slighted by teachers and school policy on privileges, staff attention, and so on. In view of the age and motivation of the adult students, we were surprised to find only one adolescent who complained that the adults seem to "think that they have the same rights the teacher has; for instance, telling the youths what to do." Inequalities between the age groups on attendance and dress were a source of irritation to six of the adolescents. Youth were required to attend five days a week, whereas the adults could attend on a more limited and irregular basis. Although regulations on dress appeared to be much less restrictive in the adult-youth school than in the regular high school, the adolescent students did not have the freedom in dress that the adults enjoyed. The remaining students who reported no advantages expressed varied interpersonal complaints such as "adults are over-critical," "they don't respect us," and even "adults lose the respect of youth by going to school with them." Most of the above complaints clearly point to the importance of generally equivalent educational skills and staff treatment between age groups for the development of positive cross-age relations.

The various benefits derived from the adult-youth composition were further explored by means of qualitative data from the adult-youth questionnaire, interviews with students in each age group (including those who felt there were no benefits in having adults in their classes), and data obtained from adolescents in a continuation school that did not enroll adults.

Academic Influence of the Adults

The various responses of youth who reported benefit from the presence of adults in the classroom center on three general themes: improved conditions for learning, a tendency to acquire a broader perspective and to learn more, and greater desire to do well in schoolwork. These outcomes appeared to result from the class participation, ideas, and academic skills of the adults, from the motivational implications of the adult academic model, and from adult influence in maintaining appropriate student conduct in the classroom.

Through the class participation of the adults, the adolescent students were exposed to perspectives and ideas seasoned by adult experiences, and a large number of the adolescents felt that their understanding of subject matter and issues was broadened by this experience. The following comments illustrate this consequence: "With the adults, you can learn more because of some of the ideas they express"; "The adults bring out more questions and work"; and "The adults discuss things you don't even know." A seventeen-year-old boy reported that he had benefited by "knowing people who have had to go out and work in this society, and discussing problems with people who are more or less more mature and also more adapted to this society. In my English class, I have argued openly [with adult students] and also have agreed openly. By doing this it has furthered my education and given me greater respect for the so-called adults."

The academic skills of the adult students contributed to the learning experience of their younger counterparts when they helped youth at a time when the teacher was too busy to offer assistance or was unable to communicate an explanation. In the adult-youth questionnaire, approximately 70 per cent of the adolescents indicated that they had received assistance from adults on school problems. One youth observed that "there have been times when a teacher didn't get something through to me and adults could." The adult students frequently described occasions in which they helped younger students in the context of benefits they acquired from attending classes with adolescents. For example: "During my attendance, I have had the pleasure of helping many of the young students in preparing and doing their classwork"; "I help them with their school work when I feel they would like to be helped"; and "I helped one teenager on a project. He didn't know all the details and the teacher didn't have time to help him." Adult approval and encouragement were frequently expressed within the context of this helping relationship. Two of the interviewed adults felt that the pride and self-confidence of adolescents from whom they received assistance was increased by this type of helping relationship. In this type of relationship, youth had the opportunity to do something which was appreciated by the adults. In return,

they received the regard of these adults and perhaps gained a greater sense of effectiveness and self-esteem in the student role.

The presence of adult students in the classroom, according to some adolescents, ensured better class preparation and instruction by teachers. This is a potentially important effect, especially for working- and lower-class youth who are likely to encounter teacher apathy and incompetence in the schools they attend. One adolescent declared that "better teaching" was the most important advantage in having adults and youth in the same class. Another commented that the "teacher teaches us more when there are adults in the class because they know the adults want to learn and not to play around." Although the number of students who mentioned this consequence is small, this aspect of the adult influence deserves systematic exploration.

Adult students were seen as both positive and negative models of behavior. The former quality was shown by their voluntary attendance, their industry, enthusiasm, and goal-orientation in the student role. For most of the adolescents in the school, attendance was generally seen as an external demand of the school system and enforcement officials; a majority did not choose to enter the adult-youth school. Most of their parents did not complete high school and were therefore handicapped in demonstrating the importance of education and in offering much in the way of academic assistance.²⁴ Under these circumstances, authoritarian demands on school performance were likely to be ineffectual. Perhaps because of these and other related conditions, exposure to a number of motivated adults appeared to impress some students. One youth who was interviewed observed, "We become unconsciously aware of the need for education by being around them." Similar observations were made by the adult students in questionnaires and interviews. A middle-aged man remarked, "If the young people see how important education is to adults, I think it will give them more drive to stay in school." Adults were able to help the adolescents directly and by example. An adult woman described the following incident:

In a math class I attend, there are quite a few teenagers and some of them think they are just going to go to sleep; they don't seem to care. But now that they see us working so hard, they are beginning to work harder. One teenager, when I came into the class, didn't seem to be doing anything. She moved her desk closer by as a next-door neighbor to me, and so we do work together. And she has done really good work for her high-school diploma.

The dropout status of many of the adults and their re-entry into school

²⁴ The relation between the enactment of verbalized values by adults and their effectiveness as models is amply illustrated by case material in Franklin K. Patterson, *Youth as Citizen: A Study of Adolescent Self-Direction and Social Responsibility* (New York: Center for Human Relations Studies), Monograph 7, 1956.

served as a potentially important warning to the adolescent students by indicating what might happen to them later on in life if they failed to finish high school before adulthood. In response to a question on the benefits gained by teenagers from attending classes with adults, a Negro girl commented, "Youth should realize that they should get a high-school diploma so they won't be like these adults." Three students who were interviewed—two of whom disliked the adult-youth mixture—mentioned how important it was to them not to have school work plus family and occupational responsibilities at the same time. The lesson for youth reflected in the return of adults to school was explicitly noted by some of the adults on the June questionnaire. For example, a man in his late thirties felt that the adults were "living proof of the need for education. I think they [the adolescent students] can see the importance of education, for adults are giving up time voluntarily for school."²⁵

Teachers and the administrative staff of the adult-youth school generally believed that adults kept noise at a minimum and were a steadying influence on the adolescent students. Although only 14 per cent of the adolescents specifically mentioned this type of adult influence as an advantage of the adult-youth composition, the reported influence of adults as academic models and as a source of encouragement undoubtedly contributed to a desirable classroom atmosphere. For example, one adolescent claimed, "You can learn more, the class is not so noisy with adults, and they can help you in your studies." Another youth observed, "I have found that the more adults there are in a class, the quieter the classroom. In a quiet atmosphere, I can do a great deal more studying and get more out of my work."

Adult Influence on Adolescent Conduct and Status. The relatively equalitarian relationship between members in each age group, as well as the apparent desire of most youth to be respected by and to respect their older counterparts, offered favorable conditions for adult influence on adolescent conduct and status. Field observations, questionnaire data, and interviews indicated that the adults encouraged appropriate, adultlike behavior among younger students through their example, their collective and individual efforts in maintaining appropriate conduct among youth in the classroom, and their

²⁵ Similar educational consequences of the adult model were noted in a large continuation school in southern California which enrolled World War II veterans in the late 1940's as well as adolescents. This age mixture was eventually discontinued despite vehement protests from the teachers. The current principal believes that the veterans tended to orient younger students toward the future, pointing out in their own behavior the importance of education for adult roles, and to set a desirable pattern of behavior as students. Similarly the return of World War II veterans to college classrooms on the G.I. Bill tended to strengthen the vocational orientation of the student bodies and added an element of seriousness to the college scene.

expectation that youth should act and be treated as adults. The adult students were generally sensitive to their responsibility to present a desirable example of adult conduct for youth in the school. One of the interviewed adults declared, "Almost all the adults I have come in contact with do their darndest to make a good impression, to set a good example." This behavioral model was most clearly shown by adults in their academic interest and their conduct in the classroom.

An adult model of conduct was also shown by the support adults gave to school regulations on conduct and by their efforts to prevent conflict and maintain order. The interviewed adults reported that they, or other adults they knew, had occasionally prevented or mediated open conflict among adolescents and between youth and their teachers. A middle-aged Negro man observed, "If it weren't for the adults, teachers in most classes would really have a hard time. These are problem youths, but they still will give an adult some respect."

The activity of the adults in attempting to maintain order in the classroom was necessitated in part by their interdependence with youth in the educational process. Students who acted up disrupted instruction and learning for all of their classmates. The sacrifices which the adults had made to attend classes increased their sensitivity to such disruptions and appeared to be a major factor in motivating their efforts in behavior control. Disapproval and approval communicated through facial expression and words, as well as diversionary tactics, were common means used by the adults to maintain order. The reaction of youth to these efforts varied according to the manner in which they were made. Available evidence indicates that most adolescents did not resent adult responses of this kind, possibly because of the student role of the adults and the support received from other adolescents although occasional arguments between an adult and adolescent were reported arising from the former's effort to encourage classroom order and responsible behavior. Some of the adults reported the use of diversionary tactics to avert interpersonal conflict. On one occasion in a shop class, two boys were quite upset by a comment that an older student made to them about handling her pottery products. Another adult, seeing them near the boiling point, asked them to break up a dish not properly formed. In the midst of doing this, the boys began laughing, soon forgetting their grievance.

Treatment of youth as adults appeared to be an important dimension of the adult moral influence in reinforcing patterns of adult conduct in the classroom and in socializing youth toward adult roles. The interviewed adults and many of those who participated in the adult-youth survey felt that adult expectations and treatment of youth were appreciated by their younger coun-

terparts. One adult observed, "They seem to like it, and act better in class."²⁶ A middle-aged Negro mother noted, "When you talk to teenagers as children, it does not make them adults, but sets them apart from others. But when they're treated as adults, I think they appreciate it." From the adolescents' point of view, adult treatment is a form of respect and esteem which they probably have seldom received from adults in positions of authority. We have noted that approximately half of the adolescents reported that they gained in some measure from the moral example of the adults. These responses included "greater maturity" and "learned to be more grown-up."

To assess the prevalence of adult treatment in this adult-adolescent school, we compared the responses of students in this setting with the attitudes of 288 students in the continuation school attended only by adolescents.²⁷ Both schools advocate treating adolescent students as adults. The students were asked if there were any advantages in attending continuation school. Boys in the adult-youth school were much more likely to mention "adult treatment and greater autonomy" than boys in the other school (55 vs. 14 per cent), and an even larger difference was obtained from girls in the two schools (79 vs. 15 per cent). More students in the age-segregated school tended to report "gives chance to those with vocational responsibilities," "get to know teacher," and "make up academic deficiencies" (an average difference of less than 10 per cent).

Another index of adult treatment in these two schools, from the viewpoint of the students, was obtained in response to the statement, "Students are treated more like adults in continuation school than in comprehensive school." Boys in the adult-youth school were more likely to agree with this statement than their counterparts in the other school (65 vs. 43 per cent); a comparison of girls in these two schools produced similar results (59 vs. 35 per cent). Only 14 per cent of the students in the adult-youth school disagreed with the statement compared to a third of the adolescents in the other school. It is of interest that a sizeable majority of the students in both

²⁶ On the importance of adult treatment to delinquent boys see Howard W. Polsky, *Cottage Six* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 165. For an essay which has special relevance to adult-youth interaction, see Howard W. Polsky and Daniel S. Claster, "The Structure and Function of Adult-Youth Systems," in Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif, *Problems of Youth* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), pp. 285-311.

²⁷ Students in the age-segregated school were similar to youth in the adult-adolescent school in the general class level of their parents, but were less likely to come from broken families and to have police records. Approximately three-fourths of the students in the age-segregated school indicated that neither of their parents had been married before, half were living with both real parents, and 80 per cent claimed that they have never been on probation. The difference between the two student bodies is partly a reflection of the racial composition of the two schools; over 70 per cent of the students in the adult-youth school were Negro compared to only 20 per cent of the students in the age-segregated school. The 288 students were obtained from an active student enrollment of approximately 340.

schools believed that students in comprehensive schools are less likely to be treated as adults than youth in their continuation school.

A school that enrolls both adults and adolescents is likely to be viewed by students as an adult institution. The age-segregated character of public schools, the prevalence of women teachers, and the dependent role of the student seem to support the belief that schooling is primarily for children. A working-class boy observed, "Most men feel that if they did return to school they would be less of a man." Approximately half of the adolescents in the adult-youth school thought the belief that "school is for children and not grown-ups" prevents many young people from staying in high school until they graduate.

We do not have comparative data on the "grown-up" versus "child" image of continuation schools that do not enroll adults. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that adolescents in the age-integrated school who interacted frequently with adult students would most likely reject the statement that "school is for children and not for grown-ups." Forty-nine per cent of the adolescents disagreed with this statement. Frequency of interaction with adult students was moderately associated with such disagreement ($r = .30$).

Although we have discussed the academic and moral influence of the adult student as separate issues in this case study, both aspects were inextricably involved in patterning the learning environment of students in both age groups. The actual impact of the adult-youth school on the academic performance of the adolescents could not be assessed due to a lack of achievement test data. However, some indication of how the adolescents felt about the educational value of the adult-youth institution is suggested by three questions included in the March questionnaire. In comparison to the regular junior or senior high school they had attended, boys reported that their courses were more useful for what they wanted to do, that courses in the adult-youth school were more interesting, and that students learned more in their classes. The average difference between those who favored the adult-youth and regular schools was 27 per cent; a similar difference was obtained among girls.

Benefits Derived by Adults from the Adult-Youth Composition

We have noted at various points reactions of the adult students to attending classes with youth. In this section, we can only briefly survey some of these responses. Most adults in the school were favorably disposed to the presence of both age groups in the classroom. Of the 147 adults over twenty-six years of age, 76 per cent felt there were advantages in having adults and youth in the same classrooms; 50 per cent could not name one disadvantage of an adult-youth composition in classes; 90 per cent reported that difficulties between adults and youth occurred less than once a month; and 77 per cent expressed

agreement with the statement, "Attending classes with adults and youths has helped me get along better with people of all ages." Both the adolescent and adult students were asked whether youth or adults benefited more or not at all from attending classes together. An equal percentage of students in both age groups reported that both adults and youth benefited equally (approximately 66 per cent); less than 10 per cent of the adults and adolescents claimed that neither age group gained from the adult-youth mixture.

Apart from the personal benefits and the influence on child-rearing beliefs, most of the married adults reported that their return to the role of student had a positive effect on their families and on friends in their neighborhoods. Three-fourths of the parents with school-age children felt that their return to school provided a stimulus for their children leading to greater enjoyment of school, stronger desire for self-improvement, better grades, mutual discussion of schoolwork, and emulation of the parent. This response, in turn, seemed to have the effect of bolstering the self-respect and esteem of the parent. Similarly, adults, friends, and children showed improved school interest. On the June questionnaire, 40 per cent of the adults reported that their return to school had a positive influence on parents and children in their neighborhoods. One Negro parent reported that she studied with her children in the evenings, and that the friends of her children frequently joined them to do homework. The reciprocal effects of student and family experiences suggested by these data deserve greater attention than they have received in research on adult education.²⁸

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Through a survey of relevant theory and research and a case study of an adult-youth school, we have explored the developmental implications for youth who attend classes with adults. Data on adult-youth interaction in the school are limited and consequently should be considered only suggestive of hypotheses for subsequent field research. For the most part, adult and adolescent students appeared to be relatively equal in status in the school, shared common problems, and were free to associate on a personal basis. A large number of the adolescents had close friends among the adults and formed meaningful relations with them. The adults served as moral and academic models for many of the younger students and tended to play an important role in controlling adolescent behavior. Compared to students in another school, one which did not enroll adults, adolescents in the adult-youth

²⁸ The effect of education on the self-image and family environment of adult students was not even mentioned in a recent analysis of the relation between education and the family, Arthur B. Shostak, "Education and the Family," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, XXIX (February, 1967), 124-39.

setting were more likely to report that they were treated as adults. From a conservative standpoint, this educational setting at least offers youth from disadvantaged environments a chance to know and develop friendships with motivated adults, many of whom came from similar types of backgrounds.

From the perspective of the school system, the presence of adults in classes with adolescents is viewed as having educational value for the latter. A committee assigned by the superintendent to evaluate the school has recommended that the adult-youth composition be maintained. There is, however, stiff opposition to this concept among teachers and administrators in secondary and adult education. Representatives from each system generally prefer to exclude students from another age level. A history of age-graded education has, it seems, contributed to an incapacity on the part of educators to envision the potential educational value of adult-youth relationships in the classroom. From consultative experience in a number of California school districts, we find that mention of this type of student composition typically arouses vivid imagery of trouble, conflict, and chaos.

We should note again that most of the data presented in this analysis have been obtained from a school with a particular type of adult-youth composition: students from both age groups were primarily from the lower classes. Substantial class differences between age groups might increase social distance and conflict. Comparison of adult-youth relations in special secondary schools with similar cross-age relations in evening and trade schools would be useful in further investigating the developmental effects on youth who attend classes with adults.

With the concept of education through the life cycle becoming a virtual necessity in this technological age, the educational consequences of age variations among students in the classroom are certain to raise important research questions in the near future. Ungraded classes in elementary school and newly developed educational parks designed to provide education for persons of all ages offer excellent opportunities for research on the effects of different types of age composition and inter-age relations on the educational process.²⁰ Though cross-age relationships potentially constitute a major fea-

* On the development of ungraded classes in elementary school, see Frank R. Dufay, *Ungrading the Elementary School* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965). See also Nathan Jacobsen (ed.), *An Exploration of the Educational Park* (New York, 1964). Looking into the future Donald Michael sees self-paced study and team-teaching as two of the most prevalent changes in schools and finds that "it is likely that more school systems will experiment with graded or ungraded arrangements which eliminate the junior high"; see *The Next Generation* (New York: Vintage Edition, 1965), p. 86. Michael also believes that the student peer group in large universities will become "the single most potent source of guidance," especially for less secure youth. "It is not impossible that married students will become mentors to the unmarried and the older students to the younger, married and unmarried" (p. 94).

ture of educational parks, this aspect of student relationships has been largely ignored.

A center for continuing education through the life cycle might represent one of several units in a city or a separate unit in an educational park. In order to provide human scale in the setting and foster cross-age relationships, the physical setting should be designed for informality and the enrollment limited to three hundred students or less. With individualized instruction and flexible attendance schedules, individuals would be able to move back and forth between student and vocational roles throughout life and to manage both roles simultaneously. The contract method of instruction in which a student receives a full list of the requirements of a course, moves as rapidly as he can or desires, and receives tutorial assistance from the teacher offers such flexibility. Group involvement and lecture methods could be used in a supplementary way to encourage student discussion and exchange.

A center of this type has particular relevance to the educational needs of the U.S. South, with its large population of adults and adolescents who lack a high school education. Most communities with a limited economic base are unable to provide an educational program for both adults and dropouts, but a single school for both age groups might be feasible. Aside from the cost-efficiency factor, a community with such a center could reap the potential benefits of cross-age relations for education, family life, and employment.

It is apparent that some educators envision a new or alternative concept of school which includes many of the above features. The Superintendent of Public Instruction in Oregon has recently argued that the concept of a lifetime education system is needed to make secondary education more suitable to the requirements of individuals in a technological society, one which would release education from the "inhibiting influence of practices which have become institutionalized, rigid, and outmoded."³⁰ In lifetime education centers, he proposes that there be no formal school semesters and that standardized curriculum content not be required for ability and age levels. Opportunities for learning should be so designed that an individual "can move between education and life learning at his own rate, becoming productive, enriching himself—in a continuous lifetime cycle."³¹ Some continuation schools in the state of California have made initial steps in this direction, although they have not been guided by a well-formulated conception of this type of education. In the near future, this revolutionary concept of education could become a much-needed alternative to traditional educational structures, or may at least motivate educational reform.

³⁰ "A Plan for Lifelong Education," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 7, 1967.

³¹ *Ibid.*

In this article a number of issues in reading and reading difficulty are derived from a consideration of the different types of definitions of reading and from an analysis of the kinds of explanations offered to account for reading difficulty. Based on the issues considered, the authors advance what they believe to be a more integrated conceptualization of reading and reading difficulty.

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Reading and Reading Difficulty: A Conceptual Analysis*

In trying to impose some coordinating conceptual framework upon the phenomena subsumed under reading and reading difficulty, we believe with T. L. Harris (1962) that "the real issues arise from different conceptions of the nature of the reading process itself and of the learning processes, sets and principles to be stressed" (p. 5). In the present paper we will specify and discuss a number of issues which we believe must be considered to develop a more adequate conceptual framework. The issues are derived from an analysis of the diversity of definitions of reading and the variety of explanations offered to account for reading difficulty. Once the issues are clearly defined, a coordinating framework may be possible. We will spell out what we think to be one such conceptualization of reading and reading difficulty.

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AN ANALYSIS OF READING DEFINITIONS

Four interrelated issues emerge from an examination of the many definitions of reading. Discussion of these issues may help clarify some of the present ambiguity and confusion about reading.

Identification versus Comprehension. The first issue is, what behaviors define reading? Some definitions focus primarily on the identification of the stimulus configurations (letters, letter patterns, words, clauses, sentences) appearing on the printed page, while others emphasize the comprehension of the material. When identification skills are emphasized, the defining attribute of reading is the correct "saying" of the word. Comprehension, on the other hand, implies the derivation of some form of meaning and the relating of this meaning to other experiences or ideas.

The assessment of identification is restricted to some evaluation of what and how words are "said." (How the word is to be pronounced and the variability permitted are both based on some implicit consensus.) Comprehension, on the other hand, is assessed by such criteria as the ability of the reader to paraphrase, to abstract the contents, to answer questions about the material, or to deal critically with the contents. Comprehension can also be inferred partly from the relative quality of identifications, i.e., by the tone, inflection, and phrasing of the identifications. However, the inability to demonstrate comprehension in any of these ways may be a function of restricted language, restricted experience, limited intelligence, or combinations of these three, rather than a function of a reading difficulty. If comprehension is used as the criterial behavior of reading, then these other possible antecedents of noncomprehension must be ruled out before the problem can be called a "reading difficulty."

When both kinds of behaviors are included in definitions of reading, the question arises whether these are solely a matter of emphasis on two parts of one process, or whether different activities are implied? At first glance, it would appear that these differences are matters of emphasis only. For those holding a single process view, identification can be considered a necessary antecedent to comprehension. Closer examination of the relationships between identification and comprehension shows, however, that rather than this one relationship, several are possible.

Although both identification and comprehension require some discrimination process (i.e., to identify or comprehend the reader must be able to distinguish among words), comprehension and identification do not necessarily imply each other. One example of the occurrence of identification without comprehension is the child who may be able to read (i.e., "say") the words printed in a scientific journal with some facility without having any notion

of the meaning of the words. Another example is an American or a Frenchman who, with only a limited amount of training, can pronounce most words in Italian (a language which has a high relationship between spelling and sound), without knowing the meanings of the words. Whether these instances are considered reading depends upon the definition. We recognize that there may be differences between the saying aloud of material by individuals who do not comprehend and by those who do. Comprehension can sometimes be inferred from inflections, tone, and pauses, all of which may be derived from the context of the material read rather than from the sentence construction. These differences, when present, are often both subtle and difficult to denote reliably.

The occurrence of comprehension without identification, on the other hand, is less evident and examples are somewhat more difficult to cite. The best single example is given by Geschwind (1962) in his work with aphasics. He finds that some aphasic patients are able to respond appropriately to the meanings of a written communication, but apparently are unable to identify the words, i.e., to say them. As we understand it, some aphasics may be able to follow printed instructions without being able to "say" them aloud. A more subtle example can be found in "speed reading" which appears to exemplify nonidentification in that the very speed required makes identification unlikely. To acquire speed reading the individual must learn to eliminate persisting identification patterns. We hold, first, that the behavior occurring in speed reading is similar to that of more typical fast readers and, second, that in the advanced stages of reading, the presence of certain identification activities may interfere with the speed of reading and may result in less than maximum comprehension. Once reading skills have been acquired, reading may go from the discrimination of stimuli directly to comprehension without concomitant identification. Further, in good readers identification occurs primarily for novel or difficult material where there is an attempt to achieve some auditory or other discriminations which can be the basis for comprehension¹ (e.g., by sounding out an unfamiliar word).

Acquisition versus Accomplished Reading. A second issue emerging from comparisons of definitions of reading is, does reading refer to the behavior occurring during acquisition of skills or to the behavior manifested after these "skills" have been achieved? Investigators who define reading in terms of accomplished reading often imply that certain other skills are present without spelling them out. Those who emphasize the acquisition of reading

¹ We will attempt later to make a distinction between visual and auditory comprehension as components in the acquisition of reading.

give definitions which focus on the skills that need to be mastered, often without stating what constitutes the end-product.²

Definitions of reading generally associate acquisition with identification behavior on the one hand, and comprehension with accomplished reading on the other. An emphasis on problems associated with the acquisition of skills most often implies a focus on identification skills, while a focus on accomplished reading often implies a stress on comprehension activities.

The failure to distinguish between acquisition and accomplished reading in definitions partially accounts for the confusion about the *relationship* between identification and comprehension. In the acquisition of reading skills, identification may be a necessary *antecedent* to comprehension (as we will discuss in more detail below, word meanings are typically available to the child primarily in auditory form). But identification, which is essential in the acquisition phase for comprehension, may be irrelevant for the skilled reader who already has meaning associated with the visual forms and who may go directly from the written forms to the meaning without identification: that is, without an intermediary "verbal-auditory" transformation. Put another way, although some form of identification (saying a word either aloud or subvocally) may be essential for comprehension during acquisition, its nonoccurrence is not a problem for an experienced reader. Thus, the final product of reading need not include components that went into its acquisition. To draw an analogy, many of the components that go into the acquisition of good driving skill disappear as the driver becomes more proficient. In early learning there is much more cognitive behavior associated with the sensory-motor behavior, while in the later phases operating a car is almost totally sensory-motor.

Relative versus Absolute Criteria. Another source of ambiguity for conceptualizing reading is the different implicit criteria used for designating "good" reading. Sometimes, reading skill (and reading difficulty) is defined in terms of absolute or ideal criteria, but more often in terms of relative criteria. Both approaches present problems. When absolute or ideal criteria are used, a good reader is typically specified as someone able to read a certain number of words at a given rate with some particular level of comprehension. Insofar as ideal criteria are arbitrary, standards can be designated which include dif-

² The research literature on reading difficulties reflects these same differences in emphasis. Some researchers focus on difficulties that can be considered as problems of acquisition, e.g., difficulty with word recognition or phonetics, etc. (Budoff, 1964; Elkind, 1965; Goens, 1958; Robeck, 1963; Goetzinger, 1960; Marchbanks; 1965). Others focus on difficulties that occur after acquisition is relatively complete, e.g., advancement of comprehension skills, critical reading, or enhancement of experiences (Robinson, 1965; Woestehoff, 1960; Chapman, 1965; Emans, 1965; Gray, 1960).

fering proportions of the reading population. Using absolute criteria, children during the acquisition of reading skill would not be considered good readers.

A relative definition of reading skill invokes criteria which specify, either implicitly or explicitly, some normative group. The implication of a relative criterion is that the same kind or level of skill may be called "good or bad reading" depending on who is doing what and when. For example, a second-grade child who has difficulties in phonetic skills (such as blending of sounds into words, which may be a necessary precursor of auditory comprehension) is not considered a reading problem when relative criteria are used, while a child in the sixth grade who lacks this skill is labeled as having a reading difficulty. In both instances, the same skill is missing. In this context, a sixth-grader may be defined as a poor reader, yet a third-grader behaving the same way (as far as we can determine) might be considered a good reader. It becomes evident that very little information can be communicated by statements about good or poor readers unless they are accompanied by clear specifications of the normative group's behaviors. Further, unless the relative criteria are made explicit, there can be no basis for comparing two "poor readers" since they might have been defined as such by different criteria.

The most important problem raised by a relative point of view is that very different behaviors may be given the same label. Having been given the same label, these different behaviors may later be treated as if they were the same phenomenon. The reading-research literature gives evidence that this danger is real in that poor reading is used as a generic term, apparently without the recognition that different investigators may be talking about very different forms of behaviors.

Research approaches and inferences are influenced by whether a relative or an absolute point of view is assumed. These different viewpoints implicitly specify the groups to be studied (those who are taken to be poor readers) and, more importantly, what is considered to be the appropriate control group for the study (the normative baseline against which the experimental group is to be compared). If the criteria are not made explicit, inappropriate control groups may often be established. For example, if a third-grader with an IQ of 75 is compared with other third-graders, he may be defined as a poor reader. Yet if he is compared with other children with IQ's of 75 in the third grade, he may be labeled a good reader by some relative criterion. In the former case, what is at issue may be relevant to intelligence, not to reading.

It may be more useful to specify the "ideal" case of reading and what its components or essential behaviors are. Having spelled out the ideal case, different people can be compared in terms of the presence or absence of these

specifications, independent of distinctions between a person learning to read and an accomplished reader, and independent of evaluative statements as to how "good" the reading is.

Reading versus Language Skills. Investigators vary in the extent to which they emphasize the role of already present auditory language (i.e., knowledge of word meaning and the availability of grammatical forms) either as a separate skill or as one included in reading. There may be little or no concern with previously acquired auditory language capabilities when reading is considered as identification. When reading is considered as comprehension, some investigators (Fries, 1962; Lefevre, 1964; Bloomfield, 1961) deal explicitly with the role of language in reading. The majority of research is less explicit, even though comprehension implies the utilization of meanings already available in some other (usually auditory) form. In studying reading difficulty, Milner (1951) explicitly notes the differential experience with verbal language skills in children from middle and lower socioeconomic backgrounds and its relationship to reading skill. Bereiter and Engelmann (1966) also consider this issue a major one as evidenced by their attempt to train culturally deprived children in language skills before introducing reading. A failure to be explicit about the relationship between reading and previously acquired auditory language often leads to ambiguities as to whether a particular difficulty is a reading problem, language problem, or both.

Examination of Specific Definitions

Having noted some issues, we can now examine specific definitions³ of reading in order to demonstrate their varying degrees of emphasis on: (a) discrimination, identification, and comprehension; (b) acquisition versus the final product of accomplished reading; (c) absolute versus relative criteria for good reading; and (d) the relation of language skills to reading skills.

The first definition reveals an emphasis on the acquisition of reading skills without specification of the attributes of an accomplished reader. More particularly, it focuses on the development of identification processes with comprehension skills noted only incidentally:

There are several ways of characterizing the behavior we call reading. It is receiving communication; it is making discriminative responses to graphic symbols; it is decoding graphic symbols to speech; and it is getting meaning from the printed page. A child in the early stages of acquiring reading skill may not be doing all these things; however, some aspects of reading must be mastered before others and have an essential

³ The particular definitions offered here are not meant to be exhaustive but were chosen primarily because they appear to exemplify the different emphases with which we are concerned.

function in a sequence of development of the final skill. The average child, when he begins learning to read, has already mastered to a marvelous extent the art of communication. He can speak and understand his own language in a fairly complex way, employing units of language organized in a hierarchy and with a grammatical structure. Since a writing system must correspond to the spoken one, and since speech is prior to writing, the framework and unit structure of speech will determine more or less the structure of the writing system, though the rules of correspondence vary for different languages and writing systems. . . .

Once a child begins his progression from spoken language to written language, there are, I think, three phases of learning to be considered. They present three different kinds of learning tasks, and they are roughly sequential, though there must be considerable overlapping. These three phases are: learning to differentiate graphic symbols; learning to decode letters to sounds ("map" the letters into sounds); and using progressively higher-order units of structure. (Gibson, 1965, pp. 1-2)

In that the above definition focuses on acquisition, we can infer that a relative scale would be used for designating individuals who are not progressing adequately. What is most noteworthy is that there is also some ambiguity in this definition as to whether the development of language skills is part of reading or prior to and/or independent of reading.

In contrast to Gibson, Geschwind (1962, p. 116) working with aphasics, offers a definition which focuses only on the accomplished reader and comprehension and which makes no reference to identification behaviors or processes in acquisition of reading:

The word *read* is used in the narrow sense of "ability to comprehend language presented visually" and not at all in the sense of "ability to read aloud."

By this definition, any reading without comprehension would be designated either as non-reading or as a reading problem, though it does not require "saying" for "reading" to occur. The definition makes no reference to the role of discrimination of the printed stimuli, which we assume must occur in order for comprehension to take place. Further, no explicit statement is made about either the relative or the absolute amount of comprehension which must be present for an individual to be designated a good or poor reader.

The following definition is ambiguous about the relationship of identification to comprehension:

. . . reading involves . . . the recognition of printed or written symbols which serve as stimuli for the recall of meanings built up through the reader's past experience. New meanings are derived through manipulation of concepts already in his possession. The organization of these meanings is governed by the clearly defined purposes of the reader. In short, the reading process involves both the acquisition of the meanings intended by the writer and the reader's own contributions in the form of

interpretation, evaluation, and reflection about these meanings. (Bond & Tinker, 1957, p. 19)

The word "recognition," as used here can be taken to mean either discrimination or identification; both usages are incidental to the role of comprehension. Further, this definition refers almost exclusively to the activities of the accomplished reader without apparent concern for the activities necessary for acquiring reading skills (other than the acquisition of meaning). By this definition, most children could be designated as having reading difficulties in that they have not yet acquired the "recognitions" nor the "meanings intended by the writer." This definition also makes little distinction between reading and language skills, thereby making it possible to confuse a language deficiency with a reading difficulty.

In contrast, the next definition makes an explicit distinction between language usage and reading.

The first stage in learning the reading process is the "transfer" stage. It is the period during which the child is learning to transfer from the auditory signs for language signals, which he has already learned, to a set of visual signs for the same signals. This process of transfer is not the learning of the language code or a new language code; it is not the learning of a new or different set of language signals. It is not the learning of new "words," or of new grammatical structures, or of new meanings. These are all matters of the language signals which he has on the whole already learned so well that he is not conscious of their use. This first stage is complete when within his narrow linguistic experience the child can respond rapidly and accurately to the visual patterns that represent the language signals in this limited field, as he does to the auditory patterns that they replace.

The second stage covers the period during which the responses to the visual patterns become habits so automatic that the graphic shapes themselves sink below the threshold of attention, and the cumulative comprehension of the meanings signalled enables the reader to supply those portions of the signals which are not in graphic representation themselves.

The third stage begins when the reading process itself is so automatic that the reading is used equally with or even more than live language in the acquiring and developing of experience—when reading stimulates the vivid imaginative realization of vicarious experience. (Fries, 1962, p. 132)

This definition is also more explicit than most in distinguishing between acquisition and the accomplished reader, the relation of identification to comprehension, and the difference between language skills and reading skills. It does not, however, specify the forms of behaviors which would constitute reading difficulty, except those skills necessary for adequate "transfer" to occur.

The next definition focuses on the sequential development of reading

from identification to comprehension. It does not make explicit the role identification plays in the skills which develop later. It also exemplifies the relativity of definitions of reading when it states that what constitutes reading skill depends upon the level of the learner as he progresses from acquisition to accomplished reading.

We may define reading as the act of responding appropriately to printed symbols. For the beginner, reading is largely concerned with learning to recognize the symbols which represent spoken words. As proficiency in reading increases, the individual learns to adapt and vary his method of reading in accordance with his purpose for reading and the restrictions imposed by the nature of the material. As the learner achieves skill in the recognition side of reading, the reasoning side of reading becomes increasingly important. The nature of the reading task, therefore, changes as the learner progresses from less mature to more mature levels; reading is not one skill, but a large number of interrelated skills which develop gradually over a period of many years. (Harris, A. J., 1948, p. 9)

These examples should make evident the diversity of emphases, the ambiguity and confusion in definitions of reading. Further, this discussion has shown that investigators, with few exceptions (e.g., Fries), have not made distinctions between reading activities and language activities, or if so, they have been ambiguous as to the independence or interdependence of language and reading. All definitions that focus on meaning or comprehension imply language as an antecedent, but do not necessarily offer a basis for identifying poor reading as a reading difficulty rather than as a language difficulty.

AN ANALYSIS OF READING DIFFICULTY

The issues raised thus far have been related to different usages of the term "reading." Other issues emerge when the term "reading difficulty" is examined. An analysis of the usages of the term "reading difficulty" indicates that four different assumptions are used to account for reading difficulty and its etiology. Each of the four models implies particular kinds of remediation.

The Assumption of Defect. Investigators who hold that reading difficulty is attributable to some malfunction, i.e., something is not operating appropriately in the person so that he *cannot* benefit from his experiences, exemplify what we call a defect model. This approach generally implies that this impairment is considered to be relatively permanent. Defect explanations typically involve sensory-physiological factors. For example, Reitan (1964) discusses "reading impairment . . . and its relationship to damage of the left cerebral hemisphere" (p. 104). Some investigators appear to assume a defect whenever there is a reading difficulty. We hold that while an assump-

tion of defect may be appropriate for some instances (e.g., cases of visual, hearing or other sensory impairment) there is no evidence that an assumption of defect accounts for all reading difficulties. Further, investigators holding a defect view often do not distinguish between the implications of a defect during acquisition of reading skill and after acquisition has taken place (e.g., blindness, brain damage). This type of explanation also implies that for "normal" reading to occur in individuals with a defect, change must occur (e.g., brain surgery) relatively independent of reading, or a different sequence in the acquisition must be utilized (e.g., teaching a blind person to read through the use of the tactual modality).

The Assumption of Deficiency. Other investigators have argued that reading difficulty is attributable to the *absence* of some function, i.e., a particular factor or process is absent and must be *added* before adequate reading can occur. Most attempts at remedial reading instruction are based on this interpretation of reading difficulties. The child must learn something he has not yet learned (e.g., phonetic skills, language skills, etc.) in order to make up his deficiency. In contrast to the defect explanation of reading difficulty, reversibility is almost always assumed.

The Assumption of Disruption. A third type of model used to account for reading difficulty assumes that the difficulty is attributable to something which is *present* but is *interfering* with reading and must be *removed* before reading will occur. For example, if a child is "anxious," "hyperemotional," or has "intrapsychic conflicts," he may be unable to learn to read (cf., Koff, 1961). An assumption of disruption is implicit in investigations of so-called neurotic learning disabilities. It is also implicit in any approach which maintains that using the wrong methods to teach reading will disrupt and interfere with the learning that takes place when the correct teaching method is used. Occasionally the assumption of disruption operates jointly with the deficiency assumption, the notion being that first the interference must be removed and then the missing components must be added.

The Assumption of Difference. Lastly, various researchers assume that reading difficulty is attributable to *differences* or mismatches between the typical mode of responding and that which is more appropriate, and thus has the best payoff in a particular situation. This model assumes that the individual would read adequately if the material were consistent with his behavior patterns; thus, a *change* in either the material or in his patterns of verbalization is a prerequisite for better reading.

Cromer and Wiener (1966) posit that poor readers have evolved different response patterns; i.e., they elaborate "cues" in a manner different from that

of good readers. Within their framework, both good and poor readers "scan" and derive partial information from the printed stimuli; the specific difference between the good and poor readers is that poor readers generally elaborate these cues by responding more idiosyncratically than do good readers, either because they have not learned consensual response patterns or because they have learned idiosyncratic patterns too well. In this framework, reading difficulty is expected to occur when there is a mismatch between the material being read and the response patterns of the reader.

An example of a mismatch is when auditorally- and visually-presented languages are discrepant, as might be the case for a lower-class child who speaks a neighborhood "slang." The child may not be able to elaborate the cues in "formal language patterns." He does not read well because he does not draw from the same language experiences as does the middle-class child for whom a typical reading test is written; there is a mismatch between the reading material and his typical pattern of responding. If, however, the material were presented in the same form as his spoken language, we posit that he would then be able to read more adequately. This child would not be considered a reading problem but rather a language problem in that he does not draw from the same language experiences as the middle-class child for whom a typical reading text is written.

Still another example of a mismatch involves the reading of highly technical material. An individual may have difficulty because he (in contrast to an expert in the same area) has sequences which are less likely to match the reading input. A psychologist reading a physics book or a physicist reading a psychology book would be slowed down, would show more errors in his reading, and would have less comprehension than when each reads in his own field. In this instance, there are differences in reading abilities, depending on the material being read. It does not seem meaningful, however, to consider these differences in skill as reading problems. Thus no pathology is posited for a "reading difficulty" stemming from a mismatch.

Associated with each of the assumption models are implicit differences in the kinds of factors—sensory-perceptual (physiological), experiential-learning, and personality-emotional (psychological)—assumed to account for reading difficulty. Pointing to physiological factors generally implies a defect; i.e., something other than the behaviors involved in reading must be changed or in some way dealt with before improved reading can occur. When the focus is on experience or learning, either a deficiency or a difference is implied; i.e., the individual has not learned a particular skill or has learned a different one. On the other hand, explanations that focus on psychological factors imply a disruption and/or a deficiency. In sum, not only are there different assumptions to account for reading difficulty but in addition, each as-

sumption model implies a particular set of operative factors and a particular form of intervention or remediation.

Models for Conceptualizing Reading Difficulty: Antecedent-Consequent Relationships

Another source of confusion in the literature is the form of explanation offered to account for "reading problems." Some investigators refer to single "causes" of reading difficulty while others state that multiple "causes" need to be invoked. Applying a formal or logical analysis to these kinds of explanatory statements reveals additional conceptual problems. This task can be facilitated by reformulating and extending a model developed by Handlon (1960) to spell out possible forms for explaining schizophrenia.⁴ We have substituted the term "reading difficulty" where in Handlon's original application the term schizophrenia appears. We will try to "explain" reading difficulties by relating the variables associated with reading (antecedents) to the variables associated with reading difficulties (consequents).

1. *Model One* (in Handlon's form of explanation) states that reading difficulty "is a class with a single member, this member having a single radical cause." In our conditional form, Model One is "If A, then X," where A is a single specific antecedent and X is a class ("reading difficulty") in which each instance of a reading difficulty is considered equivalent.

An example of Model One is Carrigan's (1959) synaptic transmission (chemical) theory of reading disability. She maintains that disabled readers are part of a population of slow learners characterized by atypical production of two chemicals, ACh (acetylcholine) and ChE (cholinesterase). Although the balance and concentration level of these chemicals is affected by environmental (anxiety producing) factors, it is the chemical factor itself which is seen to underly reading disability, that is, reading disability is presented also as if it were a single member class. Another example of Model One, Delacato's (1959) theory of "central neurological organization," attributes reading difficulty to a lack of cerebral cortical dominance.

Although logically possible, Model One does not seem very promising. Most investigators reject both the notion that a single antecedent accounts for all reading difficulties, and the notion that reading difficulty is in fact a class with only a single member.

2. *Model Two* states that reading difficulty is "a class with a single mem-

⁴ Handlon, in his model called Single-Multiple Causal Factors uses the terms "cause" and "effect"; with our philosophical bias we prefer the terms "antecedent" and "consequent." These terms will be used here in a conditional ("If, then") rather than a causal form. The conditional statement is not meant to imply either a spatial or temporal relationship, but a relationship in a formal-logical sense. We thank Dr. Roger Bibace who brought this article to our attention.

ber, that member having multiple factors constituting the radical cause."⁵ In our conditional form, Model Two is "If A or B or C. . . , then X," where A, B, etc. are particular and independent⁶ antecedents, and, as in Model One, X is a class with a single member called "reading difficulty."

Rabinovitch (1959) appears to use a Model Two form of explanation. He defines reading retardation as reading achievement two or more years below the mental age obtained on performance tests and then goes on to list three subclasses of antecedents of reading difficulty (exogenous, i.e., cultural and emotional factors; congenital brain damage; and endogenous, i.e., biological or neurological disturbances). Similarly, Roswell and Natchez (1964) in their treatment of reading disability argue for a multi-causal model and describe a series of antecedents that can "cause" reading difficulty (e.g., intellectual, physical, emotional, environmental, educational, and growth factors). Investigators using this model might *consider* reading difficulty as different for the different "causes," but they do not *specify* nor delineate these differences; that is, they seem to treat reading difficulty as if it were a single member class.

Although this form of explanation may also be logically tenable, we are convinced that the assumption that reading difficulty is a class with a single member is unacceptable. Our belief is that reading difficulty is a multiple-member class and that Model Two forms of statements might better be changed to "If A, then X_1 "; "If B, then X_2 "; "If C, then X_3 " where X_1 , X_2 , X_3 are particular and independent manifestations within the class reading difficulty (Model Five, see below). We maintain that if an investigator looks carefully enough, he will find different members within the class X which might better meet the criteria of a class with a single member associated with a particular antecedent, and that it is incumbent on investigators to explore their "single consequent" in a multiple-antecedent/single-consequent model to determine whether the consequent is in fact a class with only a single member.

3. *Model Three* states that reading difficulty "is a class with several members, all members having the same single . . . cause." This statement can be represented in the following form: "If A, then X_1 or X_2 or X_3 . . ." where A is a particular antecedent and X_1 , X_2 , etc. are particular members of the class called "reading difficulty." To the extent that investigators have not labeled

⁵ We will consider this statement only in the form "If A or B or C, then X" rather than the form "If A and B and C, then X," since the latter is logically reducible to "If A, then X," where A stands for a conjunctive category.

⁶ By using the symbols A, B, C . . . and X_1 , X_2 , X_3 , etc., there is a possible implication that these symbols may be treated as an ordinal series, with the later implying the earlier. In each model except for Model Six (see below), these symbols are used only in the sense of a nominal scale (Stevens, 1951) and could be written in the form "If alpha, then $X_{\alpha\text{label}}$ "; if aleph, then $X_{\alpha\text{label}}$ " etc."

the specific forms of reading difficulty (that is, different members of the class reading difficulty), then they would be unlikely to apply a model using a single antecedent and multiple consequents. In fact, no appropriate examples of Model Three were located in the literature. Those that appeared at first to be examples of Model Three were found to be more appropriately assigned to Model One, which treats the consequent as a single-member class.

4. *Model Four* states that reading difficulty "is a class with several members, each having single or multiple causes that are not necessarily unique to that member." In other words, there are many antecedent variables and many manifestations of reading difficulty (consequents) and the relationships between these antecedents and consequents are unspecified or unspecifiable. This model can be represented in the form: "If A and/or B and/or C. . . , then X_1 , or X_2 , or X_3"

This form of explanation appears to be most popular in the current literature; for examples one can turn to almost any comprehensive book on the "diagnostic teaching of reading" (e.g., Strang, 1964; Bond and Tinker, 1957; Bryant, 1963). These textbook approaches list all the possible "causes" of reading difficulty and then discuss techniques for remedial instruction. The relationships between the many antecedents and the many consequents are never clearly specified. The problems inherent in this approach are exemplified most clearly in a study reported by Goltz (1966). Working with "individual remedial reading for boys in trouble," he advocates the simultaneous use of five basic approaches to the teaching of reading (sight word, phonics, combination, linguistic, experiential) in the hope that one will work (he draws the analogy of shotgun pellets). The results of this approach were "some astounding successes and remarkable failures." The need for a theoretical rationale for relating possible difficulties and specific types of intervention is obvious. Again, we argue that it is incumbent on investigators to attempt to locate the particular antecedent and its relationship to a particular consequent.

5. *Model Five* appears to be the most acceptable form for explaining the phenomenon called reading difficulty. It states that reading difficulty is "a class with several members, each member having a single, unique cause. This statement can be represented in the form: "If A, then X_1 ; or if B, then X_2 ; or if C, then X_3 . . ." where the X's represent different particular patterns of less-than-ideal reading. This model says that there are many antecedent variables and many manifestations under a general rubric "reading difficulty"; and the relationships between the antecedents and the consequents are, at least in theory, specifiable. Both Model Five and Model Four have multiple antecedents and multiple consequents. Model Five, however, associates a different antecedent with a specific consequent. For example, de Hirsch (1963)

attempts to distinguish between two groups of adolescents with language disorders by suggesting that the etiology of each is different. Kinsbourne and Warrington (1963) note that two syndromes of developmental cerebral deficit seem to be associated with different forms of reading difficulty.

6. Model Five assumes that each of the manifestations of reading difficulty (i.e., the X's) is a member of the general class called reading difficulty and that each of these forms is independent. It may be, however, more meaningful to conceptualize the manifestations within the class, reading difficulty, in a model which includes a notion of sequence. This kind of model is not considered by Handlon; we will elaborate it as *Model Six*. This model can be represented in the following form: "If A, then X_1 " and "If X_1 , then B" and "If B, then X_2 ," and "If X_2 , then C" and "If C, then $X_3 \dots X_n$." If, for example, C does not occur nor does X_3 , then X_n , the particular form of behavior defined as reading, would not be expected to develop (X_n being defined as a class with a single member, a particular form of reading which is the end-product of the sequence and can be considered as an indicator on an absolute scale). Model Six explicitly includes the notion of an ordinal series and implies that if any member of the sequence were missing, further evolution of the sequence would not be expected, or at least not in the acquisition phase of learning to read. If the sequence has already evolved and there is a disruption, then depending on the point in the sequence where disruption occurs, later forms of reading may be present, even though some or all earlier forms are absent. This kind of formulation can account for differences in the kinds of reading difficulties noted when a disruption is present during acquisition or occurs in an accomplished reader (e.g., the reading of brain-damaged adults who were previously good readers versus the reading of brain-damaged children during the acquisition phase). Another implication is that the arbitrarily designated end point of a sequence specifies the antecedents and prior sequences to be included.

A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF READING AND READING DIFFICULTY

We pointed out earlier that some investigators treat reading as identification while others treat it as comprehension and that this difference has implications for what was defined as reading difficulty. In an effort to integrate these seemingly disparate approaches, reading will be conceptualized and discussed as a two-step process involving first identification and then comprehension. During the discussion, the antecedents for identification will be considered first and then comprehension will be considered.

Identification

Identification will be used to mean "word-naming," in the context of a transformation of stimuli.⁷ In the discussion that follows, our formulation comes from an analysis of visual-to-auditory transformation; similar analyses could be derived for other transformations. We assume a physiological substrate which is adequate for "normal" functioning to occur.

"Discrimination" constitutes one set of antecedents to identification. Prior to discrimination, however, a child must attend to the stimulus to make sensory input possible. Given sensory input, the child must then be able to make form discriminations. By discrimination, we mean the ability to make proper focal adjustments; to distinguish figure-ground, brightness, lines, curves, and angles; and to respond to differences in the amount of white space surrounding the forms (this latter discrimination is involved in the delineation of word units). These forms of discrimination are antecedents of identification.

Given the ability to discriminate, the child can begin to identify by distinguishing on the basis of angles and curves ("man" from "dog") or word length ("dog" from "good"), by responding to variations in relations among letter sequences ("on" vs. "no"), and by responding to spatial orientations of visual stimuli (left/right and up/down). These antecedents not only make possible new identifications but also make earlier forms of identification easier because the reader can respond to more of the available and co-occurring cues. For example, "dog" and "good" can be discriminated on the basis of word length, and the orientation of the first and last letters.

Using discriminations among sequences and general configurations, the child can now learn to identify a relatively large number of words solely by discriminating the first and last letters in an otherwise similar configuration (e.g., length, round vs. angled, internal letters, etc.). Although this discrimination may be adequate in the early stages of reading acquisition, the child must later learn to discriminate other components in the word such as internal letters ("bat" vs. "but" vs. "bet" vs. "bit"), sequence of letters ("there vs.

⁷ Identification presupposes a discrimination of one graphic symbol from others, discrimination of auditory symbols from others, and a transformation of these symbols from one form (usually visual) to a second form (usually auditory). The original visual forms and the transformed auditory forms are considered to be equivalent, differing only in that the referents are represented in different modalities. The two symbol forms are considered equivalent in that they contain the same information for members of a communication group. Essentially, then, the major critical antecedents of identification are the discriminations among the original symbols, the discriminations among the transformed symbols, and a "knowledge" of the principles of transformation from one form to the other. Implicit in this conceptualization is that the transformed symbols (i.e., words as said aloud) can become an input for another individual. Implied also is that there is some consensual basis to assess the adequacy of the identification, with consensus meaning only that there is agreement within the group using the particular language or dialect.

"three"), additions of letters ("smile" vs. "simile"), etc. In these cases, to increase speed, it would appear that the child has to learn to respond to the variety of available cues and the order of their importance as the basis of discrimination of words within his language.

Antecedents for the identification of words in isolation are not sufficient for reading words in a sequence such as a phrase or a sentence; the individual must learn to say the words in the order given, although he does not necessarily have to "look" at them in that order. A knowledge of language and language sequences will facilitate the discrimination of words in a sequence insofar as the co-occurrences of words can become an additional basis for discrimination, e.g., "the horse's mane" vs. "the horse's mine."

The antecedents discussed thus far are associated with learning to read using the "look-say" approach, which is essentially how one learns to read an ideographic language. Both this approach and languages requiring its use present special difficulties in that the reader must maintain a great many specific forms in his memory. Although he can discriminate new from old words and even among new words, he has no readily available way of identifying ("saying") the new words. If it were possible for a child to have a source of identifying words the first time he encountered them (e.g., via another person reading it or a speaking typewriter), and if he had the ability to store and recover the words as presented and as said, then the "look-say" method would be sufficient for reading. However, if new or novel words occur and there is no external source for initial identification, then a skill for identifying by oneself is required.

There are at least three different ways in which identification of new words occurs. They can be ordered by degree of explicitness for relating visual to sound forms. First, the individual may respond to some similarities among graphic forms, and he may also respond to some of the patterns of similarity among associated auditory forms. For example, the word "mat" looks like "man" and "hat," such that one approximation of the sound of "mat" could be the combination of the first part of "man" and the last part of "hat." The first sound approximated might not have exactly the same form as if it were emitted in the presence of the object. It could be corrected, however, by the reader's recognizing that the word as said sounds like some other word he had said at some other time.

The second way is like the first in that the reader uses similarities among graphic forms to aid his identification. In the first case, however, this response to similarity is incidental; in the second, it is systematic. An example of a systematic approach is the use of what linguists (such as Fries, 1962) call "spelling patterns." The individual is taught to look for similarities among visual and auditory forms by systematic exposure to various types of

possible patterns, their variations, and their associated sounds. For example, if the individual learns to identify the words "man," "ban," "hat," and "fat," he will be able to identify the word "mat." Other examples of spelling patterns are mane/bane/hate/fate; and mean/bean/heat/feat. Thus, the possible similarities among visual forms, among auditory forms, and between visual and auditory forms are made somewhat more explicit by example.

In contrast to these two ways where similarity among graphic configurations is the basis for identifying new configurations, the third way requires the reader to know more explicit rules for transforming specific visual configurations into specific sounds, i.e., phonetics, to use Fries' terminology. For example, there is a "rule" that says when there is only one vowel in a word and it comes at the beginning or middle of a word, it is usually short ("hat," "and," "bed," "end"). These rules also include the notion that various locations and combinations of letters are associated with different sounds. One example is the "rule" that a vowel when followed by an "r" is neither long nor short, but is controlled by the "r"; e.g., "fur," "bird," "term."⁸ One major difference between the phonetics approach and the other two is that identification of new words does not require previous experience with similar old words. However, the use of phonetics requires one additional ability, that of ordering letters from the beginning through to the end of a word. This skill, called "scanning," involves systematic eye movements from left to right and an organization of the input in that order.

Knowledge of co-occurrence of letters and words within a language will increase the rate of reading. Because not every word can come at a particular point in a sequence, the individual can identify words or groups of words rapidly even from very brief scanning of the material. Thus, "knowledge" of language or word sequences independent of visual input will reduce the amount of information required from scanning for identification to occur. At later stages, the reader may even be able to skip some of the words in a particular sequence, yet respond adequately with this decreased information. We propose that the ability to respond to this partial information, that is, the "elaboration" of these cues, can be based on learned patterns of sequential occurrences or what has been called "previously learned co-occurrence probabilities" (Kempner and Wiener, 1963). Differences among readers in their ability to identify a sequence correctly may be explained by differences in response availabilities rather than by differences in visual inputs. Since response patterns may be differentially available among individuals, given specific reading materials, a reader may "respond" to the same material with

⁸ In this context, ITA (cf., Downing, 1964; Downing, 1965) is seen as a procedure for simplifying acquisition; that is, for decreasing the number of "rules" the child must learn during acquisition of reading.

differing degrees of adequacy depending upon the availability of appropriate response patterns, even assuming the "same" input.

Comprehension

If comprehension⁹ is now included in the definition of reading, additional antecedents must be considered. In our usage, comprehension refers to the addition of some form of meaning associated with the identifications or discriminations, i.e., the words elicit shared associations, or consensual indicator responses to or about the referent, or a synonymous response. At least during acquisition, comprehension can occur and be examined at any point at which identification can occur; once the visual forms are transformed to auditory forms, there is a possibility of comprehension, given the presence of appropriate language skills. These language skills can be learned either before or along with the acquisition of identification skills. Language can include not only meaning but also those subjects typically dealt with by linguists (patterns, grammar, sequences, meaningful units, and so on). To the extent that these structural components are critical for meaning, these forms must also have been mastered or, alternatively, they must be learned during the acquisition phase.

It has been implied that meaning is available primarily through language as it occurs in the auditory form. We also have assumed implicitly that once there is a transformation from the visual to the auditory form, comprehension would follow. If the reader's auditory transformation (identification) corresponds to his already available auditory language forms, then meaning can be associated with the visual forms. For example, if a child in his identification says the word "ball" in the same way as he has heard it or as he says it in the presence of the referent object, then meaning can be transferred to the visual form. The assumed sequence has been: discriminations among input forms and output forms; transformation; identification; comprehension—all of these being required.

In all of the discussion thus far, individual differences have not been considered. Yet recognition of individual differences may be highly relevant in accounting for differences in forms of discrimination, identification, or comprehension. For example, individuals with low intelligence or with restricted language skills or restricted experiences might better be considered as having "problems" in these particular areas rather than in reading *per se*. Similarly, there are other instances of non-reading which might better be attributed to the conditions under which reading occurs, the content of the material being read, or the "motivation" of the individual reader and his interest in

⁹A concern with the definition of comprehension and meaning would take us too far afield, even if we were competent to deal with this complex problem.

the material. In these instances, a reading problem cannot be assessed until learning has been tried under more "ideal" conditions with materials of more significance to the reader.

We can now note some instances: (a) where auditory transformations may not lead to comprehension although the reader ostensibly uses the same language as is used in the printed material; and (b) where comprehension facilitates or even makes possible identification which would not otherwise occur.

A first instance of an identification without comprehension is when the reader has had either insufficient or no previous experience with the referent so that it is not part of his meaning-vocabulary. For example, a story about children playing with a kite may elicit no referent (and no meaning) in an individual in a subculture where no one plays with kites. A second instance of identification without comprehension can occur in individuals who have had experience with the referent, but in circumstances where these referents are typically communicated in nonverbal forms such as gesture or tone. This problem is likely to occur in individuals who use what is sometimes called "expressive language" or nonverbal rather than verbal language. For example, a child could point and say "ball" in a particular tone as a substitute for saying, "I want this ball!" or "May I please have the ball?" or "Give me the ball" (cf. Bereiter and Engelmann, 1966; Bernstein, 1965; Deutsch, 1962). For comprehension to occur in these instances, the individual must be taught to use verbal language or at least to recognize that the "message" he communicates gesturally can also be communicated through words. A third way identification can occur without comprehension is when the sounds of the words as read are different from the sounds of the words as they occur in the reader's vocabulary. For some rural Southern children "y'all" may be the commonly heard and said form of "you." If a reader identifies (says) the word "you," he may not transfer the sound "you" to the meaning of "y'all." Another example is a child from a lower-class background who may not "say" the words in the same way or in the same sequence as his middle-class teacher; and therefore, if he makes his transformations into the teacher's language, comprehension may not occur. A fourth instance of identification without appropriate comprehension is when there is a lack of correspondence between the reader's auditory language and that of the material being read. For example, note how difficult it is to read and comprehend the following passage, which is a description of Harlem.

On school: "Everyone shouting and screaming and nobody care about what they is going on. But at least it somewhere to stay away from when they make you go." And on the purpose of fighting gangs: "In this bizness you got have a place of your own and a chain of command and all that. Everything go by the book. Then you get a

name. And when you get the name maybe you can stay live a while. Thas why most men get in gangs. To stay live. Thas why the gangs form in the first place." (*Time Magazine*, February 24, 1967, p. 96)

In the third and fourth examples, there is a discrepancy between the language of the material being read and the reader's own language. This discrepancy can be resolved either by "correcting" the reader's language so that it matches the written form or by modifying the written material to correspond to his language patterns. As Labov (1967) notes, however, if the teacher is to locate the source of the difficulty and take appropriate remedial steps, he should "know" the child's nonstandard language. Labov spells out in some detail the possible discrepancies between the disadvantaged students and their teachers in their pronunciations and uses of grammar. He also discusses some of the implications of such discrepancies in the teaching of children who speak a nonstandard dialect.

One further way in which identification can occur without comprehension is when the particular meaning of the graphic material is different from the meaning typically elicited in the individual (e.g., slang, idiomatic expressions, and poetry), all of which depend on less consensual meanings. An example is a foreigner trying to read a popular detective story which uses slang and colloquialisms. Another example would be an accomplished reader reading James Joyce, where the words have highly personalized referents.

On the other hand, comprehension can facilitate identification if the reader has highly advanced language skills available, e.g., vocabulary, sequences, appropriate generating grammar (in Chomsky's, 1957, sense). To the extent that each of these skills facilitates identification by decreasing the range of possibilities of what is likely to occur in the written material, less information is necessary from the visual input to elicit the whole sequence. Thus, there are a number of ways in which knowledge of language in terms of both meaning and structure may aid identification and even make possible specific identifications which otherwise would not occur. First, the context and meaning of the material already read may generate and/or limit new forms of identification via the individual's understanding and elaboration of the material being read. For example, all other factors being constant, two scientists will differ in the rate and understanding of specific scientific material if they have a different familiarity with the subject matter. A second way in which language aids identification is through the structure of the language which limits the possible types of words or sequences which can occur at any given point. Further, comprehension may make possible identifications which otherwise might not occur. A beginning reader who has not learned phonics but who has a good vocabulary and uses language as it typically occurs in written form may be able to "guess" a word he has not previously

identified. He can identify the word on the basis of his comprehension of the context, or familiarity with the structure of the language, or both. To exemplify how the structure and context contribute to identification, all one needs to do is to remove words randomly from a story (Cloze technique, Taylor, 1953) and note the limited number and types of word insertions which occur. Third, extensive language experience facilitates speed of reading. Having learned (and being familiar with) possible elaborations, the reader requires fewer cues for a particular response to occur; the assumption here is that the requirement of fewer cues is associated with more rapid scanning, e.g., speed reading of familiar material. Fourth, comprehension facilitates the recognition of errors in reading when there is a mismatch between any of the three possible sources of information mentioned above and the identification as "said." For example, when the word elaborated from the cues is not congruent with later elaborations—it does not fit the content, context, or sequences as previously experienced—the reader will experience the possibility of an error and "check" the input for more cues.

Once reading is defined as comprehension (which we hold can occur only after basic identification and language skills have been mastered), then identification becomes secondary and may eventually be eliminated except for identifying new words. As noted earlier, an individual with good language (meaning and structure) skills can, in the case of speed reading, go directly from the discrimination to the meaning without the intermediate step of (auditory) identification. Typically, readers use identification in "reading" (here "reading" is being defined in terms of comprehension) in the following ways: first, to make the words auditorally overt (i.e., saying the words aloud so they can be understood); second, to make the words covertly auditory (i.e., lip moving); then, implicit identification (i.e., the reader experiences the words as if they were said aloud but there is no evidence of overt saying); and, finally, identification is eliminated when the reader goes directly from the visual configurations—without experiencing the words as auditory forms—to their associated meaning, e.g., speed reading. Theoretically, at least, identification (in contrast to discrimination) is not necessary and, in fact, may not occur in the accomplished reader. It is even possible that a method could be devised for teaching reading (i.e., comprehension) without the intermediate step of auditory identification. If, for example, we could evolve principles for understanding how a child learns his original language—which includes the transformation of the experience of objects into words in auditory form—we might begin to understand how a child might learn to go from an original visual form directly to meaning without an intermediate auditory "naming."

We hope this attempt to impose some order on the diversity of phenomena

included under reading or reading difficulty will be of heuristic value to other investigators. Recognizing that we have only touched on the complexities of reading behavior, we hope others will bring to bear other coordinating principles to this area of investigation.

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To The Editors

HALLS OF DARKNESS

To the Editors:

Jonathan Kozol's superb article, "Halls of Darkness: In the Ghetto Schools" (HER, Summer, 1967), prompts me to write this note. Both Kozol and HER are to be congratulated for their nitty-gritty courage. I suspect that it has already infuriated a lot of people, and the "this-just-ain't-so" and "sure-but-this-is-just-one-isolated-case" letters will, no doubt, inundate your office. Most authors worth their salt, however, always get letters damning them and their work. The truth is always hard to accept, and I've never heard of any group of people who think or say the same thing according to any apostle.

Kozol said things which had to be said by someone, but his experiences are certainly not unique. Why the great silence? Perhaps the reason is that authors were afraid of offending the "dedicated senior teachers" of America. Perhaps, too, they were as brainwashed as the teachers and students themselves. Finally, we have one strong voice crying in the wilderness, crying with concrete facts instead of sociological data and official reports. Will some modern-

day Salome ask for Kozol's head? Probably.

I've never had the opportunity to teach in a ghetto school—the Jesuits don't run any in America I'm sorry to say—but I did have the happy and rewarding experience of being involved in a Jesuit Summer Program in Boston two summers ago, financed by a research grant from the Ford Foundation and administered by ABCD (Action for Boston Community Development). The fifty eighth-graders in that program told me many stories about their schools which were very similar to the ones Kozol described. We taught these children English, math, and science during the morning hours; and each afternoon we took them to museums (they loved the Egyptian Room!), to parks, to lakes, to the Cape, to Concord and Lexington and Walden Pond. They came alive! They smiled and laughed and cried. They were really happy to see a spruce tree, an oak, a birch; they thrilled to the touch of the "rude bridge" at Concord, and shrieked with delight at the old gravestones in the cemetery, wondering aloud where "the spooks" were hiding; they ran all over the Lexington Green, felt the lush grass, smelled it hard so

they wouldn't forget—some even took a bit of it home to show their mothers; they stood in awe before Thoreau's forest retreat where he closeted himself from society, and they searched for the same blueberry bushes which had brought him some enjoyment. In short, they touched, tasted, savored, and were stung with love. *Pace* Bruno Bettelheim, love *was* enough in this case. I'm quite sure that Kozol's "Reading Teacher" would have protested that the whole summer was a waste of time. I found it almost mystical, and I got much more than I gave.

Even though Kozol's forthcoming book, *Death at an Early Age*, will be read avidly by many, it's a crime and sad commentary on America that it won't, most likely, cause the kind of stir and interest that *Up the Down Staircase* did. And yet, it should; it must, if we are to rid the schools—all of them—of "sentimental and self-aggrandizing" teachers.

My prayer is that the "system" never gets to people like Kozol. Obviously, it hasn't yet. As one of my colleagues here at CSI said to me after reading the article: "Teachers tell these poor kids that they haven't found themselves yet, and so are unteachable; and the kid does look up at these teachers with irony and say to themselves: 'You mean, don't you, that we haven't lost ourselves yet, as you have, and we hope to God we don't.'" Someday, hopefully, this message will get through to the teachers of America.

JOSEPH DEVLIN, S.J.
Center for the Study of Instruction
National Education Association

To the Editors:

Apparently, Mr. Kozol was attempting to prove that the worst education exists where the worst human relations exist.

Such a theme is laudable. A distant, formal relationship does indeed fail to encourage the development of many facets of a student's basic individuality.

I question, however, the efficacy of yet another "atrocities" story about an urban school system. Its recital undoubtedly was well-intentioned; its publication, equally so. Yet anyone exposed to a similar urban school setting could engage Mr. Kozol in a colorful (but nonproductive) challenge match of *Can You Top This*.

"Halls of Darkness" probably reaffirmed the convictions of the convinced and re-enforced the alienation of the alienated, with a total lack of defections from either camp. How much more fitting and ultimately more significant would have been an article explaining the means by which the author fostered better human relations between potentially creative teachers whom he encountered and their pupils. Failing this, he could have suggested how the discontented teacher in such a situation could "come to terms with the problem that is posed by the veteran defenders of these systems."

The reason why such an article was not written may be explained in the preface to "Halls" which states that, while the teachers portrayed are composites, their traits and attitudes are intended to be representative. If this article was intended to be representative of all teachers and administrators in the ghetto schools, it was, and is untrue. If Mr. Kozol deliberately excluded the better teachers and administrators from his article, he has created an imbalance, nearly as unjust and detrimental to urban education as that which existed in the schools he discussed.

What is needed now is not mere condemnation of the problem but rather its realistic remediation. A more objec-

tive and less dramatic analysis might have indicated where and in whom the seeds of this remediation rest. Sensationalism and self-congratulatory anecdotes are one thing. An HER article should be another.

JAMES J. BUCKLEY
Boston Public Schools

THE AMERICAN NEGRO COLLEGE

To the Editors:

Julian Stanley's assertion that Negro students would have difficulty in predominantly Caucasian state colleges in the South (HER, Summer, 1967) does not seem to be supported sufficiently by either the research or the experiences in this area. Negro students at the Universities of Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and other state-supported schools do well. So do those at the smaller colleges.

Stanley used SAT-V averages of 300 and 400 as bases for Negro-Caucasian comparisons. This sort of comparison of SAT-V scores well below the mean of the normal curve has misled many people in the past and such might well be the case in this instance. Standard scores have very narrow percentile ranges at extreme ends of the normal curve. When we speak of the differences between College Board scores of 300 and 400, we are only speaking of the difference between approximately the 5th and the 15th percentile.

Further, there are many indications that the College Boards are poor indicators of student achievement where Negro students are concerned. Kenneth Clark and Lawrence Plotkin's *The Negro Student at Integrated Colleges* contains excellent data to support this point. Also, it has been our experience that freshmen students from families headed by unskilled laborers add 10 points or so to their I.Q. scores and 15-

25 points to entrance-test scores after a year of college while scores of students from skilled and professional families remain constant.

So we shouldn't use SAT-V scores as a reason to perpetuate and expand Negro colleges as Stanley suggested. We really don't need a reason for their perpetuation. Jews, WASPS, Southern Baptists, Catholics, and other minorities operate colleges for their young people or predominate in the faculties, administrations, and student populations of public institutions. Some of the colleges are very good and some are very bad. Negroes have the right to do likewise—and without apology to anyone.

As I noted in a previous letter, we must grapple with the *real* problem in this area, the problem of trying to get a representative number of college-trained Negroes into the work force. At the present rate of change, another sixty to seventy years will be needed to achieve Negro-Caucasian comparability in this area.¹

This means raising the number of Negroes enrolled in college from about two hundred and fifty thousand to around six hundred thousand, or about 10 per cent of the nearly six million college students in the country.

This means that Negro colleges must be improved and expanded. It means that more of the new colleges (created at the rate of one a week) must be situated in the Negro community.

Importantly, it means that trustee boards of predominantly Caucasian schools must insist that their faculties

¹ For analyses of the occupational situation, see William F. Brazziel, "Federal Aid and the Negro College," *Teachers College Record*, LXVIII (January, 1967), pp. 300-6 and William F. Brazziel, "Manpower Programs and the Negro Worker," *Journal of Negro Education*, XXXV (Winter, 1966), pp. 83-7.

move past tokenism and enroll a representative number of Negro students. An additional two hundred Negroes in all of the twenty-one hundred colleges in the country would solve the enrollment gap. Harvard College, for example, would then have a Negro enrollment of four hundred or so in a student population of about four thousand. The Harvard Graduate School of Education would also recruit more Negroes.

In anticipation of the thousands of cards and letters about the dearth of qualified Negroes, let me state here that the emphasis in the equality struggle has now shifted to the qualifiable Negro and that recruitment and admissions officers and directors of developmental studies (remedial work) must show what they can do with this new concept. Also, the new federal aid to education programs should begin to pay off soon.

We can think of our efforts as a sort of reparations program or simply as the right thing to do. Whatever, we need to stop talking and start doing.

WILLIAM F. BRAZZIEL
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CONTRIBUTION OF SCHOOLING

To the Editors:

Despite its alluring title ("The Contribution of Schooling to the Learning of Norms"), I find Robert Dreeben's article (HER, Spring, 1967) generally unsatisfactory and disappointing. His main contentions are (1) that "what children learn derives as much from the nature of their experiences in the school setting as from what they are taught" (p. 211); and (2) that "the social properties of schools are such that pupils, by coping with the sequence of classroom tasks and situa-

tions, are more likely to learn the principles—social norms—of independence, achievement, universalism and specificity than if they remained full-time members of the household" (p. 221). Neither of these factual assertions is supported by empirical evidence and the author himself warns us in the very last footnote of the article to respect the hypothetical nature of his discussion. In other words, throughout the article his purpose is to give reasons why we might expect these (and other) contentions to be verified by empirical research. There are several aspects of his discussion at this level that I wish to question.

1. "The familiar phenomenon known as schooling" (p. 211). The phenomenon may be familiar enough for everyday reference, but hardly for serious discussion of a kind of learning to which schooling is claimed to contribute significantly. It emerges in the article that the author attempts to use the term "schooling" in a purely descriptive way. He picks out the pedagogical procedures which for some time have been typical of elementary and high schools in North America. Since many of these procedures (e.g., students grouped according to chronological age and moving together year by year through the curriculum) are presumably not essential to the concept of schooling, the argument at its best is persuasive only if we have in mind a specific form of school organization and procedure. Many of the features of schooling which Dreeben singles out would not apply to A. S. Neill's school, for example. Like corporal punishment and the rote method of teaching mathematics of relatively recent times, some of the features he distinguishes are probably incompatible with the moral and/or educational values built into the concept of schooling. "Schooling" is

not necessarily what most schools happen in fact to be doing in a society at any given time. The author cannot really avoid the value characteristics if he wishes to discuss the contribution of schooling.

2. The use of the term "norm." The author recognizes logical and empirical problems in the use of this term. However, he explicitly excludes the empirical problems (p. 214) and, beyond distinguishing his own use of "norm" from "general standard of what is desirable," does nothing to specify the concept as he uses it. By "norm" as applied to his four examples, does he mean the rules of a game called industrial social life? (From the context this interpretation seems too restricted.) Or standards? Or social habits (customs)? Or moral rules? (No, he has excluded these.) Are they technical rules of the form, "If one is to fit into contemporary industrial society, one should acquire the skills of being independent, etc."? Or do they state ideals which determine the concept of a (well-adjusted) citizen in an industrial society? Presumably the school might be contributing to the learning of the norms discussed in any of these senses.

3. The question of what might roughly be called "pedagogical causation." Under this rubric I would include the most serious weaknesses of Dreeben's article. The whole point of his article, as I understand it, is to suggest that the school, simply by virtue of its typical organization and modes of procedure, might be expected to contribute far more effectively than the family to the learning of various social norms characteristic of an industrial society. It should be stressed that this learning is claimed to be concomitant or incidental to the teacher's deliberate pedagogical work (see the author's contention above). Without attempting to

be comprehensive, I draw attention to the following general features.

(a) The distinction between the family and the school environments in relation to social norms seems to be drawn too sharply. The emphatic distinction in the article might have some weight if the child were moving from a kinship society into an industrial society via the school. But family and school are both within the structure of an industrial society. It is well-known that parents frequently exert strong opposition when teachers, for moral and educational reasons, try to change a prevailing social norm—e.g., the subordination of the competitive principle of our society to that of cooperation. (See, for example, John R. Seeley, *et al.*, *Crestwood Heights, A Study of the Culture of Suburban Life*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956.)

(b) As I have already indicated, the nature of the norms used as examples in the article is not clear. In other words, we are left with the ambiguous claim that the school contributes to the learning by students of norms of some kind or another. I doubt whether this is a very useful statement in terms of sociological theory; it is certainly not from the viewpoint of educational theory.

To say that a child learns a norm could mean anything from a subtle form of conditioning in which behavioral conformity is achieved without any conceptual grasp of the norm up to a clear understanding of what the norm is, what kind of norm it is, how it is justified, and how it may be applied and acted upon with due regard for varying circumstances. The author has failed to give adequate attention to the crucial concept of learning. Not all instances of learning are educative; some which could be accommodated within the framework of his article would be

classed as miseducative on the basis of moral and educational values.

The description of the norms discussed is also vague and as a consequence the influence claimed for the school environment in their coming to be learned is difficult to assess. The author emphasizes, for example, the connection between the proscription of cheating and the acquisition of the norm of independence. Obviously, if an individual's acquired skills are being tested, the proscription does reinforce "acting independently" in the literal sense of doing work on one's own. But cheating is wrong not because the individual does not act independently but because, in the circumstances, he acts deceitfully. It does not seem that the proscription of cheating, either in intention or in fact, encourages acting independently in the sense of acting on principle, thinking for oneself, not being swayed by popular opinion, etc. Frequently, examinations, even when the rule against cheating is being scrupulously observed, are an exercise in the very opposite of this ideal.

With reference to content, the discussion of the norms of universalism and specificity is even less satisfactory. Speaking of the former, the author recognizes that "the term has various meanings, not all of them clear" (p. 227). He quotes Talcott Parsons' distinction in which the latter associates cognitive values with universalistic standards and appreciative values with particularistic standards. I think we have reached a point in the discussion of fact and value when the onus of proof is on anyone who makes the above distinctions. The obscurity is compounded by the connection of universalism with the moral concept of equity or fairness. At this point the author might have consulted some recent writing on ethics (e.g., Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of*

View or R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*). A further source of confusion is the relation between universalism and specificity. The author asserts their distinctiveness, but it would seem that the norm of specificity can be applied *morally* only if we set it in the context of treating all others according to their common characteristics as human beings and moral agents. The sociologist may wish to avoid the moral issue and generalize about the ways in which people in an industrial society actually behave towards one another. But, unless we adopt a thoroughly conservative or socially relativistic interpretation of the school, this moral issue is central to an examination of what norms the school is encouraging (even indirectly) and how they are being learned. It is one thing for the school to encourage students to act on the norms of universalism and specificity independently; it is another for it to encourage them to see the latter as dependent in its application on the former.

(c) When all the qualifications of the final section of the article have been made, it seems that we are left with a rather trivial conclusion (p. 235-7). It comes to this: given the differences in the social structure and typical procedures between the school and the family in a contemporary industrial society, we may expect that the school will contribute differently to the incidental learning of social norms. This is an unexceptional claim with which no one would initially quarrel. It should be noticed that in the course of the article there is a considerable dilution in the strength of the author's assertions. In the beginning it is claimed that in addition to formal teaching, children at school inadvertently learn to accept social norms and act according to them (although the kind of learning is not made specific). By the end of the article,

it is more modestly claimed that the school setting is "more conducive to producing a given outcome" (p. 236); there are characteristics of the school which might be exploited for the purpose of learning. Finally, not only is the incidental learning of the social norms not postulated as an expected outcome of the influence of the school situation, but it is admitted that the same school situation might contribute to the learning of the very opposite patterns of behavior (or attitudes) in different people (p. 237).

(d) This leads to the teacher's role in deliberately fostering the learning of social norms. Dreeben's first basic assertion that children learn as much from their experience of the school setting as from the deliberate teaching is debatable. For one thing, it would be necessary to raise questions about the quality and significance of what they learn in these different ways. For example, in terms of criteria of educative learning, how effectively are social norms likely to be learned, if left to the incidental experiences of the school setting? Although Dreeben does not attend to the distinction between desirable and undesirable learning, his own final qualifica-

tions suggest that it might be unwise to expect too much from the spontaneous interaction of the child and his school situation. Although the teacher is not an ideal agent, his deliberate pedagogical effort would seem to be an indispensable factor in bringing about learning of social norms that would count as educative.

I have commented at some length on this article because I think it exemplifies a fairly common defect in social and behavioral scientific writing about education. This is the tendency to examine some aspect of education simply in terms of a psychological or sociological theoretical framework which was devised elsewhere. In this respect, psychological learning theories have been notorious for many years. If the behavioral scientist wishes to write relevantly about education, he should at least take *educational* theory into account. I have argued that Dreeben fails to do this in relation to the two crucial educational concepts of schooling and learning.

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Book Reviews

PUBLIC TELEVISION:
A PROGRAM FOR ACTION.
Report of the Carnegie Commission.
New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
254 pp. \$4.95.

DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND
OUR CONTROL.
by Fred W. Friendly.
New York: Random House, 1967.
325 pp. \$6.95.

Fred Friendly's dramatic departure from television in February, 1966 aired the deep conflict between the commercial and the professional in the industry, and was instrumental in launching the current movement for "public television" free from the constraints of profit motives and poll ratings. Friendly was the partner of Edward R. Murrow throughout the period that William S. Paley, Chairman of the Board of CBS, has called "the first golden age of broadcast journalism" (p. 210). But first Murrow and then Friendly were alienated by the commercial control of their performance. Since his break with Mr. Paley's CBS, Friendly has become the most articulate crusader for a noncommercial television system free to develop the full promise of this most vivid medium. His book describes the anatomy

of the conflict of interests which has restrained the development of quality programing, and presents the first professional prescription for television in the public interest.

At the suggestion of Walter Lippmann, McGeorge Bundy, newly appointed president of the Ford Foundation, made an alliance with Friendly to plan such a system. Soon after their proposal to build a national noncommercial television system serviced by a domestic satellite and supported by the savings from satellite transmission, the Carnegie Commission published its proposal to develop "public television" through an autonomous corporation roughly parallel to the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Friendly and Bundy for the Ford Foundation and Dr. James Killian and Edward Land of the Carnegie Commission spelled out these possibilities in exciting hearings last spring before Senator Pastore's Senate subcommittee on communications. Senator Pastore himself, directing the hearing with sympathetic understanding, brought out the salient points, simplified the issue in his practical analysis, and underscored its importance.

The bill before his committee was a limited one, introduced by Secretary

John W. Gardner of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, who while president of the Carnegie Corporation, had appointed the Commission, with the encouragement of the White House. The bill itself was for a \$9 million appropriation for one year, less than a tenth the estimated need for a public television system—"seed money," Pastore called it—to bring the Corporation into being. It did not include the Ford plan for a domestic TV satellite, nor the Carnegie plan for an excise tax on TV sets to support the system. Instead, the \$9 million would be a straight congressional appropriation. Nothing in the bill provided the insulation from political control that was the key to the Carnegie proposal. But Pastore argued not to complicate the issue—he pressed for a bill which would recognize the principle of public TV and create the Corporation.

Permanent financing would be worked out during the first year. The domestic-satellite proposal faced the opposition of Comsat, which had been assigned control of satellite communication, and would be an issue before the Federal Communications Commission. But Senator Pastore gave a full hearing to the ultimate plans, encouraged their development, and used his hearings to advance public understanding about the unrealized potential of television.

The senator summed up the issue:

And the point is to [take action] now. I think America has to decide . . . what it is going to do about these satellites, what it is going to do about educational television. . . . As Mr. Bundy said, "I don't care how you do it, but do it and do it right." (pp. 301-2)

The bill passed the Senate and moved to the House, where it passed in September in the same limited form, for one year, leaving to later the issues of

the scope and financing of the Corporation. But the combined impact of the Ford and the Carnegie proposals has been substantial. The promise of public TV has received influential backing from practical men who have spelled out the means for it with professional skill.

The most urgent voice for non-commercial television has been Fred Friendly's. The issue finds dramatic presentation in his book, a great story and greatly told. It so identifies Friendly with the issue that the *New York Times* coined the term "Friendlyvision" in the title of the cover story in its Sunday magazine of April 23, 1967.

Even as the public television bill moved in the House, Friendly, with \$10 million of Ford Foundation backing, was developing a demonstration that will be a national test of this promise of public television. Starting in November, for a period to run through the Fall, all the educational television stations in the country will be provided with a live two-hour Sunday night program which explores the contemporary scene. This will be a show window of what public television promises. Much is at stake in its success.

Over more than a decade, the Ford Foundation has put some \$100 million into support of educational TV, the formal name for the noncommercial TV that has grown up sporadically in state universities and community centers, with uneven but generally insufficient support, utilizing those channels that the government set aside for educational use. Originally an expansion of classroom instruction, educational TV has extended its coverage to include the arts and public affairs. It is this larger area of programming that the Ford Foundation has strengthened through its support of the National Educational Television center. This is

not a network, for the cost of transmission has been beyond the modest financing of educational television. Rather it has been a producer, supplier, and broker of quality programs that have upgraded the offerings of the local stations.

It is this area—the public sector—of educational television to which the Carnegie Commission directed its study; for it, the Carnegie Report coined the happy term “public television.”¹

As the Carnegie Report defined it:

Public Television is capable of becoming the clearest expression of American diversity, and of excellence within diversity. Wisely supported, as we conclude it must be . . . it will be, in short, a civilized voice in a civilized community. (p. 18)

The Carnegie Report proposes, in essence:

That Congress establish a non-profit, non-governmental “Corporation for Public Television,” empowered to receive and disperse government and private funds to extend and improve public television programs.

That the Corporation support at least two national production centers, to prepare programs for educational television stations.

That Congress provide funds for the Corporation through a manufacturer's excise tax on TV sets, beginning at two per cent and rising to five per cent. The revenues to be

¹In confining its plans to “public television,” the Report makes clear that this is only because the use of classroom television has yet to be sufficiently studied. Its final recommendation is that public and private agencies sponsor “extensive and innovative studies designed to develop better insights into the use of television in formal and informal education.”

made available to the Corporation through a trust fund.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to provide adequate facilities for present stations, to help increase the number of stations for nation-wide coverage, and to increase support for instructional television programs.² (pp. 5-9)

The Commission emphasizes that it “considers the creation of the Corporation fundamental to its proposal and would be most reluctant to recommend other parts of its plan unless the corporate entity is brought into being” (p. 5). The Carnegie Report was still unpublished when Fred Friendly wrote his candid biography of network TV with its concluding chapter outlining a proposal for what the Report was to call public television.

²The Commission's concern to insulate the Corporation from pressures through the device of a trust fund applies only to the sensitive role of programing. It is content to depend on regular appropriations through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to support and expand facilities of educational television stations. These numbered 124 in 1966; the Commission would see the number increased gradually to 337 to cover the nation. It contemplates total financing for them of \$270 million. Of this, \$100 million would come by excise taxes to the Corporation, four-fifths of it to go to program production. Transmission costs it estimates at \$17 million. It puts appropriations for facilities at \$91 million. Another \$75 million it assigns to private support, largely from the local communities for local stations. The other \$4 million would come from the yield of a nest-egg private endowment of \$25 million it hopes will be raised for the Corporation to supplement its tax funds.

Educational television now has total financing estimated at \$60 million, less than 3 per cent of the annual revenues of commercial television that exceed \$2 billion. Fred Friendly's graphic phrasing compares the public contribution to educational television with the \$40.7 million spent annually on television to advertise cat and dog foods.

The most urgent proposal of the Friendly-Bundy petition to the Federal Communications Commission was that it wait for the Carnegie Report before making an irrevocable decision on the assignment of satellites. Comsat had petitioned for control of domestic as well as international satellite transmission. The FCC has withheld its commitment.

It was Friendly who first realized the strategic key that a domestic satellite would provide. Friendly, representing American television, had joined with European broadcasters in organizing the debut of the Early Bird satellite in 1965. This new marvel was a product of America's huge investment in space technology. Friendly suggested to McGeorge Bundy that the commercial networks would save, through satellite transmission, perhaps up to half the enormous cost of their charges for long distance telephone lines, now some \$50 million a year; soon, he estimated, to reach \$80 million a year. Half of that savings, resulting from the investment of the American taxpayer, would pay for a satellite to serve educational television and provide it for the first time with interconnections for simultaneous broadcasting across the nation. Bundy quickly mobilized a staff of top-grade technicians and lawyers to prepare the plan that he submitted to the FCC in August 1966.

Bundy told the FCC:

Intensive exploratory studies have convinced us at the Ford Foundation that these revolutionary possibilities [of satellite communications] offer the promise of building a cost-free highway system for multiplied regional and national noncommercial services—and also of providing a large part of the new funds which are desperately needed for noncom-

mercial programing at every level. (p. 314)

Noncommercial television has two great needs: first, to become a true national network, at a cost it can afford—and second, to have money for programing, at a wholly new level of excellence. Properly used, a television satellite can meet both needs. By its natural economic advantage over long landlines, it can effectively eliminate long-distance charges as a determining element in network choices—commercial and noncommercial alike. And if in the case of commercial networks a major share of these savings is passed on to the noncommercial programers, then both problems are on the road to solution, and everyone is better off than he was before. This is not magic, or sleight-of-hand. It is a people's dividend, earned by the American nation from its enormous investment in space. (p. 315)

The Carnegie proposals did not include satellite transmission. They recognized its possibilities, but preferred not to key their proposals to it. If and when a domestic satellite became available, it would be a further gain for public television. But public television should not depend upon the uncertainty and probable delay in determining satellite control. They preferred to insure financing of the system by a manufacturer's excise tax on TV sets. One of their members, Joseph H. McConnell, president of Reynolds Metals Company, refrained from support of this tax plan. He pointed out that this would tax all TV purchasers for programs that might appeal to only some of them.

Mr. McConnell shared the philosophic approach of the Bundy-Friendly plan that commercial television, profiting hugely from use of the public air

waves, might appropriately be asked to share its savings through satellite transmission with the public.⁸ But in the main the Carnegie and the Ford proposals dovetailed to supplement and reinforce each other as they were presented to Senator Pastore's committee.

Pastore's political agility minimized or postponed most conflicts. As the limited bill before him did not include any method of financing, except the normal congressional appropriation, the tax issue could be put off for the administration to work out before the one-year term of the bill expired.

But the satellite issue could not be

⁸Concurring in the Report, except for the excise tax proposal, Mr. McConnell said:

I quite agree that if public television is to be financed in major part by the federal government, it would be highly desirable to avoid year-to-year appropriations by the Congress. The political implications of these are apparent. And certainly there should be complete divorce of the programming and other functions of the Public Corporation from the government.

In effect, our proposal for an excise tax on television sets would tax the mass of the public, whose program preferences determine the television we have, to provide another service we believe they should have as well.

I suggest that those who are licensed to use the airways in the "public interest"—the television stations—should at least share in the cost of Public Television. If they should pay a franchise tax for that purpose, we can assume, as in the case of the tax on television sets, that this would be passed along to the purchaser—the advertiser. Perhaps it is the advertiser, with his basic test of program content, to whom we refer when we speak of "acceptability—which . . . keeps commercial television from climbing the staircase." If this is what has brought about the need for Public Television, it would seem to me to be equitable that the advertiser bear a part of the cost, so that television could realize the promise for it so ably and so eloquently set forth in the Commission's Report. (p. 72)

avoided. Comsat's Gen. James McCormack, while asserting all friendliness to Friendlyvision, insisted that Comsat had been assigned sole responsibility for satellite communication. He argued that Comsat could and would develop an all-purpose domestic satellite system to serve public television and commercial television alike and the multiple other communication needs. This issue goes into the lap of the Federal Communications Commission initially, but will certainly return to Congress for ultimate resolution. When it does, the original controversy over Comsat will inevitably be renewed. Only after a terrific congressional contest was the Comsat bill passed in 1962 to put the new commercial satellite communication development in private hands, with AT & T the largest component. Bundy and Friendly argued that Comsat had a big enough assignment with global transmission without acquiring also a monopoly of domestic transmission. There for now that issue rests.

It is the core of the Ford proposal that national interconnection be provided for a system of simultaneous broadcasting by the noncommercial stations. The key to the Carnegie proposal is that quality programs be provided by an independent corporation. It gives less emphasis to live transmission, which apparently would be by conventional interconnections.

The Carnegie Commission had applied its maximum ingenuity to the concept of a Corporation. It sought to insulate it from political influence through two devices. To minimize political influence in appointments, it would have the President appoint only half the members; these appointees would then select persons to fill the remaining positions seeking to supplement their own capacities in selecting

these persons. Each renewal of appointments would be in the same ratio.

To minimize the influence of Congress over programs, they proposed an excise tax rather than Congressional appropriations. Thus the Corporation would not need to appear annually before Congressional committees, including its critics, and have to defend its programs before those who would determine its budget.

Even Pastore raised his eyebrows as this concept of autonomy was explored. It would be novel for the Congress, he mildly suggested. The Carnegie commissioners firmly insisted that only the guaranteed insulation from political influence would permit the Corporation to realize the promise of its role. They had ardent support in this view from Fred Friendly.

They obviously were impelled to this position by the dreary record of the Federal Communications Commission in its merely nominal regulation of television, its timid concern for Congressional reaction, the conservatism of most of its appointees, its reluctance to take any initiative. In short, like most regulating bodies, it has appeared more concerned for the interest of the industry than of the public.⁴

Friendly accuses the FCC of "failure to plan and failure to understand the true meaning of television" (p. 300). "The commission is at best a referee," he says, "and at its worst is only a sounding board for special pleaders. With the notable exception of a few of its members, it has made a virtue and a credo out of abdication of its responsibilities" (p. 300).

⁴ Elizabeth Brenner Drew, "Is the FCC Dead?" *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1967. The dissent of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson of the FCC to the decision approving the merger of ABC with IT & T (December, 1966) gives a graphic description of the inadequacy of the Commission staff, its budget and its hearing procedures.

The Carnegie Commission studied the television systems of Britain, Japan, and other countries, but insists that its own proposal is uniquely patterned to the American scene. Nevertheless, the autonomy it seeks for its Corporation suggests the British Broadcasting Corporation. Its manufacturer's excise tax is a variation of the Japanese tax on householders' sets, which provides a handsome budget for the great range and superb quality of the programming of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation.

Britain's experience with television was the reverse of ours. It began with public TV under an autonomous corporation that has sustained a high degree of independence from governments of whatever party. When Britain permitted "independent" (i.e., commercial) television, it retained a degree of control not exercised in the U.S. The corporation for independent television leases broadcasting rights to independent stations. It has exercised its supervisory role only this year by reassigning certain major programs and prime time arrangements that have balanced things up in what it considers the public interest, quite regardless of its effect on the profits of some of the strongest stations.

But American television was born commercial and the interests of the advertiser have dominated programming. Television departed from the traditions of American journalism to copy much more the pattern of Hollywood, with sponsors instead of theatre-goers paying for the popular entertainment to which it has devoted its maximum energy. Its journalistic side, dealing with public affairs and the arts, has proved a very minor role, developed only slowly and sporadically, dependent on the whims of sponsors.

The American newspaper had had two centuries of independence to de-

velop the strength of tradition before it had to cope with the power of modern mass advertising. It depends heavily on advertising, and it is often criticized for taking its tone largely from the mood of the business community. But certain minimum journalistic concepts had become intrinsic, such as the separation of advertising from news. No newspaper leaves it to the enterprise of an advertiser to determine whether it will publish editorials or political columnists or survey the electoral prospects or the progress of school integration.

Commercial television blossomed at the moment when advertising of the mass-produced goods of an affluent society had reached its peak of profitable proficiency. The sponsors took over television. This indeed is the reason for the Carnegie proposals as it is the key to the story that Fred Friendly has to tell in his epic drama of the evolution of television. It makes his book a landmark in television as the first full-dimensioned inside report by a professional whose own career parallels that of this infant giant industry, and who understands what he has experienced.

Friendly's own immense vitality, his robust, extroverted personality, his fertility of innovation, his immense determination and durability fitted him magnificently for the producer's role in television. The fortunate chance that brought him into early partnership with Edward R. Murrow created the greatest chapters in television history.

The Murrow-Friendly partnership began in 1947 when Friendly, then producing a radio program in Providence, suggested the joint development of an album of recorded history. In 1949, they joined in producing a radio program, "Hear It Now," which two years later became the television program, "See It Now," and Murrow's television debut, with Friendly as his producer.

Murrow had returned from his war reporting a national figure and a great asset for CBS. He was given extraordinary freedom to exercise his talents in the developing medium. In the amorphous pristine day of early television, the Murrow-Friendly unit was an autonomous operation within CBS. They created the great Murrow programs, "See It Now," "Person to Person," "Small World," "CBS Reports." They searched the land for the great themes. They explored the great issues. They reported on the great controversies—the Supreme Court, segregation, Senator McCarthy, the plight of the migrant workers, cigarettes and lung cancer, the Bricker Amendment, the security case of Lieut. Radulovich. They interviewed Robert Oppenheimer; they presented the case for statehood for Hawaii and Alaska. In this saga of discovery, they realized new dimensions for the television camera. They mirrored the American condition, its promise and its pains. The ingredients they contributed to television, as Fred Friendly says, were "conviction, controversy, and a point of view" (p. 3).

Television meantime was growing to vast stature with mounting earnings, its programs sponsored by the advertisers of America, its profits reflecting the prosperity of American business reaching larger markets through the universal screen. The parallel developments proved incompatible. The fame of the Murrow programs, a great factor in the fame and fortune of CBS, became an embarrassment to its management when controversy alienated sponsors. Rocking the boat worried business conservatism, inflamed reactionaries to boycott the sponsors of Murrow programs.

"See It Now" was the vehicle for the most illuminating, the most searching, and so at times the most controversial of the Murrow programs. It was long the most distinguished pro-

gram on the air. Yet CBS refused to advertise the three most controversial "See It Now" programs—on Lieut. Radulovich, on Senator McCarthy, on the inspiring Oppenheimer interview of January 4, 1955. Each time Murrow and Friendly personally paid for and inserted an ad in the New York Times the morning of the program.

The death of "See It Now" was long a TV mystery, incredible to the TV critics who had admired it above any other television production of its era. But it died because controversy and commercials didn't mix. CBS withdrew the autonomy of the Murrow-Friendly unit, gradually curbed Murrow's control of programs, finally eased him out of his key reportorial role. His appointment by President Kennedy in 1961 to direct the USIA relieved a CBS situation that had become untenable. Friendly, then put in charge of news, found new layers of business management and program decision blocking his access to top levels. His professional judgment of the assignment of time for crucial news events came under veto of the sales executives. The final veto that exploded into his departure was over the televising of the most important day of the Fulbright Committee hearings on Vietnam, February 10, 1966.

Even over that Friendly can be philosophical. "No one person at CBS said, even to himself, much less to anyone else, 'I would prefer to have our network present a fifth rerun of "I Love Lucy" today at 10 o'clock instead of the Kennan testimony on Vietnam'" (p. 213). But it had cost CBS \$175,000 in canceled commercials to broadcast the hearings the day before.

The anatomy of a great and rapidly expanding institution like CBS is a fascinating revelation in itself. This revelation stays in the background until the end of Friendly's narrative. His story moves with the rapid action of a

TV camera, but the momentum of the commercial evolution of CBS and the weight of the influence of its sales organization system and its stockholders accompanies the production process. It grows gradually like a shadow of foreboding until it comes to haunt his story.

Although Friendly has no villains, he cites repeated instances of the insensitivity of the business management of TV. One was a two-month hold-up of the first interview with Walter Lippmann, which was to become an annual institution of distinction for CBS. The interview was done in early May, 1960. But it took CBS until July 7 to find a spot for it. By then it was necessary to re-do part of it that had fallen out of date.

Another incident was the occasion of the separation of Howard K. Smith from CBS. Smith was moved into Murrow's role in "CBS Reports," but he was banished soon after Murrow left over a program, "Who Speaks for Birmingham?" This took Smith to the scene, May 18, 1961, when Bull Connor's police watched civil rights workers beaten by a mob. Smith closed that program with a quotation from Edmund Burke: "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

Friendly reports:

The management of CBS, deeply disturbed by the Birmingham program and its possible effect on the affiliated stations in the Deep South, ordered the Burke quote removed. It was an attack on the decent white citizens of Birmingham and it was an editorial remark, they said. . . .

There were other problems, some of them personal, but the Birmingham situation brought matters to a head and ended, months later, with

Paley's and Stanton's request for Smith's resignation. (p. 127)

This is the double meaning of Friendly's title: *Due to Circumstances Beyond Our Control*. But, he asserts in his final chapter, we can control if we assert our public right over the public's air ways. Then he gives his own prescription for the way to do it, which McGeorge Bundy adapted to the Ford Foundation's proposal—for what the Carnegie Commission calls public television.

The promise of public television is described in the following eloquent passage from the Carnegie Report:

If we were to sum up our proposal with all the brevity at our command, we would say that what we recommend is freedom. We seek freedom from the constraints, however necessary in their context, of commercial television. We seek for educational television freedom from the pressures of inadequate funds. We seek for the artist, the technician, the journalist, the scholar, and the public servant freedom to create, freedom to innovate, freedom to be heard in this most far-reaching medium. We seek for the citizen freedom to view, to see programs that the present system, by its incompleteness, denies him. (pp. 98-99)

Friendly's vivid narrative and the Carnegie Commission's exploratory study supplement each other in providing a valuable look at the complex story of the American search for quality television.

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THE WAY OF THE SCIENTIST.

Selected and Annotated by the Editors of *International Science and Technology*.

New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966. \$8.95.

One of Adlai Stevenson's most memorable quips was the remark he made at a campaign rally in Cambridge: "I have just been to M.I.T., where I tried to humanize the scientists; now I am at Harvard, where I shall try to simonize the humanists." This collection of edited taped interviews from a lively trade magazine succeeds remarkably well in humanizing the scientists.¹ Whether it will also succeed in simonizing any humanists is another matter.

For many humanists have lately had some rather disquieting thoughts about the impact of science upon society. In England, for example, when C.P. Snow revived the complaint of T.H. Huxley against the aesthetic establishment for having so defined culture as to exclude science, F.R. Leavis eagerly cast himself in the defensive role originally played by Matthew Arnold and denied emphatically that science had anything serious to teach about the really important things in life. In substance there was no novelty in the controversy, but Snow was certainly right to argue that the attitude of the mandarin establishment was politically, economically, and socially—if not culturally—disastrous. Britain *has* suffered from the brain drain, and one reason scientists have emigrated is the disdain they still encounter from the classicists who control the educational system. One of the "drainees" interviewed by the editors of this book recalls that when he ar-

¹ Even to the point of discovering such wits in the family as the biologist who is quoted as having defined a drug as "a substance which, if injected into an animal, produces a paper" (p. 114).

rived to take a position as a teacher of physics in an illustrious public school, "a wizened figure with a chalk-covered gown came up to me in the faculty common room, a classics don of considerable standing, and said to me, 'So you're the new stinks don' " (p. 314). The use of this less than solicitous sous-briquet, usually reserved for professors of chemistry, is of course only a small token of an attitude of disdain which is very pervasive and very damaging.

In America, the humanist is apt to feel that the situation is just the reverse. Here the humanities are scorned as impractical and the sciences are worshipped as the source of all progress and wisdom. The result is that whereas in England Snow attacks the smugness of the humanists, here Jacques Barzun tries to puncture the pretensions of the scientists and warns against an idolatrous worship of science and scientific thinking. For in this, the most technologically advanced nation in the world, the danger is not that science will be deprecated or ignored but that it will be expected to solve all problems and that it will be taken as the paradigm, the ideal model, of all useful thought. Barzun rightly points to at least two specific dangers in this attitude. One is that in our growing dependency upon science we risk losing sight of the link common sense tells us we must maintain between the abstract and the concrete; instead, as he puts it, "what is felt is the *curse* of abstraction, the *burden* of pullulating fact."² The second danger is that in our obsession with the mechanistic models of science we will lose sight of the fact that man is and wishes to be increasingly a self-determining creature.

Interestingly enough, the most strik-

² Jacques Barzun, *Science: The Glorious Entertainment* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 5.

ing common feature of the off-the-cuff remarks of the scientists interviewed in this collection is what they reveal about the attitude of scientists themselves toward "the scientific method." The scientists' own descriptions of their work styles, if they can be accepted as at all accurate, would reassure even the most skeptical humanist that a good many scientists do not claim to possess methods any more efficacious than his own. The conventional notion that scientists are simply objective experimenters, rigorously led from hypothesis to law by a dogged pursuit of evidence—as contrasted to the picture of the humanist as a subjective speculator, anxious most of all to establish the personal uniqueness of his own self-expression—is best refuted by what the scientists themselves say. Surprising as it may seem to some, it turns out that "the way of the scientist"—or at least the way of the supremely creative scientists who are the subjects of most of these interviews—is in certain respects rather like that of the artist.

Robert R. Wilson, a leading designer of particle accelerators, is an especially articulate witness. "To me," he says, "physics is, among other things, a form of personal expression"; "to me style is important. . . . I can't stand the present trend toward multi-authored papers—anonymous physics" (p. 48); "my thinking about accelerators does tend to be intuitive rather than logical" (p. 49). Creativity in science, he notes, is not easily captured in any how-to-do-it cookbook formula:

You go through a long, hard period of filling yourself up with as much information as you can. You just sort of feel it all rumbling around inside of you, not particularly at a conscious level. Then—it can happen at any time—you begin to feel a solu-

tion, a resolution, bubbling up to your consciousness. At the same time you begin to get very excited, tremendously elated—pervaded by a fantastic sense of joy. (p. 51)

Who has not had the same curious experience in any creative endeavor?

Nor is he alone in thinking that good science is in some important degree "intuitive" rather than merely the result of laborious study or of a series of exercises in problem-solving. Abdus Salam, another physicist, says that to be a successful scientist "you need good imagination, intuition, perception, seeing a correlation between facts. You do not need that long tradition of erudite knowledge" (p. 70). Peter J. W. Debye observes that when working in chemistry (*chemistry!*) he found that "you had to use your feelings," indeed to ask, "What does the carbon atom *want* to do?" "I can only think in pictures," he adds (p. 81), compounding his heresy with a swipe at mathematics. Albert Szent-Gyorgi, like Debye a Nobel Laureate, is no more orthodox: "I just wander about without especially clear ideas or preconceived notions so far as I know, and now and then something pops up—boom!—something that is entirely new, that leads to new lines of research." The really great scientists, he says, have been "the dreamy fellows moving about with hands in pockets," the "intuitive types" (p. 113).

Are great scientific discoveries made in the laboratory—in the pale glow of the bunsen burner or in the light patterns photographed in a bubble chamber? One of Leo Szilard's best discoveries came to him "in a plane flying back from Stockholm to London. . . . I suddenly had an idea. Everything fell into place" (p. 30). Charles H. Townes discovered the principle of the maser and the laser sitting on a bench

in Franklin Park in Washington at dawn. And what about Bernd Matthias, the experimenter's experimenter? How and when did he arrive at the rule that explained variations in superconductivity among elements? "It was at night, but I was awake at the time. Some superconductors I found when I was asleep, but this time I wasn't. I was reading a book, something quite different, and suddenly I knew that it was the number of valence electrons that was the common feature" (p. 41).

James Joyce called experiences like these his "epiphanies." But surely such near-mysticism must be confined to theorizers; surely practical men like inventors will rely less on leaps of faith than on exhaustive tinkering? Apparently not. F.C. Williams, an ingenious inventor and electrical engineer, holds out no hope for mere plodders. "You can't make an invention by steady application. You can sit down and work very, very hard indeed, and you will never make an invention in your life, unless you're the sort of chap who can do it." "*An invention*," he says—in a definition that ought to be inscribed in gilt and hung in place of every THINK sign in existence—"is something that does not follow logically from the data" (p. 158, emphasis added). "When you've made this step, then you can see how you should have got there by logical processes—what we call 'the bright light of hindsight'" (p. 159). Williams is less enthusiastic about mathematics even than Debye. Should engineers be taught advanced math, he is asked. "What do they want to bother with that rubbish for? The time to learn about that class of things is—never" (p. 164).

Frank Nixon, another engineer who is director of quality control for Rolls Royce, comes remarkably close to Barzun's attack on the "curse of abstraction" when he criticizes the aero-

space industry—well before the fire in the Apollo capsule—for meeting government specifications with “an estimate of the *probability* of reliability” instead of testing components until they are proven definitely reliable (p. 172).

With all this evidence that the scientific method is really a method of confirmation rather than a way to discovery, and far from infallible when it involves statistics, as it so often does, we might imagine that scientists would be careful not to claim too much for it. Many of them are, especially when they approach questions in the realm of values or social policy. But occasionally some researchers become infatuated because of success in some limited area of work and imagine their techniques to be some kind of new philosopher's stone capable of working miracles in any and every area. Richard C. Raymond, the head of a California “think factory” which services the Defense Department, is in the grip of just such a delusion:

I think the scientist can offer to world political problems the values which are derived from work in science and these are values on truth. They are values on objectivity. They are values on experiment. Scientists all over the world . . . can talk to each other, because they have generally a reverence for truth and objectivity. (p. 182)

How pious! As though scientists were disembodied oracles who could only dispense objective political truth and who could never controvert each other even on such technical issues as the dangers of fallout from nuclear testing, the consequences of a nuclear test ban, the relationship of smoking and health, or the use of pesticides and other chemicals. As though the AMA were led by a band of selfless saints,

with hardly a care for the income of doctors. As though when scientists compete for scarce federal research funds, often sitting as judges in their own case, they are not in the least tempted to overestimate their own needs and underestimate those of fellow researchers in other areas.⁸ As though there were scarcely any need to be concerned with the ethics of scientists—or with what Guy Ourisson, the French organic chemist, calls the “deadly sins of research” (p. 129), including the scientist's preconceptions, his commitment to his own work, the “curious mixture of envy, pride, and even covetousness” (p. 132) which limits his objectivity, and the unhappy effects of the race to publish and to establish priority.

Fortunately, the American scientists who have been in the most sensitive position at the intersection of government and science—which is to say, who have served as Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology—are acutely aware of the limitations of science and of the relativistic, contingent character of practically all political questions. George B. Kistiakowsky recalls when he was asked by President Eisenhower to mediate a dispute between the scientists in HEW and those in Agriculture over the menace to public health of a toxic substance used in the cultivation of cranberries, he and his staff decided that the way to resolve the issue was to use common sense rather than “abstract principle.”

⁸ Consider, for example, the caustic criticism by disgruntled scientists of the recommendation by a panel of high energy physicists in favor of the rather expensive 200-Bev accelerator now scheduled for construction. One such critic remarked in a Congressional hearing that although everybody he knew shared in the federal pork barrel, this was one time when the division of the pork had been arranged by the pigs themselves.

When they asked themselves whether there was actual danger in its actual mode of use they were able to allay public fears and Thanksgiving Day went on as scheduled (p. 199). Jerome B. Wiesner admits that space expenditures take more federal funds than many scientists think they are worth, but he also points out realistically that these expenditures support much related science and create a climate in which "it will be generally easier to get support for science" (pp. 214-5). Donald F. Hornig, the present incumbent, is apparently the last man who would subscribe to the view that an application of scientific method would straighten out all political problems. "The whole question of allocation among fields," he admits candidly, "is one I keep looking at, but I just haven't any idea how you solve it" (p. 220-1). "My own thinking tends to rely on incremental planning. . . I think absolute planning is almost hopeless" (p. 226-7).⁴

Plainly what makes a scientist useful in government—apart from his particular fund of technical knowledge, which is inevitably limited to the area of his specialization—is not that he is a bright-eyed Boy Scout but that he is able to guide earnest but baffled politicians through the fog of technical jargon and conflicting expertise which, in an age of science, is bound to envelop them. That is why Kistiakowsky, Wiesner, Hornig, Glenn Seaborg (chairman of the AEC), and Harold Brown (in Defense) have been so suc-

cessful. It is of course also the reason that Admiral Rickover has what Senator Clinton P. Anderson describes as "a great hold" upon Congress. As Anderson explains, "He tells people the truth, to the best of his ability. He's intemperate sometimes. He has prejudices like some of the rest of us. But he's never tried to mislead the committees" (p. 284).

It is also well to bear in mind that relations between scientists and politicians are by no means those of one-way dependency. There are times when politicians perform a valuable service not only in calling scientists to task for professional misconduct but also in making them aware of public needs. Senator Anderson recalls an episode in which he found himself bringing two different scientific projects together:

One day somebody said that to get salts out of the sea water the water had to be lifted to about 1400°. I went from that meeting to another in which they were talking about a certain type of reactor. They said when you run water through there you use water as a coolant, it rises to about 1400°. And I said, "Why not consolidate these two things?"

"They" are now working on just that.

The editors of this volume have performed an imaginative and a very useful service in recording these comments by some forty-one people prominently associated with science and technology. Inevitably the discussion frequently strays from common themes, sometimes into the obscurely technical. As the editors acknowledge, the selection would have had better balance if more life scientists had been included. Nevertheless, this collection presents a remarkably candid and successful self-portrait of the scientific community. The quality of the book is en-

⁴ Although Hornig thinks this attitude derives from his "background as an experimentalist," a political scientist may perhaps be forgiven for suggesting that he has in fact been brainwashed by the Budget Bureau. Like anyone else with a clear head and a year's experience in the Executive Office Building, Hornig has become a card-carrying Incrementalist.

hanced by helpful annotations as well as by good photographs. Teachers who may wish to give students an insider's view of what life is really like for scientists will find this volume well worth recommending. And humanists who are concerned with the dangers posed by the misunderstanding and misuse of modern science can perhaps take some comfort in the ample evidence that their concerns are shared by the great majority of the creative scientists whose thoughts are recorded in this volume.

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KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: ESSAYS ON
SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT.

edited by Sanford A. Lakoff.

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pp. \$10.95.

Daniel Bell, the sociologist from Columbia University, has suggested that the days of the industrial age in the United States are numbered, and that we are moving rapidly towards a new stage of social development. He claims that we have entered what he calls post-industrial society. The label "post-industrial" clearly indicates that this latest configuration of the modern world is not "without" or "against" industry and all that man has come to associate with this word over the last century or so. And, obviously, Bell knows his economic and social history well enough not to deny the fact that the industrial world has gone through important changes which together have created an environment vastly different from the one dominated by steel mills and railroads, Morgans and Fords, tycoons and syndicalists. He argues, however, that we have now made a quantitative jump, that we have crossed a watershed so high that we will fail to understand the

changed state of the Union and the new problems with which it is faced if we continue to see the new reality in yesterday's categories and terms.

The qualitative difference between the industrial and the post-industrial stages of social development, again according to Bell, is directly related to the new role of knowledge in society. Science, technology, research, innovation, method and planning, data and data-handling, systems and systems analysis—these are some of the key terms of the new age, with education behind all the others. In fact, the post-industrial society might as well be called the knowledge society:

The post-industrial society is a society in which business is no longer the predominant element but one in which the intellectual is predominant. The majority of the society will not, of course, be intellectuals, but the sense of the society, its spirit, the areas of conflict, of advance, of engagement, will be largely in intellectual pursuits. The major institutions of society will be a vast new array of conglomerations of universities, research institutes, research corporations.¹

That massive and systematic creation of new knowledge and its deliberate use for social purposes are the major agents of social change in our day, and that science and technology have therefore become constituent elements of a new (and potentially world-wide) society, are convictions shared by several

¹ Daniel Bell, "The Post-Industrial Society," in Eli Ginzberg (ed.), *Technology and Social Change* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964), p. 44. Bell is presently working on a book on the post-industrial society. Also, see his "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society," *The Public Interest*, Nos. 6 and 7 (Winter and Spring, 1967), pp. 24-35 and 102-118.

well-known social philosophers. Unfolding the full meaning of Bacon's centuries-old insight, Knowledge is Power, seems to be a unifying concern behind the thought and writing of such a diversified group of worldly philosophers as Galbraith, Boulding, Heilbroner, McLuhan, Fuller, Mesthene, Aron, and de Jouvenel.²

It is probable that few, if any of these men see themselves as close colleagues in the pursuit of the same intellectual endeavor, but I have referred to all of them as social philosophers. They are thinkers who have the imagination and courage to ask seemingly simple, but in reality quite radical questions: What is really new about our age? What does it mean for man, for his institutions, for his ways of thinking

²For reasons too lengthy to explain in this context I have not included in the above group people who try to forecast, in any detail, the shape of tomorrow's world (like Herman Kahn) or to develop methods which may help in this endeavor (like Olaf Helmer). I mention the following publications for those readers who may wish to look into the justification of my remark about the "common denominator" which holds together the unorthodox group of social philosophers I selected: John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century: The Great Transition* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Limits of American Capitalism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Marshall McLuhan, "Address at Vision '65," *The American Scholar*, XXXV, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), pp. 196-205; R. Buckminster Fuller, "The Year 2000," *Architectural Design* (February, 1967), pp. 62-3; Emmanuel G. Mesthene, "Technology and Wisdom," in Mesthene (ed.), *Technology and Social Change* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1967), pp. 57-62; Raymond Aron, *The Industrial Society* (New York: Praeger, 1967); Bertrand de Jouvenel, *The Art of Conjecture* (New York: Basic Books, 1966).

and doing, for his habits and values? They are searching for meaning, orientation, direction in the change that surrounds us—change induced by the powerful forces of new knowledge and new tools, change occurring with an intensity and a speed previously unknown to human experience. In their efforts to raise new questions or, rather, to ask the perennial questions in a new way, they are trying to fill a role in society which the majority of professional philosophers is unwilling to take. Charles Malik—politician, philosopher, social critic—recently had this to say about the failure of contemporary philosophy: "The soul of youth, not only in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, but also in Europe and America, is hungering for some fare of satisfying truth, and philosophers are engaged literally in splitting words."³ Philosophers, obviously, can easily push aside such emotional and dramatic criticism by saying that theirs is not the role of the pseudo-religious prophet. Scholars in the social sciences, again arguing for the pureness and exactness of their research, have been equally reluctant to reformulate their disciplinary problems in light of major changes in the social universe brought about by the scientific age. The political scientists, for example, have been criticized from among their own ranks on this very issue:

A few political scientists have studied the behavior of scientists in non-laboratory, policy-oriented, decision-making situations, but a far larger number have been content to engage in philosophical disputes over the possibility or desirability of "being scientific" in their own disciplines, or from prepared semantic positions

³ Charles Malik, "Reflections on the Great Society," *Saturday Review* (August 6, 1966), p. 14.

to defend political analysis against invasion or subversion by scientific methods.⁴

Knowledge and Power, a collection of essays edited by Sanford Lakoff, holds a middle position between the bold attempt of the social philosopher trying to define the characteristics of the knowledge society, and the more history- and facts-oriented political scientist who shows increasing awareness of the new dimension added to his traditional field of study by the encounter of science and government. The book rarely asks the explicit questions the title leads us to expect about changes in the nature of political processes in the knowledge society, and with few exceptions (such as Lakoff's remarks on p. 57), we find little that would contribute to a theoretical analysis of the relationship between knowledge and political power that has developed since the massive intrusion of science and scientists into the corridors of power during World War II.⁵ In this respect, the philosophical treatise on *Knowledge and Power* remains to be written.

Yet Lakoff clearly belongs to the small, gradually growing group of political scientists who have turned their professional attention to the problems now commonly discussed under the headings "Science and Public Policy," "Science and Government," or "Science Policy." In fact, Lakoff was one of the

first investigators to do so.⁶ He takes the scientific age for granted and sees little need to ask general questions about its broad implications for the art and organization of government. Instead, he prefers to focus on the analysis of specific instances and concrete events in the encounter between science and government.

His book is a collection of fifteen essays, three of them written by Lakoff himself. Among the other authors (to mention the better known names) we find Philip Abelson, Harvey Brooks, McGeorge Bundy, Daniel Greenberg, Alan Waterman, and Alvin Weinberg. Most of the essays were written from three to five years ago, which occasionally presents difficulties. For example, two case studies dealing with the establishment of Comsat and with the organization of scientific advice for Congress were seriously outdated by the time of publication. (In these, as in a few less critical cases, an editor's resumé of subsequent events would have been useful.) Six of the papers presented here had been published previously; three others originated as student papers for a Harvard seminar on Science and Public Policy. The volume is dedicated to the seminar's initiator and principal faculty member, Don K. Price.

To put the discussion into a wider historical context, Lakoff begins the volume with an excellent essay about the intellectual origins of the knowledge society. This well-written and well-documented study of Western thought about the social role of science deserves, in my opinion, a detailed summary. The article reminds us that since the Renaissance social philosophers have

⁴ Avery Leiserson, "Science and Public Life," *The Journal of Politics*, XXIX (1967), p. 241.

⁵ *Corridors of Power* is the latest novel by C. P. Snow (New York: Scribner's, 1964). His novels, perhaps more than his theoretical works, contain valuable insights about the broader changes in the political universe that have come about with the scientific age. See in particular *The Light and the Dark* and *The New Men*.

⁶ See his article, written in 1955, "The Third Culture: Science in Social Thought" (to be reviewed below) and his book, in collaboration with J. Stefan Dupré, *Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).

expected dramatic changes—for better or worse—in the condition of man to go hand-in-hand with advances in science and technology. The account begins with Francis Bacon, the oft-quoted author of this motto of modern times: Knowledge is Power. Almost two centuries later, with Condorcet, the separate themes of the social usefulness of science (Bacon) and of political freedom (Locke, Rousseau) converge into one. For thinkers of the Enlightenment on both sides of the Atlantic, science and democracy were considered both closely related and mutually reinforcing. The revolutionary and nationalistic nineteenth century (and a good part of our own) regarded this hope as "naive optimism": "The grand controversy that agitated Europe from the French Revolution through the nineteenth century virtually ignored the role of science and technology. No one—not Burke in England or de Maistre in France—sought to blame the French Revolution on Newton or Descartes" (p. 19). The pendulum began to swing back with Saint-Simon and more significantly with Comte. Science was again considered an important social force; indeed, it was thought to lead man to the highest stage of human development—the scientific, positive, industrial age.

At this point in the historical account Lakoff makes an interesting remark about the extreme difficulty of forecasting social developments. "From the seventeenth century until close to the middle of the nineteenth, social theorists were clearly divided on the importance of advances in science and technology. There were those, like Bacon, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, and Comte, who were ecstatic about the probable consequences of these advances. Most of the better known theorists, however, were altogether indifferent to them" (p. 26). This

was true of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Burke, and of the great economists. "Neither Adam Smith nor Ricardo nor Malthus believed that technological change would have any great effect on productivity and the factors of production" (p. 26). Lakoff concludes: "In this they were, in retrospect, remarkably shortsighted" (p. 26).

The historical account then progresses to the well-known positions of Karl Marx (strict technological determinism) and of Max Weber (the scientific society is the rationalized and bureaucratic society, but offers the chance of freedom through awareness). The section on the "technocratic optimists" in America deals with Bellamy (author of a widely read novel, *Looking Backward*), Veblen, and Skinner. From there the author leads us to a short glance at the opposite camp, the pessimists who see science and technology as endangering humanistic culture and truly human values. It turns out that the list of social philosophers who overlooked the potential for social change inherent in science is much more impressive than the list of those condemning technocracy and the cold and brutal take-over of numbers, scientific laws, and dehumanizing machines. Oswald Spengler and Georg Friedrich Juenger are prominent in the latter group. Juenger's *The Failure of Technology: Perfection without Purpose*, according to Lakoff, "is almost a handbook of twentieth-century anti-technological thought" (p. 43). More recently, we might add, Jacques Ellul's *The Technological Society* (English translation published in 1964) seems to have taken over this role, but Ellul's book had not yet been published when Lakoff wrote his piece back in 1955.

Four essays in Lakoff's book study the characteristics of new, public or semi-public organizations designed to

take charge of novel, science-induced tasks with which the Federal government finds itself confronted. NASA and Comsat are examples of organizational innovations for developing major new technologies, while the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and the Congressional Science Policy Research Division represent the attempt to integrate science-policy advice into the highest levels of decision-making in the Federal government. "The Establishment of NASA," by E. Schoettle, gives a detailed and competent analysis of the political debate between the military (supported by their in-house scientists) and the Senate on one side, and PSAC, the Bureau of the Budget, the House of Representatives, and the scientific community at large on the other side, which was finally resolved by the establishment of a civilian-controlled space agency directed by a single administrator. "The Congress of the United States, led by Lyndon Johnson, succeeded in broadening the conception of the space program and in identifying it as a major national program far beyond the expectations and even the desires of the scientists and their allies within the office of the President" (p. 262). Schoettle's study of political issues at stake and of organizational alternatives for the country's space effort represents a highly informative case study, comparable in many respects to Don K. Price's earlier analyses of the establishment of the National Science Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the as-yet-unformed organization for the nation's oceanographic activities.⁷

Roger Kvam's paper on the Communications Satellite Corporation, established by Act of Congress in 1962, is a

contribution to the debate on the continual erosion of the formerly clear-cut distinction between public and private organizations. The author paraphrases President Kennedy's objective as trying to "use science and technology in the public interest, but in accordance with the traditional American reliance on private enterprise" (pp. 272-3). Comsat, a blend of public and private enterprise, may well be a model for future organizational innovations, but throughout his essay Kvam seems somewhat undecided about whether such an unorthodox, hybrid kind of organization as Comsat deserves straightforward condemnation or cautious commendation. Also, considering Comsat's potential as a model for future development, it would have been of interest to hear something about the organization's experience during the early years of its existence. Unfortunately, the analysis presented here goes only so far as the completion of the legislation creating Comsat in 1962.⁸

E. Galloway's "Scientific Advice for Congress," a paper prepared as a staff study for the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, presents three alternative means of providing Congress with sound, impartial advice on scientific and technical matters relevant to new legislation. The final decision, again not discussed in this paper, was to establish a Science Policy Research Division as part of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, and to ask the National Academy of Sciences and its Committee on Science and Public Policy to prepare policy studies for Congressional use.

Carl William Fischer, writing on

⁸ Some of the achievements and problems of the new organization are discussed in an article by Charles E. Silberman, "The Little Bird that Casts a Big Shadow," *Fortune* (February, 1967).

⁷ For NSF and AEC see *Government and Science* (1954); for oceanography, *The Scientific Estate* (1965), pp. 208-56.

"Scientists and Statesmen: A Profile of the President's Science Advisory Committee," contributes a useful study of the functions, organization, membership, and working methods of PSAC and its supporting staff. With the earlier studies by Brooks and Kreidler, we now have a fairly detailed picture of the work of the highest science policy body in the country.⁹ All three studies agree that science advice at the Presidential level cannot be looked at as a narrowly defined technical matter, but as complete involvement, with all its risks, in the study and evaluation of broad policy issues. The same note is struck forcefully by McGeorge Bundy, whose experience as special assistant to the President makes his article particularly poignant. A second common theme in the various studies of PSAC refers to a gradual shift in its responsibilities from predominantly defense and space technology to the broad social policy concerns of the Great Society programs. Details of the many policy areas in which PSAC is increasingly involved can be found in a recent Congressional report, and a careful analysis of this trend would be in order.¹⁰

I can mention only briefly some of the remaining articles, in order to indicate the range of issues covered in the volume. Brooks and Weinberg, in contributions which have received wide attention and by now have almost

achieved the status of classics in the "Science and Public Policy" literature, discuss the specific difficulties and possible decision-criteria for the allocation of public funds to research and development. Three other essays present some *causes célèbres*, accidents or incidents, in the surprisingly smooth partnership between science and government. First, Lakoff sees the Oppenheimer trial, in parallel with the trial of Socrates, as the accusation not only of an individual, but simultaneously of the society for which he stands. In Oppenheimer's case it was liberal democracy in America, in the case of Socrates, the Athenian *polis*. A second essay, written by Daniel S. Greenberg, attacks Project Mohole, "a design to drill the earth to unprecedented depths—[which] stands out as an administrative fiasco that deserves earnest scrutiny." Greenberg himself provides the scrutiny in one of the best articles of the volume. We can assume that his masterful piece was not without influence in preparing the ground for last year's Congressional decision to cut off funds for this apparently scientifically sound but poorly planned and poorly managed project that cost the taxpayer not far from \$10 million. Finally, Stanley J. Reiser relates the story of how "human habit and modern industry [the \$8 billion tobacco industry] have combined in a formidable alliance" (p. 297) to reduce to almost nothing Congressional action against cigarette smoking. Although considerable evidence of the health dangers associated with smoking had been accumulated, the voice of the scientists lost much of its impact when legislators and the general public realized that they were confronted not with a unanimous scientific position, but with three distinct theories on the association between cancer of the lung and cigarette smoking.

⁹ Harvey Brooks, "The Scientific Adviser"; Robert N. Kreidler, "The President's Science Advisers and National Science Policy." Both papers were published in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (eds.), *Scientists and National Policy-Making* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964).

¹⁰ United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, *The Office of Science and Technology: A Report prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress* (U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1967).

In conclusion, I shall return briefly to the general critique of *Knowledge and Power* that I made earlier. We have seen that the volume contains, in addition to Lakoff's historical essay, a number of competent case studies on organizational innovations and other science policy issues. What is most often missing is reflection on what these new developments mean for the political organization of society and the "business" of political decision-making. The quality of the book would have been enhanced by a more ambitious examination of what might be called "knowledge and power at work"—the new policy issues of the knowledge society, the new decision-making tools and techniques at its disposal, and—most important of all—the new options that science and technology offer for political decision-making. True, the volume includes a study (by G. H. Uyehara) on "Scientific Advice and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," but it focuses mainly on the description of the political infight between the military establishment and Teller on one side, and the alliance of Kennedy-Wiesner and the "action intellectuals" on the other side. Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days*, which relates his version of the test-ban negotiations, reveals far deeper awareness of the new policy alternative for overcoming the long deadlock in negotiations with the Soviets, which was made available only by recent advances in seismic-wave detection. It is this important and still incompletely understood change in the relation of knowledge to power that needs more exploration by political scientists. Robert C. Wood and Emmanuel G. Mesthene have given us hints about the direction in which we may look:

The power of this century's science and technology makes it possible to change the rules. It thus "shifts the

emphasis of the persistent political question 'Can we do this' from the consideration of legal constraints to consideration of physical constraints." The physical conditions of political action are no longer fixed.¹¹

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edited by Robert Davis.

Toronto, Ontario. \$95.

Here are two magazines which exemplify the polarization of the liberal—or, perhaps, the progressive—movement in education today. They differ from one another as Michael Harrington differs from Paul Goodman, or Jerome Bruner from John Holt. *Changing Education* is a quarterly published by the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, "to promote Democracy in Education and Education in Democracy." *This Magazine is about Schools* is published occasionally by "a group of teachers, social workers, and child care workers" with romantic and radical notions about schools.

The two magazines speak entirely different languages. One considers education from the vantage point of the organized teachers of America (more than 125,000 of them); the other speaks from

¹¹ E. G. Mesthene, "The Impacts of Science on Public Policy," *Public Administration Review*, XXVII, No. 2 (June, 1967), p. 98. The quotation within the quotation is from Robert C. Wood, "The Rise of an Apolitical Elite," in Gilpin and Wright (eds.), *Scientists and National Policy-Making*, p. 54.

the vantage point of the young, probably the "under thirty" young, who identify with the archetypal student—be he three years old or twenty-nine. Taken together, they illustrate a phenomenon of increasing importance in both the political and educational domains—the phenomenon crudely described as "old left" vs. "new left." In politics it takes the form of overt conflict between those who are convinced that wide-ranging popular coalitions are required if necessary reforms are to be won, and those who prefer to go it alone on the assumption that most existing organizations are depersonalized and corrupt. In education the conflict is not yet fully articulated, but there is a growing contest between those who believe that federally aided public schools can create a humane, and what John Dewey called a "learning" society, and those who feel, to quote Edgar Z. Friedenberg, that the public school system "has evolved to meet society's demand for a docile and uncritical youth." An examination of these two journals tends to make one think that the conflict ought finally to be joined.

Changing Education—cleancut, outright, pragmatic—deals with subjects like "teacher power," collective bargaining, and quality education for all children within the existing institutional frame. *This Magazine*... is McLuhanesque, Friedenbergian, Summerhillian. Its writers are preoccupied with student protests, "the defeat of the child" in the traditional classroom, the teacher who behaves like a "petty official," and the need for experimental private schools.

The AFT journal stands foursquare in the Dewey tradition, with its explicitly social orientation and its core concern with "democracy." The Toronto magazine, with its romantic overtones, carries on the strain of thought associated with Bronson Alcott and Henry

David Thoreau. The self-actualizing individual becomes the be-all and end-all; society is the source of dwarfing and constraint. There are accounts of hopeful experiments in a few public schools (which keep the board, writes the editor, "from turning *This Magazine* into an in-group newsletter for converted radicals"); but, what with the emphasis on therapy and "happiness," there are few implications for those concerned with teaching children to conceptualize the inchoate and complex world. In any case, the main thrust of the articles in *This Magazine*... is towards the "utopian" school, generally considered as a "commonwealth," a "community," another version of Summerhill, with Marshall McLuhan's picture next to A. S. Neill's.

Changing Education, on the other hand, says little about experiment and even less about the child. "The campaign for educational democracy" is identified with the advances of the common man; the "Establishment" refers to the forces opposed both to the public schools and to collective bargaining; the implication is that the educational heavenly city is a building, now that we have an AFT. There is something faintly chilling about Joel Kaplan's effort to connect unionism with professionalism (Summer 1966). Professionalism signifies, he says, that "the advancement of the educational system is stressed by the organization; innovation and new ideas are stressed; participation of the organization in educational matters is achieved." When, for example, the United Federation of Teachers in New York City moves from a concentration on salary schedules, working hours, and class size to demands for more remedial teachers, more guidance counselors, and expansion of the 600 schools, it is becoming "professional" in its concern. Granting the importance of proper pay and work-

ing conditions, the necessity for teacher organization, and even the relationship between a teacher's welfare and his pupils' readiness to learn, we still confront the kinds of questions pervading *This Magazine* . . . : Do successful collective bargaining negotiations lessen what Friedenberg describes as the "ceremonies of humiliation" in the public school? Do they prevent what McLuhan calls the "psychic drop-out"? Does the "quality direction" in which the schools are presumably moving—due, as Franklin Parker writes (Winter 1967), to the work of such "New Guard" stalwarts as Conant, Keppel, Gardner, and Howe—signify that "dehumanization," "enslavement," and automatization will come to an end?

Obviously, *Changing Education* has a social conscience. The Fall 1966 issue, preceding the AFT Conference on Racism in Education, concentrated on "The Negro and American Education." David Berkman, Stephen Joel Trachtenberg, and Miles Myers had some brave and clearheaded things to say about desegregation. Most of the other articles treated racism in textbooks and in the teaching of English and history. They exposed the shocking treatment of the Negro in traditional texts; they made a fairly eloquent demand for the recognition of the Negro artist and of the role played by the Negro in American history. It is not of incidental importance that, as Robert Bone pointed out in the February, 1967 *Teachers College Record*, the two writers who dealt with the teaching of Negro poetry were so innocent of the canons of literary evaluation that their end effect was "chauvinistic." Only approximately informed about American literary history, they gave the impression of "undiscriminating approbation of all Negro poets," not because they wrote good poetry but because of the color of their skins.

There is a sense in which this attitude, well-intentioned though it may be, is another facet of the attitude which moved the editor to capitalize both "democracy" and "education" in his statement of purpose. And indeed, there is a note of abstractness and generality in even the most empirical and reportorial of *Changing Education's* articles. The motives seem always to be unexceptionable; but what emerges is frequently reminiscent of "front office" talk. In the Winter 1967 issue, for example, there is an article called "California's Militant Professors," written by James Degnan. On the facing page there is a fine, dramatic photograph of the Sacramento demonstration of last February, complete with picket signs, eager faces, and a banner saying, "Local 1570 AFT." One is made to expect a dramatic account, rather in *cinema verité* style, of what it is like to teach and protest in Reaganland. (I found myself recalling the Italian film entitled *The Organizer*.) But the lead sentence reads: "Since the strike at St. John's, the American Federation of Teachers has achieved numerous victories in its battle to organize American college professors." Visions of Mastroianni in *The Organizer* give way to visions of Samuel Gompers. After all, the Summer 1966 issue boasts an Osborn sketch of Gompers and quotes an editorial the AFL leader wrote in 1915, after some teachers in Chicago won a victory over an anti-union school board. "Teachers must be independent free citizens," said Gompers, "determining their own lives and intelligent, resourceful, reverent leaders of those whom they instruct. Working people in Chicago are directly interested in public school teachers. They are educating their children. They are ready to assist them." It is stirring, certainly, to read Blanche Rinehart on "Mr. Gompers and the Teachers" or Frank Morris on "Teach-

ers and the Yellow-Dog Rule: The Seattle Experience." Nevertheless, when one remembers the children in the classroom, the talk of union victories, strikes, and teacher power is likely to give one pause.

The angry and whimsical young men and women on *This Magazine* . . . may have regarded talk like this as the sort that makes "deadly print." They may well have thought it "thin fare," much like what was to be found in the bulletins, school papers, and quarterlies which moved them to go it alone. There is, in fact, something amusing about their refusal to regard teachers as workers—as anything but members of a lower echelon bureaucracy.

One of the more compelling articles they presented was a reprint from a 1964 issue of *Redbook Magazine*: a dialogue between Mario Montessori and A. S. Neill, two educators who act like anything but petty officials, and who—in their differences with each other—succeed in making a joint affirmation of the need for a "free atmosphere" for children in a school. This affirmation is expanded in the second issue of *This Magazine* . . . in an article written by Norman Friedman, an admitted disciple of the Friedenberg-Goodman-Neill triumvirate. Explicating Neill, Friedman says:

His basic insight is that it is more important to allow the child to grow up in an emotionally healthy way than it is to coerce him into learning things that we think are necessary to his success in later life. We should put, in other words, the child first, and his adjustment to society last. For we may succeed in fitting him for adjustment to the world—a world which society, not necessarily reality, has made—but ruin him, as we usually do, for happiness and joy in living.

This credo, in addition to some points made by McLuhan and some of Friedenberg's familiar arguments, pretty well sums up the commitment of *This Magazine*. . . . (One may object, of course, that the Friedenberg side is overdone. Not only did he write an article for the second issue. His book, *Coming of Age in America*, was so warmly reviewed in the first issue that he was moved to write a letter of appreciation, also printed in the second issue.)

The point is, though, that *This Magazine* . . . has communicated a mood, a tone, and a commitment which the proponents of "Democracy in Education" on the board of *Changing Education* would find alien, if not embarrassing. And it is this, I think, which justifies such efforts as the one made by the group which initiated *This Magazine* The so-called "romantic educators" may look to some like the "flower children" who went to hold a picnic in a Newark park before the riots were entirely over. They may look laughably impractical, perhaps irrelevant to those who have cast their lot with the Great Society, productivity, technological advancement, and the rest. Even so, their values are worth attending to; and it cannot be too debilitating—even for the toughest, coolest, most power-conscious bureaucrat—occasionally to contemplate the meaning of personal freedom, happiness (yes, even that), and joy of life.

For the rest, a line from the ubiquitous Friedenberg's letter to the reviewer of his book may shed some light:

It seems to me that a person with more faith in the social potential of human beings than I have and therefore a warmer curiosity about the alternative ways in which they might attempt to perfect decent social arrangements would really have writ-

ten a considerably better book about education than I can write.

Education will never move in a truly human (as well as "quality") direction if some of those involved with it do not have the warm curiosity Friedenberg claims to lack. Nor will it move if teachers do not assert themselves as dignified human beings who can afford to respect the children in their classrooms because they have learned to respect themselves.

These two magazines are strangely dichotomous. In being dichotomous, they are disturbingly exemplary. The time may yet come when we can overcome the either/or.

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VILLAGE SCHOOL DOWNTOWN:
POLITICS AND EDUCATION—
A BOSTON REPORT.

by Peter Schrag.

Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.

191 pp. \$5.95.

Village School Downtown beckons suburban Americans to save public education in the cities and, thereby, save the cities. For Peter Schrag, life downtown depends on strong public education, but the schools there are rotten and not enough "good education hostages" remain to reform them from within. Those who used the cities and their schools in an earlier, better day and who have escaped to the suburbs must shoulder the responsibility. The situation demands a new political and educational order.

Schrag delivers his message in the form of a report on Boston. He has cleverly pieced together evidence from interviews, school visits, and news clippings gathered during 1965-66 to create

a case study which is meant to exemplify the plight of all our cities and the need for complete reconstruction of urban education.

The book makes slick reading. In a style reminiscent of *Schools Without Scholars* by John Keats and Martin Mayer's *The Schools*, the author tries his hand at raking the educational muck of the sixties. His product is provocative and illuminating, but his analysis and prescriptions are superficial. As a clarion call to the suburbs illustrating the troubles of education in the cities, it is effective. As an analysis of political reform, however, it does not pass muster. Schrag may be beckoning in the right direction, but he doesn't have a convincing solution.

The problem addressed is the relevance of present public education for the increasing, poor, nonwhite populations of the core cities. Boston is chosen because although it is "probably no more or less typical of the situation of urban education than any other metropolis... its well publicized political and educational battles make it an ideal place to examine what it is that the community presumably wants from its public schools" (p. 3). The major issue in Boston education now is *de facto* segregation. It shakes the established school order as no issue has for some time, and it is well exposed because control of the school system is held by a committee of five persons who hold their seats largely because of their opposition to integration.

Schrag's thesis is this: the polity shapes the schools; if the schools need reshaping, reform the polity. The case starts with a description of the governmental machinery for education, the Irish-Catholic voting majority, and that majority's representatives for school policy led by "the great white mother," Louise Day Hicks. Then it turns on the

school establishment, insightfully laying out the collusion of administration, teaching staff, custodians, Home and School Association (P.T.A.), and School Committee toward the end of keeping order. This discussion of the system provides a backdrop for a look at classroom performance. Schrag finds the teaching dismal. His attack is not limited to the lesser lights of the system. From sacred Boston Latin School to the newest John F. Kennedy elementary school, the performance is judged unsatisfactory. Instruction is rigid, traditional, conservative; devoted to drill, drill, drill. There is no searching, no creativity, no intellectual challenge; just keeping the given order. The schools are failing right down the line, and this failure is particularly acute for those children who have least to gain from preservation of the present order, the Negro children.

In general, I agree. Public education in Boston is in poor shape, and the problem is not simply insufficient money. What is to be done? Are there any existing reforms that hold promise? Not for Schrag. The several programs both in and out of the school system are all thought to be inadequate for the task. Boston's own efforts through the Office of Program Development, which is directed by the one "outsider" in the administration, are "... too little, too meek, too pious, too detached, and too conservative" (p. 113). State action applied through the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act is considered defective. As Schrag sees matters, the net effect will be further flight from the city by middle-class whites needed for integration. Even the private efforts of Negro parents and others outside the school system are found inadequate. Transportation of Negro children to predominantly white schools both in the city (Exodus) and out (Metco) and estab-

lishment of private schools in the ghetto (New School for Children) are faulty because they tend to remove the more able children and divert the more concerned parents from building strong public education in the ghetto.

"The Boston situation demands not merely reform or adjustment; it demands a fundamental revolution in political structure and educational practice" (p. 146). What is this revolution to be?

The author's views on reconstruction of educational practice are left vague. The new program must be "relevant," "genuine," and it must "teach reform rather than accommodation to the social order" (p. 150). The words are potential dynamite, but there is little operational definition. Schrag is frank to admit that he lacks the right keys. In this book, he is more adept at asking hard questions of both the establishment and the reformers than at stating his own answers. There is a specific recommendation for the new political structure, however. This is central to the thesis; if the schools are failing, the polity must be reformed.

The solution is a full-fledged metropolitan school district. This new district would have one over-all school committee of members from various geographical parts. The committee would establish a single property tax and uniform per pupil expenditures. Within the district, "neighborhood subdistricts" of 10,000 students would be created. Each subdistrict would have its own elected school committee to control funds allotted to it. Among its duties, the metropolitan committee would direct integration by race and social status. The working relationship between this committee and the subdistrict committees on this issue and most other matters is not defined.

The intended effect on Boston is put

candidly—"the district would also break the hold of the old Boston hierarchy and School Committee by giving suburban interests, through their population advantage, a dominant voice in the governing board of the new organization" (p. 148). The metropolitan committee would not have complete jurisdiction, of course. The subdistricts, presumably nine within Boston, would serve to accommodate special needs of the neighborhoods. But, this committee would be the prime agent to initiate the new educational order.

What appears to be an engaging scheme is, in fact, a slapdash and illusory solution—patent medicine to cure a cancer. Three questions with which Schrag fails to deal come immediately to mind. Where is the political base to bring about such a revolution? If such a base does not exist, how is it to be created? And why is this plan preferable to a variety of other changes which might be more readily attained—an appointed school committee for Boston, new state financing or regulation, new multi-district plans for regional schools, personnel exchanges, and so forth?

Yet even these questions are peripheral; let me cut for the jugular. Would the new plan in practice produce what Schrag intends? The answer will be found only by looking at the potential voting power of the new metropolitan "community." We are not given specific bounds of the district; but since the population figures used in the book match those of the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), I presume that this area would constitute the district. The impression given is that the metropolitan committee would be controlled by the likes of those living in Newton, Lincoln, and Brookline. Schrag knows that less than one-third of the metropolitan population lives in Boston. He seems to assume that the

remaining two-thirds, or a sizable part of it, consists of suburban, good-education types who will hold a comfortable majority, control the committee, and keep Boston in check.

Unfortunately for his case, the author has not looked very closely at metropolitan Boston. The outlying SMSA area isn't all Newtons and Brooklines. Among the 78 cities and towns of the area are Chelsea, Revere, Everett, Lynn, Salem, Malden, Somerville, Cambridge, Medford, Waltham, Watertown and Quincy. None of these communities could be considered a hotbed of public educational reform, to say the least. Not one has a reputation for distinguished schools, and, I dare say, if the author were to screen them, he would find them all more akin in educational style to Boston than to his notion of reformed education. The population in 1965 of these twelve parts of the SMSA together with that of Boston happened to be 1.34 million, slightly more than half of the SMSA total of 2.605 million. These same parts had some 670,000 or 51 per cent of the 1,307,000 registered voters in the SMSA (State decennial census data). Is that really the potential majority the author wishes to create for purposes of carrying out his educational reform? Will this change of the polity actually produce a suitable alternative to the Boston School Committee?

Schrag presumed that his plan would submerge Boston in suburban affluence and talent. In practice, the scheme might well be a metropolitan Frankenstein destined to provide the "Boston-types" with control not only over Boston but over the entire SMSA region. I do not contend that these census figures are definitive predictors or that this scheme for a full-fledged metropolitan district is doomed to fail; but I strongly suggest that the plan might be

self-defeating. Perhaps Schrag has some ingenious scheme for gerrymandering the SMSA district or eliminating such places as Somerville or Everett so that he could get the right majority. Perhaps he had planned to push the boundaries of the district farther out (a precarious prospect because of the danger of absorbing rural areas which in his terms are liabilities, not assets), but he doesn't share any such ideas with us. No matter which way he draws or redraws the bounds, he will be facing a very slim voting margin, one that may well be against him. The book is written as if he were oblivious to this possibility.

Boston, at first glance, looks to be a perfect area for metropolitan planning. More significant metropolitan cooperation for education can and should take place. If such plans are to alter the political order, they must be far better constructed than those of this book. In drawing such plans, I suggest that more careful consideration be given to existing reforms. Schrag may be impatient with the "piecemeal demonstration projects" (p. 147) initiated to date, but neither he nor anyone else can dismiss them unless we have more effective alternatives to build on. These alternatives must pass the kind of rigorous political muster which this book lacks.

The most surprising characteristic of Schrag's work is that during the time he spent around the people of Boston's political establishment, he never acquired that sixth sense with which they all seem to be born, a sense of sizing up the votes. It is unfortunate he didn't, for the book suffers thereby. *Village School Downtown* alerts suburban America to do something, but it is not persuasive about what to do.

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THE EMPTY FORTRESS.

by Bruno Bettelheim.

New York: The Free Press, 1967.

484 pp. \$9.95.

It was only in the late nineteenth century that our view of infancy as a time of passivity, innocence, and incoherence of experience began to give way. Under the powerful impact of Freud's pronouncement of the theory of infantile sexuality and its role in adult neuroses, the evolution of the image of infancy entered a modern phase. The past few decades have seen increasing emphasis on the importance of the earliest mother-child relationship *in toto*, with interest in several specific aspects of this dyad such as feeding (Brody), the communication of anxiety (Sullivan), depressive withdrawal (Spitz), individuation (Mahler), and separation (Bowlby). Ever earlier experiences are seen as significant for later years. Also, increasingly, the infant himself is viewed as being active in affecting his early circumstances, either in "interaction" with qualities of his mother or as a determinant of her reactions to him. Clinical thinking more and more admits not only differences in early mothering but also individual temperamental differences in infants.

Because Professor Bettelheim assumes the existence of a specific set of circumstances in infancy and a specific set of reactions and adaptations to these to account for autism, his views become relevant not only to further understanding this devastating and resistant illness but also to our evolving conceptualization of infancy, and through this conceptualization to our implicit or explicit view of the nature of man.

* This review is written in the author's private capacity and should not be construed as representing a Department position.

In the struggle for physical and psychological survival, the child has to be thought of as undergoing different vicissitudes, especially under extreme circumstances of deep threat to life and will. We have underestimated the perceptiveness of infants whose existence is unwelcome to their parents. While they may be well cared for physically, such infants very soon understand, in whatever vague way, that their psychological survival is not ensured. The outward guarantees of caring may betray basic destructiveness toward the infant. Because his sense of self has never had a chance to develop and no concept exists of a world other than the one he knows from the crib, the infant cannot differentiate between his reality and another. He then experiences his emotional deprivations as omnipresent, irrevocable, and inescapable. Whatever the modality of the frustration—purely emotional or physical, or both and protractedly traumatic—the overwhelming and ever-present threat to survival may lead to the assumption of the autistic position. Simply put, this means that the infant stops trying, withdraws from attempting contact with the world, or as Professor Bettelheim expresses it with chilling precision, the infant so threatened and so disappointed, *ceases to act on his own behalf*.

This formulation of the origins of infantile autism draws heavily on certain features of psychoanalytic theory (particularly Hartmann), yet it goes beyond it. The author assumes that the drive toward autonomy exists almost as early as birth. Doing nothing, not participating, not feeling, not communicating is the same as not having a self. The autistic *Anlage* is the conviction that "one's own efforts have no power to influence the world, because of the earlier conviction that the world is insensitive to one's reactions" (p. 45).

Years of patient caretaking, accept-

ance, love, and commitment to an autistic child are often not enough for cure. Somehow the child has to begin to act on his own behalf. He has to discover his will, his wishes, and his potential for action. The staff of the Orthogenic School has for over a decade undertaken to create the conditions facilitating the "emergence of the self" from autism. Three case histories form the core of Dr. Bettelheim's account; theoretical chapters, and reviews of the literature flank the careful accounts of three patients. There is little doubt that *Laurie*, *Marcia*, and *Joey* will become classics before long. These are masterpieces of clinical work and clinical writing. The case histories are written with a sense of immediacy and much feeling, yet with a meticulous adherence to details and refusal to minimize contradictions. The studies are enhanced by frequent excursions into conceptual problems. For example, the troublesome matter of "regression" is re-examined in light of the clinical finding that "regressive" behavior on the part of autistic children is frequently a progressive step, from the point of view of this illness and the course of recovery peculiar to it. Enlightening conceptual discussions appear throughout the book, either as a result of clinical observations or separately, as for example in Professor Bettelheim's impressive differentiation between levels of autistic withdrawal.

Courageous confrontation of the most complicated clinical and conceptual issues is the hallmark of *The Empty Fortress*. There is a forceful and orderly refutation of Rimland's competing neurologic hypothesis about etiology. There is an illuminating discussion of the possible origins of the myths of feral children, in light of modern knowledge. There is an open and detailed account of the follow-up information on over forty children treated at the Orthogenic School, showing evidence that thera-

peutic work with autistic children is worth further exploration because even though it is time-consuming and expensive, the clinical gains from modest to good are amply supplemented by theoretical dividends going way beyond autism *per se*.

What is missing is an account of the counselors, the "concerned caretakers" who after all are the most immediate agents of help for these children. Throughout the book the counselors receive recognition and praise for their efforts. But it would seem that the scientific community could benefit from a differentiated account of their selection, training, professional development, and from a discussion of the particular problems attendant on the care of these children from the point of view of the staff.

The Empty Fortress was written over a twelve-year period. At times it reads as though it took a lifetime to write it. Among the many quickly constructed non-books of the rapidly growing mental health professions, Professor Bettelheim's latest contribution stands like a fortress but not empty at all.

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EXISTENTIAL CHILD THERAPY.
edited by Clark Moustakas.
New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966.
254 pp. \$6.50.

The title of this book is ambiguous and to some extent deceptive. The reader who expects its content to inform him of a new type of psychotherapy will be disappointed. Instead, he will find that ten of this book's eleven chapters are devoted to lively descriptions of therapy with ten different children by therapists from varying professional backgrounds, adhering to different schools of thought.

The ten children, whose treatment

is described in some detail, suffered from serious emotional conflicts, behavioral disorders, and character disturbances. Each therapist is to be commended for his unusual ability to communicate with his patient, for his deep empathy with his patient's plight, and for his intuitive understanding of his patient's conflicts and anxieties.

In general, the reports are extremely well written. The therapists give graphic descriptions of the children's appearance and behavior, many times quoting verbatim the interchanges which took place between them and their patients. They share with the reader their own emotional responses to many of the children's words and deeds, responses which often moved them to act in ways which led to dramatic responses from the children.

On the other hand, each writer gives only cursory information on his patient's early childhood and developmental history. This emphasis on the treatment experience, the here and now of the therapeutic encounter, is not accidental. Neither is the absence of attempts at a genetic reconstruction of the child's emotional disturbance, nor the lack of an explanatory theory of how and why the treatment worked and whether it had a lasting effect. The reader is prepared for these omissions in the editor's introductory chapter, "The Existential Moment." Clark Moustakas stresses the importance of the existential moment "when the child and the therapist are in full communion" (p. 2). He sees the value of psychotherapy, as does Eugene Gendlin in the closing chapter, "Existentialism and Experiential Psychotherapy," mainly in the degree to which it is a creative experience, a revelation, an intensely emotional therapeutic encounter between patient and therapist.

Moustakas', as well as Gendlin's reason for stressing the sole importance of

the emotional communion at the expense of an intellectual meeting of minds, seems to be at least in part based on a misconception of how non-existential clinicians work with patients in treatment. Moustakas states:

He [the therapist] remains with the child and enables him to come to terms with his own rejection, immorality, or hatred, *not by utilizing a dialectical maneuver or professional technique*, but by bringing to the child the full resources of a real self, interested and committed to the child's well-being. (p. 5)

The view that a therapist with a particular clinical training based upon a specific psychology approaches his patient with his theory is commonly held, probably because, unfortunately, poorly trained clinicians may well fall into this trap in order to mask their discomfort and ineptitude as therapists.

There is, however, a more meaningful implication which pervades both the introduction and the closing chapter of the book. This implicit conviction is that intuition and reason are doomed to remain in absolute conflict, that human faculties such as spontaneous emotion, reflective reason, and empathy are basically incompatible and incapable of being integrated.

The editor chose these reports of treatment because

when they [the therapists] speak about therapy and therapeutic process, they hold different views and different theories, but their own integrity and daring are more important than schools of thought and professional ties....In the living encounter with the child, they are not *bounded* by any theory or system, but they live in accordance with self-values and are open to spontaneous perceptions and insights....They fol-

low no rule or custom or techniques, but only the guiding spirit of the integrated self and the direction of their own senses. (p. 7)

Though Moustakas here speaks of the "integrated self," it is the reviewer's impression that his introduction actually refutes the idea that an integrated self is a possible goal or even a desirable one. Both the editor and Eugene Gendlin seem to propose that a theoretical framework such as psychoanalytic psychology precedes clinical observation and stultifies psychotherapy. This reversal ignores the history of the birth and development of psychoanalytic theory which evolved from Freud's clinical and self-observations and from his attempts to find a base from which individual symptoms and conflicts, dreams, parapraxes, etc. could be understood. It evolved into a developmental psychology which tries to explain observable similarities in the growth and psychic development of all individuals, a common factor among the endless variety of individual manifestations.

Critical evaluations of existing theories and practices are needed and useful, but only if done by those who are properly informed. In the first paragraph of Chapter 11, Eugene Gendlin writes in support of experiential psychotherapy, "In these newer therapies, people are perceived as human beings and not as containers of machinery." Theories, namely methods of treatment, never do look upon people. Therapists who view patient's symptoms and illnesses in certain ways may attempt to divorce the illness from the totality of the living human organism and try to treat the patient's symptoms more or less to the exclusion of other aspects of his personality. If Gendlin means that the person who treats the conflicted patient as a thing is not very

likely to accomplish much, regardless of his intentions or approach, I am in full agreement. I would question, however, whether any good clinician from whatever school of thought ever wishes to or even can take such an extreme position as the writer suggests.

A serious misconception and distortion becomes apparent when Gendlin states that psychoanalysis and client-centered therapy "both were highly formal denials of a real relationship. One *role-played* a relationship of transference, the other *role-played* a perfectly neutral acceptance" (p. 210). Neutral acceptance does not mean lack of empathy or a mechanistic approach to people. It is the clinician's vehicle, by means of which he helps his patients to become aware of the source of their conflicts and symptoms through clarifications and interpretations. The neutral attitude is born from the conviction that people can and wish to find compromises between self- and other-directed strivings, that they can and wish to respect and love themselves as well as others, if helped in specific ways by an accepting, competent therapist. Such a clinician has a basic acceptance and specific awareness of human frailties, limitations, and shortcomings—including his own. This accepting, non-condemning attitude makes it possible for him to empathize with the plight of his troubled fellow man. His training permits him to help his patient find different ways of resolving conflicts which lead to symptom formation, ineffectiveness, lack of self-esteem, and so on.

To see transference manifestations as role-playing, however, misses the boat entirely. Freud discovered that in the course of psychoanalytic treatment, his patients developed feelings towards and fantasies about him which were unwarranted by his attitude, behavior, or verbal communications. They ascribed thoughts, feelings, and judgment

to him which could only be understood as resulting from a confusion on the patient's part between figures of crucial importance to him from early childhood (most frequently parents or parent substitutes) and his therapist.

Such transference manifestations occur spontaneously and are of crucial importance if they can be put to therapeutic use. They permit, in many instances, the undoing of harmful effects of these earlier relationships—harmful because they gave rise to faulty convictions in the child's mind about himself, about the nature of human relationships, and about cause and effect. These convictions have often remained unaltered and are subject to modification only if re-experienced in the transference. The transference relationship is an affective one which can exist side-by-side with the recognition of the therapist as an understanding, helping person here and now and not a replica of the childhood parent. Likewise the patient can feel himself to be a much younger person while at the same time keeping his awareness of his present age and life situation.

No doubt a theoretical framework, originally derived from clinical observations, in turn, does guide a clinician's therapeutic work. However, the assumption that it of necessity impedes an empathetic approach is erroneous. It may well caution a clinician against spontaneity. Intuitive awareness and spontaneity on the part of the therapist are of value only if they promote the patient's recovery. Intuitive understanding is understanding of the patient only if he feels understood and if the therapist's remarks make sense to him or, in other words, if the therapist's communications strike an emotional chord as well as have intellectual meaning to him.

The professional training of the psychotherapist who practices psycho-

analysis or intensive psychotherapy is lengthy, arduous, and indispensable exactly because it requires from him the ability to differentiate between his own fantasies, needs, feelings, and convictions and those of his patients. This training does not lead him to approach the patient with a theory but, rather, results in his ability to maintain continuous floating attention to his own responses as he concentrates on his patient's acts, moods, and verbal expressions. The ubiquity of affective experience, such as fear of loss of love and desertion or of loss of control over aggressive and sexual impulses, forms the bridge between uniqueness and similarity in all human beings.

The therapists in this book have different theories by which they explain to themselves and their patients the causes for and origins of their conflicts and fears. That different explanations are possible and effective does not imply that they are therefore meaningless and dispensable. Moustakas' and Gendlin's glorification of the unique emotional encounter smacks of magic and omnipotence. This reviewer seriously doubts that these moments *per se* have the power to modify in lasting ways, convictions and attitudes born at times from severe and often chronically frustrating and abrading childhood experiences. If pursued to its extreme, the view of these authors is more likely to convince us of the futility and ineffectiveness of existential psychotherapy, rather than of its power.

Existential philosophy tries to come to grips with a logical impasse, an impasse happily transcended in the total psychic experience of all human beings. What may be logically, or in the philosophical sense rationally, impossible, is psychologically a living actuality and griat for the mill of the clinician. We can at once feel the same and different; we can maintain a feeling of self and

surrender our separateness when in close physical and/or emotional union with others. What is rationally illogical makes emotionally perfect sense. As human beings, we develop the capacity to integrate ambiguity, to maintain a feeling of life-long sameness while experiencing inner change. We can feel free to choose while feeling bound to rules, because we accept ourselves as not omnipotent and others as similar to us.

As an antidote to an intellectualized approach to patients, the case histories as well as the introduction and closing chapter of this volume have a good deal of merit. As examples of a new type of therapy, they do not. Neither the introduction nor the closing chapter of this book convinces me that experiential therapy provides us with a better conceptual framework for understanding the genesis of psychopathology.

The philosophical dilemma, how to reconcile psychic experience with pure reason, is an age-old one. On pages 228 to 235, Gendlin describes how existential philosophy attempts to resolve it: namely, by viewing the individual existence as essentially nonexistent but created and recreated from moment to moment ever different with no essence of its own. To draw attention, as existentialism does, to the importance and variability of affective experiences has indeed contributed greatly to our appreciation of the importance and impact of a personal feeling experience, and has added to the growth of contemporary psychology. To make this philosophy the sole referent for a treatment method, to view the merits of psychotherapy insofar as it consists of a series of meaningful emotional experiences which continuously create a new person who gets lost when the next experience comes along, makes me wonder whether existential philosophy as a theory can serve as a format for psycho-

therapy any better than materialism could. In both instances it seems to me that the "real" patient is being disregarded.

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CLASSROOM GROUPING FOR
 TEACHABILITY.

by Herbert A. Thelen.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
 1967. xi + 274 pp. \$7.50.

THE EFFECTS OF ABILITY GROUPING.

by Miriam I. Goldberg, A. Harry
 Passow, and Joseph Justman.
New York: Teachers College Press,
Columbia University, 1966. ix +
254 pp. \$7.00.

For at least a century, teachers and administrators have sought to find in classroom grouping some sort of panacea for the problems schools encounter as they confront the infinite array of differences found in children and youth. Old records show that in the 1860's St. Louis was trying to cope with the problem by regrouping children several times annually and that at least thirty-five city schools (out of 465 surveyed) had by 1890 introduced some early forms of grouping.¹ Historically interesting approaches to individualization through grouping, such as the work of Preston W. Search,² are well known; and innovations of the 1920's by Carleton W. Washburne in Winnetka and Helen Parkhurst in the Dal-

ton School are so familiar as to need no documentation.

The two volumes reviewed here are excellent examples of current, mature efforts to study grouping methodically. The books reflect successful attempts to add to previous educational data and to depart from much previous "research" on grouping which, while interesting, was often limited to surveys of practices, to the application of subjective judgment, or to editorializing.

The inquiry reported by Herbert A. Thelen was begun in 1957, and data were accumulated over a three-year period. It was the purpose of Thelen's research group to ascertain how the interactive personal resources of students and teachers could be better employed and deployed in the teaching process. From this very general point of departure, the investigator and his associates produced a great deal of relevant information bearing on the influence of teacher-pupil compatibility and its implications for grouping.

A preliminary sample of fifty secondary-school sophomores from the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago was involved in the inquiry. The actual population studied consisted of twenty-six classes in basic subjects (thirteen experimental and thirteen control groups) taught by thirteen teachers. These ranged from grades eight through eleven and eight schools were involved during a year of depth study. Despite the focus on young adolescents, the reader will find that the conclusions reached also have a direct bearing on education programs designed for elementary-school children.

What was concluded from the grouping-for-teachability study probably confirmed what many of the readers have felt intuitively if they are or have been teachers, namely that a given instructor does a better job with some students

¹ Cf. J. C. Boykin, "Class Intervals in City Public Schools," *Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year 1890-91*, II, 983.

² Preston W. Search, "Individualized Teaching on the Pueblo Plan," *Educational Review*, VII, 154-170.

than with others and vice versa. In Thelen's words, the interplay of particular personalities in a group has "... a great deal of influence over the nature and productivity of classroom experience. It is this method of grouping that we have tested in our experiment. We have called it 'teachability' or 'facilitative' grouping" (p. 190).

Grouping for teachability is, in a sense, *people-centered* rather than *structure-centered* as were many early plans such as the platoon system or the XYZ plan. As the book makes clear, however, the facilitative procedures involved a great deal more than merely encouraging teachers and students to spend three years in an atmosphere of professional *Gemütlichkeit*. The implications of the teachability grouping study include the following, according to the authors:

(1) Certain student characteristics, probably not constituting a tight pattern, are positive indicators that these students will work best with a given teacher who has complementary qualities. However, "... we insist that the prescription should be written to fit the teacher rather than giving all teachers the same prescription and then studying the mortality rate."

(2) Many teachers—most of them that is—do a better job with some students than with others. There are some students that a certain teacher may not reach at all.

(3) If teaching is defined as a set of specific procedures, there is no one "right" way to teach.

(4) Grouping should be one of the teacher's professional responsibilities rather than an administrative responsibility.

(5) Teachability grouping may lead to some striking improvements in teaching.

(6) While teachability grouping may

support a variety of instructional procedures, it does seem to have a bias which favors certain procedures over others: e.g., careful matching of teachers and the taught, heed to feedback from students, flexible and modifiable methods, and so on. (pp. 191-4)

Although the detailed procedures used can be learned only from the book, this reviewer agrees with Thelen and his associates that teachability grouping does promise to facilitate many teachers' purposes and to increase their effectiveness. It is important to note that the grouping described builds on and extends many of the values which, thirty years ago, were associated with so-called progressive education and which have been further strengthened by inquiry techniques of current vintage.

In the foreword to *The Effects of Ability Grouping*, Arthur W. Foshay comments that research, particularly certain studies from England and Sweden, suggests that ability grouping functions not as "individualization of instruction" but as selective deprivation. The growing number of teachers and administrators who have become disenchanted with mechanical grouping plans will find strength and comfort in this detailed research study. The book follows a thesis-style form of presentation, which students seeking information will appreciate. Chapter I surveys research on grouping. Chapter II presents the design of the study, and so on.

The three general null hypotheses which were tested by the writers were

(1) The presence or absence of the extreme ability levels (gifted and slow) has no effect on the changes in performance of the other ability levels.

(2) Narrowing the ability range in the classroom has no effect on

changes in the performance of pupils.

(3) The relative position of any ability level within the range has no effect on changes in the performances of the pupils. (p. 154)

The fact that an entire chapter was devoted to a summary and certain conclusions about ability grouping suggests that major findings noted are highly compressed. An important broad conclusion from the researchers is that (in predominantly middle-class elementary schools) narrowing classroom ability range on the basis of general academic aptitude will *not, per se*, produce important positive changes in the academic achievement of pupils *at any ability level*. At the same time—and contrary to the subjective judgments of some writers in past years—the Goldberg, Passow, and Justman data do *not* support the point that narrow-range classes have a negative influence on nonintellective factors such as attitudes toward school or self-concepts (pp. 167-8).

The writers take the temperate and reasoned position that "ability grouping is inherently neither good nor bad. It is neutral. Its value depends on the way in which it is used" (p. 168). As many able teachers long have suspected, pupil growth is guided and fostered less by the imaginary ju-ju of grouping plans than by the artful and intelligent choice of content and methods of teaching which are employed. Given competent teachers, however, flexible grouping procedures can become important assets in the school program.

There may be those who would attempt to trivialize both of the researches reviewed here by saying, "I knew all this about grouping" or "Don't the reports merely elaborate the obvious." Such a reaction is naïve in the extreme. Grouping, after a century of trial and

error and experimental study, remains deceptively simple as a passive mechanism and ineffably complex when it is put into operation.

The teachability-grouping concept, while clearly understandable in principle, emerges as an approach demanding consummate professional skill and teacher motivation as Thelen records it. Likewise, Goldberg, Passow, and Justman clearly demonstrate in their study not only the danger in intuitive or subjective conclusions regarding grouping but the meticulous care needed in order to document (or to explode) certain hypotheses regarding ability grouping.

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**THE COMPREHENSIVE HIGH SCHOOL:
A SECOND REPORT TO INTERESTED
CITIZENS.**

by James Bryant Conant.
*New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1967. 95 pp. \$1.95.*

James Bryant Conant's first study of the American high school, reported in 1959 in *The American High School Today*, was guided by two questions: Is the comprehensive high school a viable institution? And, if it is, how might that institution be strengthened? Conant's answer to the first question was an unqualified "yes," and to the second, a series of twenty-one recommendations—most of which were calculated to broaden the scope of the elective program of the comprehensive school or to strengthen the programs selected by individual students. His "second report to interested citizens" is essentially a summary of a follow-up study, conducted eight years later, in which he attempted to determine the extent to which his

earlier recommendations had been heeded.

The Comprehensive High School is to a very considerable extent, then, a restatement of the views that Conant formulated a decade ago. To this he has added a report of his survey of prevailing practice as it reflects, or fails to reflect, his earlier recommendations. Although Conant is not at all satisfied with the pace of change he discovered in his "second look," he is pleased with the direction of emerging trends since they correspond in almost every instance with the recommendations he made earlier.

But no one should be much surprised with this general finding. Surely one could anticipate that secondary educators would readily accept recommendations that comprehensive high schools offer advanced mathematics and the "new sciences," that they increase their counseling services to a minimum standard, that they provide four years of foreign language instruction, that they broaden the scope of their vocational offerings, and that they maintain minimum library facilities. These have become articles of faith in the literature of secondary education.

What one might not have expected, however, were the wide variations that Conant found in practice, particularly with respect to the extent to which programs in American comprehensive high schools have, in fact, been broadened and strengthened during the intervening years. In many high schools, change and improvement have come with astonishing reticence. For example, in 1965-66, fewer than 50 per cent of the schools studied were offering the "new" physics or chemistry; only slightly more than 50 per cent were offering advanced mathematics or four years of a foreign language. Why the lag in some schools?

Conant's answer to that question is his most interesting and significant find-

ing: *the capacity of a comprehensive high school to broaden and improve its program appears to be directly related to its student-to-staff ratio.* Schools with comparatively low student-to-staff ratios approach the desired breadth and depth in their programs; schools with comparatively higher student-to-staff ratios fall far short of the ideal.

The conclusions (and recommendations) developed by the author from this evidence warrant careful consideration. His concern about the "inequality of opportunity" led him to conclude:

...that a radical overhaul of our thinking about financing public schools is required. My prejudices, I am frank to say, are inclining more and more to the belief that the financing of the public schools should be a state and not a local responsibility. As to the role of the federal treasury, I may as well admit that I am an unreconstructed believer in general federal aid to public schools. (p. 20)

Centralized financing is undoubtedly, as Conant contends, the most obvious solution to inequalities both in effort and in opportunity in education. But, as has been demonstrated in so many other parts of the world, centralization of the public schools creates as many problems as it solves. Centralized control too readily leads to ponderous bureaucracy; removing the community from direct participation almost inevitably leads to lethargy and lack of interest. Add to these dangers the "dead-leveling" and lack of creativity and change that often characterize public agencies of this kind and one cannot help but wonder if Conant's solution is as reasonable as it may appear at first glance. American educators have had little experience with the problems that are precipitated when local effort is displaced by remote authority. Increased rigidity in the system would be a high

price to pay for equalizing the financial base for education, particularly when there is no guarantee that such a simple solution will resolve the difficulties inherent in such a complex situation.

The Comprehensive High School will undoubtedly have some impact upon secondary education in North America. The author's restatement of his earlier recommendations is certain to cause a new wave of concern over the program of the comprehensive high school. His analysis of the "inequality of educational opportunity" and the prescription he offers for resolving the problem, will likely result in a renewed debate over the financing of public education. If the book does evoke such responses, both educators and interested citizens should pause to ask: Does the report derive its influence from the freshness and significance of its recommendations—or from the reputation of its author?

In light of the advances that have been made recently in establishing the content of educational programs and in determining the appropriateness of various modes of instruction and learning, some of Mr. Conant's continuing beliefs regarding curriculum seem just a bit dated. For example, his treatment of social studies on pages 32-33 disregards the work that has been done in this field over the past decade and seems to imply that the author's recommendations of several years ago should remain the last word. The suggestion that a course in government for seniors focus on economics now seems far too arbitrary; and the suggestion that free class discussion constitute the sole mode of inquiry into value-laden questions now seems grossly unsophisticated. If Mr. Conant has heard of the contributions of the American Council of Learned Societies and the National Council for Social Studies,¹ or the work of such

scholars as Henry Steele Commager² and Michael Scriven,³ there is little evidence of it in this new book.

The author's treatment of "unequal educational opportunity" also seems just a bit naive. The discussion on pages 18-22, in which he presents his case for state and federal financing, would lead one to believe that Mr. Conant had just discovered a new phenomenon which had not yet received the attention of economists and political scientists. One suspects that, had he been familiar with the work of Paul Mort,⁴ or Charles Benson,⁵ or Jesse Burkhead⁶—to name just a few—Mr. Conant might have been more appreciative of the complexities of the issue. And had he been familiar with the research of Richard Carlson⁷ or Everett Rogers,⁸ he might have been less inclined to assume a direct causal relationship between level of educational expenditure and rate of educational innovation. Carlson and

and the National Council for Social Studies, *The Social Studies and the Social Sciences* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962).

² Henry Steele Commager, *The Nature and Study of History* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill, 1965).

³ Michael Scriven, "The Structure of the Social Studies" in G. W. Ford and Lawrence Pugno (eds.), *The Structure of Knowledge and the Curriculum* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

⁴ Paul R. Mort, Walter C. Reusser, and John W. Polley, *Public School Finance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

⁵ Charles S. Benson, *The Economics of Public Education* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961).

⁶ Jesse Burkhead, "The Syracuse Project: A Social Science Look at Educational Finance" in The N.E.A. Committee on Educational Finance, *Long-Range Planning in School Finance* (Washington: The Association, 1963).

⁷ Richard O. Carlson, *Adoption of Educational Innovations* (Eugene, Ore.: University of Oregon Press, 1965).

⁸ Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

¹ American Council of Learned Societies

Rogers claim that this assumption is not borne out in research and that the countless research projects based on the assumption have contributed little to our understanding of how to initiate change in education. No serious consideration of the problem can afford to disregard such evidence.

Follow-up studies always run the risk of being studies in obsolescence. To apply a conceptual frame-work conceived ten years earlier to an advancing field of study is a hazardous undertaking. Conant has done just this. In the process, while he has uncovered more worthwhile information than might have been expected, he has brought no fresh insight to the problems of secondary education.

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CHANGING ORGANIZATIONS.

by Warren G. Bennis.

*New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1966. 223 pp. \$6.95.*

This collection of essays by Warren Bennis, social psychologist and well-known teacher, writer, and innovator, focuses on natural (unintended) and planned (intended) change in organizations. They are part of an ever-increasing body of literature describing the application of behavioral science concepts and techniques to problems of social and organizational change.

The essays are reprinted from a variety of sources, but Bennis has added brief introductory and transitional sections which allow reasonable continuity of thought. The presentation and language are suited to the general reader, rather than the technical expert; and the volume as a whole provides a broad orientation to Bennis'

thinking about organizations and the phenomena of organizational change.

The author has divided his material into two parts. In part one, he deals with what he calls evolutionary trends in organizational development. The dominant trends he identifies are the decline of bureaucracies and the growth, in number and importance, of democratic organizations characterized by full and free communication, adaptability to change, a scientific attitude (particularly in management), increased individual involvement in and motivation for work, and improved mental health.

Bureaucracies are the "bad guys" throughout the book, and Bennis reiterates his criticisms a number of times, usually to provide a basis for comparing them to the democratic organizations of the future. He claims his criticisms of bureaucracies "outnumber and outdo the Ninety-five Theses tacked up on the church door at Wittenberg" (p. 6). Bureaucracies, Bennis asserts, do not allow for the development of mature personalities; develop mistrust, fear, and conformity; thwart and distort communication and innovation; and utilize hopelessly out-dated systems of control and authority.

Although it is easy to characterize Bennis' analysis of democratic organizations as utopian and unrealistic, he does draw on the work of a number of distinguished behavioral scientists. His use of behavioral science research and theory, however, seems very biased. Although not intentionally inaccurate, the author does simplify and assimilate ideas and research findings to the extent that he does not consider limitations on generalizability and contradictory findings. Even where he has a good case, such as the demonstrated relationship between organizational structure and capacity to adapt to technological

change, he states the case so strongly that the reader is led to see a very dramatic distinction between "good" and "bad" organizations. This polarization will often annoy the specialist, but it probably adds to the interest of the book for the general reader.

It is important to note that Bennis is not talking about any particular organizations. There is no description or analysis of an actual operating bureaucracy or democratic organization. Rather, these are treated as "ideal" types, about which generalizations can be made. Certainly this treatment prevents Bennis from considering any counter-trends in American society. For example, while a number of astute observers have noted that businesses are increasingly likely to be run along some sort of democratic lines, with less formal structure, more exchange of information, etc., others have noted that institutions such as colleges and hospitals, many of which are experiencing unprecedented growth, are increasingly likely to be organized and managed along bureaucratic lines. And the computer, which Bennis sees as a technological device which can free many people from drudgery for more interesting work, is seen by others as a force for mechanical and highly centralized control of people.

In part two, Bennis discusses the planning and control of organizational change. He summarizes a wide variety of approaches to organizational change, but gives strong emphasis to change strategies which are based on the principles of democratic organizations. He is not interested in helping us understand how any desired change can be effected. Rather, he attempts to demonstrate how more democratic kinds of organizations can be generated, since these are more desirable in his opinion and will come about eventually in any

case through evolution. Although he never says so explicitly, Bennis seems committed to speeding up the evolutionary trends he has identified.

The change strategies which Bennis emphasizes begin with the actions of a change agent who often operates without formal authority and through direct personal communication, striving for the establishment of relationships of mutual trust. Bennis states that the kind of change agents he is interested in tend to have certain normative goals regarding organizations: the development of increased understanding between and within working groups; the development of more rational and open methods of conflict resolution; and the wider sharing of control and responsibility.

In Bennis' paradigm, the agent of innovation introduces a program designed to bring about the desired change. It may be a consulting program in which the agent uses himself as a role model. It may utilize an applied research and feedback model in which the clients participate in analyzing problems in their organization. Or it may consist of a laboratory or sensitivity-training program in which the clients have an opportunity to examine their interpersonal relationships in an unstructured group setting. Bennis devotes considerable attention to these laboratory or sensitivity-training programs. In fact, the essay on laboratory-training methods is the most systematic and detailed in the book.

Changing Organizations is certainly not an eclectic, unbiased survey of the tools available for effecting organizational change, nor is it an objective analysis of the process of organizational change. It is, instead, an articulate presentation of the philosophy, experience, and accumulated wisdom of an excep-

tionally able teacher and practitioner. Bennis has attempted to present a provocative, fresh, insightful point of view about organizations and organizational change; and the result is exciting reading. If this book challenges those who disagree to think more systematically about their views or if it stimulates those who agree to test their ideas in research and practice, it will have made a very significant contribution to both the science of behavior and the art of management.

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THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION.

by Francis E. Rourke and
Glenn E. Brooks.

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1966. viii + 184 pp. \$8.00.

The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education is primarily an analysis of results from interviews and questionnaires employed in a survey of administrative practices in American institutions for higher education. A four-part questionnaire with items concerning institutional research, use of electronic data-processing equipment, budgeting, and space allocation was sent to 433 institutions (361 state, 36 private and 36 public, but not state, institutions) and to 10 statewide coordinating agencies. Eighty percent responded. In addition, 209 interviews were held with individuals from 33 colleges and universities and 16 central-state governing boards. In conducting the survey, the authors had two primary objectives: "The first was that of gauging the extent to which new techniques of management have actually permeated American higher

education" (p. 15) and, second, "that of measuring what impact the new science of management has had upon the academic community" (p. 16).

The "revolution," as the authors describe it, consists in "a growing commitment to the use of automation in the routine processes of administration, an increased resort to data-gathering and research as a basis for policy-making, and an expanding effort to develop objective criteria for making decisions on the allocation of resources instead of leaving these matters entirely to the play of campus pressures or to the force of tradition" (p. vi). The result can be described as a trend toward "rationalizing" the management of institutions of higher education" (p. vi). Whether this process should be described as a revolution or an uneven evolution may be open to question, but that the development of computers has had a major impact on institutional self-conception and operation can hardly be denied.

Rourke and Brooks start with a general discussion of bureaucracy in higher education. They point out the impact of new techniques of management ("managerial science") on traditionally conservative and simple forms of academic administration. Furthermore, they demonstrate how this pressure is intensified by the growing size of institutions, increased student enrollment, and the need for increasingly sophisticated and quantitatively demonstrable rationales for additional funds.

The major report and interpretation of the authors' study are contained in four chapters: "The Computerized Campus," "The Growth of Institutional Research," "Allocating Academic Resources," and "New Styles of University Management." These are followed by a short chapter on the implications of managerial innovation and three appendices detailing the methods of the

study and comparing the developments in this country with the relatively slow rate of change and restricted character of administrative responsibilities in other countries. The book concludes with a selected bibliography on the management of higher education.

Although computers constitute the key to the new science, the authors point out that to date their potential for total university planning and operation is largely unrealized. Computers "are still being used mainly to increase the speed, accuracy, and general effectiveness of many routine administrative operations" (p. 18). Computer science has reached a point at which mathematical models of universities can be programed to test alternative complex policy decisions for institutions as a whole, but most universities are not yet ready to utilize such sophisticated procedures. However, the computers have led to two far-reaching effects. They have given rise to new designs for administrative organization which promote more effective utilization of comprehensive and integrated information. In addition, according to the authors, computers frequently influence "the distribution of authority and the shape of policy within an academic institution" (p. 19). Centralization of information tends to lead to centralization of authority and greater organizational unification.

One of the most striking aspects of the managerial revolution has been the rapid development of offices of institutional research—from 10 in 1955 to 115 in 1964. The specific roles played by these offices vary widely as do their influence. The latter seems to be directly proportional to the proximity of the office of institutional research to the office of the president (p. 60). In the areas of allocation of academic resources, including budget and space, the trend particularly in larger institu-

tions is toward "more rationalized procedures," including the use of formulae, cost analyses, and space utilization studies (p. 68). The larger the unit being analyzed the more effectively quantitative formulae apply; that is, maximal use will be made of them in state-wide systems and minimal use in small unit and departmental decisions. Among the more disturbing conclusions the authors reach is that the rationalized procedures for allocation of resources "have changed the locale of important policy decisions, often shifting effective control from one hierarchical level of administration to another, or literally from one group of officials to another, as for example, from deans to business officers" (p. 68).

The authors see four areas of change in the "style" of university administration. The first has been a shift from secrecy to a public stance in the general conduct of administrative and academic affairs. Second, there has been the development of a cabinet form of government in contrast to a strictly presidential form of executive leadership. The third change has been the use of more objective bases for decision-making in the place of "the purely intuitive styles of the past" (p. 101). And the fourth has been the reinforcement in the public sector of multi-campus systems of higher education.

In the final chapter the authors note with approval the move towards public disclosure and candor in university administration. They also point out that the increasing reliance on quantitative standards has not, as sometimes feared, "driven out qualitative criteria altogether in the management of colleges and universities" (p. 123). Only in some of the newer institutions is there a tendency to rely uncritically on the newer management techniques. They warn against the major pitfall of allowing the computer to reinforce the

sense of impersonality found in the environment of large campuses. In addition, they suggest that the managerial revolution has outmoded collective faculty deliberation on matters of policy and has underlined the need for a shift from "direct democracy to representative government" (p. 128) in areas of faculty concern. Accordingly, their final suggestion for preserving faculty involvement in university policy-making is that the faculty develop "its own academic civil service, which will reflect faculty rather than administration points of view in the management of the university" (p. 129).

That computers and the development of institutional research have brought about major changes in the universities of the country can hardly be denied, nor can the fact that many of the changes have increased efficiency, led to more effective self-evaluation and projection, and even reduced the red tape and wear and tear on students and faculty (whether the students or faculty fully realize it or not).

Nevertheless the book has a number of highly disturbing aspects. The assumption that use of computers and the development of offices of institutional research have made university administration into a managerial science seems highly gratuitous and likely to encourage the "overzealous and premature commitment" (p. 124) of newer institutions which the authors warn against. Although the authors distinguish between efficiency and effectiveness, and warn that the two are not the same, they invariably characterize as rational what can be quantified and characterize as "disorderly, unorganized" and "loose" what cannot be (p. 127). That as much quantitative information as possible should be brought to bear in the decision-making process may be axiomatic, but suggesting that decisions should be

made by weighing quantitative factors alone is a very different matter. The authors do specifically try to avoid the latter conclusion. And yet their recommendation of an academic civil service to preserve at least the form of faculty involvement, their rejection of collective faculty deliberation as impractical, and their recognition and at least tacit approval of the fact that the locale of important policy decisions has shifted "from deans to business managers" (p. 68) all raise much more serious questions about the reason for which colleges and universities exist.

Objecting to computers and formulae on the basis of a Thoreauvian nostalgia for a simpler time is clearly no answer to either the needs of today's complex institutions or their impersonality. The use of every possible means to increase information, to eliminate unnecessary duplication and waste, and to facilitate rational decisions is to be encouraged. But the critical question is: Towards what ends? And surely the answer must be: Towards the academic viability of the institution, not just the managerial efficiency. If this is the case, then as important as business managers and institutional researchers are, they serve an auxiliary function. Basic policy decisions must be made with academic effectiveness in mind and by academically-oriented personnel.

The book, while brief and expensive, is not only valuable as a survey of present managerial trends in higher education but also highly provocative in its presentation both of opportunities for effective use of new managerial and administrative tools and of serious dangers and conflicts that may lie ahead without their wise as well as efficient use.

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THE MAKING OF A COLLEGE.

by Franklin Patterson and
Charles R. Longworth.

Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press,
1966. xxii + 364 pp. \$4.95.

There is something fascinating about the founding of new colleges and universities. Perhaps fascination arises because, of all institutions, those devoted to higher education make the most of their newness, or at least are the most vocal about the way in which they intend to grasp their new opportunities. A sizeable handful of recent books describe the founding of new colleges and universities: A. E. Sloman's lectures on the University of Essex; the collection of Sussex essays edited by David Daiches; the wide-ranging *New Universities in the Modern World* which Murray Ross compiled last year, and others. To these has recently been added much the most detailed statement of them all, *The Making of a College*.

This new book is subtitled "Hampshire College Working Paper Number One"; it is one of the most thorough-going working papers I have come across. A paragraph from the preface will give an indication of the scope of the book:

It examines the present context of circumstances in which a new college will be built, projects Hampshire's role as an agent of change, defines an organized vision of liberal education for a new era, establishes the groundwork of the College's academic program, outlines in provisional but illustrative detail the nature of the Hampshire curriculum, specifies *language* as a major new component of liberal education content, describes the community of Hampshire College, and forecasts the financial requirements and operations of the new institution.

Hampshire will plan for a student enrolment of 1440 divided into four "Houses" of about 360 students each, a Master, a Proctor, and some resident faculty. Its academic unit will be the "School," of which there will be four: Humanities and Arts, Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and Language Studies. Its unit of time will be the "Division": the first, Basic Studies, for most students will take one year; the second, Disciplinary Studies, two years; and the third, Advanced Studies, the last year. There will be only a tiny number of absolute requirements for graduation.

The book contains a number of detailed suggestions about less central things, such as the Reading Period, the Midwinter Term (a planned and imaginative use of the break between terms), and the Fall Colloquy (a rigorous introduction to the world of the intellect). Much stress is put on nondisciplinary approaches and independent work, and the reader is shown how opportunities for such activity are "built in" to the institution. An unusual amount of space in the document is devoted to the questions of inter-institutional cooperation, and the responsibilities assumed by the college for the life of the region in which it is set; but perhaps this is only to be expected considering that it was the inter-institutional cooperation on the part of Amherst, Mount Holyoke, Smith, and the University of Massachusetts that formed the genesis of Hampshire itself.

It is an impressive document, but it is also maddening in many respects. The narrative is plagued by repetition. Saying everything three times over may work well for Dr. Billy Graham, but it tends to exasperate President Patterson's reader, especially when the repetition is so frequently acknowledged with some phrase such as "earlier it was said" or "recapitulating a point made at the beginning of the chapter."

The irritation experienced by one reader, however, is a small thing when compared to another effect of repetitiveness in manifestos: the tendency for slogans and catch-phrases to emerge which come to take on far greater significance than anyone intended them to have. Mr. Patterson will have enough problems to cope with without slogans coming home to roost. Indeed, one cannot help wondering whether there is not a great deal in this book that will haunt him in the next four or five years. Even in McLuhan's time, the printed word tends to achieve a degree of permanence that may be inappropriate for this kind of statement. Perhaps Mr. Patterson should have resisted the temptation to turn a loose-leaf mimeographed working paper into a printed book intended for wide circulation.

The trouble is that there is always a peculiarly painful situation in which heads of new institutions find themselves. They must somehow plan carefully enough to satisfy their trustees, to justify expenditure, to give architects something accurate to work with, and to enable potential colleagues to see what they are getting into. But this must be done without giving anyone—professor, student, administrator—the feeling that all the important decisions have been made already. Plan too little and you are irresponsible; plan too much and you are autocratic; either way you may be headed for trouble. Mr. Patterson clearly recognizes this dilemma in making an analogous point about the President as Man of Destiny and as Nervous Nellie.

For my own part, I believe that in spite of their best efforts, the authors of this new book have fallen into the trap of saying too much. I wonder about the extent to which any imaginative human being (and Mr. Patterson is clearly very imaginative and very human) can give up ideas in which he has

invested so much time and effort—at least without some hurt and resentment. A person in Mr. Patterson's position is rather like an expectant mother who knows that her baby will be let out to foster-parents almost as soon as it is born; she will nourish it and care for it before its birth, but, knowing that its upbringing will be largely in the hands of others, she will be well-advised not to make too many plans herself, and not to get too love it too dearly, because it may not be at all what she had hoped once it is in the hands of others. Indeed, the child may choose not to know her, or may turn against her.

In my view, the kind of explicitness that leads to a four-page description of a particular course based on a Netsilik Eskimo family is out of place in a planning document like this. One cannot help feeling that someone (presumably Mr. Patterson) has set his heart on this course, and that a faculty would be ungrateful indeed which did not adopt it, and a student body unkind which did not attend it. In short, the title of the book is wrong, for this is a statement about the planning of a college, not about its making; the making will come later.

All of this may suggest that I find the Hampshire plan, and this book, unacceptable. Far from it. It may be exasperating, but it is also exciting; it may be a bit of a patch-work quilt, but some of the patches are very beautiful. In some ways it may be precious in the bad sense; but in some ways it is precious in the best of senses, for it is another testimony to the marvellous American combination of idealism and practicality. If I were not working in an even more exciting institution, I should be trying to get a job at Hampshire; and one cannot say fairer than that.

There are attractive patches strewn throughout the book, bright ideas and

felicitous expressions which illuminate and cheer the way: the approach to the Midwinter Term, a "useful, freeing change" of rhythm with the newly-added possibility of a "work-service team project"; the idea of self-evaluation ("No artistic fictions would be greeted warmly, any more than would new accounts of what one did to win a new merit badge in the great scout-hood of life"); the thought of a Student Assistant to the President (though I see two drawbacks: he isn't given an office to work in—see page 318—and he is selected in part through election by his fellow-students—is Mr. Patterson ready for the possibility of a student body which doesn't believe in elections?); the lengthy and impressive chapter on Language and Liberal Education; the commitment to using the miracles wrought by technology in so many aspects of the whole business of "finding out" about something (it often strikes me as odd that I can watch a machine shovelling the moon but cannot sit in the library on the Santa Cruz campus and read a book that is still in the library at Berkeley); the critically important section "Very Early Identification and Encouragement of Students with College Potential" (which points out that there are children in this dynamic booming society who "by the end of fifth grade, often have decided that school really doesn't want them").

This is by no means all. I find it very satisfying to find a college president putting his seal of approval on the kind of policy implied by the following extracts:

Just as I think everyone at the College should take courses which move and shape the intelligence, so should they take courses which move and shape the feelings, and which provide exercises for the expression of feelings, which is a considerable part of

what art is about. . . . [The] objective of work in the arts should be to give people practice in as complete and accurate expression of themselves as they can manage. (p. 50)

. . . education reflects what Jules Henry called the *drivenness* of our general technological society. . . . There are new and old institutions, however, where students do find high academic performance and an active connection between intellect and life very much a part of the college community. It is this fact that is hopeful. It shows that the great current, running in society and education, can be channeled to serve more than manpower training needs, that colleges, while imbedded in the culture, are not bound entirely by it. The fact [is] that some colleges do enable students to "gather intellect, ethical sense, and action into one related whole". . . . The community of Hampshire College is founded on this belief. (p. 174)

It must be admitted that the creation of [the Social Sciences] division as suggested runs counter to the traditional set of attitudes characterizing the relationships between disciplines. The social science disciplines have tended to discount and deride the methods of one another, and hence their contributions. In asking that faculty trained to such loyalties work together, we require a willingness to place the problem before the discipline, an unfamiliar requirement. (p. 80)

I would also commend to those who are thinking about higher education the section (pp. 94-5) on requirements for graduation at the "standard" institution, which is, in my view, both fair and devastating, especially when compared with the imaginative approach to "requirements" proposed here. The

passages concerned with assessing the current situation in the high schools (pp. 10-11) show a clear-sighted, keen-minded refusal to take the apparent for the real. Mr. Patterson's grasp of many and various developments covering all areas of knowledge and thought will encourage his colleagues to demand much of him in the way of intellectual leadership.

The use of that word, however, brings me to my last point, and to express my chief reservation about the Hampshire plan as stated here. Not only does it say too much, it indicates that the leaders will try too hard. Put another way, I find two kinds of distressing explicitness in the plan: the one already referred to that seems to mortgage some of the academic decision-making; and another which insists on saying things that are better left unsaid. The former undermines the academic hope; the latter endangers the life of the whole enterprise.

In my view, a man who says to a group of young people "I intend to treat you as men and women, not as boys and girls" has already gone back on his word. He has made the mistake of being explicit (and that on a grand scale and in public) about one of the delicate areas of human relationships where actions speak far louder than words. In this book, the authors make this mistake all the time; they are constantly trying to describe the kind of students they want in terms of qualities that are best left undescribed. It is a bit like trying to create loyalty by calling for it instead of by inspiring it. It is the result of a miscalculation; it finds clear expression in a sentence of which I suspect Mr. Patterson is rather proud:

The vision of liberal education at Hampshire is one of hospitality to contemporary life, tempered and given meaning by two ageless virtues

which may seem archaic in the modern world: duty and reverence. (p. 46)

The whole point is that it is not duty and reverence that seem archaic, but *talking about* duty and reverence, *exhorting others* to duty and reverence.

One suspects that these areas are important ones for Mr. Patterson; one hopes so. But the way in which they are being approached seems to me to involve a limited, almost an easy, approach to leadership—and with leadership Mr. Patterson is rightly concerned:

The obligation seen by Hampshire College leadership is to spur the development of a strong institutional culture which will be distinctive not for the sake of distinctiveness, but in its relevance to the vision of liberal education described earlier. (p. 52) It takes more than vetoes to build a new institution, particularly one which will be dedicated to a vigorous and imaginative reconstruction. . . . Leadership in this new academic community cannot take refuge in the modern art of reaching a decision without really deciding. (p. 189)

These statements seem to imply a belief in the illusion that the life-style of an institution can be created by manifesto. A clearer indication of this belief comes in the pages where the founding of Reed College is described with considerable enthusiasm. Mr. Patterson writes:

The Reed culture is no accident. From the day the college opened in 1911 it has left little doubt about what it stands for and what kind of atmosphere it has. The earliest bulletins of Reed asserted vigorously that this institution would be a non-nonsense, highly intellectual place.

There would be none of the rah-rah about Reed; students who expected sports and "social" life were clearly not wanted. The first Reed catalog was unequivocal:

Intercollegiate athletics, fraternities, sororities and most of the diversions that men are pleased to call "college life," as distinguished from college work, have no place in Reed College. Those whose dominant interests lie outside the courses of study should not apply for admission. Only those who want to work, and to work hard, and who are determined to gain the greatest possible benefits from their studies are welcomed.

The case of Reed illustrates the point that college leadership can affect what the college culture will be. . . . The Reed illustration emphasizes that college leadership has its main impact on the formation of a distinctive campus culture by a vigorous, demanding assertion of what the college will and will not be. (pp. 54-5)

There is surely a fallacy here; perhaps two. The one certain mistake is that a lack of fondness for college football is somehow comparable with the abstract virtues Mr. Patterson would like to see (as who would not?) in his students. The probable mistake comes from assuming that what was a good method by which Reed might express its point of view in 1911 is a good method for Hampshire in 1969. Nobody is denying that "college leadership can affect what college culture will be"; nobody is denying that it *should* affect what that culture is. It is rather a matter of suggesting a more rigorous examination of the analogy with Reed's founding: the ends as well as the means.

A second example which suggests the need for such an examination is to be found in a paragraph which I find the most unpleasant in the whole book.

Mr. Patterson has been writing about Jerome Bruner's concept of "courtesy" in teaching; he goes on:

Bruner's *courtesy* is similar to what Hampshire means by *civility*. In the College, it translates into every relationship. It means attention to taste in day-to-day life as well as in events and undertakings of larger moment.

Freedom is alien neither to grace nor dignity. In a time when freedom is too often glossed as formlessness, Hampshire believes that freedom is not necessarily alien to form either. The College will admit students who see civility as freedom's normal dress, to be worn with a certain pride. Indeed, as Reed's first president might have said, others need not apply. (p. 57)

Frankly I find that degree of explicitness repellent; not because I don't believe in civility, but precisely because I do.

It seems to me that to demand that your new students must not only know what civility is, but be committed to expressing it in their college lives from their first day there, is like insisting that all incoming students must have a B.A. before they will be admitted. Surely one of the things a college such as Hampshire exists for is to *teach* civility, to *induce* it, to *cultivate* and *nourish* it; not to *demand* it as an admission requirement. This degree of explicitness somehow does not sit well with a plan which respects individual judgment, and encourages individual initiative.

I apologize to Hampshire's first president if I sound a trifle testy and indignant. I hope he will see it for what it is—an indication of my high hopes for his institution and of my concern for its fulfilling its own highest hopes. He has an enviable task, for Hampshire will open its doors at a time of great

question-asking about the two principal pillars on which it is built: the private institution and a liberal education. This book suggests that he will come through it all with flying, if tattered, colors, and no president should ever ask for more.

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HARPER'S UNIVERSITY: THE BEGINNINGS.
by Richard J. Storr.
*Chicago and London: The University
of Chicago Press, 1966. 411 pp. \$8.95.*

For fifty years, the leading work on the birth and beginnings of the University of Chicago was a detailed account by Thomas W. Goodspeed, one of its progenitors and early guardians. Close to the act of creation, Goodspeed could reproduce its tonalities—the delightfulness of doing everything *de novo*; the tediousness of starting everything from scratch. As secretary to the trustees of the University, he could also pit an insider's authority against the hostile surmises of outside critics. (It was he who first disproved the allegation that Rockefeller had bought as well as subsidized the University—that he had drawn no substantive distinction between a center of refinement and an oil refinery.) But the defect in history as memoir, especially when it is addressed to an institution, is that it tends to be parochial and apologetic; and the Goodspeed book, for all its virtues, was marred by a camaraderie that spoke no evil and by a stress on material accomplishment that served to obliterate larger themes.

The drawbacks of proximity and close involvement are pointed up by the appearance of the first volume of a new

history of the University. Covering much the same ground, the author, Richard J. Storr, is too late and too young—and too much the detached historian—to employ the very same perspective. Where Goodspeed was constrained by current confidences, Storr taps a stream of publication into which many of those confidences have been since injected; where Goodspeed was burdened by parental loyalties, Storr is sufficiently liberated by the time-lag to name the policies that brought the fledgling to the rim of failure as well as those that helped it routinize success. Most of all, the late-comer is favored by the knowledge of what has happened in American higher education since the University of Chicago came of age, and this knowledge allows him to trace out influences not apparent in a study made at point-blank range. Storr is not always equal to the task of imparting vicarious excitement without sounding labored. Here and there, he must recapitulate his predecessor, and inevitably some of his twice-told tales (like those bearing on the ideological restraint of the tycoon benefactor) lack the first-teller's special punch. Still, it cannot be denied that most of the significant advantages lie with the non-participant observer, with the one who can relate but not relive the formative experiences of an institution.

The distinctive character of this university did not unfold; it was proclaimed, in meticulous detail, before so much as a stone was laid. Official Bulletin Number One, issued on the heels of the articles of incorporation, spelled out all ends at the beginning. It decreed that the University of Chicago would be omniscient: that it would be a graduate and undergraduate institution; that it would teach the liberal and the practical arts; that it would be as hospitable to the parvenu professions of pedagogy, fine arts, and engineering as

to the traditional professions of law, divinity, and medicine; that it would both organize itself for advanced research (by installing German-style head professorships and providing facilities for publication) and gird itself for incessant teaching (by adopting an elaborate college program and using the facilities throughout the year). Along with the policy of the fullest line went a plan for maximum exposure. The University, as defined in the first pronouncement, would not be a self-absorbed academy, centered on the few who might gain admission, but a base from which a missionary force of teachers would debouch on the general population, dispensing—through circuit lecturing, evening classes, and correspondence courses—the wisdom and degree credits of the Quads. Finally, as grandiose in its approach to institutions as to courses, tasks, and potential audiences, the first Bulletin envisioned a system of formal alliances between the University and various secondary schools and colleges, to the end that the latter might be elevated and the former better served. The apex institution in Chicago (it was decided in prospectus) would examine and qualify the students, pass on the faculty appointments, train (free of charge) the instructors, and furnish (at low cost) the equipment of all its affiliated colleges. In turn, these standardized and uplifted places would send their best students to the University and perhaps eventually take exclusive responsibility for the first two undergraduate years. Never before had an American university weighed anchor with such far-reaching ambitions. Yet this was not to be the last of such embarkments. For what was at that point an innovation would one day be recognized as the going fashion, as part of the trend toward diversification of function (in modern parlance, the growth of the "multiversity") and the trend toward

rationalization of resources (in modern form, the growth of educational "master-planning").

Why, of all the *fin de siècle* academic ventures, was this university chosen to pioneer? Storr gives copious credit to personalities: to the imagination of William Rainey Harper, the first president of the University and the author of the prenatal bulletin; and to the backing of John D. Rockefeller, whose unparalleled personal wealth provoked the president into immodest dreaming. Yet, though he calls his book "Harper's University" and dwells at length on the complicated relationship between the academic castle-builder and the man of means, Storr does not let the question of "why" dissolve completely into a matter of "who." He is aware that very little in the initial plan, aside from its totality, actually originated with Harper (the education of adults via university extension had already gained impetus in Great Britain; the academizing of practical subjects had already been initiated by the land-grant movement; the pursuit of academic orderliness was already in high gear in America and would soon take effect in the establishment of the Association of American Universities and the regional accrediting bodies). Storr is also aware that the first Rockefeller bequests were not immense (they came to less than the patron sum that launched the less embrace Johns Hopkins) and that the founder was deeply unsympathetic to large schemes of incalculable cost.

Innovation, Storr perceives, needs not only agents but conditions—a specifically auspicious context. The planting of the University in Chicago, in one of the fastest growing of the world's great cities, was bound, he felt, to have an expansive impact: placed in less booming surroundings, coevals Stanford and Clark were given less cause to think heroically. Another predisposing factor,

in his view, was the Baptist sponsorship of the University. Superficially the opposite might have seemed the case: certainly, that highly decentralized church had not heretofore shown a love of system—unless the consistency with which it had founded insolvent colleges, including one that expired in Chicago, gave evidence of a certain kind of methodicalness. But if the Baptists contributed to the slovenliness of American higher education, they also contributed to its messianism; and Storr is able to trace very clear connections between Harper's creed of unlimited service and the Baptist creed of unlimited salvation, between a pedagogical and a pietistic evangelicism. Moreover, the forming in 1887 of the American Baptist Education Society signalled the end of the worst era of fragmentation. It was in the hope of gaining a new coherence (and of matching their denominational rivals) that the Society set about creating a pivotal institution in Chicago, and it was partly to rectify the old dispersement that Harper proposed his affiliation scheme. Still, an all-purpose secular institution was not clearly envisioned by these sectarians. The leader of the Society looked confusedly in two directions when he called for a top-notch university that would command "the services of the ablest specialists" and a home mission agency or sodality that would be "wholly under Baptist control, employing none but Christians in every department, seeking to bring every student into surrender to Jesus Christ our Lord." What spared the University of Chicago a maiming crisis of identity was the rapid entry of non-Baptists and even non-Christians into positions of support. Rockefeller had conditioned his generosity on the securing of matching funds within a certain period; the efforts of the Baptists in Chicago fell far short of the cash re-

quired; the Society had to ask others to pay the piper and in so doing de-parochialized its tune.

Storr does well to emphasize the subtle factors—the booster quality of the environment, the outreaching thrust of religion, the ecumenicism of fund-raising—that shaped the University's grand design. And he is very helpful, too, in explaining why the original plan had to be revised. It took a decade and a half—the official life of the demi-urgic Harper—for the University to surrender the objective of reordering the world beyond itself. It retained its internal eclecticism. But it conceded that it could not coordinate its hinterland—in part because the stronger colleges had their own conceits, in part because the weaker colleges which did not dream of growth and glory needed large financial inducements to agree to any reforms at all. In time it also proved unable to distribute the benefits of site instruction far and wide—in part because the regular faculty looked askance at the alleged cheapening of the product, in part because the peripatetic faculty regarded their itineracy as a stigma and longed to be in, not merely of, the campus world that conferred prestige. The burden of academic coordination and, to a large extent, of nonresident education would fall to the public sector, as would concomitant institutional tensions and status-linked faculty strains.

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ETHICS AND EDUCATION.

by R. S. Peters.

Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967. 218 pp. \$3.95.

Ethics and Education is an abridged version of a book published under the

same title in England last year. It attempts to apply certain principles of moral and social philosophy to certain problems of education (p. xiii). The principles in question have previously been enunciated and defended in much greater detail in *Social Principles and the Democratic State*¹ co-authored by S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, to which Peters frequently refers those readers wanting a fuller treatment of the problems.

The first chapter offers a detailed analysis of the concept of education, usefully distinguishing it from related concepts such as vocational training, the imparting of a competence, and the drilling in some skill. Peters distinguishes four sets of requirements: those relating to the *educational clientele*—"the members of a society" who eventually "become committed to" what the society regards as worthwhile in itself; those relating to the *educators*—the parents and teachers who engage in the activity of initiating the educational clientele; those relating to the *matter of education*—activities, organized into a form of life which is (thought to be) worthwhile; and those relating to the *manner of education*—requirements which do not impose any specific manner of introducing the clientele to educational activities but rather disqualify certain forms of initiation, namely, any procedures of transmission which "lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner" and any which do not involve, on the part of the learner, knowledge, understanding, and a certain "cognitive perspective" relating to the way life is conducted.

In the second chapter, Peters critically surveys "classical theories of justification." He offers his own sketch of a positive theory of justification since the ethical questions which are necessarily

raised by the educative enterprise cannot legitimately be answered without assistance from ethical theory. The question of what is worthwhile in itself and what principles are to shape initiation into a society are not matters of mere conceptual analysis but matters reaching into the realm of ethical theory (p. 21). Peters rejects Naturalism, Intuitionism, and Emotivism and gives a tantalizingly brief general outline of an alternative (Kantian) type of justification. Roughly, he undertakes to show that the principles he advocates are "necessary for a (certain) form of discourse to have meaning, to be applied, or to have point" (p. 44). This form of discourse is the one defined by the question, "What ought I to do?" The *presuppositions* involved in asking and trying to answer the question can serve to justify principles by which those living in a community are to be governed, and hence, also to justify the activity of initiating the young of such a community into its way of life and the principles governing it.

The remainder of the book is given over to making good this undertaking. In Chapter 3, Peters attempts to justify the principle of equality and fairness and to apply it to the question of the "distribution" of education. He says many illuminating things about the differences between the application of this same principle in America and in Britain (pp. 59-64). In Chapter 4, Peters attempts to analyze what we mean when we say of experiences and activities that they are worthwhile, or that one is more worthwhile than another, and to show, in terms of this analysis, that the activities characteristic of the school curriculum, those which have a theoretical, cognitive aspect, are especially worthwhile. Lastly, he gives a reason why someone seriously asking, "Why do this rather than

¹ (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959).

that? [must] be more committed to these sorts of activities which have this special sort of cognitive concern and content built into them" (p. 87). The reason is that "these sorts of inquiries are all, in their different ways, relevant to answering the sort of question that he is asking" (p. 87).

In the remaining six chapters, further concepts and the principles derived from them (namely, consideration of interests, freedom, respect for persons and fraternity, authority, punishment and discipline, and democracy) are formulated, justified in the same manner, and then applied to various problems and issues of education. In each case, important questions are raised, difficulties clarified, and general solutions offered.

One critical comment must serve as an illustration of what I regard as the major philosophical weakness of this book. It concerns Peters' method of justifying the principles he enunciates. In the case of the consideration of interests (Ch. 5), Peters first distinguishes between what a person is *interested in*—the psychological sense—and what is *in his interest*—the normative sense—(pp. 92-3). He then claims that "the normative notion of 'interests' combines judgments about what is worthwhile or desirable (judgments of content) with judgments about individual capacity and potentiality" (p. 95). Then he asks, "Whose interests should be promoted?" and in particular, "Why should a rational man consider the interests of *others*?" His answer follows the quasi-Kantian pattern of justification which he has adopted throughout the book: "Consideration of the interests of others is a *presupposition* of asking the question 'Why do this rather than that?' seriously" (p. 95). There follow about two pages of what is clearly an effort to substantiate this conclusion.

I find Peters' arguments obscure and unconvincing. The main argument appears to be that "Why do this rather than that?" is "a question in public discourse"; that such discourse presupposes situations "in which men are concerned with finding answers to questions of practical policy, in which they need the help of other men"; and that people would not try to answer such questions unless they assumed that in the determination and carrying out of such practical policies their own interests would be taken into consideration. Now, if it is true that people would not engage in raising such questions unless they made the assumption that their interests would be taken into account (and that seems to be a question of empirical fact about people's behavior, to which it may be rash for a philosopher to give an *a priori* answer) and if they would not cooperate in carrying out practical policies unless they first raised and answered such questions and if a person's interests could not be properly promoted unless he received such cooperation in the execution of practical policies, then it really would be in anyone's interest to do what is necessary to persuade certain others to make that crucial assumption without which they would not cooperate. And if, furthermore, it is true that it will sometimes, perhaps often, be *necessary* for someone really to take another person's interest into consideration if he is to get that other to make the assumption that his interests are being taken into consideration, then the promotion of one's own interest on some occasions (though not necessarily always) really requires considering another's interest. However, this argument does not show that, *apart from* one's own interest let alone in preference to it, one should ever, let alone always, take the interest of another into account. It is not clear in what sense seriously asking what

one ought to do *presupposes* that one ought to take other people's interests into account.

Hence, no answer has been given to a person who, while quite seriously asking what he ought to do, also seriously asks why he should promote the interests of anyone other than himself, except if and when that is necessary as a means to promoting his own. Perhaps Peters has other arguments at the back of his mind; if so, they do not come across clearly in this book. I find the same looseness in many of his quasi-Kantian justifications and also in other arguments.

Of course, Peters himself anticipates this sort of criticism. He intended his book as "an introductory textbook in the philosophy of education in the field of ethics and social philosophy," i.e. both for teachers and for students of philosophy. Peters expects criticisms from both types of reader: that his book is too abstract to solve any "concrete substantive problems of the classroom" and that it is too loosely argued

to clinch any philosophical points of disagreement. I do not know whether "hard-headed teachers" will make the anticipated complaint. I would have some sympathy with them if they did. But I feel certain that students of philosophy will make the complaint, for the issues Peters deals with are ancient, subtle, and much-debated. The undeniable clarity of his presentation, his extensive knowledge of the literature, and the sound common sense of his views cannot conceal the fact that the arguments are far from conclusive. If this knowledgeable and lucid writer appears to fail in satisfying the requirements of either hard-headed teachers or students of philosophy, the suspicion arises that his objective was excessively ambitious. Perhaps it is impossible to satisfy the demands of both hard-headed teachers and students of philosophy within a single short book covering the whole field of ethics and social philosophy.

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Administration

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
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


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


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


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
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